The democratic surprises of 2016—Brexit and the Trump phenomenon—fueled by “fake news”, both real and imagined, have come to constitute a centrifugal, nationalistic, even tribal moment in politics. Running counter to the shared postwar narrative of increasing internationalism, these events reignited embers of cultural and moral relativism in academia and public discourse dormant since the culture wars of the 1990s and ‘60s. This counternarrative casts doubt on the value of belief in universal human rights, which many in (...) the humanities and social sciences argue have of late been used as instruments of postcolonial oppression. This book essay introduces three texts written before the dawn of the latest “post-truth” era—The Sociology of Human Rights by Mark Frezzo, The Political Sociology of Human Rights by Kate Nash, and Keeping Faith with Human Rights by Linda Hogan—that address moral skepticism of human rights. Along with these authors, the essay briefly treats human rights’ past and prospects, analogizing it to the waves of feminist thought: in international politics, developing nations first desired a seat at the table and repeal of discriminatory laws and practices; when one-nation-one-vote did not result in equal treatment, the persistence of hierarchy helped developing nations awaken to their own evolving national identities and they wished to be recognized as not only equal, but different and unique. The essay recapitulates and amplifies these authors’ argument that the contemporary challenge for all nations, their citizens, and for the human rights community is to deliberatively decide what values unite these identities beyond simple self-determination and extend them toward the goal of a just global whole. The essay also makes an original contribution in summarizing the initial post-war debate in the United Nations that birthed the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, which has been subject to revisionism and perspectivism typical of cultural and moral relativism. It provides some social scientific, historical, and philosophic grounding for serious conversation of the ideas of truths in politics, and universal, transcultural goods and rights that underpin the authority of the international human rights regime in theory and practice. It does so while recognizing the serious epistemological challenges to this universalist conception, chiefly: how a social construct can be both time-bound human creation and continue to be morally binding across space, time, and the accelerated change global citizens of all corners are experiencing, simultaneously yet in their own way. (shrink)

Since the original UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights1 laid out the general principles of human rights, there has been a split between what have been regarded as civil and political rights as opposed to economic, cultural and social rights. It was, in fact, the denial that both could be considered “rights” that prevented them from being included in the same covenant.2 Essentially, the argument for distinguishing the two concerns the nature of (...) freedom. The civil rights to the freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, association, and so on do not specify the content of the speech, the theology of the religion or the purpose of the assembly or association. 3 Freedom in such cases is necessarily value-neutral. In leaving the choice up to the individual, these rights purposefully abstract from the content of this choice. The case is quite different for economic, cultural and social rights. All of these necessarily express values with regard to the forms of our social organization. This is because they move beyond individual choices to consider the purposes or goals of our existence together. Thus, the rights to the cultivation of a cultural identity necessarily impact more than the individuals exercising them. As collective, they affect the society as a whole. The same holds for the UN sponsored rights of a person “to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services.”4 For a society to honor these rights involves specific choices with regard to its social content and collective organization. Such choices embody a particular value—in the UN’s words, that of the “social security” of the individual.5 Freedom, here, is freedom for specific social goals. Since these goals are collective, they.. (shrink)

This thesis considers the space of encounter between the quantum mechanical ontology of limited universal holism and the legal system. This space of encounter is identified through an examination of two premises. The first premise is that the ontological structure of limited universal holism has significant legal philosophical and socio-­‐legal implications. The second premise is that the loci of commitment within the ontology of limited universal holism epistemologically coheres with the core ontological notions that underpin the Preamble (...) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,1 specifically the notions of equality, universality and inalienability. Both premises are affirmed in the course of analysis undertaken in this thesis. In addition some novel contributions are posited. Some of the ontological elements of limited universal holism when deployed as heuristic tools show, inter alia, coherence between the way socio-­‐legal constructivists conceptualise the law and the wave-­‐particle duality of quanta. In respect of the second premise, epistemological coherence is shown between the ethos that underpins modern human rights and the loci of commitment within the ontology of limited universal holism. This coherence improves the epistemic stability of monist perspectives on which deep equality may be framed. The thesis concludes with some suggestions for future research. Two particularly exciting areas for future research are uncovered in the course of the analysis. First is the coherence between the work in this thesis and the jurisprudential paradigm of Wild Law. Second is the potential for the monist ontology of limited universal holism derived from scientific research to cohere with many diverse wisdom and ethno-­‐cultural traditions and in so doing increase the epistemic standing of monist ontologies. (shrink)

The consciousness of social security comes to a man when he feels that he is getting his basic rights. Human Rights are related to those rights which are related to man’s life, freedom, equality and self-esteem, are established by Indian constitution or universal declaration of human rights and implemented by Indian judiciary system. In other words, “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place (...) of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status.”1 We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. But we when come the present conditions of Indian society, it is painful to say we find lots of discrimination and violations of human rights is a common problem. In this paper it is an attempt is made to describe that casteism cause social insecurity and is a form of violation of human rights. (shrink)

This book manuscript, entitled United Nations Human Rights Ethics: For The Greatest Success of the Greatest Number, critically examines most all major normative ethical theories since Socrates and finds Roman Stoic ethics to be the least deficient. It divides ethical theories into popular ones with little academic support, other popular ones that have had such support, and Kantian ethics standing alone as a philosopher's academic ethical philosophy with limited popular support. It criticizes the appropriation of human (...) class='Hi'>rights by the international law profession to the exclusion of moral philosophy, despite the origin of "human rights" in the moral philosopher Rousseau. It blames the inability of moral philosophers to reach a professional consensus on the elements of normative ethics, not the legal profession. It laments both the failure of human rights education to human beings everywhere as requested by the Universal Declaration and the decline in popular support for human rights in favor of nationalism in current history since 2015. It advocates a way of redirecting human right education to people on the ground rather than mainly to law students. Such education has been overtaken by the Rule of Law movement fighting high crimes crimes against humanity unanticipated by the Universal Declaration. It argues for a way for ethicists to get on the same page in teaching elements in ethics and argues forcefully for a positive method for popular human rights education as well as for human rights-based elementary ethical theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This essay focuses on two underlying presumptions that impinge on the effort of UNESCO to engender universal agreement on a set of bioethical norms: the conception of universality that pervades much of the document, and its disregard of structural inequalities that significantly impact health. Drawing on other UN system documents and recent feminist bioethics scholarship, we argue that the formulation of universal principles should not rely solely on shared ethical values, as the draft document affirms, but also (...) on differences in ethical values that obtain across cultures. UNESCO's earlier work on gender mainstreaming illustrates the necessity of thinking from multiple perspectives in generating universal norms. The declaration asserts the ‘fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights’1 and insists that ‘the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition’2 yet it does not explicitly recognize disparities of power and wealth that deny equal dignity and rights to many. Without attention to structural (as opposed to merely accidental) inequities, UNESCO's invocation of rights is so abstract as to be incompatible with its avowed intention. (shrink)

There are many reasons to suggest that human rights have a spiritual flavor. Grounded in the understanding that individuals and communities have spiritual interests, the idea of human rights has been called upon time and again to protect and provide for them. This development has raised questions about what spiritual interests are and what role human rights can play in this regard. On a cursory glance, linking human rights to spirituality benefits three (...) right-holders: individuals, communities, and humanity as a whole. Human rights contribute to the realization of a person’s human dignity through the satisfaction of his or her developmental, physical, psychological, and spiritual needs (UNFPA: 2005). And the spiritual interests of communities reflect in the specific rights—namely cultural rights, land rights, environmental rights, the right to peace, etc. In addition, commitments to the spiritual rights of human beings and the planet could be considered essential for the survival and evolution of humanity. (Universal Declaration of Spiritual Rights). Noteworthy in human rights cases is the use of spirituality-based concepts—namely spiritual development, spiritual needs, spiritual rights, spiritual reparations, etc.—as benchmarks for research, policy interventions, and reforms. (shrink)

The purpose of the following study is that of providing a critical anal‑ ysis of Intellectual Property (IP), with a closer look on copyright, in the context of human rights. My main conjecture is the following : the legal infrastructure stemming from the implications of copyrights which states created has nega‑ tive consequences if we have a closer look at some human rights specified by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). For (...) example, copyrights are, in my view, incompatible with the human rights which specify that (1) hu‑ man beings have a right to freely take part in the cultural and scientific life of the communities which they inhabit and (2) human beings have a right to own property. My main hypothesis is the following : if copyrights are, in fact, more difficult to ground from a moral perspective, then this considerations must trump the provision of the 27th article of the UDHR, which states that creators, be they artists or researchers, have a human right to have their moral and mate‑ rial interests protected with regard to their intellectual products, if this amounts to a justification for a copyright. (shrink)

This article is the preface to a completed book manuscript, United Nations Human Rights Ethics. Based on the indivisibility of human rights, the Four Freedoms Speech, and the Preamble of the Universal Declaration, the book takes freedom of expression as the one human right. Other rights are modes of this one. For example, one exercises freedom of expression (speech) by exercising the right to life, access to courts, etc.. The book argues that (...) human rights are primarily an ethical concept (introduced by Rousseau) rather than a concept of international law. (shrink)

The Convention of the Rights of the Person in Outer Space, more informally known as the Space Rights Convention, is a human rights and animal rights document that outlines basic principles, rights and freedoms bestowed to different categories of species in outer space which including on extraterrestrial bodies (both planetary and sub-planetary), synthetic bodies (e.g. space stations), as well as on spacecraft (both commissioned and uncommissioned) travelling through space itself (which is often referred to (...) in the Convention as the interspace (i.e. the space between terrestrial bodies). The Convention mirrors much of the rights outlined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights but its purpose is to tailor those fundamental human rights to the context of spacefaring activity and to civilisations beyond planet Earth's atmosphere. The Convention was composed by Cometan and is published by the Astronist Institution alone on 23rd May 2022 and is scheduled to be republished as one of the preppendices of the Astrodoxy as its final major draft, after which only amendments may be made to its contents. (shrink)

This article considers whether the international legal human rights system founded on liberal individualism, as endorsed by liberal theorists, can function as a fair universal legal regime. This question is examined in relation to the collective right to self-determination demanded by indigenous peoples, who are paradigmatic decent nonliberal peoples. Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination has been internationally recognized in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted by the United Nations in (...) 2007. This historic event may seem to exemplify the international legal human rights system’s ability to function as a truly global legal regime applicable cross-culturally to all well-ordered societies, whether liberal or nonliberal. The article argues, however, that the collective right to self-determination advocated by indigenous peoples for the sake of cultural integrity is inconsistent with the international legal human rights system founded on liberal individualism. By showing the plausibility of indigenous peoples’ defense of their cultural integrity, this article suggests that the international legal human rights system ought to be reconceptualized to reflect a genuine international consensus on human rights among all well-ordered societies if it is to function as a just mechanism for global governance. (shrink)

Discussions concerning whether there is a natural right to health care may occur in various forms, resulting in policy recommendations for how to implement any such right in a given society. But health care policies may be judged by international standards including the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The rights enumerated in the UDHR are grounded in traditions of moral theory, a philosophical analysis of which is necessary in order to adjudicate the value of (...) specific policies designed to enshrine rights such as a right to health care. We begin with an overview of the drafting of the UDHR and highlight the primary influence of natural law theory in validating the rights contained therein. We then provide an explication of natural law theory by reference to the writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as elucidate the complementary “capabilities approach” of Martha Nussbaum. We conclude that a right to health care ought to be guaranteed by the state. (shrink)

A. Klimczuk, Cultural Diversity, Multiculturalism, and the Challenge of the Ageing Population, [in:] H. Qarasov, Materials of International Scientific Conference "Multiculturalism and Human Rights" Dedicated to the Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, NURLAR, Baku 2017, pp. 150-152.

Problem of Axiological Legitimization of the Universal System of the Protection of Human Rights Summary In this paper it is argued that legitimization of the universal system of the protection of human rights depends primary not from the content of values recognised as fundamental but rather from metaaxiological solutions related to the way of existence and to the possibility of cognition of these values. Legitimisation is based on the recognition of an objective nature and (...) of cognoscibility of basic values. Realisation of the primary aim of this paper is linked to the problem of different meanings of the notion of universality, used in the context of the universal system of the protection of human rights. First, descriptive and normative meanings have to be distinguished. In the case of normative sense, there are moral and legal meanings of “universality”. An axiological justification of the universality of human rights in the legal sense leads to the legitimisation of the universal system. It is shown that modifications of – broadly accepted in the Polish theory of law – definitions of an axiological justification of legal norms are needed. These definitions base such a justification on the valuations made by particular groups of subjects. It is argued that it is much more convenient to refer to valuations understood as meanings of sentences of certain kind. -/- Streszczenie W artykule zmierza się do uzasadnienia tezy, że legitymizacja uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka jest oparta nie tyle na treści wartości uznawanych w tym systemie, ale na uznanych w nich rozstrzygnięciach metaaksjologicznych, dotyczących tego, jak istnieją wartości podstawowe dla tego systemu i czy są one poznawalne. Walor legitymizacyjny posiada przede wszystkim uznanie obiektywnego charakteru tych wartości i ich poznawalności. Realizacja zasadniczego celu zakłada uporządkowanie podstawowych pojęć dotyczących problematyki powszechności praw człowieka – termin „powszechność” stosowany w odniesieniu do praw człowieka w kontekście uniwersalnego systemu ochrony ma wiele znaczeń. Przede wszystkim odróżnić trzeba powszechność w aspekcie opisowym i w aspekcie normatywnym. W przypadku powszechności w aspekcie normatywnym w grę może wchodzić powszechność w sensie ideowym i powszechność w sensie pozytywnoprawnym. Uzasadnienie tej ostatniej jest też uzasadnieniem poszukiwanej tu legitymizacji uniwersalnego systemu ochrony praw człowieka. Prowadzone analizy prowadza także do sformułowania postulatów dotyczących sposobu definiowania uzasadnienia aksjologicznego norm prawnych. Modyfikacji wymagają powszechnie przyjmowane w polskiej teorii prawa definicje relatywizujące takie uzasadnienie do ocen przyjmowanych przez konkretne podmioty oceniające lub ich grupy. (shrink)

Contemporary Islam presents Europe in particular with a political and moral challenge: Moderate-progressive Muslims and radical fundamentalist Muslims present differing visions of the relation of politics and religion and, consequently, differing interpretations of freedom of expression. There is evident public concern about Western “political correctness,” when law or policy accommodates censorship of speech allegedly violating religious sensibilities. Referring to the thought of philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and accounting for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Universal (...) Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, and various empirical studies on the religious convictions of Muslims, it is argued here that: (1) sovereign European state powers should be especially cautious of legal censorship of speech allegedly violating Muslim religious sensibilities; and (2) instead of legal moves to censorship, European states should defer to the principle of separation of religion and state (political authority). Further, a reasonable interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence allows that matters of religious difference may be engaged and resolved by appeal to private conscience and ethical judgment, rather than by appeal to public law per se. In so far as they are 1 representative of contemporary scholarship, the interpretative positions of Ziad Elmarsafy, Jacques Derrida, and Nasr Abū Zayd are presented in illustration of this latter point. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is (...) constructed. The conclusion contains an application of the results of the analysis conducted in the second part. The first part comprises four chapters. The first aims at revealing characteristics of human rights on the basis of an analysis of historical conditioning of the inter-national law of human rights and its development. The historical context displays the practical, vindicative, and critical character of the positive legal protection of human rights. Moreover, the process of change of positive human rights law is distinguished from the process of change of human rights as such. In the second chapter the content of human rights - a topic which is only auxiliary to the conducted analysis - is discussed. Basic typology and catalogues of rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and protected in the International Covenants of Human Rights are presented. The review of the content of rights aims at a more precise limitation of the field of research. The examination shows a diversity of rights which poses a serious challenge to the coherence of every philosophical theory of human rights. In the third chapter, central in the first part, international law is analyzed with regard to the characteristics of rights and the foundations of them. The analysis of documents shows a number of solutions referring to the anthropological foundations of rights. The inherent dignity of the human person is the source of all human rights. Each human being is recognized as free, and endowed with both reason and conscience. In the propounded conception of man individuals are not rivals but create a community which is a condition for their development. International law characterizes the rights as universal, inherent, inalienable and inviolable. The reconstructed conception also comprises the following basic elements: on the level of the structure of rights, a recognition of their equality, interdependence, and comprehensiveness; in the grounding of these rights, a recognition of the anthropological foundations of law; in the conception of positive law, a recognition of the secondariness of the positive law of human rights to human rights themselves, and a recognition of human rights and justice as the basis for legal order; in the conception of state, a recognition of the well-being of the individual as the fundamental aim of actions undertaken by political institutions, and recogni¬tion of rights which form an impassable boundary to the power of the state, includ¬ing its legislative actions. The characterization of the international legal paradigm serving for the under¬standing of human rights is supplemented by analyses of the structure of their posi¬tive legal protection. Various meanings of the terms "right" and "freedom" are distinguished. Subjective right, as basic structure of the positive legal protection of human rights, is understood as a complex relation formed by various legal situations of the subject of a right which create a functional whole in respect of the subordi-nation of human person to its good. Subordinating person to a good proper for it, expressed usually in a proclamatory norm, is the central element of particular rights around which further elements aiming at the realization of this good are built. In the second part of the book a philosophical theory is developed which allows for the location of a coherent foundation for the presented characterization of human rights and their positive legal protection. This part consists of two chapters. The first includes a review of some - not entirely satisfactory - means of founding of human rights; the second presents philosophical conceptions of law and man which may form a basis for the constructed theory. The review of arguments contained in the first chapter does not aim at a detailed analysis of various specific ways of argumentation encountered in works on this subject but rather at a concise presentation of the main possible lines of argumentation. These analyses also serve to emphasize the positive solutions which are pro¬posed later and to underscore the explanatory power of the elaborated theory. This theory, retaining accurate intuitions contained in the presented types of argumenta¬tion, helps in avoiding their consequences which are difficult to reconcile with the reconstructed paradigm of human rights. Efforts to base human rights on the norms of international law rightly take into account the necessity of determining the content of the rights and their positive legal protection as a means for the realization of man's good. These attempts, how¬ever, do not properly take into account the inherent character of human rights, which are independent of positive law and provide grounds for applying specific legislative measures and not others. Founding human rights on freedom accurately points at the freedom of an indi¬vidual as a constitutive element of some rights; however, absolutization of freedom leads, to a loss of an important element of the contemporary paradigm of under¬standing human rights. This foundation undermines recognition of the fact that human rights may set limits to both the freedom of others and the freedom of the subject of rights itself. Additionally, attempts at the so-called axiological justification of human rights are discussed. This type of justification has a few variants depending on the as¬sumed conception of value. Subjectivistic conceptions have similar advantages and disadvantages to the conceptions basing human rights on freedom; objectivistic conceptions while providing for the universality of human rights place, the fundamental aim of human rights protection beyond the individual human being - in the idealistically existing world of values; finally, conceptions rooting values and human rights in culture, while accurately noting that human rights are learned through the medium of culture, place the source of human rights beyond a concrete individual - in culture and processes which take place in it - which leads to difficulties in finding a basis for the universality of rights. Furthermore, attempts to ground human rights in specific characteristics of the human being are presented. This type of approach points to an important problem of dependence of the content of rights on what man is. However, recognition of specific characteristics of a human being as an ontic foundation of the existence of rights poses a danger to their universality since one has to accept that it is not enough to be a man to be a subject of rights, but a man possessing specific charac¬teristics. The second chapter aims at outlining solutions worked out by Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a fuller understanding of his propositions selected elements of Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy are presented. It was them who formulated the founda¬tions for reflection on law and justice in the ontological context. A qualification is made that Stoicism is not be analysed in depth. Although Thomas' concept of law was undoubtedly developed under the influence of the Stoic doctrine as well, it is not in this that one should look for the tools to understand the ontic foundations of human rights and law in general since the Stoic moral philosophy and philosophy of law were developed in the context of a theory of being which assumed monistic and pantheistic premises as foundations, leading to the recognition of a total subor¬dination of the human individual to a larger unity of which man is only a part. The analysis of Plato's and Aristotle's texts concentrates on problems of justice. Plato seems to be the first philosopher who reflected on the formula basic in the history of European thought: to render to each his due. It appears that justice as both a characteristic of man and his acts is understood in the perspective of that which is just, that which is a good for another man - the recipient of the act. The basis for determining what is just is the relation of correspondence between some¬one and something. While in the case of Plato this relation is based on something beyond its terms, namely on ideas, in the case of Aristotle the relation occurs on account of the elements of the relation itself. Something is just when it contributes to the develop¬ment of the recipient of an act realizing that which is just. At the same time, the realization of that which is just is a good for the agent. In the analysis of the just two types of relation are revealed: the relation of due-to-recipient occurring on account of the compatibility of that which is due, with the recipient of the act; and - a "superstructure" - a relation of obligation-of-subject occurring on account of the compatibility of the acting subject with the thing which should be done. The basis for being that which is due is formed by various potentialities of development of man - the recipient of agency; the basis of being that which is an obligation is the possibility of development of the subject of action. Aristotle distinguishes various types of freedom and points to the necessity of taking them into account in the discussion of justice. Among other things, as the core of man's freedom, he considers life for its own sake, which can be seen as his expression of the basic indices of the autotelic character of man - which is funda¬mental for later conceptions of dignity. The freedom which is described by him is not, however, inherent and inalienable; being free is conditioned by a factual possi¬bility of undertaking actions, which are not solely means to the realization of aims set by others. Thomas Aquinas takes over the Aristotelian research perspective both in his conception of man and of law. At the same time, however, he significantly enriches it. In anthropology he develops a conception of personal being. Drawing upon his distinction between existence ("that something is") and essence ("what something is"), he sees the basis for being a person in the dignity of personal being which is a certain way of existence of a rational being more perfect than that of non-personal beings. The person is a being which, by virtue of its act of existence, is individual¬ized in a specific way. It is an aim in itself. Expressing it in a negative way, one may say that it does not exist as a means for the realization of the aims of others and, in this sense, that it is free. As distinct from Aristotelian conclusions, being a person is not conditioned by the specific actions of a being. Dignity is inherent, based on that which is the foundation of the factual existence of every rational being. Although freedom requires that a being is rational, dignity still encompasses all being, all its properties and potentialities. Thus an act conforming with dignity has to take into account a whole human being. Among different types of that which is just, ius, the first place, from the point of view of understanding law, falls to "the just thing itself ("ipsa res justa"), which is right in the full meaning of the word. On the one hand, it is that which is due; on the other hand, it determines the way of acting in the utmost degree, since the course of every act is determined in the fullest extent by its aim. The content of ius may be determined both by elements independent of free decisions - ius naturale - and by free decisions taking into account the state of things - ius positivum. Recognition of the objective structure of being as the basis of law does not entail that it is possible or desirable to determine unequivocally "the only right" patterns of conduct. This concept is very well justified within the system proposed by Saint Thomas. Individualization of being is a significant element of the develop¬ment of a person as a person. It is attained by the realization of individual aims which are not unequivocally determined by circumstances and the nature common to all people. By virtue of free choices made in the sphere of that which is not by its nature unjust, the object of action becomes ius. Since in the realization of the person the individualization of human being is central, Aquinas clearly sees the need for the protection of the sphere of "dominion of will". This sphere itself constitutes ius naturale, something which is due to man independently of the acts of will. Therefore "law should forbid nothing which is not unjust" ("nihil debet lege prohiberi quod licite fieri potest", In 3 Sent., dist. 40, q. I, a. 1, 3). Besides the relation of due-to-recipient, ius also includes the relation of obligation-of-subject which is superimposed on the relation of due-to-recipient. As far as the ontic foundations of obligation are concerned, in explaining why man is subordinated to realization of the good of others, Aquinas generally follows Aristotle in accepting that this basis is the subordination to moral good - to actions conforming with the learned truth about reality. Aquinas' systemic solutions allow, however, to reach deeper and understand why moral development is also a development of the whole human being. This was difficult within Aristotle's system, since he was reluc¬tant to decide whether precedence should be given to intellectual or moral develop¬ment. The inclination to realise good of another appears to be a transcendental characteristic of being, based on its very existence. Morality understood as rational and free subordination to realize the good of another is a specifically personal way of the realization of this inclination. Thus just actions contribute to the actualization of being in the aspect of its existence and therefore to the actualization of being as a whole. Thomas' conception of natural law (lex naturalis) as participation in eternal law (lex aeterna), offers possibilities for grasping that which is just as something which is basically accessible cognition, independently of Revelation and independently of faith in God, and at the same time as something based in eternal law, understood as a design of God's wisdom. Eternal law, embracing all particular actions, is not, from the human perspective, accessible cognition directly. It is enacted in the struc-ture of the created being and - in case of human beings - in free choices taking this structure into account. In the concluding remarks, the results obtained earlier are applied directly to the contemporary conception of human rights. Human rights are understood in the first place as "just things" - concrete goods of man; as that which is due because of subordination, based on dignity, to the personal development of man. That which is just is understood as a relational - actual or potential - state of things, which exists by virtue of existing relations. Evaluations referring to that which is right are true when respective relations of due-to-recipient take place; norms of conduct are true when respective relations of obligation-of-subject take place. Examples of the application of the sketched theory outside the field of human rights are also presented. Procedural consequences of the developed theory are shown, such as the discrimination of two types of legislative procedures which differ significantly in the structure of argumentation: the first aims at recognition of that which is just independently of the will of the legislator, and the second, at making individual or collective "projects" of development compatible. Finally the possibilities of applying the theory to the increasingly important problems of the protection of the environment and the "rights" of animals are mentioned. The central issue is a philosophical conception of man and his freedom and a conception of law. It is also indispensable to turn to a general theory of being. The search for a comprehensive theory of human rights requires attention to the Abso¬lute Being - God - as well. This is important for at least two reasons. First, a conception of the Absolute Being is integral to philosophy of the systemic type -of which the present book is a piece. A conception of the Absolute Being is signifi¬cant for understanding all being, including, first of all, man as a personal being. Second, every theory of human rights which does not comprise the problem of the Absolute may be questioned as to whether solutions adopted in it do not lead, in consequence, to eliminating God from the perspective of the understanding of law. It is desirable that a philosophical theory should deal with this problem directly. A theory which eliminates God from the perspective of the understanding of rights will be unacceptable for all those who, for philosophical reasons or relying on faith, consider God as the author of inherent rights. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach to rights from the perspective of the Absolute Being should only be a possible extension of a philosophical approach which bases rights on something which is cognizable independently of the acceptance of the existence of God so that the theory is also acceptable for those who reject the existence of God or suspend their judgment on this subject. The pursued theory should therefore contain, on the one hand, reference to natural, faith-independent foundations of human rights, but on the other hand, point to a possible extension accounting for the Absolute Being. The analyses contained in this chapter have undoubtedly some historical value since they are based on source texts. Nevertheless, the use of these texts and not critical works was dictated, first of all, by a conviction that analyses embrace a given theory in the aspect selected by the interests of the researcher. Therefore to find out what past thinkers say on the subject characterized in the first part it is simpler to reach to the sources than to adopt the existing critical works. The pre¬sented reconstruction of Aquinas' views on philosophy of law incorporates proposi¬tions of supplementing and developing some of the ideas undertaken by him. Obligation to act in this and not an other way arises because human actions are subordinated to the conformity, on the one hand, of aims realized by these actions and, on the one hand, the order of being determining that which is favourable to man or destroys him. The content of the order of being is, on the one hand, determined by the structure of being independent from man's will and, on the other, by free decisions of man. (shrink)

Professional sport like most human activities undertaken for pay is subject to Article 23(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Equal Pay for Equal Work”). An athlete’s ‘work’ can be variously construed, however, as entertainment/profit generation, athletic performance, or effort. Feminist arguments for gender wage parity in professional sport based on the former two construals rely on counterfactual assumptions, given that most actual audiences and performances of athletes identifying as female do not (currently) equal (...) those of athletes identifying as male. But both philosophical and scientific accounts of the truth-conditions of counterfactual conditionals of the form ‘If conditions X obtained, then the entertainment value/performance of female athletes would equal that of male athletes’ remain uncertain. Construing athletic ‘work’ as effort, on the other hand, ties remuneration to a quasi-unobservable quantity, with paradoxical outcomes when varying levels of athletic or social disadvantage are taken into account. Appeal to procedural justice, finally, does not yield wage equality unless we make the same counterfactual assumptions, or postulate a right to equal remuneration on unrelated grounds of substantive justice. On either of these approaches, the case for gender wage parity in professional sport requires strengthening. (shrink)

One of the best-known members of the United Nations Commission which drafted the 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," Jacques Maritain, famously held that the "natural rights" or "human rights" possessed by every human being are grounded and justified by reference to the natural law.' In many quarters today, the notion of the natural law, and arguments for a set of natural rights grounded in the natural law, have come under fierce (...) attack. One common line of attack is illustrated by the arguments of some utilitarians, for whom "natural law thinking" is mistaken insofar as it implies that there is an absolute moral prohibition against violating any human being's "natural rights." Even if there is such a thing as "natural rights," these utilitarians argue, such rights - including even the natural "right to life" - are necessarily relational, and thus have meaning only within the context of a larger social whole. As a result, the argument goes, the supposed "natural rights" possessed by individual human beings are never inviolable or unconditional, but instead always negotiable and subject to being "traded away" for the sake of greater social utility. Consider just one alleged counter-example to the notion that there are inviolable or unconditional "natural rights": it is well-known that approximately 36,000 people in the United States die every year as a result of influenza infections or influenza-related complications.' There is little doubt that hundreds, and probably even thousands, of human lives would be saved every year if local governments were to pass laws requiring flu vaccinations for all members of at-risk populations (e.g., the very young and the very elderly). It would seem that there would be broad support for mandated flu vaccinations- no matter what the expense - if human lives would be saved and if the natural "right to life" is inviolable or unconditional.' And yet no such life-saving laws exist, apparently because citizens and legislators believe that the social costs and inconveniences would be too great. According to the utilitarian position, this demonstrates - contrary to what Ronald Dworkin and others say about rights' - that rights do not trump utility, but in fact are quite regularly and reasonably trumped by utility. In light of such contemporary understandings and policies, can natural law thinking about natural rights be made credible? In what follows, I shall argue that utilitarian thinkers are correct to hold that rights are intrinsically relational; but they are wrong to conclude that the relational character of rights entails that "natural rights" are not inviolable or not unconditional. (shrink)

The "second-generation indigenization" hypothesis of Huntington's phenomenological observations on totalitarianism in Cold War regime collapse subtly portrayed the realpolitik interest groups' political influences with autocracy disbandment processes. The research puts democratization as the premise and globalization as purpose for the analysis, with the cultural anthropological psychopathology & criminological elements of genocide and crime against humanity explained, underlying some of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s organizational behaviors. With the regionalism purposes & approaches to multilateralism by People's Republic of China (PRC), (...) the end of democratization is leveraged against the procedural means with power politics of declared “decmocracy”. Between quantitative autocratic controls and realpolitik local-regional interest groups, the connotation of democratization in liberal international globalization has either been used for militant purposes or pushed the landscape of regime collapse into realpolitik local groups and autocratic controls in the process of globalization, with a case study on a local branch of Argricultural Bank of China on supply-side hijacking by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). With the industrial interests omposed on realpolitik local groups, autocratic regionalism becomes of the "best interest scenario" for the realpolitik local groups with psychopathological spread of the criminological behaviors, by the cyber organizational criminal operations correlated with PRC’s approaches to international relations and multilateralism through bilateral trade & finance in monetary and currency domains, developed into the digitization of economies with criminological schemes in telecommunication, information, and informatics systems. However, the diminishing autonomy & freedom of the territorial population in turn derogated the real economy that wielded the prisoners' dilemma between autocracy and totalitarianism in a negative sum game deterioration cycle, with the censorship practices by the illicit regimes for propaganda controls sustaining "ideology security". In the democratization process of the dictatorial regime, "second-generation indigenization" is thus mapped to the sectarian interests respondent to dictatorial propaganda generation, other than a natural phenomenon out of autonomy and freedom premises in decision theory. The article recaps the coup d'état between Xi Jinping and Bo Xilai before Xi took the autocratic power, and analyzes the human rights situation in the obstacle of democratization and by the coercion mechanism imposed on the mainland China civil society for the militant purposes, with its behaviral spread of censorship to the “internet platforms” in liberal democratic countries by financial interest incentives and avoidance from war threats, whereby military backends in the cyber systems already indicate otherwise. (shrink)

Mens rea means a guilty mind; guilty knowledge and wilfulness without clear permission to do so. The 1924 Declaration of the Rights of the Child and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, followed by the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child have all been ignored by the UK Home Secretary and the UK Prime Minister. These universal laws place the child in the nexus of the State, the parents, (...) and the broader society. The 1959 Declaration claims in its Preamble, that “mankind owes to the child the best it has to give” and it contains ten principles outlining numerous rights of children. See also, Philip Alston, “The Best Interests Principles towards a reconciliation of culture and human rights”, (1994), 8, International Journal of Law and the Family, 1-25, 6. -/- . (shrink)

Human dignity is a stubborn concept, at least for jurists and philosophers. After World War II it found its way immediately into the opening articles of the UN Charta, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the German Grundgesetz, apparently out of the blue, i. e. almost without any precedent in earlier juridical docu- ments. Consequently, scholars of law still have difficulties to formulate an adequate understanding of human dignity. And although the concept has (...) a certain tradition in philosophy, if we search for an independent ethi- cally attractive understanding of human dignity, it turns out that going back to Cicero, Kant or the Christian heritage is of little help, too. Much more promising, though, is a look at the long-standing usage of the expression ‘human dignity’ and its German counterpart Würde des Menschen where something like a universal right not to be humiliated is expressed. Given this understanding, we can read the commandment to respect human dignity as the basic obligation to treat other people in a way that allows them to keep their personal, individual dignities—or at least minimally decent ones. To be sure, this formulation is just a very first, tentative step on the way to a philosophically satisfying conception of human dignity, but in the author’s opinion it is definitely a promising start for a research group. (shrink)

Examines the role of philosophical analysis for the understanding and realization of human rights. Relies on two historical events: the framing of the universal declaration of human rights and recent emphasis on global justice. Suggests that power and moral authority of human rights does not depend on a previous thorough consideration of this notion, and also that this authority is not compatible with any theory. Argues also that philosophical analysis is important for (...) the understanding of the idea of global justice and quite irrelevant for its realization.<<<--------------------->>> -/- Se examina la relevancia de los análisis filosóficos para la conceptualización y para la realización de los derechos humanos, a partir de dos episodios concretos: la elaboración de la declaración universal de los derechos humanos y los planteamientos recientes sobre la justicia global. Se propone que la fuerza y la autoridad moral de los derechos humanos no depende de que se haya llevado a cabo un examen exhaustivo de esta noción, pero también que esa autoridad no es compatible con cualquier teoría sobre ello. Y se defiende la relevancia del análisis filosófico de la idea de justicia global y la irrelevancia de la filosofía para su realización. (shrink)

As an adherent to the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United States has made a commitment to social justice. As a part of this commitment, the U.S. maintains that the right to an education is both innate and compulsory. This paper addresses U.S. government’s failure to uphold its citizens’ educational rights, made clear by the inadequacy of the educational programs currently offered to juvenile offenders. Based on the findings of recent scholarly literature, this (...) paper argues that both juvenile and adult correctional institutions lack the resources necessary to provide proper educational instruction and adequately address the special educational needs of juvenile offenders. To help the U.S. maintain its commitment to social justice, alternatives to juvenile incarceration are proposed. (shrink)

이 논문의 목적은 ‘인권의 보편성’에 관한 세 가지 논의에 기초하여, 북한의 ‘우리식 인권론’을 비판적으로 평가하고, 통일교육에 주는 함의를 제시하는 데 있다. 통일교육은 북한 인권문제를 둘러싼 논리적 대립이나 이념적 갈등의 연장선에서 이루어져서는 안된다. ‘인권의 보편성’에 대한 진지한 이해에 기반한 함의가 통일교육의 기초가 되어야 한다. 인권의 보편성이 지닌 보편주의와 역사성에 대한 인식을 바탕으로 북한이 내세우는 인권관의 오류에 대해 평가할 수 있어야 한다. 인권개선을 위한 북한의 자구적인 노력에는 분명한 한계가 있다. 우리는 지속적으로 북한 인권문제에 관심을 갖고 지혜롭게 관여해 가야 한다. 통일교육을 통해 북한 (...) 인권개선을 위한 국내외의 사회적 연대가 중요하다는 점이 환기되어야 하며, 인권문화의 형성과 확산이 이루어져야 한다는 점도 강조되어야 한다. 최근의 보호책임 논의에서 보듯이, 국가주권을 제약하는 국제인권규범의 중요성은 갈수록 부각되고 있다. 통일교육은 인권 담론의 틀을 확장시켜 가는 데도 일조해야 한다. 북한의 인권 상황은 숙명적인 특수주의에 속해 있지 않다. 우리는 북한의 인권 상황에 담겨야 할 보편적 인권의 가치를 확인하고 적용해가는 데서 인권의 실천적 의미와 통일교육의 역할을 찾아야 할 것이다. (shrink)

Idea powszechności legła u samych podstaw współczesnej ochrony praw człowieka i nadal jest często podkreślana w dyskursie typu praktycznego, na różnych płaszczyznach: politycznej, moralnej czy religijnej. Jednakże trudno o koncepcję praw człowieka pozwalającą pogodzić powszechność z właściwościami prawa, z postulatami respektu dla pluralizmu ugruntowanego tak w odmienności kulturowej, jak i wolności poszczególnych jednostek ludzkich. Wziąwszy pod uwagę, że powszechność jest fundamentalnym przy¬miotem praw człowieka, kłopoty z powszechnością są kłopotami ze zbudowaniem filozoficznej koncepcji praw człowieka w ogóle. Odrzucenie powszechności jest równoznaczne (...) z odrzuceniem podstaw współczesnej koncepcji tych praw. Opracowanie zmierza do identyfikacji rozmaitych aspektów powszechności praw człowieka i do uporządkowania argumentów przytaczanych w dyskusji nad powszechnością. (shrink)

Human rights theory and practice have long been stuck in a rut. Although disagreement is the norm in philosophy and social-political practice, the sheer depth and breadth of disagreement about human rights is truly unusual. Human rights theorists and practitioners disagree – wildly in many cases – over just about every issue: what human rights are, what they are for, how many of them there are, how they are justified, what human (...) interests or capacities they are supposed to protect, what they require of persons and institutions, etc. Disagreement about human rights is so profound, in fact, that several prominent theorists have remarked that the very concept of a “human right” appears nearly criterionless. In my 2012 article, “Reconceptualizing Human Rights”, I diagnosed the root cause of these problems. Theorists and practitioners have falsely supposed that the concept of “human right” picks out a single, unified class of moral entitlements. However, the concept actually refers to two fundamentally different types of moral entitlements: (A) international human rights, which are universal human moral entitlements to coercive international protections, and (B) domestic human rights, which are universal human moral entitlements to coercive domestic protections. Accordingly, I argue, an adequate “theory of human rights” must be a dual theory. The present paper provides the first such theory. First, I show that almost every justificatory ground given for “human rights” in the literature – such as the notion of a “minimally decent human life”, “urgent human interests”, and “human needs” – faces at least one of two fatal problems. Second, I show that after some revisions, James Griffin’s conception of “personhood” provides a compelling justificatory ground for international human rights. Third, I show that the account entails that there are very few international human rights – far fewer than existing human rights theories and practices suggest. Fourth, I show that there are reasons to find my very short list of international human rights compelling: “human rights justifications” for coercive international and foreign policy actions over the past several decades have consistently overstepped what can be morally justified, and my account reveals precisely how existing human rights theories and practices have failed to adequately grapple with these moral hazards. Finally, I outline an account of domestic human rights which fits well with many existing human rights beliefs and practices, vindicating those beliefs and practices, but only at a domestic level. (shrink)

Human rights have made mass murder and genocide more, rather than less, likely. -/- Posted 21 December 2022. A previous version of this paper appears as chapter 3 of my Patriotic Elaborations: Essays in Practical Philosophy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009).

Kant is regarded as the spokesman of the contemporary declaration of human rights and the forerunner of global citizenship theory. However, this noble image has been questioned by critics for his comment of empirical racial hierarchy stated in the pre-critical period: Kant’s moral law applies only to the white race with the “full personality”. Around the question of whether Kant’s pure moral philosophy was impregnated by his racist view, the defenders of Kant either adopt the negative defense (...) strategy of affirming the transcendental moral philosophy and negating the racial thought, or try to justify the consistency of Kant’s theory from the perspective of his later philosophy of right. The deficiency of these two justifications is that they do not directly deal with the relationship between moral philosophy and race theory. When Kant developed a mature moral theory in the mid-1780s, he also constructed a systemically mature race theory under the guidance of teleology principles to defend the unity of mankind in a different world. This theory can be used as the explanatory basis to prove the universality of Kant’s moral philosophy, which reflects the deep correlation between moral philosophy and race theory. From this perspective, it can not only make up for the lack of defenders and respond to the critics’ doubts, but also portray a consistent egalitarian image of Kant. (shrink)

What is the rational foundation for the doctrine of universal human rights? Some philosophers, such as Alan Gewirth, argue that it may be discovered simply by reflection on certain essential features of the human constitution. However this approach has significant problems, achieving its ends by smuggling certain tacit premises into the argument. A better approach is one that appeals to the communal practices and traditions within which doctrines of human rights have evolved historically. It (...) is here that Alasdair MacIntyre's work becomes relevant, because it maintains that traditions have a rationality of their own, and that all rationality is in some sense traditional. That MacIntyre himself has used these ideas to dismiss the doctrine of universal human rights only shows the extent to which MacIntyre (like many others) has misunderstood the true character of that doctrine. (shrink)

The philosophical foundation of human rights has become more explicit, given that the presumption of peace in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights demands further development, both in its definition and in the conditions or requirements for its fulfillment. Based on the discussion of the human right to peace, we propose to reinterpret the Arendtine expression “The right to have rights” as the philosophical formula that calls for the ascension (...) of peace to a legal enunciation; this is based on the critique of Human Rights, the valuation of human singularity, and on believing in the merging of actions and discourses that characterize Hannah Arendt’s politics.Keywords: peace, human rights, stateless persons, philosophical foundation, the human right to peace. (shrink)

Raymond Geuss asserts that there are fragmented views on what human rights are and that there is no unifying principle underlying such notion. I think that this view has its merits. It conveys the particularity of our perspectives, attitudes, desires and selfunderstandings. It rejects abstractness and is committed to a thick, perspectivist, historical understanding of personhood. To understand who we are, is to understand how we arrive at being who we are. By contrast, the notion of human (...) rights deploys abstractness, unification of agency, necessity and a thin view of personhood. In this paper, I attempt to bring into focus these two aspects of the notion of human rights. I will first analyse the genealogical method advocated by Geuss and argue that it has the merit of elucidating our historical contingencies; however, it is argued that any view in favour of the genealogical method relies on the idea that evaluative or normative concepts cannot be defined in terms of a common denominator. We reconstruct the Aristotelian idea of ‘focal meaning’ as core-resemblance and show that there is a unifying concept of human rights. We conclude that the perspectivist spirit of genealogy is not far from the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle’s inquiry into a concept that could grasp different perspectives and contingencies as opposed to a Platonic understanding of abstract and universal forms shows that genealogical worries are germane to the tradition. (shrink)

Zasadniczym przedmiotem analiz tego opracowania jest pojęcie godności w Karcie praw podstawowych Unii Europejskiej z 7 grudnia 2000 r. Interpretacja Karty prowadzona jest z uwzględnieniem postanowień Traktatu z Lizbony z 13 grudnia 2007 r., który podniósł Kartę do rangi prawa traktatowego. Uwyraźnienie treści pojęcia godności w Karcie dokonywane jest przez pryzmat paradygmatu rozumienia godności utrwalonego już w prawie międzynarodowym praw człowieka na poziomie uniwersalnym, czyli prawa kształtowanego i funkcjonującego w ramach Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Paradygmat uniwersalny, w którego centrum znajduje się (...) uznanie godności za przyrodzoną (inherent – „nieoddzielalną), powszechną, równą i za źródło wszystkich praw człowieka, był dotąd w systemach prawnych powszechnie akceptowany. Obejmował on elementy prawnonaturalne, które po doświadczeniach z dwudziestowiecznymi systemami totalitarnymi i systemami – mówiąc słowami Gustawa Radbrucha – „ustawowego bezprawia”, uważane były za pożądane, nie tylko w prawie międzynarodowym. Przy bliższym przyjrzeniu się najważniejszym postanowieniom prawa europejskiego dotyczącym godności i podstaw praw człowieka okazuje się, że paradygmat uniwersalny został radykalnie zakwestionowany – w miejsce ugruntowania praw człowieka w czymś obiektywnym, przyjęto ich ugruntowanie w kulturze. (shrink)

This work discusses human rights from the perspective of welfarism. The problem of human rights and welfare has been central in the thought system of political philosophy. This is so because the state which objective is to protect human rights and guarantee welfare has rather use her apparatus to trample on human rights thereby depriving citizens of their welfare. For the state to ensure successes of human rights she needs to (...) take as its cardinal objective, human rights grounded on universal moral principles that require government to aid, protect and refrain from abusing their own citizens. These will help advance tip triumph of human rights and welfare. To achieve this, I recommend that the state should protect and respect human rights and provide a framework within which human welfare can be satisfactorily promoted. Therefore rationally argues that human' rights promotion enhances human well-being. That by respecting specific rights, government, and states will enhance public welfare. (shrink)

Domestic courts are often quoting foreign case law on human rights. The conversation pursued through cross-referencing across jurisdictions has added to the globalization of international human rights standards. As the practice is gaining ground and becoming a more permanent feature of domestic judgments, its relevance needs to be examined. A closer look at the practice will bring forth a more realistic understanding of the approaches of domestic courts and the advantages which they offer to the institution. (...) This paper raises few questions on the value and influence of cross-referencing in the area of human rights. Questions in this regard can be posed as to (a) whether cross-referencing is reflective of an emerging consensus on the subject matter? (b) Is it strategic for domestic courts to quote foreign case law? (c) Is the practice of cross-referencing simply a trend or an urge to belong to a community of courts? (d) Is the practice of relevance towards the implementation and advancement of international human rights standards? The topic can shed light on broader themes including the universality of human rights, contestations/disagreements over human rights standards, and the measure of acceptability of international human rights standards within domestic settings. This paper discusses the practice, its role and influence in relation to international human rights standards. Three judgments [of the courts of Nepal, India and Singapore] addressing the human rights and homosexuality agenda have been illustrated for discussion. (shrink)

This essay claims that a rupture between two languages permeates human rights discourse in contemporary Anglo-American legal thought. Human rights law is no exception. The one language is written in the sense that a signifying relation inscribed by institutional authors represents concepts. Theories of law have shared such a preoccupation with concepts. Legal rules, doctrines, principles, rights and duties exemplify legal concepts. One is mindful of the dominant tradition of Anglo-American conceptual jurisprudence in this regard. (...) Words have been thought to copy ready-made concepts. Acts of intellectualisation and the accompanying analytic technique have excluded a consideration of a very different sense of legal language. The second sense of a language concentrates upon unwritten acts of meaning which lack a discrete and assignable author. This essay aims to unconceal the importance of an unauthored language. Drawing from Edmund Husserl’s early writings, particularly his Logical Investigations, I shall argue that an unwritten language embodies the written language with acts of meaning. An act of meaning confers one’s experiential body into the content of a concept signified in a written language. In order to understand the importance of such pre-legal acts of meaning in human rights laws, I begin by outlining how universal human rights have been signified as universal by virtue of their content-independence. I then raise the problem of the exclusion of social-cultural phenomena as elements of human rights laws. The clue to this exclusionary character of human rights law rests in the analytic leap from an unwritten to a written legal language. The essay then addresses the effort to link legality with the social world: namely, the effort of grounding legality in a social convention. I examine how a social convention itself is conceptualized, leaving the remainder of acts of meaning. This failure of social conventions to access social-cultural phenomena encourages me to turn to acts of meaning as such acts were understood by Edmund Husserl in his earlier works. Meaning-constituting acts exist prior to intuitions and prior to social conventions. This priority exists analytically as well as phenomenologically. In order to exemplify this prior character of acts of meaning, I retrieve Antigone’s experiential knowledge in Sophocles’ Antigone. Antigone’s unwritten laws are characterized by an absence of mediating concepts. I then identify several elements of an act of meaning in an unwritten language: the experiential body as the source of the acts of meaning, praeiudicia (prejudgements), collective memories, the act character of meaning, and the act of interpretation of social behaviour. My final section raises the prospect of whether human rights can be considered universal if acts of meaning are that important in the identity of a law. (shrink)

This book extract (from‘WHY DO THEY TORTURE? a Sri Lankan Perspective’ (ASIN B0BTCF4LQV)) contributes to the literature by inter alia (1) identifying societal justification as incentivizing torture, (2) disclosing man’s innate cruelty and habitual recourse to elective disassociation as facilitating its unperturbed discharge and (3) deeming moral realization its universal panacea.

W niniejszym opracowaniu zamierzam zwrócić uwagę na powiązanie roszczenia uniwersalności z potrzebą dostosowywania formułowanych standardów do odmiennych i zmiennych warunków życia, a następnie zidentyfikować rozstrzygnięcia filozoficzne skorelowane z uznaniem takiego powiązania. Akcent zamierzam przy tym położyć na problematykę metaaksjologiczną, dotyczącą nie tyle tego, jakie wartości zostały uznane, ale tego, jak uznane wartości są ugruntowane, co nie jest bez znaczenia dla określenia sposobów ich poznawania i ustalania. Rozstrzygnięcia te, jako zawarte m. in. w artykule 1, okazują się jednocześnie należeć do przyjętych (...) w Deklaracji fundamentalnych rozstrzygnięć filozoficznych w ogóle. (shrink)

The discursive character of human rights prevents a precise summary of historical origin, rationale, or definition outside of the various codifications in religious texts, secular philosophies, founding national documents, and international treaties, charters, conventions, covenants, declarations, and protocols. Regarding the objects of human rights, we can speak of a “foundational five” 1) Personal security 2) Material subsistence 3) Elemental equality 4) Personal Freedom and 5) Recognition as a member of the human community. Despite, or perhaps (...) because of its multivalence, the concept of human rights has been criticized as “foundationalist,” “essentialist,” or “ethnocentric”—its universalism being used as a weapon against itself by critics of cultural imperialism. Even the tolerance discourses so popular in critical theory, however, gain their normative force from the same basic notion of individual or group rights. Notwithstanding these rhetorical abuses, the concept of human rights has proved robust as a doctrine of equality owing to its openness to a pluralism of justifications grounding the basic “goods” agreed as necessary for human development. (shrink)

As the technosciences, including genomics, develop into a global phenomenon, the question inevitably emerges whether and to what extent bioethics can and should become a globalised phenomenon as well. Could we somehow articulate a set of core principles or values that ought to be respected worldwide and that could serve as a universal guide or blueprint for bioethical regulations for embedding biotechnologies in various countries? This article considers one universal declaration, the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and (...) Human Rights ( 2005a ). General criticisms made in a recent special issue of Developing World Bioethics are that the concepts used in the Declaration are too general and vague to generate real commitment; that the so-called universal values are not universal; and, that UNESCO should not be engaged in producing such declarations which are the domain of professional bioethicists. This article considers these and other criticisms in detail and presents an example of an event in which the Declaration was used: the request by the Republic of Sakha, in Siberia, for a UNESCO delegation to advise on the initiation of a bioethics programme. The Declaration was intended to provide an adequate “framework of principles and procedures to guide states in the formulation of their legislation, policies and other instruments in the field of bioethics” (article 2a). The Declaration was produced, and principles agreed upon, in an interactive and deliberative manner with world-wide expert participation. We argue that the key issue is not whether the general principles can be exported worldwide (in principle they can), but rather how processes of implementation and institutionalisation should take shape in different social and cultural contexts. In particular, broader publics are not routinely involved in bioethical debate and policy-making processes worldwide. (shrink)

Human rights are grand political philosophy of the modern times, thus no wonder as a language of progressive politics which once was discourse of social emancipation (Boaventura Santos, 2002), has transcended national boundaries to become aspiration of humankind (Samul Moyn (2010), and is a commonly shared bulwark against evil (Lynn Hunt, 2007). Centred upon moral belief propelled on metaphysical moral assumption with its origin in Christianity pity and Enlightment discourse, however, human rights have become a sort (...) of moral imperialism of our time which exclude and include humanity on the basis of coloniality of power (Anibal Quijano, 2007). Although human rights are site of contentious discourse (Issa Shivji, n.d.) however, rights did not disappear in action and thought, but discussion shifted within national frameworks, in fact, “human rights when belief in them have become more widespread (Lynn Hunt, p.134, 2007)”. The combination of emotional/moral appeal and lack of conceptual clarity makes human rights immensely effective as a rhetorical tool and serve as a moral apparatus for humanitarian intervention into the third world countries. Both, the just war tradition and those who theorize the ethics of the law of armed conflict have taken moral and political reality of human rights seriously. Taking anti-foundational approach by challenging its main elements such as ‘universality’ and ‘morality’ this paper would argue that moral premises of human rights is flawed. (shrink)

Our planet contains 194 independent states and much more nations. They share membership of the United Nations and in consequence they subscribed the Universal Declaration of Rights. These are rooted in the modern universal conception of states and human rights formulated by philosophers of the Enlighten Age like Locke, Kant., Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. Concepts like democracy are mirrored to the organization of the political life as it was developed in North America and Europe (...) at the end of the 18th and the 19th century. Universality was deeply rooted in the Western intellectual, moral and religious tradition of that part of the world. Even globalization of the economic and social life is governed by the same Western standards and worldwide consumed basic goods like prime matter,. food and energy is expressed in terms of Western currency like dollar, pound sterling or euro. Despite this economic globalization there were two contradictory political evolution to discern: At the one hand more than 70 new states where created and on the other hand 28 European states started to integrate to a political European Union. The latter trend was based on a deep economic integration and since the creation of the euro also a financial integration. Basic idea was the creation of a free economic market as bases for a political unified Europe. Euro criticism is not only identified with conservatism, nationalism, narrow mind and even racism, euro criticism is deprived from any intellectual significance. However other trends put some shadow on the European project. First the Soviet experience around Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism unified more different nations than the European Union but ended in a complete political and economic chaos. Secondly the financial euro crisis involves only the tacit undermining of the national political independence of the member states, but does not make room for a deep analysis what the fundamentals are of this crisis such as lack of confidence of the citizen in the created unified political and financial market and its main instruments like banks that we consider as the fundamental boundary conditions of the worldwide globalization of goods, power and all aspects of human life. Furthermore we claim that this market in al its aspects is the worst answer to the inconvenient yet unavoidable truth that Western way of life of consumption includes a ecological footprint that exceeds since many years the sustainability of our planet. -/- . (shrink)

In the past decade UNESCO has pursued a leadership role in the articulation of general principles for bioethics, as well as an extensive campaign to promulgate these principles globally.1 Since UNESCO's General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights in 2005, UNESCO's Bioethics Section has worked with member states to develop a "bioethics infrastructure." UNESCO also provides an "Ethics Teacher Training Course" to member states and disseminates a "core curriculum," primarily targeting medical students. (...) The core curriculum orients itself by the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and aims to articulate a set of "bioethical principles" that provide a "common global . (shrink)

The question of how to arrive at a consensus on human rights norm in a diverse, pluralistic, and interconnected global environment is critical. This volume is a contribution to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West. The legitimacy of the global legal, economic, and political order is increasingly premised on the discourse of international human rights. Yet the United Nations’ Declaration of Human (...) Rights developed with little or no consultation from non-Western nations such as India. In response, there has developed an extensive literature and cross-cultural analysis of human rights in the areas of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, yet there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to India. As problematically, there is an lacuna in the previous literature; it simply stops short at analyzing how Western understandings of human rights may be supported from within various non-Western cultural self-understandings; yet, surely, there is more to this issue. The chapters in this collection pioneer a distinct approach that takes such deliberation to a further level by examining what it is that the West itself may have to learn from various Indian articulations of human rights as well. (shrink)

The Human Rights Studies Programme, School of International Studies (JNU), in collaboration with the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies (JNU), and the Indian Law Institute (Delhi), organized a Human Rights Day Webinar on the Intersections of Human Rights and Criminal Law on December 9-10, 2021. Experts and young scholars from the field shared their insights and research on the webinar theme. The presentations were organized under four sessions, including Session I (...) on Rights Jurisprudence and Criminal Law, Session II on Proposals for Criminalisation and Decriminalisation, Session III on Crimes, Victims, and Punishments, and Session IV on Reforms in the Future. The Webinar was conceptualized keeping in view the responsibility of states under international human rights law to prohibit and punish for the protection of human rights and the redressal of violations. The obligations of States to prohibit and punish inform the development of criminal rules and procedures under different legal systems, leading to the near universalization of legislative frameworks, legal justifications, and punishments. In the working of international human rights institutions, the criminal laws adopted by States are an indicator or marker of the level of compliance of States with the international mandates. In recent years, the interface between the two fields, i.e., international human rights and domestic criminal laws, has sparked great jurisprudential, political, and constitutional debates in different parts of the world. Against this backdrop, the Webinar was organized on Human Rights Day to discuss the relevant issues. (shrink)

As with terms such as “human rights”, “democracy”, and “equality”, the notion of “freedom” has an emblematic character with highly normative overtones. After the declaration of universal human rights, one might argue that freedom is – at least formally – a universal entitlement belonging to every human being. However, this universalist structure is built upon a conflictual foundation, as the juridico-political meaning of freedom is determined by the boundaries of national citizenship, statehood, (...) and territorial sovereignty. This chapter examines refugeehood as a normal by-product of the post-colonial world order, embodying the counter-history of nation-states whose internal borders, walls, and external fortifications are growingly being militarised and reinforced. Refugeehood represents an anomalous juridico-political condition that cannot be elucidated by colonial-racial binaries such as inclusion versus exclusion or rightlessness versus national citizenship. The central idea of this chapter is that, for refugees, the meaning of freedom and unfreedom are intertwined and should be approached as a dynamic relationship characterising the state of (non)-subjectivity. As political (non)-subjects, refugees call structural determinations of unfreedom into question. Refugees’ freedom is expressed in the act of flight and border crossing, irregular migratory movement, language games of resistance, and other emancipatory signifying practices by which they claim a place of refuge in the world. (shrink)

This Study has covered Post Graduate Students of four University of Gujarat State including Sardar Patel University, M. S. University, Gujarat University and DDIT University. The data collected from 400 P G Students 100 students from each university for the study under the research design of descriptive cum exploratory in nature. The Questionnaire is used for this research consists of 50 Questions. As a Consideration of that the youth or students are the future for any nation so level of understanding (...) of youth about human rights is very important to know. If human rights knowledge is not up to mark among youth or students, it's a serious issue for the youth and nation as well. As a Social Worker, to maintain equality, non discrimination, protection and development is a mission. So, Human Rights is a one of the best weapon to all social worker to achieve main goals as mentioned before. Mehul Rabari | Dr. S. D. Mishra "Youth and Human Rights - A Research Study among University Student" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-1 | Issue-1 , December 2016, . (shrink)

In the field of human rights, expressions like justice and legal reform are closely linked to the process of harmonization of domestic and international human rights standards. Harmonization of human rights standards can be described as a process wherein international human rights are incorporated or given full effect to at the domestic level. [i] To harmonize the two set of standards i.e. domestic and international is viewed as both a commitment and obligation (...) of states under international law. [ii] In terms of state practice, the process of harmonization may entail a set of actions including adoption of laws and creation of mechanisms for enforcement and redressal of violations. -/- At the international level, the harmonization agenda is actively promoted at forums including the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) or during consultations between states and human rights treaty bodies, etc. Questions on whether states are in compliance with their international human rights commitments under treaties and other resolutions are to a large extent determined based on the extent of harmonization. Other pertinent questions being whether existing domestic laws are compatible with international human rights standards? What conditions obstruct and facilitate harmonization of human rights standards? Are there any parameters to measure harmonization? -/- While harmonization is widely promoted, its study and assessment is complex. (shrink)

Th e contemporary right to freedom of thought together with all its further declinations into freedom of speech, religion, conscience and expression, had one of its earliest historical recognitions at the end of the Wars of Religion with the Edict of Nantes (1598). In several respects one can saythat the right to freedom of thought is virtually “co-original” with the endof the Wars of Religion. Following this thought further, one might think that human rights defi ne the boundaries (...) of our social coexistence and are inextricably connected to the “fact” of cultural pluralism. (shrink)