The current appeal of non-standard economic alternatives is backgrounded against the vulnerability of mainstream capitalism to meltdown and crisis as shown in recent times. There is an increasing number of governments, institutions, and civil societies (NGOs) that have been advocating economic systems, structures, or dynamics that would promote the good of the human person (dignity, personhood, values, and worth). People have started to realize that doing economics is not always within the realm of rationalized judgments and mathematized calculations (highly impersonal) (...) but must look after the human person, at all costs. This paper attempts to contribute to this agendum by employing an interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and economics; drawing a moral-cultural framework towards a compassion-based economics. Together with the positive traits of today’s economic alternatives and the salient features of Jesus’ praxis of compassion, this paper would offer fourteen (14) criteria as basis for what could be the most feasible base/locus for an economics of compassion. Eventually, what has been considered as the suitable base/locus is the Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs). Hence, a BEC-based Economics of Compassion or BEC-EC. (shrink)

This article examines whether Willard Van Orman Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be sustained. The argument from above, Quine argues, can derive indeterminacy as its conclusion. I will argue that the indeterminacy claim cannot be sustained. I further argue that Quine changed the formulation of the underdetermination of theory by evidence (UTE) argument from what Duhem said to the Quine/Pierce meaning verification view, in order use the new formulation of UTE to imply indeterminacy. Given all that, we see when we (...) apply the old UTE argument we only arrive at underdetermination of theory by evidence, and that applies to all sciences, philosophy and knowledge, including philosophy of language. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In Word and Object, he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy – particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). Conclusion: We can have well-defined notions of synonymy and analyticity even if we embrace Quine's holism, naturalism, behaviorism, and radical translation. Quine's meaning skepticism is to be repudiated on Quinean grounds. (shrink)

Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an ‘evoked questions norm’ on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century ordinary-language philosophy, inferential erotetic logic, inquisitive epistemic logic, and contemporary zetetic epistemology) all converge on (...) the evoked questions norm. Second, we show that suitably interpreted, the evoked questions norm correctly predicts several underappreciated kinds of bad questions. It does this, in part, by recovering versions of previously defended ignorance and knowledge norms. Some of those bad questions cannot be predicted by either norm singly, but only when corporately taken to reflect a common normative category. We identify this category as evocation. (shrink)

The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness. I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ignorant with respect (...) to a question if the question is sound. (shrink)

A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (2021), Feldman (2002), and Chisholm (1977) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by closing inquiry we would meet a unique epistemic standard. I argue that no epistemic norm of this general form is true: there is not a single epistemic standard that demarcates the boundary between inquiries we are forbidden and obligated to close. In short, (...) such norms are false because they are insensitive to the potentially ambitious epistemic goals that agents may permissibly bring to bear on an inquiry. Focusing particularly on knowledge-oriented versions of the norm, I argue that ignorance has a positive role to play in epistemic life by licensing prolonged inquiry into questions that we especially care about. (shrink)

This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other‐regarding, allowing asserters to act in the (...) best interests of their audience when psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth. (shrink)

A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there is (...) an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right. (shrink)

Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “p, but you don’t know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion (...) is not the initiating epistemic position of the speaker but the resulting epistemic position of the audience. (shrink)

I sympathetically explore the thesis that God literally forgets sins. I articulate some altruistic God might have for forgetting certain sins. If so, then God may have altruistic reasons to relinquish a great-making trait (omniscience). But according to traditional Anselmian perfect being theology, God is necessarily perfect and so incapable of acting on these altruistic reasons. More broadly, a God who necessarily has all the perfections is a God who is incapable of making a certain kind of sacrifice: God can (...) never make tradeoffs that diminish God’s overall greatness, even when those diminishments are relatively small (like forgetting a particular proposition) and the (altruistic) rewards of making the tradeoff substantial. I argue that God’s inability to make such tradeoffs is not a trivial cost for traditional perfect-being theologians who also believe that God is in loving relationships with creatures. Along the way, I explore the prospects for a less traditional form of perfect being theology, perfect being kenoticism, and different models for divine forgetting. (shrink)

Recently, a number of epistemologists (notably Feldman [2007], [2009] and White [2005], [2013]) have argued for the rational uniqueness thesis, the principle that any set of evidence permits only one rationally acceptable attitude toward a given proposition. In contrast, this paper argues for extreme rational permissivism, the view that two agents with the same evidence may sometimes arrive at contradictory beliefs rationally. This paper identifies different versions of uniqueness and permissivism that vary in strength and range, argues that evidential peers (...) with different interests need not rationally endorse all the same hypotheses, argues that evidential peers who weigh the theoretic virtues differently can sometimes rationally endorse contradictory conclusions, and finally defends the permissivist appeal to standards against objections in the works of Feldman and White. (shrink)

Knowledge is good, ignorance is bad. So it seems, anyway. But in this dissertation, I argue that some ignorance is epistemically valuable. Sometimes, we should suspend judgment even though by believing we would achieve knowledge. In this apology for ignorance (ignorance, that is, of a certain kind), I defend the following four theses: 1) Sometimes, we should continue inquiry in ignorance, even though we are in a position to know the answer, in order to achieve more than mere knowledge (e.g. (...) understanding) while minimizing the effects of confirmation bias. 2) It’s false that we should believe every proposition such that we are guaranteed to be right about it (and even such that we are guaranteed to know it) if we believe it. 3) Being in a position to know is the norm of assertion: importantly, this does not require belief or (thereby) knowledge, and so proper assertion can survive speaker-ignorance. 4) It can be permissible and conversationally useful to tell audiences things that it is logically impossible for them to come to know: Proper assertion can survive (necessary) audience-side ignorance. Cumulatively, this project suggests that, properly understood, ignorance has an important role to play in the good epistemic life. (shrink)

According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.

We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position-to-know-ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability-ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do.

This paper argues for extreme rational permissivism—the view that agents with identical evidence can rationally believe contradictory hypotheses—and a mild version of steadfastness. Agents can rationally come to different conclusions on the basis of the same evidence because their way of weighing the theoretic virtues may differ substantially. Nevertheless, in the face of disagreement, agents face considerable pressure to reduce their confidence. Indeed, I argue that agents often ought to reduce their confidence in the higher-order propositions that they know or (...) rationally believe disputed content. I argue, however, that when the subject matter is difficult, there is more flexibility for agents to simultaneously believe that p while withholding belief about whether such belief is rational or known. This allows for modest steadfastness on hard questions in, e.g., philosophy and religion. (shrink)

I argue that the story of God’s commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac can be read as a variant of Kavka’s (1983) Toxin Puzzle. On this reading, Abraham has no reason to kill Isaac, only reason to intend to kill Isaac. On one version of the Kavkan reading, it’s impossible for Abraham, thus situated, to form the intention to kill Isaac. This would make the binding an impossible story: I explore the ethical and theological consequences of reading the story in this (...) way. Finally, I suggest that analytic philosophers may have more to contribute to interpretive projects in philosophical theology than generally practiced. (shrink)

Exposome research is put forward as a major tool for solving the nature-versus-nurture debate because the exposome is said to represent “the nature of nurture.” Against this influential idea, we argue that the adoption of the nature-versus-nurture debate into the exposome research program is a mistake that needs to be undone to allow for a proper bioethical assessment of exposome research. We first argue that this adoption is originally based on an equivocation between the traditional nature-versus-nurture debate and a debate (...) about disease prediction/etiology. Second, due to this mistake, exposome research is pushed to adopt a limited conception of agential control that is harmful to one's thinking about the good that exposome research can do for human health and wellbeing. To fully excise the nature-versus-nurture debate from exposome research, we argue that exposome researchers and bioethicists need to think about the exposome afresh from the perspective of actionability. We define the concept of actionability and related concepts and show how these can be used to analyze the ethical aspects of the exposome. In particular, we focus on refuting the popular “gun analogy” in exposome research, returning results to study participants and risk-taking in the context of a well-lived life. (shrink)

The increasing religious diversity in educational space has raised a legitimate question on how Catholic theology/ catechesis must be taught in Philippine Catholic universities given the institutional mandate to educate students “into the faith of the Church through teaching of Christian doctrine in an organic and systematic way” (Wuerl, 2013, 1). On this note, the paper makes reference to “centered plural- ism” (CP), a positional posture espoused by Georgetown University in dealing with this predicament. In an attempt to (re) appropriate (...) CP into local context, there is a need to explore the Filipino conception of self/others as enveloped within the indigenous concept of kapwa. Hereon, the paper finds that CP is not just feasibly suitable in local context but with kapwa's more inclusive description of the relationship of self and others, a CP‐based teaching paradigm in theology/ catechesis is a promising project in the educational scene of the Philippines. (shrink)

The dilemma of the anthropos confuses him as to the advantage of the market to his existence. The market anthropos is seen as homo economicus, a self-interested, utility-maximizing individual. This popular belief is critically analyzed as to its nuances insofar as the homo politicus of John Rawls is concerned. The life of the market anthropos seeks consensus towards societal cooperation and justice. Popularly held to be dissenting, this paper seeks to explore their possible convergence in the light of the nuances (...) predicated by Adam Smith and Rawls. Ultimately, it is argued that the anthropos in either startum of politics or market is not differentiated but is one and the same, contextually apart but anthropologically integrated. The cooperative homo politicus can also be a cooperative homo econonomicus just as both can be selfishly motivated and utilitarianist. (shrink)

There is an inherent phenomenological tendency in British moral theory, especially from John Locke onward. The purpose of his Essay was, he said, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with. This is language that might serve well in a general description of the work of Husserl and other phenomenologists.

For Filipinos in Japan, their long-historicized existence in Japan has forced them to continually (re)adjust and (re)articulate their own sociocultural norms, particularly in secular areas like workplaces, societal institutions, marketplaces, and even in their own domestic familial spaces. This article argues, however, that this narrative of struggle is somehow extended even in the confines of religious and ecclesial spaces of Catholic parishes and churches. In this light, this article attempts to articulate the current status and predicament of Filipino Catholics in (...) Japan, particularly in the Archdiocese of Tokyo, where the author spent ten months of field work in selected parishes, churches, and Filipino Catholic communities. It seeks to offer a fresh and updated analysis of their ethnoreligious stories given the emerging situational predicament of increasing nonreligiosity of society and the aging population of Filipino Catholics and their disinterested bicultural children. In response to current demographic crisis and future uncertainty, the Archdiocese has responded by initiating a call for “full integration” that embraces the image of a multicultural church in Japan to acknowledge the presence and contribution of foreign Catholics in Japan. However, this has been received with suspicion and anxiety, particularly from Filipino Catholics. While attempting to expose its ambiguity, this article also highlights the interesting situation of Filipino Catholics as religious in nonreligious Japan—despite this, they have reconfigured the way they express and practice their faith. Their historicized attempt to survive and negotiate as a religious “other” within a constrained and confined socio-spatial plane reveals interesting dynamics and opportunities for renewed dialogue. (shrink)

This study examines the relationship between technological profile, digital literacy, and self-efficacy among teachers in blended learning. The study utilized the descriptive-correlational design. The participants involved 35 teachers selected via purposive sampling from urban schools in Maasin City implementing printed and online teaching modalities. Standardized tools assessed teachers’ digital technology profile, literacy, and self-efficacy. Significant findings revealed that teachers have easy access to digital technology, are somewhat familiar with technological concepts, often utilize ICT-based technologies, and perceive usage purposes as necessary. (...) Teachers’ digital literacy and self-efficacy are at the average level. Correlation analysis established a significant and strong relationship between the technological profile of teachers and their digital literacy. Digital literacy also significantly and strongly correlated with self-efficacy. This study concluded that the technological profile of teachers influences their digital literacy level. Teachers with high digital literacy skills increase their self-efficacy in technology integration. The blended learning approach constitutes teachers’ digital literacy and self-efficacy as critical players of effectiveness. (shrink)

We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.

Layunin ng pag-aaral na mailahad at matukoy ang kahalagahan ng sikolohiya, implikasyon, at mga danas at lakbayin ng “Sunod” sa pangkat ng Biga at mga karatig tribo nito sa Tabuk City, Kalinga. Ang nasabing pananaliksik ay sumailalim sa Kuwalitatibo at Deskriptibong pag-aaral na nilapatan ng Sikolohiyang pagdulog, Sosyolohiya, at Etnograpiya, tinalakay ang mga kulturang kinagisnan ng isang pangkat. Mga piling “Pangat” o pinuno at matatanda sa pangkat Biga ang mga kalahok sa pananaliksik na nagbigay ng kani-kanilang mga karunungan, karanasan at (...) lakbayin sa pagdalumat ng “Sunod” sa buhay. Ang resulta ng pag-aaral sa mga Ibiga at mga karatig tribo ay may maayos na ugnayan at mapayapang pamumuhay. Malakas ang tungkulin ng pamilya sa pagbibigay ng disiplina at pagtutulungan sa bawat miyebro. Lumitaw rin na hindi kailangang magkadugo ang maituturing na “sunod” kundi lahat ng katribo at mga karatig tribo. Dahil dito ay naiiwasan ang mga di-kanais- nais na kaganapan o mga kaguluhan sa pagitan ng bawat isa. Matatag na kanilang sinusunod ang kahalagahan ng relasyong “sunod” sa bawat araw ng kanilang pakikibaka sa buhay. Napatunayan din na malakas ang kapangyarihan ng mg “Pangat” o “Tribal elders” at ibang matatanda sa pagpapanatili ng kaayusan. (shrink)

PanagKalangkang is a small fishing community in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. Viewed as rough ground, life there is an everyday struggle where, from their need to survive, people have to negotiate and adjust. In this paper, the author attempts to draw on the idea of “rough grounds” as locus theologicus and thereby contribute towards a theological methodology sourced from the praxis of the margins, where people find themselves in the midst of friction between the dominant forces of structure/system and the dearth (...) of the ground. To better facilitate the analysis of the frictional dynamics at the ground, this paper makes use of a heuristic device that borrows fundamental ideas from the science of lubricated friction, a branch of engineering science called tribology. It has been discovered that the peculiarity of that locus has implications for theological methodology. Anecdotal narratives of the author’s field research in selected BECs in the Diocese of Boac, Marinduque are integrated to provide concrete “corporeal” structure to an otherwise theoretical abstraction. (shrink)

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive (...) reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ. (shrink)

The Church seeks to be inclusive; one that opens her doors to everyone. For many Filipino Catholics (FCs) in Japan, their ecclesial existence is marked by a history of negotiation as “guests” hosted by the Japanese Catholics (JCs). Within this field of host–guest interplay, this paper explores the dynamics of sociospatial seclusion by employing the ideation of marginality pro ered by Loic Wacquant’s study on urban ghettos. The paper argues that the guest-identity of FCs must not be understood as a (...) unilateral action imposed upon by the dominant hosts against the former’s subjugated narrative as powerless victims. Instead, its maintenance is perpetuated by FCs’ elective and chosen ethnic clustering. In attempt to obtain better analytical clarity of this dynamics, this paper employs the functional value of the Cartesian plane as a mapping device in plotting historical events of interplay within a spatial field. The techne inherent in the Cartesian plane is embedded with the episteme of Wacquant’s ideation. Fused together, its utility as a heuristic device is herewith proposed. It is hoped that this theoretical construct can also be useful to any analysis of marginality contained within a host–guest interplay. (shrink)

Pope Francis argues for a shift to a new economic model that is in the service of the human life and is "more attentive to ethical principles" (LS 189). He does not endorse a specific model except that he provides conditions, principles, and frameworks by which its ethos must be grounded against. As part of his pastoral approach and his vision of a synodal Church, he invites everyone to participate and contribute to this discussion because "not all discussions of doctrinal, (...) moral or pastoral issues need to be settled by interventions of the magisterium" (AL 3). It is within this papal invitation of discoursing this new economic model where this paper aims to contribute particularly on the centrality of the anthropological criterion. The first section explores the meaning of his articulation on economics; situating it within the economic discourse of Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI. The second section focuses on the anthropological criterion as problematized by the identification of the homo economicus as self-interested. The third section draws a theoretical framework from substantivist economics in forwarding the desired economic ethos while the fourth section provides praxeological inputs and argues that homo economicus can be prosocial when the culture that is embedded in a particular economic model is put together to nurture such ethos. (shrink)

Review of All Things Wise and Wonderful by E. Janet Warren.

This book delves into esoteric knowledge, describing the structure of the universe (Brahmanda or Cosmic Egg) as a series of astral biospheres. These biospheres, or lokas, are linked to spiritual consciousness and degrees of divine bliss (Ananda). Advanced spiritual figures, such as Rishis and Mahatmas, can navigate these realms and help others evolve. The article presents a detailed comparison between “Puranic Hinduism” and “Sanatana Dharma”, specifically addressing their differences in cosmogenesis and spiritual evolution. The difference between the cosmogenesis of Puranic (...) Hinduism and Sanatana Dharma is that while the former is founded on the concept of Trimurti as taught by the Puranas, the latter is a Manu-centric and Guru-centric spiritual system. This has a lot of significance concerning the rituals and the social order they have produced. Here, the Cosmic Purusha is identifiable with Manu, not with Trimurti or the God of Abrahamic religions, because of their different spiritual status in the cosmological hierarchy. (shrink)

R.J. Barnes (chapter 3) takes up the ways in which Sicilian comedy engaged current intellectual fashions, especially philosophy. Sicily was the home of rich and influential poetic and philosophical traditions that Epicharmus held up for comic examination and ridicule.

The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective observations. The (...) problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind. (shrink)

In the digital age, the concept of identity has evolved in ways that challenge long-held philosophical assumptions about the self. No longer has fixed or continuous, identity become fragmented, shaped by multiple digital personas that people craft in response to the ever-expanding digital universe. Now, there is no sense of a fixed self that remains constant throughout space and time. Self and identity can be seen as a Heraclitean flux always in a state of becoming and never for a moment (...) being in a state of being. The boundaries between the real and the virtual have blurred, and hyperreal experiences now often seem more significant than actual events. This review delves into the complex relationship between selfhood and digital representation, exploring how traditional theories like Baudrillard’s hyperreality and Buddhist notions of impermanence help explain this transformation. It examines the implications of digital simulations, especially in the context of digital immortality, which raises profound questions about consciousness, existence, and the essence of being. In a world where avatars, social media profiles, and virtual realities dominate, self navigates an uncertain terrain between reality and simulation. This study is an exploration of the evolving nature of identity, consciousness, and human experience in the age of digital fragmentation, with a focus on the philosophical and psychological dimensions of selfhood in the modern, digitized world. (shrink)

Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.

The text is translated from the book W.V.O.Quine: Theories and Things. Second printing, 1982. pp. 1-24.

The text is translated from W.V.O.Quine: From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. Second Edition, 1980. pp. 130-139.

In his book “Minds and Computers: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence”, Matt Carter presents a comprehensive exploration of the philosophical questions surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Carter argues that the development of AI is not merely a technological challenge but fundamentally a philosophical one. He delves into key issues like the nature of mental states, the limits of introspection, the implications of memory decay, and the functionalist framework that allows for the possibility of AI. Carter contrasts functionalism with (...) reductive materialism, highlighting how the former accommodates the concept of artificial minds. He also emphasizes the significance of computationalism, which combines functionalism with computational theory to provide a robust explanation for mental processes. The book further discusses formal systems, the role of register machines in computation, and the inherent challenges in AI research, particularly in developing natural language processing systems. Carter’s work underscores the limitations of current computational models of cognition while remaining hopeful that advances in neuroscience may lead to stronger AI systems in the future. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

This paper explores the nature of hate, forgiveness, and interconnectedness in human relationships. Hatred often arises from conflicts with personal expectations but can be transformed into forgiveness by adopting an impersonal, holistic perspective. Drawing on evolutionary theory, psychological insights, and Buddhist philosophy, the paper argues that forgiveness is essential for individual mental well-being and societal harmony. The Buddhist concept of “two arrows” illustrates that while pain is unavoidable, suffering stems from emotional reactions and can be mitigated. Embracing the interconnected nature (...) of events allows individuals to transcend psychological suffering and cultivate compassion. Forgiveness, distinct from condoning or forgetting, is a profound process of healing and self-liberation with significant implications for mental and physical health. By integrating philosophical and psychological perspectives, the paper highlights forgiveness as a biological and psychological necessity, improving mental health, life satisfaction, and fostering both personal and communalistic harmony. (shrink)

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Computational Functionalism is a subfield of philosophy of mind most relevant to the subject of cognitive science as well as to artificial intelligence (AI). The analysis of this paper focuses on Hilary Putnam’s and Gualtiero Piccinini’s standpoints regarding the molecular understanding of computation. Finally, Putnam’s argument of the functionalism in notion of the mental states is based on the positive definition of those states by their functions, while Piccinini, and on the other hand suggest that an understanding of the mechanism (...) of computation will go a long way to explaining cognition. This research also points out shortcomings of functionalism in their theories especially in regards to connectivity with physicality of AI structures. Therefore, the paper identifies the following gaps: The first gap holds that although both theorists have important insights, the two approaches put forward by the respective theorists are flawed and a better proposal is required, then a new proposal is suggested In identifying these gaps, the paper seeks to contribute to the literature by arguing for the need to develop a composite of the two theorists. The results show that the big ideas are important in present-day AI debate and analysis, which helps to explain the mind as computation. (shrink)

This essay explores the psychological freedom that emerges from the acceptance of death, arguing that it should not be seen as merely a one-sided freedom of death without the complementary freedom of life. While death is often met with dread and fear, it can foster a sense of authenticity and alignment with personal values. However, this realization must also emphasize the importance of life, as the goal of psychological well-being lies in living, not just acknowledging death. This balance allows us (...) to live fully, prioritize meaningful experiences, and discard trivial concerns. By drawing on Carl Sagan’s reflections on humanity’s insignificance within the cosmos, this essay encourages empowered and responsible living that embraces both life and death. (shrink)

This paper explores the profound teachings of the Yoga Sutras and their application in modern psychological and therapeutic contexts. Yoga, as defined by Patanjali, aims to tranquil the fluctuations of the mind and achieve spiritual liberation through the integration of conscious and unconscious processes. The critique of Western dualism (more specifically Cartesian’ dualism) in favor of a unified perspective with Samkhya philosophy is discussed, emphasizing the role of the intellect, karma, and self- awareness in achieving mental calm and freedom from (...) suffering. Modern challenges such as social media’s impact on identity and the rise of mental as well as psychological disorders are examined through the lens of the methods of Yoga Philosophy, highlighting the efficacy of mindfulness and yoga therapies in promoting self-regulation, inner well-being, and peace. (shrink)

Josiah Parsons Cooke established chemistry education at Harvard University, initiated an atomic weight research program, and broadly impacted American chemical education through his students, the introduction of laboratory instruction, textbooks, and influence on Harvard's admissions requirements. The devoutly Unitarian Cooke also articulated and defended a biogeochemical natural theology, which he defended by arguing for commonalities between the epistemologies of science and religion. Cooke's pre-Mendeleev classification scheme for the elements and atomic weight research were motivated by his interest in numerical order (...) in nature, which reflected his belief in a divine lawgiver. (shrink)

In the quest for mental peace and philosophical insight, the most profound approach is to let the mind function freely, without the interference of a controlling thinker. This essay explores the philosophical and cognitive implications of an unimpeded mind, drawing from Eastern traditions such as Zen Buddhism and Taoism, alongside contemporary cognitive science. It argues that the natural rhythm of thought is disrupted by the ego’s need for control, leading to mental fragmentation and turbulence. By embracing the concept of “no-mind” (...) or non-interference, individuals can achieve a harmonious flow of consciousness. Contemporary cognitive science supports this view, showing that reducing self-referential thinking enhances cognitive flexibility and emotional regulation. This harmonious state, akin to the flow experienced by top athletes and artists, offers a path to greater psychological well-being and deeper philosophical understanding. (shrink)

In the present essay, imagination and its effects on the foundations of human life and thought, particularly those pertaining to desire and motivation, are investigated. It is then argued that the human as we know it cannot exist without imagination, and as such, it is an integral part of the self.

There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...) for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy. (shrink)

The role of intuition in Kant’s account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms “images” that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even “pure images”) actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in (...) their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant’s theory of sensibility. (shrink)