Desires are contentful mental states. But what determines the content of a desire? Two different classic answers were proposed by Russell and by Wittgenstein, starting in the 1910s. Russell proposed a behaviorist account according to which the content of the desire is fixed by the type of state that puts an end to the relevant kind of behavior which was triggered by some initial discomfort. The desire’s content consists in its “satisfaction conditions”. Wittgenstein criticized such an account for neglecting the (...) crucial point that the relation between a desire and its content is a conceptual, internal one, not an external contingent one. Desires specify their own contents, their “fulfillment conditions”. Even though there is a lot to say in favor of Wittgenstein’s criticism, this paper argues that Russell pointed at an important aspect of desires which plays a crucial role for accounts of self-knowledge of one’s own desires. It turns out that fulfillment conditions and satisfaction conditions are tied together in rational self-knowledge of one’s own desires. In this sense, the views of Russell and Wittgenstein can be combined in a fruitful way. (shrink)

Abstract This essay seeks to realize the following question: what is the correspondence between the sign and the thing that names? In reality, what is significant is closely linked with the being, however in this case the sense will be a particular manifestation of an own subjectivity; therefore the determinant relation is limited to the capacity of representation, where the meaning is connected with the socio-cultural sense. In this regard, this work seek realize this problem from the analytical approach of (...) Ludwig Wittgenstein, who is based on the method of philosophical investigation through formal logic. In this first period of development, his speculative work, which in principle leads to the search for logical foundations for mathematics, practised it in direction to the study of the nature of the representation. Subsequently, and as necessary this test delimitation, will expose the confrontation —more not necessarily contradiction— of their approaches in the light of the own Wittgenstein who, in a second reflective period poured into his later work, is obliged to discuss the foundational in his speculative work logical-philosophical topics from a pragmatic point of view. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the strong fascination that Wittgenstein has had for artists cannot be explained primarily by the content of his work, and in particular not by his sporadic observation on aesthetics, but rather by stylistic features of his work formal aspects of his writing. Edoardo Paolozzi’s testimony shows that artists often had a feeling of acquaintance or familiarity with the philosopher, which I think is due to stylistic features of his work, such as the colloquial tone (...) in which Wittgenstein shares his observation with the reader, but also the lack of long-winded arguments or explanations. In the concluding part I suggest that we can read Wittgenstein’s artworks of a specific kind: as philosophical works of art. (shrink)

The relationship between William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has recently been the subject of intense scholarly research. We know for instance that the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. Not surprisingly therefore, the pragmatist nature of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is increasingly acknowledged, in spite of Wittgenstein’s adamant refusal of being labeled a “pragmatist”. In this brief paper I merely want to piece together some of the (...) available evidence of Wittgenstein’s high regard for William James, not only for his thoughts, but even more so for his character. (shrink)

This article analyses in detail Wittgenstein’s ‘Cambridge period’ from his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his decease in 1951. Within the ‘Cambridge period’, scholars usually distinguish the ‘middle’ (1929–1936) and the ‘late’ (1936–1951) periods. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his visit to Brouwer’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Dutch mathematician Brouwer influenced not only Wittgenstein’s ability to do philosophy again but also the development of some of his (...) ideas. Namely, for Brouwer, language was a natural development of the social history of human beings. With the help of his friends, F. P. Ramsey, J. M. Keynes, G. E. Moore, and B. Russell, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. The author argues that this was the crucial turning point in his philosophy that led to the revision of some of his ideas. Wittgenstein returned from self-isolation in remote villages of Lower Austria to the intellectual academic environment, where he could discuss his ideas with intellectual interlocutors and receive their valuable remarks and comments. This article is organised in chronological order: it describes the very ‘early’ middle period of 1929–1935 involving the development of Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenology’ and the origin of the ‘language-games’ concept in the Blue and Brown Books; 1935–1936 period of ‘romantic’ enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and a trip there; Wittgenstein’s life and work during the WWII-time; resign from teaching in Cambridge in 1947 to finally finish his Philosophical Investigations. The author suggests that the ‘romantic areal’ about the USSR was formed by Wittgenstein’s predilection for Russian poetry and literature of the nineteenth century, i.e., Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pushkin. Analysing the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, the author mentions the influence of N. Bakhtin and P. Sraffa. Also, the author touches upon the topic of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein’s life and thought. (shrink)

This implies that something cannot be both a rule of grammar and at the same time a description of reality. This approach leaves the religious language game forever defining its own rules. The question is then prompted that if religious language does not get beyond itself to explore reality, how did it get started at all. -/- The fundamental reason that I myself stick to the idea that there are right and wrong moral judgments and better and worse moral outlooks, (...) and also right and wrong evaluative judgments and better and worse normative outlooks in areas other than morality, is not a metaphysical one. The reason is simply that that is the way that we—and I include myself in this \"we\"—talk and think, and also the way that we are going to go on talking and thinking. -/- Hume confessed that he left his scepticism about the material world behind as soon as he left his study; and I observe that no matter how sceptical or how relativistic philosophers may be in their conversation, they leave their scepticism or their relativism behind the minute they engage in serious discussion about almost any subject other than philosophy. (shrink)

Ludwig's contribution to the discipline of philosophy of language cannot be overemphasized. This article addresses his contribution to resolving problems in philosophy by the use of language, in two of his most famous works: Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations.

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein’s later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy’s attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. Arranged in sections that highlight the pertinence of the aspect-seeing remarks to aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and (...) consciousness, linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and “seeing connections,” the sixteen essays, which were specially commissioned for this volume, demonstrate the unity of not only Philosophical Investigations but also Wittgenstein’s later thought as a whole. They open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena and concepts surrounding aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy. The volume includes a concordance for the unnumbered remarks in the various editions of Philosophical Investigations, including the latest (4th) edition. (The front matter is posted here. The introduction - "Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein" - appears below under "Published articles."). (shrink)

Em 27 de janeiro de 1937, o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) anotou em seu diário, enquanto viajava para Skjolden, um vilarejo norueguês à beira do fiorde Sogne, onde havia construído em 1913 uma cabana para viver isolado: “Certamente sou singular em muitas coisas & por isso, muitas pessoas se comportam de maneira comum quando comparadas comigo; mas em que consiste minha singularidade?” De acordo com psiquiatras contemporâneos como Michael Fitzgerald, Christopher Gillberg e Yoshiki Ishisaka, a singularidade de Wittgenstein decorria (...) de ele ter autismo. Considerando-se o diagnóstico póstumo feito por esses especialistas em transtorno do espectro autista, este livro tem dois objetivos básicos: (1) detalhar como se refletem na obra de Wittgenstein tanto as suas particularidades comportamentais quanto as suas dificuldades cognitivas, inclusive aquelas relacionadas à linguagem, e (2) mostrar que Wittgenstein “dissolveu” em sua segunda filosofia, especialmente nas Investigações filosóficas, problemas que não são problemas para ninguém valendo-se de conhecimentos linguísticos e filosóficos básicos acumulados no Ocidente desde a Grécia Antiga que ele havia ignorado no Tractatus logico-philosophicus, livro de sua primeira filosofia. (shrink)

In this article, the author analyses the relationship between two prominent philosophers of the 20th century in Europe and Great Britain—Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell. According to a lot of correspondence available nowadays we can reconstruct not only the environment of thought in Cambridge in the beginning and the first half of the 20th century but to find out some very personal, subjective grounds for the changes of relationship between thinkers, misunderstandings between them. Such a kind of biographical-historical reconstruction (...) does not interfere but helps to understand better the origin, development, and criticism of philosophical ideas and theories. In this context, the personal relationship between Russell and Wittgenstein, their friendship for more than 30 years, and mutual assistance, both intellectual and business, played a big role in the development and formation of both philosophers as philosophers. Even mutual disagreements and criticism of ideas over time helped them to see the shortcomings and sometimes even complete failure of their theses and statements. First, the author describes in detail the role of Russell in Wittgenstein’s life: first meeting and inspiration to do philosophy, support in studies, assistance in the publication of Wittgenstein’s first book, support, and facilitation in returning to Cambridge in 1929, obtaining PhD degree and receiving Trinity College grant. Second, the author considers the fundamental points of philosophical disagreements between the two philosophers and Wittgenstein’s critique of Russell’s ideas. (shrink)

In this article, I highlight the role of the notion of meaning for educational administration. I draw attention to Thomas Greenfield's theses regarding the role of meanings in organization. I explore the relations between Greenfield's thesis about meaning in organization and Ludwig Wittgenstein's thoughts about language and meaning. I shed some light on the encounters and distances between these two thinkers. My account is both exploratory and critical. On the one hand, I point to the relationships between meaning, practices, (...) and action in organization. On the other hand, I identify one aspect of Greenfield's thought that can be further explored in the light of Wittgenstein' s remarks about the public character of meaning. (shrink)

This study identified and characterised Wittgenstein’s socialised epistemology. It examined some arguments against Wittgenstein’s socialised epistemology. It also assessed the strength of Wittgenstein’s socialised epistemology in light of the arguments against it. This was with a view to redirecting epistemology from its endless attempts in refuting radical skepticism to providing a solid ground for knowledge in Wittgenstein’s notion of “forms of life”. The study made use of both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source comprised a close reading (...) of Plato’s “Theatetus”, Roderick Chisholm’s Theory of Knowledge, D.W. Hamlyn’s The Theory of Knowledge, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. The Secondary source included books, journal articles and the Internet. The data collected were subjected to conceptual analysis and philosophical argumentation. The results showed that Wittgenstein’s epistemology was a rejection of the orthodox epistemology, which assumed a representational relationship between words and objects in providing valid basis for knowledge. The study discovered that Wittgenstein treated knowledge as a product of epistemic community. It found out that in spite of its shortcomings Wittgenstein’s epistemology remained a plausible alternative approach to orthodox epistemology. It also discovered that contrary to the criticisms against Wittgenstein’s socialised epistemology, there were numerous merits that made it worth adopting as an approach to the problems of knowledge. The study concluded that rather than endlessly seeking to refute radical skepticism, epistemologists should be contented with knowledge as provided by the form of life embedded in an epistemic community. It also concluded that it was in this form of life that the nature of knowledge could be properly understood and attained as a socialised phenomenon. (shrink)

The article is an attempt to pinpoint the areas of Ludwig Wittgenstein aesthetic thought, in which he is crossing the borders principally imposed upon the method and the language of his philosophy. I am directing my attention to metaphysical and mystical motifs of his reflection devoted to aesthetics, the essence of art and the essence of reality. I wish to discuss this issue based on the texts of Arthur C. Danto containing analysis of chosen notions of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic investigations. (...) Additionally in this matter I am appealing to appropriate theses of Leszek Sosnowski and Wojciech Sady, concerning above issues. (shrink)

Overall, it is first rate with accurate, sensitive and penetrating accounts of his life and thought in roughly chronological order, but, inevitably (ie, like everyone else) it fails, in my view, to place his work in proper context and gets some critical points wrong. It is not made clear that philosophy is armchair psychology and that W was a pioneer in what later became cognitive or evolutionary psychology. One would not surmise from this book that he laid out the foundations (...) of the modern concept of intentionality (roughly, personality or higher order thought) which has been further advanced by many (most notably in philosophy by John Searle in “The Construction of Social Reality” and “Rationality in Action”). There is no clear explanation of how W defined the class of potential actions, which he called dispositions or inclinations, (now often called propositional attitudes), differentiating them from perceptions, memories and actions and showing how they lack truth value. He notes that W spent much of his time discussing the foundations of mathematics but fails to provide any explanation as to how this relates to his work on language and logic. In fact, as W came to realize, they are all names for groups of functions of our innate psychology with many differences and none are dependent on the others. It is not really made clear that all our behavior depends on the unquestionable axioms of our evolved psychology and thus differs totally from the testable empirical facts which they enable us to discover. It is not explained that W’s frequent references to “grammar” and to “language games” refer to our innate psychology. All these failings are the norm in behavioral studies. -/- He notes that W described thinking and other dispositions or inclinations (W’s terms)-- (ie, judging, feeling, remembering, believing etc)-- as behaviors and not as mental activities but I don’t see that he really makes it clear that another pioneering discovery of W’s was that dispositions describe public actions and cannot be mental phenomena for the same reason that he so famously rejected the possibility of a private language. -/- He repeatedly and correctly notes (eg, p176) that the core of W’s work is the nature of language but (again the universal failing) does not make it clear that language is for humans (as opposed to animals) almost coextensive with thought (public behavior as W insisted) and thus with our evolved psychology. Like most people, philosophers or not, Kanterian has not followed W and taken the final step towards understanding and describing behavior from an evolutionary standpoint, the only viewpoint that makes sense of it, or indeed of anything. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

L'etica, secondo Wittgenstein, ha a che fare con la mostrazione di un modo di vivere, inteso vuoi come disposizione complessiva del soggetto, vuoi come "habitus". In questo libro, Marta Cassina ripercorre le forme di questa mostrazione nell'opera del filosofo, argomentando, in primo luogo, che il modo di vivere indicato nel "Tractatus" come il contrassegno indicibile della vita giusta e felice debba essere compreso, man mano che il pensiero di Wittgenstein matura, come un "fare" e un uso condiviso della vita; che (...) questo uso, inoltre, possa essere letto nelle sue implicazioni teoretiche e nella maniera della sua genesi attraverso le "lenti" della credenza religiosa e della grammatica del voto di fede. (shrink)

This text offers major re-evaluation of Wittgenstein's thinking. It is a collection of essays that presents a significantly different portrait of Wittgenstein. The essays clarify Wittgenstein's modes of philosophical criticism and shed light on the relation between his thought and different philosophical traditions and areas of human concern. With essays by Stanley Cavell, James Conant, Cora Diamond, Peter Winch and Hilary Putnam, we see the emergence of a new way of understanding Wittgenstein's thought. This is a controversial collection, with essays (...) by highly regarded Wittgenstein scholars that may change the way we look at Wittgenstein's body of work. (shrink)

A critical review of Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty' which he wrote in 1950-51 and was first published in 1969. Most of the review is spent presenting a modern framework for philosophy(the descriptive psychology of higher order thought) and positioning the work of Wittgenstein and John Searle in this framework and relative to the work of others. It is suggested that this book can be regarded as the foundation stone of psychology and philosophy as it was the first to describe the two (...) systems of thought and shows how our unshakable grasp of the world derives from our innate axiomatic System 1 and how this interacts with System 2. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Una revisión crítica de 'On Certainty' de Wittgenstein, que escribió en 1950-51 y fue publicada por primera vez en 1969. La mayor parte de la revisión se dedica a presentar un marco moderno para la filosofía (la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de orden superior) y posicionar el trabajo de Wittgenstein y John Searle en este marco y en relación con el trabajo de los demás. Se sugiere que este libro puede ser considerado como la piedra angular de la psicología y (...) la filosofía, ya que fue el primero en describir los dos sistemas de pensamiento y muestra cómo nuestra comprensión inquebrantable del mundo deriva de nuestro innato axiomatic Axiomatic System 1, y cómo interactúa con el sistema 2. Fue una revolución en la epistemología ya que demostró que nuestras acciones no descansan en juicios, sino en axiomas indudables que conducen directamente a la acción. Situaré el trabajo de Wittgenstein y Searle en el marco de los dos sistemas de pensamiento prominentes en el pensamiento y la investigación de decisiones, empleando una nueva tabla de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2010), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Thirty years ago Richard Rorty detected the similarities between Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953) and the philosophical framework of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), the founder of pragmatism. Rorty tried to show that Peirce envisaged and repudiated in advance logical positivism and developed insights and a philosophical mood very close to the analytical philosophers influenced by the later Wittgenstein (Rorty 1961). In spite of that, the majority of scholars have considered both thinkers as totally alien. Some scholars have attributed the pragmatist flavor (...) of the Philosophical Investigations to the influence of Frank P. Ramsey, who awoke Wittgenstein from the dogmatic slumber of the Tractatus. Nevertheless, the real scope of the influence of American pragmatist philosophy in Wittgenstein's later thought is not clearly known. The purpose of my paper is not to describe the common themes between Wittgenstein and Peirce, but the way in which recent scholarship has established some links between both philosophers. -/- . (shrink)

This is Wittgenstein´s least interesting book, being only random notes dealing with art, music, religion and other areas of culture, taken from his notebooks over the course of his life. But W is never dull and it's a measure of the awe in which he is held that this book was even published. I can´t imagine publishing such a book by anyone else,-certainly no philosopher. Those interested in W should go to nearly any of the other 20,000 odd pages of (...) his works (but NOT the Tractatus!)-but those with little acquaintance be forewarned, though W may seem a shallow tepid pool, if you jump in you may never stop swimming. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) . (shrink)

TLP is a remarkable document which continues to seduce some the best minds in philosophy, with new books and articles dealing partly or entirely with it appearing frequently over a century after it was first conceived. The first thing to note is that W later rejected it entirely for reasons he spent the rest of his life explaining. He was doing philosophy (descriptive psychology) as though the mind was a logical mathematical machine that processed facts, and behavior was the result. (...) Thus, long before computers W gave the ultimate statement of what was half a century later to become known as strong AI, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and most recently DSM (Dynamic Systems Theory). Eventually, W realized that perception and memory were the raw material acted upon by our innate psychology (EP) and logic and math were some of the results. Being able to say or understand anything presupposed EP and trying to make logic primary leads to incoherence, as is evident throughout TLP (and the explanation for its many bizarre statements-see e.g. Hutto). Even so, one can “understand” TLP in the sense that one can state the confusions he labored under and which most of the world still does. I briefly review Wittgenstein’s work in modern context. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). (shrink)

Chapter in Wittgenstein at the Movies, an in-depth explorations of two experimental films on Wittgenstein: Derek Jarman's Wittgenstein and Péter Forgács' Wittgenstein Tractatus.

This article examines the special features of the atmosphere in Habsburg’s Vienna, which led to the formation of such a direction in philosophical thought as a critique of language (Sprachkritik) and the influence its representatives such as Karl Kraus and Fritz Mauthner on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on language. I argue that Sprachkritik was inextricably connected with Sprachkrise (crisis of language), Sprachkrise was a strongly Austrian phenomenon due to special socio-cultural-political reasons and which led to the consideration of (...) the very phenomenon of language from a new point of view. Here I claim that Ludwig Wittgenstein, a ‘product’ of Habsburg’s Vienna, was strongly influenced by the intellectual atmosphere of the critique of language reigning in it. In Roberto Poli’s (1997: 16), scholar in sociology and philosophy, words, the “language-world relationship was a central element of the intellectual debate of those years: suffice it to mention Rainer Maria Rilke and Hugo von Hofmannsthal among writers, and Fritz Mauthner and Ludwig Wittgenstein among philosophers.” . (shrink)

Rom Harré has recently proposed that there is a difference between the driving force behind the early and the later Wittgenstein. According to Harré, in the early work, the major inspiration came from science, while, in the later, it came from religion. I show that only Harré’s first proposal is fully justified. In section one of my paper, I examine the picture theory, the theory of truth-functions, the meaning of propositions, and Tractatus §6.3. In section two, about the Philosophical Investigations, (...) I show that Harré is misleading. In a first step, I argue that science plays the same role in this later work as in the Tractatus, namely the role of source of inspiration. In a second step, I show that science plays also the role of a contrast against which the rich world of meaning can be discerned. I examine this contrastive role not only as regards religion, but also as regards psychology, and as regards the repercussions of Wittgenstein’s later work on science-studies. My final proposal is that the distinction between science as source of inspiration and science as a contrast goes beyond Wittgenstein: it characterises much twentieth century philosophical work in this area. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s writings and lectures during the first half of the 1930s play a crucial role in any interpretation of the relationship between the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations . G. E. Moore’s notes of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge lectures, 1930-1933, offer us a remarkably careful and conscientious record of what Wittgenstein said at the time, and are much more detailed and reliable than previously published notes from those lectures. The co-authors are currently editing these notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures for a book to (...) be published by Cambridge University Press. We describe the materials that make up Moore’s notes, explain their unique value, review the principal editorial challenges that these materials present, and provide a brief outline of our editorial project. (shrink)

The problem of colour exclusion is not fatal to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, nor was it the catalyst for his later philosophy. The remarks in the Tractatus about the impossibility of the simultaneous occurrence of two colours at a point in the visual field sit comfortably with the remarks in the rest of the book, the discussion of mathematical physics above all. Furthermore Wittgenstein’s second thoughts about the impossibility were a consequence, not the cause, of the subsequent turn in (...) his philosophy. (shrink)

This is a review of Miles Hollingworth's recent intellectual biography of Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein si presenta, nel panorama filosofico novecentesco, come uno dei filosofi più originali. Nella fase finale della sua vita, giunge a criticare la concezione tradizionale del rapporto tra mente e significato, per la quale a garanzia della relazione di significazione basterebbe l'accesso che ciascun individuo ha ai propri contenuti mentali, riscontrando quindi il fondamento del significato nell'interiorità soggettiva. Wittgenstein, invece, avanza una prospettiva che pone un "gioco linguistico" con delle regole ben precise come condizione di giudizio del significato di un'espressione (...) linguistica, regole che sono oggettive e condivise, non private, e che determinano precise funzioni del linguaggio e della conoscenza. Lo studio di Wittgenstein trova motivazione se consideriamo che, attraverso i secoli, la filosofia ha sviluppato un suo proprio linguaggio che si è costantemente reinventato e specializzato, a seconda dello sviluppo storico e degli eventi che lo hanno caratterizzato; periodicamente, quando in maniera velata, quando esplicita, essa ha cercato di imitare il linguaggio scientifico, con l'aspirazione di un maggiore rigore espositivo e concettuale. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the "Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics", often refers to contradictions as deserving special study. He is said to have predicted that there will be mathematical investigations of calculi containing contradictions and that people will pride themselves on having emancipated themselves from consistency. This paper examines a way of taking this prediction seriously. It starts by demonstrating that the easy way of understanding the role of contradictions in a discourse, namely in terms of pure convention within (...) a specific linguistic community, is naive and therefore to be avoided. A number of steps will then be taken to formulate and justify what will be called a ‘containment-account’ of contradiction. This term refers to a way of understanding how a contradiction in a discourse can be contained without allowing it to infect the entire discourse with inconsistency. The account builds on work done by N. Rescher and involves complex ontologies that are either over-determined or under-determined at some points. These worlds are such that, for some P, they allow us to deny simultaneously both that P and that -P. They likewise allow us to hold both that P and that -P. The ontological status of P and that of -P are considered independent issues, so as to block the inference from P and -P to the conjunction (P & -P). In this way, the task of containment is carried out by the complexity of the ontology determining the possible worlds under consideration. The paper proceeds by countering the objection that such possible worlds are useless fictions. This is carried out by highlighting three significant areas of application, one in philosophy of science, one in philosophy of religion, and one in the area of epistemology. In general, one may say that, in some language-games, a contradiction can be a useful instrument to attest that rationality goes beyond ratiocination, in other words to indicate that there is more to discourse and practice than what can be expressed in precise algorithmic trees. The upshot of the entire argument is that the proposed ‘containment-account’ of contradiction can be an adequate illustration of how Wittgenstein’s prediction is not sterile, but a possible source of inspiration. (shrink)

No ensaio “Wittgenstein on mathematics”, publicado no Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, Michael Potter procura não apenas analisar por que a filosofia da matemática de Wittgenstein é tão controvertida entre filósofos e matemáticos como justificar essa situação. Com esse intuito, Potter enfatiza o caráter inacabado das reflexões de Wittgenstein sobre a matemática. Neste artigo, tem-se por objetivo explicitar algumas inconsistências e contradições no pensamento matemático de Wittgenstein que ratificam as críticas que esse autor vem recebendo há décadas, mas que não tiveram (...) a mesma atenção dos especialistas que os comentários de Wittgenstein sobre os teoremas da incompletude de Kurt Gödel e suas discussões com Alan Turing sobre os fundamentos da matemática. (shrink)

“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). -/- “Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because (...) it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 -/- "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 -/- “Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 -/- “Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” BBB p125 -/- These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. Sadly Wittgenstein's brilliant exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful. -/- Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and private language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of literature on this topic since but neither W nor anyone else ever makes it clear that the basic argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that distinguishes between two words they cannot have a role in language and there cannot be any such test for private mental phenomena. In between he is describing how System 1 (the automatic functions of the brain) is described by intransitive uses of verbs such as seeing, remembering (i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive) and differs from and blends into System 2- the deliberative linguistic system (e.g. p101, 161, 166 etc). He spends much time showing that disposition words (S2) such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but that their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive verbs (i.e., having Conditions of Satisfaction, which is the phrase Searle invented decades later). They are abilities to act. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Adolf Loos is one of the few figures that Wittgenstein explicitly named as an influence on his thought. Loos’s influence has been debated in the context of determining Wittgenstein’s relation to modernism, as well as in attempts to come to terms with his work as an architect. This paper looks in a different direction, examining a remark in which Wittgenstein responded to Heidegger’s notorious pronouncement that ‘the Nothing noths’ by reference to Loos’s critique of ornamentation. Wittgenstein draws a parallel between (...) the requirement to start philosophy with an inarticulate sound and the need, in certain cultural periods, to highlight the borders of tablecloths using lace. Paying heed to Wittgenstein’s remark sheds further light on a Loosian influence at work in his thinking about modern civilization, both in his well-known ‘Lectures on Aesthetics’ and in the earlier notes from his 1930 lectures at Cambridge. (shrink)

The paper investigates the history of the introduction of what was later called “analytic philosophy” in October 1911–May 1912. Despite the fact that Russell and Wittgenstein were in full agreement in their antipathy towards the old-style philosophy, for example, that of Bergson, each had his own conception of the New Philosophy. For Russell, it meant “examined philosophy”, or philosophy advanced through “scientific restraint and balance” of our theoretical conjectures, and resulted in a series of logically correctly constructed theories. For Wittgenstein, (...) it resulted in syncopated, short logical-philosophical “discoveries”. In the years to come, the two conceptions of “rigorous philosophy” embraced by Russell and Wittgenstein often came in conflict. (shrink)

In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous "rule-following paradox". The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule - the applications of which are potentially infinite - when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical (...) position that there are no facts that we follow a rule but that there are still conditions under which we are warranted in asserting of others that they are following a rule. In this paper, I explain why Kripke's solution to the rule-following paradox fails. I then offer an alternative. (shrink)

This paper examines religious epistemics in relationship to recent defenses of belief-credence dualism among analytic Christian philosophers, connecting what is most plausible and appealing in this proposal to Wittgenstein’s thought on the nature of religious praxis and affectively-engaged language-use. How close or far is Wittgenstein’s thought about faith to the analytic Christian philosophers’ thesis that “beliefs and credences are two epistemic tools used for different purposes”? While I find B-C dualism appealing for multiple reasons, the paper goes on to raise (...) critical concerns about the manner in which it has been applied to the epistemology of religious belief. I argue that this application is at odds with some of Wittgenstein’s best insights, and that it presents a promising but comparatively unbalanced account of religious epistemics. (shrink)

Proporciono un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de Wittgenstein y Searle sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein, que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos — confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo que todas las soluciones son las mismas — observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que (...) sus condiciones de verdad (condiciones de satisfacción o COS) sean claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (el estado claro COS para) cualquier enunciado arbitrario y significado es solamente posible en un contexto muy específico. Empiezo con ' On Certainty ' (‘En Certeza’) y continúo el análisis de los escritos recientes por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva de los dos sistemas de pensamiento, empleando un nuevo cuadro de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punta de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

This chapter outlines ways in which Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism is manifest in his later conception of philosophy and the negative attitude he held toward his times. The chapter tries to make clear how these two areas of Wittgenstein’s thought are connected and reflect an anti-scientistic worldview he held, one intimated in Philosophical Investigations §122. -/- It is argued that the later Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy is marked out against two scientistic claims in particular. First, the view that the scientific method is (...) superior to all other means of learning or gaining knowledge. Second, the view that scientific knowledge is superior to all other kinds of knowledge and understanding. Wittgenstein’s opposition to these claims is brought out through examining a fundamental aim of his later philosophy, producing the ‘kind of understanding which consists in “seeing connections”’ (PI §122), and his attempts to expose certain philosophical confusions. It is argued that these reflect his antiscientistic worldview. -/- Through discussion of Oswald Spengler’s influence on Wittgenstein, the chapter outlines how Wittgenstein’s opposition to scientism underwrites his negative cultural outlook and how this is connected with the anti-scientistic elements of his later philosophy discussed. The work of Ray Monk (1999; 1990) and Hans-Johann Glock (1996) is instrumental in what follows. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...) a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., human ecology and psychology) in school, maybe civilization would have a chance. -/- In my view these articles and reviews have many novel and highly useful elements, in that they use my own version of the recently (ca. 1980’s) developed dual systems view of our brain and behavior to lay out a logical system of rationality (personality, psychology, mind, language, behavior, thought, reasoning, reality etc.) that is sorely lacking in the behavioral sciences (psychology, philosophy, literature, politics, anthropology, history, economics, sociology etc.). The philosophy centers around the two writers I have found the most important, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Now that I think I understand how the games work I have mostly lost interest in philosophy, which of course is how Wittgenstein said it should be. But since they are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put, it due to the lack of perspicuity of language, the problems run throughout all human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning principally with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS),but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles. -/- When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in an Amazon review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research. -/- Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides Standard Social Science Model. Democracy and equality are wonderful ideals, but without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation and any world that adopts them. The monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our children’s heritage for temporary comforts. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the thoughts of System 1) must lead directly to actions. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves an heuristic for how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it,includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth. -/- My writings are available in updated versions as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C . (shrink)

Em sua filosofia da mente, Ludwig Wittgenstein afirma repetidas vezes que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas. No entanto, não apresenta argumentos claros em favor desse posicionamento. Para piorar, os comentadores de sua obra não dão a esse aspecto de sua filosofia a atenção devida. Em vista disso, neste artigo investiga-se por que Wittgenstein tanto insistiu em dizer que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas. A explicação que se oferece é que Wittgenstein o fez visando (...) a justificar seu método conceitual, em detrimento dos métodos científicos utilizados na psicologia. Além disso, são analisadas algumas implicações da afirmação de Wittgenstein de que não pensamos com as nossas cabeças ou nelas a suas críticas à refutação de G. E. Moore ao ceticismo filosófico e a seus ataques à psicologia e à psicanálise. (shrink)

Remarkably, the theological discourse surrounding Hans Frei and postliberal theology has continued for nearly thirty years since Frei's death. This is due not only to the complex and provocative character of Frei's work, nor only to his influence upon an array of thinkers who went on to shape the theological field in their own right. It is just as indebted to the critical responses that his thinking continues to inspire. One recurrent point of criticism takes aim at Frei's use of (...) Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work for theological ends. In his recent book Liberalism versus Postliberalism: The Great Divide in Twentieth Century Theology, John Allan Knight challenges what he sees as Frei's dependence on problematic Wittgensteinian assumptions. This article raises a few concerns about Knight's charges against Frei. Specifically, I argue that Knight's account tends to conflate the work of Wittgenstein and Frei. It does this by undervaluing two determinative features of Frei's work: (1) its basic Christological orientation; and (2) its Christologically motivated use of ad hoc apologetics. I argue that the Wittgensteinian view that Knight attributes to Frei is not Frei's view at all, and is, moreover, a problematic account of Wittgenstein on its own terms. Finally, Knight's claim that Frei's work “depends upon” and “is suffused” with the understanding of Wittgenstein that Knight attributes to him is based upon an account of Frei's treatment of the sensus literalis that is not entirely accurate. Without question, Knight does remarkable service to Frei's legacy by keeping important debates over his work alive. In what follows, I propose several points where I think Knight's account might be further enriched. The result, I hope, will be a more nuanced understanding of the ways that Frei actually appropriated and deployed Wittgenstein's thought. I will contextualize my account of Frei with reference both to Wittgenstein's writings and the literature surrounding his writings. Setting forth these accounts in tandem should help make further available Wittgenstein's work for subsequent work by postliberal theologians. (shrink)

R.C. Pradhan claims in Language, Reality, and Transcendence that, in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, “[i]n no case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding language, as for him philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of language” (Pradhan 2009, xiv). I consider Ludwig Wittgenstein’s purportedly anti-scientific and anti-empirical approach to language in light of advances by philosophers and linguists in the latter half of the 20th century. I distinguish between various ways of understanding Wittgenstein’s (...) stance against scientism. Due to the success of more recent work on language, I argue that Wittgenstein’s critique, as interpreted by Pradhan in Language, Reality, and Transcendence, does not undermine the formal study of language. Nevertheless, I argue, the contention of Wittgenstein and Pradhan that language, through grammar (in Wittgenstein’s sense), serves a variety of functions still sheds light on the differences in meaning across different discourses. I argue that a synthesis of Wittgenstein’s pluralist theory of meaning with elements of a theoretical study of language offers the best comprehensive account of natural language. I will argue that this conception of language is consistent with elements of Pradhan’s interpretation. As Pradhan notes, “The aim here is not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical nuances are not papered over in the name of the unity of grammar” (Pradhan 2009, 28). (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is the most famous philosopher of modern times but very few understand his pioneering work and there has been a collective amnesia regarding him in recent decades. Most of the essays are new but some date as far back as 1979 and whether they give a new view of his ideas depends on one’s understanding of what he said. For me, the interpretations are not new and mostly just as confused as nearly all the other commentary on (...) W and on human behavior throughout the behavioral sciences and by the general public. As usual, nobody seems to grasp that philosophy is armchair psychology, and that W was (in my view) the greatest natural psychologist of all time. He laid out the general structure of how the mind works, which is often referred to as intentionality and is roughly equivalent to cognition or personality or thinking and willing or higher order thought (HOT). He can thus be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary psychology, although hardly anyone but me seems to realize it. W was thus nearly 50 years ahead of his time as the first to reject (though not entirely consistently) the blank slate or cultural view of human nature, though this has gone unrecognized and he has generally been interpreted as supporting a communal consensus view of psychology—exactly the opposite of his overall thrust (e.g., see Short’s comment on p 115). -/- I provide my recent (2016) table of intentionality for a current frame of reference from the two systems point of view before remarking on each of the essays. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

This study which utilized the critical analysis, analyzed Wittgenstein’s concept of language-game and its implications in philosophical discipline and contemporary society. To delineate the origin of the problem of language in terms of epistemological dimension, the researcher analyzed the related concepts on classical philosophy. To determine the origin of the concept of language-game, the researcher used the historical method. To constructively criticize the end-goal of language-game, the hermeneutical approach of Hans Georg Gadamer was employed. From the findings and with the (...) aid of the above-mentioned methods, the researcher had come up with these conclusions. Language is inalienable in the sociological nature of man. Man is always related or connected to the other. In this sense, man shares his very subjectivity with the other. Unless he realizes this, he cannot actualize the essential part of his nature. In every aspect of man’s life, it is imperative for him to negotiate, communicate, and collaborate with the members of his household and society. Wittgenstein is the one of the philosophers who gave deeper commitment and emphasis on the concerns of language in man’s life. Mastering our use of language is not just for the sake of conventional understanding, but, more importantly, we use it in its proper context in order to express our thoughts clearly and in the process to understand ourselves. It is because, as we speak or write using language as medium of communication, we are projecting ourselves to the other. If we come up with the c common understanding, then we will be able to create a harmonious society. This study provided the readers with a better understanding of the importance of proper use of words or terminologies in their proper context. It is because this research delved on the conceptual and analytical mechanisms of using language in order to give a systematic pattern of corrective thinking and application for word’s use. Aside from affirming the importance of language in connection with our contemporary activities, this research looked into a deeper realization on the workings of language. This realization originated from Wittgensteinian context of understanding. As affirmation for Wittgenstein, it is appropriate to say that to understand a word in its proper context is to understand the sentence. To understand a sentence is to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of technique. This signifies that understanding is to know how to do something; in the case of language, understanding language means knowing how to use it. The researcher realized that understanding the meaning of a word is not something private to the mental life of an individual, but something which exist out in the open, in the public domain. This means that understanding the meaning is objectively understandable by people. However, the researcher did not agree with Wittgenstein’s view that philosophy should stop once we clear the way of understanding how our language works. Instead, the researcher adheres to the fact that philosophy as enterprise is an undying process in search for truth. For the researcher, we do not stop philosophizing because our imaginations continue to desire progress in terms of creativity. Thus, he affirmed Gadamer in claiming that we should not hinder our philosophical endeavors by breaking it. Even if we can clear the confusions and misunderstanding of language, still our active minds cling to what is new in the field of learning things. This research led to the formulation of other theories which can be useful tool in understanding the complexities with regards to ourselves and our society as a whole. Henceforth, all the laborious efforts of this research and the regimented time invested in the writing of this work are meaningfully compensated. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein's life and writings attest the extraordinary importance that the art of music had for him. It would be fair to say even that among the great philosophers of the twentieth century he was one of the most musically sensitive. Wittgenstein’s Denkbewegungen contains some of his most unique remarks on music, which bear witness not only to the level of his engagement in thinking about music, but also to the intimate connection in his mind between musical acculturation, the (...) perils of modernity, and the challenge, which was very personal to Wittgenstein, of philosophizing amidst what he believed was a dissolution of the resemblances which unite his culture’s ways of life. In particular, Denkbewegungen contains unique remarks on modern music, the problem of Gustav Mahler’s music, and the music of the future. Also, it contains, among other things, some unusually forward-looking remarks on the differences between Brahms and Bruckner, which both probe deeply into the nature of musical creativity and anticipate his later philosophical move beyond the inner/outer divide in his last writings. I shall offer a close reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music in Denkbewegungen, which situates them in the broader context of his philosophical development in his middle-period and beyond. I aim to show the deep integration of Wittgenstein’s thinking about music with his philosophical development, his deep sense of cultural lamentation, and his development as a person and as a philosophical expositor. (shrink)

Monk’s ‘The Temptations of Phenomenology’ examines what the term ‘Phänomenologie’ meant for Wittgenstein. Contesting various other scholars, Monk claims that Wittgenstein’s relation to ‘Phänomenologie’ began and ended during 1929. Monk only partially touches on the question of Wittgenstein’s relation to the phenomenological movement during this time. Though Monk does not mention this, 1929 was also the year in which Ryle and Carnap turned their critical attention toward Heidegger. Wittgenstein also expressed his sympathy for Heidegger in 1929. Furthermore, though in 1929 (...) Wittgenstein agrees with the early Husserl on relating logic and science to phenomenology, it is not clear that they mean the same thing by either logic or phenomenology, or that they agree on what the relation between the two should be. (shrink)

_Wittgenstein_ presents a concise, comprehensive, and systematic treatment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's thought from his early work, _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,_ to the posthumous publication of _On Certainty_, notes written just prior to his death. A substantial scholarly addition to our understanding of one of the most original and influential thinkers of the twentieth century, by renowned Wittgenstein scholar, Hans Sluga Proposes an original new interpretation of Wittgenstein's work Written to also be accessible to readers unfamiliar with Wittgenstein's thought Includes discussion of (...) the social and political background and contemporary relevance of Wittgenstein's thoughts. (shrink)