In this presentation, I propose a way to (re)interpret conceptualist ideology. Especially, I consider the following two notions: (i) reality as amorphous lump; (ii) existence as a variable concept. For both, the core question is that such notions are somewhat inscrutable. However, there is a tension: those allegedly unintelligible notions are well-understood within (meta-) ontological debates. I try to give a semantic framework where this tension might be resolved. I proceed as follows. In §2, 3, I introduce our framework, based (...) on Conventionalist semantics by Iris Einheuser. Then first, in §4, I consider the amorphous world ideology, our first subject. And in §5, I consider the recent proposal that quantifier variance is just domain variance. In §6, I conclude. (shrink)

The theory of universals faces two opposing demands. On the one hand, it must be explanatory. That is, certain kinds of statements found in our everyday discourse and the theories used to explain them seem to require the existence of universals for their understanding or acceptance. On the other hand, it must be ontologically appropriate. This means that theories that intervene ontologically without sufficient reasons for the existence of implausible entities or theories that result in an excessive proliferation of new (...) entities should not be embraced as theories of universals. The problem is that a theoretically sound theory of universals appears to inevitably involve a tension between explanatory and ontological appropriateness. This dilemma arises from the two aforementioned demands, and it is a genuine dilemma in that it is difficult to give up either demand. Philosophy, or metaphysics, fundamentally aims to explain the facts of the experiential world. If a philosophical theory fails to adequately satisfy our explanatory demands regarding the experiential world, it is not suitable as a philosophical theory. Conversely, it is also undesirable for a philosophical theory to impose excessive ontological burdens. The justification of a philosophical theory is a priori, and any a priori claims about the existence of entities should not be arbitrarily adopted. This article resolves this dilemma as follows: If the explanatory demand requires reduction from an ontological standpoint, it can be adequately addressed through unproblematic means. On the other hand, the apparent conflict between the explanatory demand and appropriate ontology only arises when it is understood as a demand for explanatory priority. However, such a demand does not necessarily require the introduction of any ontological priority. Therefore, there was no need for the dilemma to arise. Finally, I attempt to respond to the demands from natural kind predicates. (shrink)

It is natural to suppose the following three: factivity of knowledge, alda-know synonymy, and the univocity of alda. However, rago-knowledge attribution, expressed by “rago alda” sentences, seems to defeat to hold them at once. In this paper, I try to dissolve this predicament, analyzing “rago alda” sentence as a kind of hybrid language expression. And the theoretical advantages, which my analysis has over other possible, alternative approaches, are to be shown.

One of the most fundamental tasks for philosophers is to comprehend the nature of human activities. Philosophers of language investigate the structure and functioning of linguistic life, while philosophers of science and epistemologists examine the principles that underpin human scientific and epistemic life. Ethicists, philosophers of art, and philosophers of religion explore the foundations and norms that govern practical, creative, and religious dimensions of human life. Just as the exploration of reality beyond human life is an important philosophical endeavor, the (...) study of human life itself has equal significance. Yet, such activity is itself a human one. The fact that philosophizing constitutes a part of human life implies that an inquiry into the nature of philosophical activity is also the philosopher’s duty. Given that philosophical activity often manifests in the form of debates concerning various problems, we are thus prompted to investigate the nature of philosophical debates. This raises the following question: What is the nature of philosophical debates? The present study represents a partial response to this question. Specifically, I aim to address a question that is often overlooked by philosophers: What is the logical structure of ontological debates? In other words, this study aims to explore the philosophical logic underlying ontology-talks. For this purpose, I focus on the logical structure of essential expressions for ontological debates—that is, their logical syntax and semantics. This investigation is significant not only as an exploration of a philosophical task which is not explored, but also as a meta-philosophical undertaking that critically reflects on philosophical activity itself. In Chapter 2, I develop a theory of \(\mathcal{H}^{S\times O}\), a formal language for ontology-describing expressions, which includes counterontological conditionals and ontology-quoting sentences. I argue that a language capable of accommodating ontology-describing expressions must incorporate impossible worlds within its logical space and adopt a two-dimensional structure partitioned along the axes of metaphysical possibilities and ontologies. After defining \(\mathcal{H}^{S\times O}\) within this framework, I outline a translation procedure for ontology-describing expressions into \(\mathcal{H}^{S\times O}\)-sentence forms. I further demonstrate that this translation procedure preserves the logical and semantic properties of the original expressions. Chapter 3 shifts focus to ontology-evaluating expressions. I first analyze their logical properties and subsequently extend \(\mathcal{H}^{S\times O}\) to include these expressions, introducing a set of pure axioms to characterize their formal features. To illustrate the practical applicability of ontological evaluative expressions in actual ontological debates, I introduce and justify three impure axioms and employ them to construct model cases for resolving ontological debates. In Chapter 4, I propose a philosophical interpretation of the second dimension of the logical space articulated in \(\mathcal{H}^{S\times O}\). Here, I advocate a conventionalist approach, arguing that this second dimension represents alternative conventions governing the term “exist.” To justify my approach, first, I critically evaluate three alternative interpretations, demonstrating their limitations. I then argue that to introduce a conventional dimension into the logical space is both natural and necessary. Finally, I provide examples that suggest the view that discourse on ontology can be viewed as discourse concerning the linguistic conventions associated with the term “exist.” The present study seeks to elucidate the logical properties of essential expressions that constitute ontological debates and to theorize these properties through a robust framework of logical syntax and semantics. Furthermore, this study aims to show that the ontological alternatives in question are not merely contradictory situations, epistemically possible scenarios, or fiction. Rather, they represent alternative world-descriptions grounded in alternative linguistic conventions. If successful, this study will contribute to a broader and more profound understanding of the human activity of engaging in ontological debate. (shrink)