Results for 'act-evaluation, agent evaluation'

977 found
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  1. Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common Sense Morality.Paul McNamara - 2010 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume I. Oxford University Press. pp. 202-235.
    The standard analysis of supererogation is that of optional actions that are praiseworthy to perform, but not blameworthy to skip. Widespread assumptions are that action beyond the call is at least necessarily equivalent to supererogation ("The Equivalence") and that forgoing certain agent-favoring prerogatives entails supererogation (“The Corollary”). I argue that the classical conception of supererogation is not reconcilable with the Equivalence or the Corollary, and that the classical analysis of supererogation is seriously defective. I sketch an enriched conceptual scheme, (...)
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  2. Acts, Attitudes, and Rational Control.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
    I argue that when determining whether an agent ought to perform an act, we should not hold fixed the fact that she’s going to form certain attitudes (and, here, I’m concerned with only reasons-responsive attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions). For, as I argue, agents have, in the relevant sense, just as much control over which attitudes they form as which acts they perform. This is important because what effect an act will have on the world depends not (...)
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  3. Understanding Moral Judgments: The Role of the Agent’s Characteristics in Moral Evaluations.Emilia Alexandra Antonese - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (2): 203-213.
    Traditional studies have shown that the moral judgments are influenced by many biasing factors, like the consequences of a behavior, certain characteristics of the agent who commits the act, or the words chosen to describe the behavior. In the present study we investigated a new factor that could bias the evaluation of morally relevant human behavior: the perceived similarity between the participants and the agent described in the moral scenario. The participants read a story about a driver (...)
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  4. Hedonistic Act Utilitarianism: Action Guidance and Moral intuitions.Simon Rosenqvist - 2020 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
    According to hedonistic act utilitarianism, an act is morally right if and only if, and because, it produces at least as much pleasure minus pain as any alternative act available to the agent. This dissertation gives a partial defense of utilitarianism against two types of objections: action guidance objections and intuitive objections. In Chapter 1, the main themes of the dissertation are introduced. The chapter also examines questions of how to understand utilitarianism, including (a) how to best formulate the (...)
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  5. Group Agents and the Phenomenology of Joint Action.Jordan Baker & Michael Ebling - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (3):525-549.
    Contemporary philosophers and scientists have done much to expand our understanding of the structure and neural mechanisms of joint action. But the phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a live topic for research. One method of clarifying what is unique about the phenomenology of joint action is by considering the alternative perspective of agents subsumed in group action. By group action we mean instances of individual agents acting while embedded within a group agent, instead of with individual (...)
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  6. Is act-consquentialism self-effacing?Nikhil Venkatesh - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):718-726.
    Act-consequentialism (C) is self-effacing for an agent iff that agent’s not accepting C would produce the best outcome. The question of whether C is self-effacing is important for evaluating C. Some hold that if C is self-effacing that would be a mark against it (Williams 1973: 134); however, the claim that C is self-effacing is also used to defend C against certain objections (Parfit 1984: Ch. 1, Railton 1984). -/- In this paper I will show that one argument (...)
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  7. Faculty evaluation in higher education: a theory-of-action case study in Vietnam.Lan Anh Thi Nguyen - 2022 - Dissertation, The University of Auckland
    The growth in neoliberal or market-driven higher education has challenged traditional approaches to evaluating faculty members. The involvement of multiple stakeholders (i.e., accreditation bodies, quality assurance officers, administrators, teaching faculty, and students) has led to different and sometimes conflicting needs in faculty evaluation. While extant literature generally suggests that faculty evaluation in contemporary higher education is strongly associated with accountability purposes, little is known about how key agents at the institutional level use evaluation for learning and improvement. (...)
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  8. Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations.John Turri, Ori Friedman & Ashley Keefner - 2017 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 70 (3):504-515.
    Five experiments demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding (...)
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  9. When a Free Act Costs a Motive: Clearing Consequentialism of Conflict.Austen McDougal - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (1):25-39.
    Consequentialist theories that directly assess multiple focal points face an important objection: that one right option may conflict with another. Robert Adams raises an instance of this objection regarding the possibility that the right act conflicts with the right motives. Whereas only partial responses have previously been given, assuming particular views of the relation between motives and acts, an exhaustive treatment is in order. Either motives psychologically determine acts, or they do not – and I defend direct consequentialism on each (...)
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  10. New Frontiers in Epistemic Evaluation.Jennifer Nagel - 2024 - Res Philosophica 101 (4):825-833.
    In forming groups—corporations, teams, academic departments, juries—humans gain new ways of acting in the world. Jennifer Lackey argues that groups need to be held responsible for their actions, and therefore need to be subject to epistemic evaluation. To criticize receptive or reckless behavior on the part of a corporation, for example, we need some account of what it is for a group to believe something, and for a group belief to be justified. In Lackey’s account, group epistemic states are (...)
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  11. A Decidable Multi-agent Logic for Reasoning About Actions, Instruments, and Norms.Kees van Berkel, Tim Lyon & Francesco Olivieri - 1996 - In Johan van Benthem (ed.), Logic and argumentation. New York: North-Holland. pp. 219 - 241.
    We formally introduce a novel, yet ubiquitous, category of norms: norms of instrumentality. Norms of this category describe which actions are obligatory, or prohibited, as instruments for certain purposes. We propose the Logic of Agency and Norms (LAN) that enables reasoning about actions, instrumentality, and normative principles in a multi-agent setting. Leveraging LAN , we formalize norms of instrumentality and compare them to two prevalent norm categories: norms to be and norms to do. Last, we pose principles relating the (...)
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  12. New frontiers in epistemic evaluation: Lackey on the epistemology of groups.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Res Philosophica.
    In forming groups—corporations, teams, academic departments, juries—humans gain new ways of acting in the world. Jennifer Lackey argues that groups need to be held responsible for their actions, and therefore need to be subject to epistemic evaluation. To criticize receptive or reckless behavior on the part of a corporation, for example, we need some account of what it is for a group to believe something, and for a group belief to be justified. In Lackey’s account, group epistemic states are (...)
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  13. Elements of Episodic Memory: Insights from Artificial Agents.Alexandria Boyle & Andrea Blomkvist - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B.
    Many recent AI systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these ‘episodic-inspired’ AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory whilst differing in important respects, and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory’s (...)
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  14. Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Might’? How (not) to Resolve the Conflict between Act and Motive Utilitarianism.James Skidmore - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):207-221.
    Utilitarianism has often been understood as a theory that concerns itself first and foremost with the rightness of actions; but many other things are also properly subject to moral evaluation, and utilitarians have long understood that the theory must be able to provide an account of these as well. In a landmark article from 1976, Robert Adams argues that traditional act utilitarianism faces a particular problem in this regard. He argues that a on a sensible utilitarian account of the (...)
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  15. Traditional Roles of African Women in Peace Making and Peace Building: An Evaluation.Anweting Kevin Ibok & Ogar Tony Ogar - 2018 - GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis 1 (1):41-56.
    The study set out to scrutinize the scope of conflict in Africa and further evaluate the contribution of women to the peace process as well as the challenges such roles impose on them. The study affirms the important roles of women as an agent of peace in which they demonstrated an act of courage and love to end conflicts when men failed. The study shows that there is an overemphasis on women as victims of conflict or sometimes as combatants (...)
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  16. Fantaisies architecturales chez Iakov Tchernikhov : surpasser la mimèsis à travers la phantasia comme agent du progrès.Marianna Charitonidou - 2021 - Nouvelle Revue d'Esthétique 27 (1):131-143.
    L’article examine les « compositions » de Tchernikhov en liant sa recherche constante de nouvelles formes à la capacité de convertir les « fantaisies » en représentations. Contrairement à Aristote, qui conçoit la mimèsis comme l’équivalent de l’entreprise artistique, Tchernikhov perçoit ses « compositions » comme des actes de dépassement de la mimèsis par la phantasia. Les illustrations visionnaires de ses Fantaisies architecturales expriment son intention de remplacer les mots par des images graphiques. Son approche est fondée sur la croyance (...)
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  17. (1 other version)Desire-as-Belief Revisited.Richard Bradley & Christian List - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they (...)
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  18. Agency, Character and the Real Failure of Consequentialism.Kevin C. Klement - 2000 - Auslegung 23 (1):1-34.
    Certain consequentialists have responded to deontological worries regarding personal projects or options and agent-centered restrictions or constraints by pointing out that it is consistent with consequentialist principles that people develop within themselves, dispositions to act with such things in mind, even if doing so does not lead to the best consequences on every occasion. This paper argues that making this response requires shifting the focus of moral evaluation off of evaluation of individual actions and towards evaluation (...)
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  19. (1 other version)Success and Knowledge in Action: Saving Anscombe’s Account of Intentionality.Markus Kneer - 2021 - In Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk (eds.), Context Dependence in Language, Action, and Cognition. De Gruyter. pp. 131-154.
    According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near-universally rejected due to a well-known counter- example by Davidson: a man intending to make ten legible carbon copies might not believe with confidence, and hence not know, that he will succeed. If he does, however, his action surely counts as intentional. Damaging as it seems, an even more powerful objection can be levelled against Anscombe: while act- ing, there is as yet no fact of the (...)
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  20. Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative Prerogative.Uwe Steinhoff - 2016 - Law and Philosophy 35 (2):193-209.
    This paper is not so much concerned with the question under which circumstances self-defense is justified, but rather with other normative features of self-defense as well as with the source of the self-defense justification. I will argue that the aggressor’s rights-forfeiture alone – and hence the liberty-right of the defender to defend himself – cannot explain the intuitively obvious fact that a prohibition on self-defense would wrong victims of attack. This can only be explained by conceiving of self-defense also as (...)
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  21. How common standards can diminish collective intelligence: a computational study.Michael Morreau & Aidan Lyon - 2016 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 22 (4):483-489.
    Making good decisions depends on having accurate information – quickly, and in a form in which it can be readily communicated and acted upon. Two features of medical practice can help: deliberation in groups and the use of scores and grades in evaluation. We study the contributions of these features using a multi-agent computer simulation of groups of physicians. One might expect individual differences in members’ grading standards to reduce the capacity of the group to discover the facts (...)
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  22. Relativized Rankings.Matthew Hammerton - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 46-66.
    In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who (...)
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  23. Emotions, Language and the (Un-)making of the Social World.Frédéric Minner - 2019 - Emotions and Society 1 (2):215-230.
    What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is (...)
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  24. Foundations for Knowledge-Based Decision Theories.Zeev Goldschmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (4):939-958.
    Several philosophers have proposed Knowledge-Based Decision Theories (KDTs)—theories that require agents to maximize expected utility as yielded by utility and probability functions that depend on the agent’s knowledge. Proponents of KDTs argue that such theories are motivated by Knowledge-Reasons norms that require agents to act only on reasons that they know. However, no formal derivation of KDTs from Knowledge-Reasons norms has been suggested, and it is not clear how such norms justify the particular ways in which KDTs relate knowledge (...)
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  25. Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists.Christian Tarsney - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):505-520.
    Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? The most common response to this challenge has been to defend a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent's credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: what would possibly (...)
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  26. The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality.Donald C. Hubin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):445.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalist theories of reasons for acting have been presented with a dilemma: either they are normatively trivial and, hence, inadequate as a normative theory or they covertly commit themselves to a noninstrumentalist normative principle. The claimed result is that no purely instrumentalist theory of reasons for acting can be normatively adequate. This dilemma dissolves when we understand what question neo-Humean instrumentalists are addressing. The dilemma presupposes that neo-Humeans are attempting to address the question of how to act, 'simpliciter'. Instead, (...)
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  27. Ontological-Transcendental Defence of Metanormative Realism.Michael Kowalik - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):573-586.
    If there is something (P) that every possible agent is committed to value, and certain actions or attitudes either enhance or diminish P, then normative claims about a range of intentional actions can be objectively and non-trivially evaluated. I argue that the degree of existence as an agent depends on the consistency of reflexive-relating with other individuals of the agent-kind: the ontological thesis. I then show that in intending to act on a reason, every agent is (...)
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  28. Rage Against the Authority Machines: How to Design Artificial Moral Advisors for Moral Enhancement.Ethan Landes, Cristina Voinea & Radu Uszkai - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-12.
    This paper aims to clear up the epistemology of learning morality from Artificial Moral Advisors (AMAs). We start with a brief consideration of what counts as moral enhancement and consider the risk of deskilling raised by machines that offer moral advice. We then shift focus to the epistemology of moral advice and show when and under what conditions moral advice can lead to enhancement. We argue that people’s motivational dispositions are enhanced by inspiring people to act morally, instead of merely (...)
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  29. The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.
    While much has been written about the functional profile of intentions, and about their normative or rational status, comparatively little has been said about the subjective authority of intention. What is it about intending that explains the ‘hold’ that an intention has on an agent—a hold that is palpable from her first-person perspective? I argue that several prima facie appealing explanations are not promising. Instead, I maintain that the subjective authority of intention can be explained in terms of the (...)
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  30. Agency and Responsibility in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics.Jozef Müller - 2015 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 60 (2):206-251.
    I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...)
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  31. Rethinking quasispecies theory: From fittest type to cooperative consortia.Luis Villarreal & Guenther Witzany - 2013 - World Journal of Biological Chemistry 4:79-90.
    Recent investigations surprisingly indicate that single RNA "stem-loops" operate solely by chemical laws that act without selective forces, and in contrast, self-ligated consortia of RNA stem-loops operate by biological selection. To understand consortial RNA selection, the concept of single quasi-species and its mutant spectra as drivers of RNA variation and evolution is rethought here. Instead, we evaluate the current RNA world scenario in which consortia of cooperating RNA stem-loops are the basic players. We thus redefine quasispecies as RNA quasispecies consortia (...)
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  32. Apparent Paradoxes in Moral Reasoning; Or how you forced him to do it, even though he wasn’t forced to do it.Jonathan Phillips & Liane Young - 2011 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society:138-143.
    The importance of situational constraint for moral evaluations is widely accepted in philosophy, psychology, and the law. However, recent work suggests that this relationship is actually bidirectional: moral evaluations can also influence our judgments of situational constraint. For example, if an agent is thought to have acted immorally rather than morally, that agent is often judged to have acted with greater freedom and under less situational constraint. Moreover, when considering interpersonal situations, we judge that an agent who (...)
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  33. Communicating Praise.Daniel Telech - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces readers to the view that praise is a form of address, or is communicative in the sense of seeking uptake from its target. The proposal that praise is communicative will seem counterintuitive if we take blame to be our paradigm of what it is for a responsibility-response to be communicative. This is because blame is communicative in a manner that intuitively presupposes some normative failure; it involves calling its target to account (or answer) for some wrongdoing. But, (...)
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  34. Lying, uptake, assertion, and intent.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):314-333.
    A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging (...)
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  35. Blame: Taking it Seriously.Michelle Mason - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):473-481.
    Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because the target (...)
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  36. Nietzsche's affective perspectivism as a philosophical methodology.Mark Alfano - 2019 - In Paul S. Loeb & Matthew Meyer (eds.), Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy : The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a philosophical methodology for achieving various epistemic goods. Furthermore, perspectives as he conceives them relate primarily to agents’ motivational and evaluative sets. In order to shed light on this methodology, I approach it from two angles. First, I employ the digital humanities methodology pioneered recently in my recent and ongoing research to further elucidate the concept of perspectivism. Second, I explore some of the rhetorical tropes that Nietzsche uses to reorient his audience’s perspective. These include engaging the (...)
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  37. A Higher-Order Approach to Diachronic Continence.Catherine Rioux - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):51-58.
    We often form intentions to resist anticipated future temptations. But when confronted with the temptations our resolutions were designed to withstand, we tend to revise our previous evaluative judgments and conclude that we should now succumb—only to then revert to our initial evaluations, once temptation has subsided. Some evaluative judgments made under the sway of temptation are mistaken. But not all of them are. When the belief that one should now succumb is a proper response to relevant considerations that have (...)
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  38. The Transmission of Cumulative Cultural Knowledge — Towards a Social Epistemology of Non-Testimonial Cultural Learning.Müller Basil - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.
    Cumulative cultural knowledge [CCK], the knowledge we acquire via social learning and has been refined by previous generations, is of central importance to our species’ flourishing. Considering its importance, we should expect that our best epistemological theories can account for how this happens. Perhaps surprisingly, CCK and how we acquire it via cultural learning has only received little attention from social epistemologists. Here, I focus on how we should epistemically evaluate how agents acquire CCK. After sampling some reasons why extant (...)
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  39. Evidence, Causality, and Collective Action.Samuel Fullhart - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):1-19.
    In collective action problems, large numbers of contributions together produce a good outcome, but any one contribution often makes no difference. Many philosophers think that act consequentialism implies that individuals should not contribute in these cases, given that their contributions cannot be expected to affect the outcome. Nearly everyone has assumed that the relevant expected effects of an action are those effects that are counterfactually dependent on what a given agent does. This assumption is at the heart of causal (...)
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  40. History, Freedom, and Normativity in Cassirer.Michael Gregory - 2021 - In Luigi Filieri & Anne Pollok (eds.), The Method of Culture. Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Pisa: Editioni ETS. pp. 167-192.
    Whether and to what extent Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture contains a normative element for the proper evaluation of symbolic forms is a central question in Cassirer interpretation. In this paper, my aim is to specify the nature of this normative element. I not only assert the existence of a real normative dimension in the philosophy of culture, but also specify the nature of its main element: the concept of freedom. The concept of freedom in Cassirer is by no (...)
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  41. Good Intentions and the Road to Hell.Sarah K. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):40-54.
    G.E.M. Anscombe famously remarked that an adequate philosophy of psychology was needed before we could do ethics. Fifty years have passed, and we should now ask what significance our best theories of the psychology of agency have for moral philosophy. My focus is on non-moral conceptions of autonomy and self-governance that emphasize the limits of deliberation -- the way in which one's cares render certain options unthinkable, one's intentions and policies filter out what is inconsistent with them, and one's resolutions (...)
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  42. Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust.Keith Dowding & Brad R. Taylor - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (2):1-22.
    Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents to (...)
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  43.  36
    Compartmentalization by industry and government inhibits addressing climate denial.Yogi Hale Hendlin - 2025 - PLoS Climate 2025.
    The move from outright denialism by the fossil fuel and related industries to ‘soft denial’ urges reassessing the mechanisms and networks of actors involved in anti-environmentalism. One high-level tactic which harnesses evolutionary psychology and organizational self-protective tendencies to willfully overlook negative outcomes involves compartmentalization. Segmented judgment applies to multiple domains, including highlighting commitments, declarations, and philanthropy as a mask for continuing unsustainability. Selective accounting gives the impression that states and companies are doing enough on climate, that things are not as (...)
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  44. Fire and Forget: A Moral Defense of the Use of Autonomous Weapons in War and Peace.Duncan MacIntosh - 2021 - In Jai Galliott, Duncan MacIntosh & Jens David Ohlin (eds.), Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Re-Examining the Law and Ethics of Robotic Warfare. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 9-23.
    Autonomous and automatic weapons would be fire and forget: you activate them, and they decide who, when and how to kill; or they kill at a later time a target you’ve selected earlier. Some argue that this sort of killing is always wrong. If killing is to be done, it should be done only under direct human control. (E.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Peter Asaro, Christof Heyns.) I argue that there are surprisingly many kinds of situation where this is false and (...)
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  45. Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich międzynarodowej ochrony.Marek Piechowiak - 1999 - Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL.
    PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION Summary The book consists of two main parts: in the first, on the basis of an analysis of international law, elements of the contemporary conception of human rights and its positive legal protection are identified; in the second - in light of the first part -a philosophical theory of law based on the tradition leading from Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas is constructed. The conclusion contains an application (...)
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  46. Beyond Acting-With: Places as Agents?Mog Stapleton - 2022 - Constructivist Foundations 17 (3):201-202.
    Stapleton M. (2022) Beyond acting-with: Places as agents? Constructivist Foundations 17(3): 201–202. Commentary on Laura Candiotto: Loving the Earth by Loving a Place: A Situated Approach to the Love of Nature • I argue that Candiotto's account of loving presumes participating-with a system, rather than acting-with a system. I explore the implication of this: that to love a place we must understand places as agents.
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  47. Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks.Florian Cova - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):35-53.
    Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [. “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [. (...)
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  48. Görüngüsel Muhafazakarlık: Genel Bakış ve Bazı Yaygın Eleştirilere Alternatif Yanıtlar.Utku Ataş - 2023 - Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):34-52.
    Turkish Epistemoloji rasyonel inançların felsefi analizini konu edinmesi nedeniyle gerekçelendirme edimine merkezi bir önem atfeder. Gerekçelendirme kişinin bir önermeye inanmak için gerekçeye sahip olunmasını sağlayan koşul veya koşullar dizisinin tespit edilmesini içerir. İnançlarımızın birçoğunun çıkarımsal olmayan gerekçelerinin bulunduğu şeklindeki ılımlı/yanılırcı temelci perspektifle uyum sağlayan bir gerekçelendirme teorisi olarak Michael Huemer tarafından ortaya konan görüngüsel muhafazakarlık ilkesi, bu türden bir koşulu tanımlar. GM formülasyonuna göre eğer S’ye p olarak görünüyorsa, çürütücü etmenlerin yokluğunda S’nin p’ye inanmak için en azından bir dereceye kadar (...)
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  49. I knew I Shouldn’t Do It; But I Did It: Davidson on Causal Strength and Weakness of Will.Rafael Martins - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):05-20.
    Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not (...)
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  50. Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good.Richard Y. Chappell - 2020 - In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism. New York, USA: Oup Usa. pp. 498-512.
    Consequentialist views have traditionally taken a maximizing form, requiring agents to bring about the very best outcome that they can. But this maximizing function may be questioned. Satisficing views instead allow agents to bring about any outcome that exceeds a satisfactory threshold or qualifies as “good enough.” Scalar consequentialism, by contrast, eschews moral requirements altogether, instead evaluating acts in purely comparative terms, i.e., as better or worse than their alternatives. After surveying the main considerations for and against each of these (...)
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