Results for 'bias towards the future'

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  1. Bias towards the future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (8):1–11.
    All else being equal, most of us typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future rather than the past and negative experiences in the past rather than the future. Recent empirical evidence tends not only to support the idea that people have these preferences, but further, that people tend to prefer more painful experiences in their past rather than fewer in their future (and mutatis mutandis for pleasant experiences). Are such preferences rationally permissible, or are they, (...)
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  2. Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):148-163.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue (...)
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  3. What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?Todd Karhu - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):876-889.
    A person is biased toward the future when she prefers, other things being equal, bad events to be in her past rather than her future or good ones to be in her future rather than her past. In this paper, I explain why both critics and defenders of future bias have failed to consider the best version of the view. I distinguish external time from personal time, and show that future bias is best (...)
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  4. The Rationality of Near Bias toward both Future and Past Events.Preston Greene, Alex Holcombe, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):905-922.
    In recent years, a disagreement has erupted between two camps of philosophers about the rationality of bias toward the near and bias toward the future. According to the traditional hybrid view, near bias is rationally impermissible, while future bias is either rationally permissible or obligatory. Time neutralists, meanwhile, argue that the hybrid view is untenable. They claim that those who reject near bias should reject both biases and embrace time neutrality. To date, experimental (...)
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  5. The Sooner the Better: An Argument for Bias Toward the Earlier.Bradford Saad - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):371-386.
    In this article I argue that we should be prudentially and morally biased toward earlier events: other things equal, we should prefer for good events to occur earlier and disprefer for bad events to occur earlier. The argument contends that we should accord at least some credence—if only a small one—to a theoretical package featuring the growing block theory of time and that this package generates a presumptive bias toward earlier events. Rival theoretical packages are considered. Under reasonable allocations (...)
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  6. Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants (...)
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  7. Why future-bias isn't rationally evaluable.Callie K. Phillips - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):573-596.
    Future-bias is preferring some lesser future good to a greater past good because it is in the future, or preferring some greater past pain to some lesser future pain because it is in the past. Most of us think that this bias is rational. I argue that no agents have future-biased preferences that are rationally evaluable—that is, evaluable as rational or irrational. Given certain plausible assumptions about rational evaluability, either we must find a (...)
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  8. Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.
    People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, (...)
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  9. Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2053-2075.
    Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal (...)
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  10. On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: FutureBias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):181-194.
    Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers (...)
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  11. Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):226-252.
    Until recently, philosophers debating the rationality of time-biases have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. First, there is evidence that our third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about whom we know nothing; given access to some information about the preference (...)
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  12. Why are people so darn past biased?Preston Greene, Andrew James Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Alison Fernandes (eds.), Temporal Asymmetries in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 139-154.
    Many philosophers have assumed that our preferences regarding hedonic events exhibit a bias toward the future: we prefer positive experiences to be in our future and negative experiences to be in our past. Recent experimental work by Greene et al. (ms) confirmed this assumption. However, they noted a potential for some participants to respond in a deviant manner, and hence for their methodology to underestimate the percentage of people who are time neutral, and overestimate the percentage who (...)
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  13. Time-biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research about Time Preferences.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2015 - In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brozek & Lukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press. pp. 149-187.
    The empirically documented fact is that people’s preferences are time -biased. The main aim of this paper is to analyse in which sense do time -biases violate the requirements of rationality, as many authors assume. I will demonstrate that contrary to many influential views in psychology, economy and philosophy it is very difficult to find why the bias toward the near violates the requirements rationality. I will also show why the bias toward the future violates the requirements (...)
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  14. Epicurus on Death and the Duration of Life.Phillip Mitsis - 1988 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 4 (1):303-322.
    Discusses the symmetry argument in Lucretius and defends the Epicurean claim against objections by Nagel and Parfit. Concludes that while the argument is vulnerable to the objection (found in Nabokov) that treating our past and future non-existence symmetrically leaves open the possiblity of increasing our anxieties rather than eliminating them, it remains rational, on Epicurean grounds, not do to so. In the context of Lucretius's overall argument in DRN 3, it bolsters the claim that we do not have a (...)
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  15.  80
    Husserl on Emotional Expectations and Emotional Dispositions Toward the Future. A Contribution to Mindfulness Debates on Present Moment Awareness and Emotional Regulation.Celia Cabrera - 2023 - In Susi Ferrarello & Christos Hadjioannou (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I approach the anticipatory character of experience and the possibility of focusing on the present from the viewpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I do this by analyzing in particular the emotional dimension of expectations. In the framework of Husserlian phenomenology, the concept of emotional expectation describes a subject´s orientation toward what is coming as an affective tension, that is, an emotional way of “being tensed” toward the future. The general aim of the chapter is thus to explore (...)
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  16. Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes 1.Kristie Miller - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):216-232.
    We direct different attitudes towards states of affairs depending on where in time those states of affairs are located. Call this the type asymmetry. The type asymmetry appears fitting. For instance, it seems fitting to feel guilt or regret only about states of affairs that are past, and anticipation only of states of affairs that are future. It has been argued that the type asymmetry could only be fitting if there are tensed facts, and hence that since it (...)
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  17. On the instrumental value of hypothetical and counterfactual thought.Thomas Icard, Fiery Cushman & Joshua Knobe - 2018 - Proceedings of the 40th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.
    People often engage in “offline simulation”, considering what would happen if they performed certain actions in the future, or had performed different actions in the past. Prior research shows that these simulations are biased towards actions a person considers to be good—i.e., likely to pay off. We ask whether, and why, this bias might be adaptive. Through computational experiments we compare five agents who differ only in the way they engage in offline simulation, across a variety of (...)
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  18. Is future bias a manifestation of the temporal value asymmetry?Eugene Caruso, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also (...)
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  19. Rationality and Success.Preston Greene - 2013 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswick
    Standard theories of rational decision making and rational preference embrace the idea that there is something special about the present. Standard decision theory, for example, demands that agents privilege the perspective of the present (i.e., the time of decision) in evaluating what to do. When forming preferences, most philosophers believe that a similar focus on the present is justified, at least in the sense that rationality requires or permits future experiences to be given more weight than past ones. In (...)
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  20. Dossier Chris Marker: The Suffering Image.Gavin Keeney - 2012 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    This study firstly addresses three threads in Chris Marker’s work – theology, Marxism, and Surrealism – through a mapping of the work of both Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida onto the varied production of his film and photographic work. Notably, it is late Agamben and late Derrida that is utilized, as both began to exit so-called post-structuralism proper with the theological turn in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It addresses these threads through the means to ends employed and as (...)
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  21.  11
    Aligning AI with the Universal Formula for Balanced Decision-Making.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    -/- Aligning AI with the Universal Formula for Balanced Decision-Making -/- Introduction -/- Artificial Intelligence (AI) represents a highly advanced form of automated information processing, capable of analyzing vast amounts of data, identifying patterns, and making predictive decisions. However, the effectiveness of AI depends entirely on the integrity of its inputs, processing mechanisms, and decision-making frameworks. If AI is programmed without a foundational understanding of natural laws, it risks reinforcing misinformation, bias, and societal imbalance. -/- Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, (...)
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  22.  17
    The Inefficiency of the Biological Brain and Its Impact on Personal, Social, and Societal Problems: A Perspective Based on the Universal Formula.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    -/- The Inefficiency of the Biological Brain and Its Impact on Personal, Social, and Societal Problems: A Perspective Based on the Universal Formula -/- The human brain, though remarkably complex and capable of extraordinary feats, is inherently limited by its biological structure and inefficiencies. These limitations often lead to errors in perception, cognition, and decision-making, which in turn contribute to a wide range of personal, social, and societal problems. Using the framework of the universal formula, which incorporates the law of (...)
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  23. Risks of artificial general intelligence.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2014 - Taylor & Francis (JETAI).
    Special Issue “Risks of artificial general intelligence”, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 26/3 (2014), ed. Vincent C. Müller. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/teta20/26/3# - Risks of general artificial intelligence, Vincent C. Müller, pages 297-301 - Autonomous technology and the greater human good - Steve Omohundro - pages 303-315 - - - The errors, insights and lessons of famous AI predictions – and what they mean for the future - Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S. Ó hÉigeartaigh - pages 317-342 - (...)
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  24. Exploring Arbitrariness Objections to Time-Biases.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Jordan Oh, Sam Shpall & Wen Yu - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    There are two kinds of time-bias: near-bias and future-bias. While philosophers typically hold that near-bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future-bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been levelled against both near-bias and future-bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this paper we investigate whether there (...)
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  25. The Future Is Not What It Used to Be: Longevity and the Curmudgeonly Attitude to Change.Kathy Behrendt - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (8):557-572.
    Boredom has dominated discussions about longevity thanks to Bernard Williams’s influential “The Makropulos Case.” I reveal the presence in that paper of a neglected, additional problem for the long-lived person, namely alienation in the face of unwanted change. Williams gestures towards this problem but does not pursue it. I flesh it out on his behalf, connecting it to what I call the ‘curmudgeonly attitude to change.’ This attitude manifests itself in the tendency, amongst those getting on in years, to (...)
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  26. Conceptual and Methodological Aspects of Documenting the History and the Future of Monuments Restoration – Towards an Interdisciplinary Perspective.Georgia Zacharopoulou - 2016 - RECENT 17 (3):402-407.
    The objective of the paper is the methodological presentation of the basic principles towards a critical interdisciplinary approach for studying the history of monuments restoration, valid for different cultures. The proposed integrated framework offers the possibility to study and document monuments restoration in various spatial levels e.g. global, continental, international, national, regional, and local. The conceptual and methodological aspects are based on the following fundamental pillars a) the development of science and technology, including relevant history of education, b) the (...)
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  27. Risks of artificial intelligence.Vincent C. Muller (ed.) - 2015 - CRC Press - Chapman & Hall.
    Papers from the conference on AI Risk (published in JETAI), supplemented by additional work. --- If the intelligence of artificial systems were to surpass that of humans, humanity would face significant risks. The time has come to consider these issues, and this consideration must include progress in artificial intelligence (AI) as much as insights from AI theory. -- Featuring contributions from leading experts and thinkers in artificial intelligence, Risks of Artificial Intelligence is the first volume of collected chapters dedicated to (...)
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  28. EXTENT OF FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG PNP PERSONNEL: BASIS FOR AN EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.Henry Legazpi Ligson - 2023 - Get International Research Journal 1 (2):32-44.
    Variations in people’s perceptions of investment risk and financial literacy have been linked in studies. More specifically, Diacon (2016) discovered significant differences between less financially savvy non-experts and financial professionals. Lay people therefore have a larger propensity for association bias (i.e., they give suppliers and salesmen a higher level of credibility than laypeople) and are often less risk-tolerant than financial professionals. The method of sampling that the researcher chose is known as purposeful sampling. According to Easton & McColl, it (...)
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  29. The future of death: cryonics and the telos of liberal individualism.James Hughes - 2001 - Journal of Evolution and Technology 6 (1).
    This paper addresses five questions: First, what is trajectory of Western liberal ethics and politics in defining life, rights and citizenship? Second, how will neuro-remediation and other technologies change the definition of death for the brain injured and the cryonically suspended? Third, will people always have to be dead to be cryonically suspended? Fourth, how will changing technologies and definitions of identity affect the status of people revived from brain injury and cryonic suspension? I propose that Western liberal thought is (...)
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  30. Back to the Future: Retrospectivity, Recovery, and Nostalgia in Rewilding.Linde De Vroey - 2023 - Environmental Ethics 45 (4):359-380.
    In this article, rewilding’s orientation towards the past is discussed. A response is given to the criticisms that condemn rewilding for its retrospectivity, either as nostalgically clinging to the past or escaping history. Instead, it is shown how rewilding can embrace nostalgia as part of a critical, (counter-)cultural vision aimed at the transformation of modern culture. Its main goal can be seen as threefold: first, it is aimed at providing a more nuanced assessment of rewilding’s contested stance towards (...)
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  31. Can we turn people into pain pumps?: On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:1-32.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no (...)
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  32. Future Bias and Presentism.Sayid Bnefsi - 2020 - In Per Hasle, David Jakobsen & Peter Ohstrom (eds.), The Metaphysics of Time: Themes on Prior. Aalborg University Press. pp. 281-297.
    Future-biased agents care not only about what experiences they have, but also when they have them. Many believe that A-theories of time justify future bias. Although presentism is an A-theory of time, some argue that it nevertheless negates the justification for future bias. Here, I claim that the alleged discrepancy between presentism and future bias is a special case of the cross-time relations problem. To resolve the discrepancy, I propose an account of (...) bias as a preference for certain tensed truths properly relativized to the present. (shrink)
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  33. Future Bias and Regret.Sayid Bnefsi - 2023 - In David Jakobsen, Peter Øhrstrøm & Per Hasle (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: The History and Philosophy of Tense-Logic. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. pp. 1-13.
    The rationality of future bias figures crucially in various metaphysical and ethical arguments (Prior 1959; Parfit 1984; Fischer 2019). Recently, however, philosophers have raised several arguments to the effect that future bias is irrational (Dougherty 2011; Suhler and Callender 2012; Greene and Sullivan 2015). Particularly, Greene and Sullivan (2015) claim that future bias is irrational because future bias leads to two kinds of irrational planning behaviors in agents who also seek to avoid (...)
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  34. What is Responsibility Toward the Past? Ethical, Existential, and Transgenerational Dimensions.Natan Elgabsi - 2024 - History and Theory:1-24.
    Today, there is a growing interest in the ethics of the human and social sciences, and in the discussions surrounding these topics, notions such as responsibility toward the past are often invoked. But those engaged in these discussions seldom acknowledge that there are at least two distinct logics of responsibility underlying many debates. These logics permeate a Western scholarly tradition but are seldom explicitly discussed. The two logics follow the Latin and Hebrew concepts of responsibility: spondeo and acharayut. The purpose (...)
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  35. Shaping the Future: Sustainability and Technology at the Crossroads of Arts and Science.Harald Pechlaner, Michael de Rachewiltz, Maximilian Walder & Elisa Innerhofer (eds.) - 2024 - Llanelli: Graffeg.
    The exacerbating energy crises that are wreaking havoc around the globe, as well as the apparent effects of climate change, have spurred, amongst other causes, the concerted orientation towards amelioration aims such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG). Although often presented as not only the solution to these global problems (if adopted wholesale), they are increasingly being used as a vehicle to traffic the centralisation of power and exacerbate growing authoritarian (...)
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  36. Creating a Better World: Towards the University of Wisdom.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - In Ronald Barnett (ed.), The Future University: Ideas and Possibilities. Routledge.
    Universities need to change dramatically in order to help humanity make progress towards as good a world as possible.
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  37. Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):237-245.
    Most of us are hedonically future-biased: other things being equal, we prefer pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future. Recently, various authors have argued that future bias is irrational, and that we should be temporally neutral instead. I argue that instead of temporal neutrality, the putative counterexamples and the rationales offered for them only motivate a more narrow principle I call Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act (...)
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  38. A Faith for the Future.Carl-Johan Palmqvist - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):95-122.
    . In the philosophy of J. L. Schellenberg, “evolutionary religion” is a religious stance oriented towards the deep future. According to Schellenberg, the best form of evolutionary religion is non-doxastic faith in ultimism. I reject Schellenberg’s arguments for preferring ultimism and suggest that committing non-doxastically to traditional religion makes more sense from an evolutionary perspective. I argue that the alignment argument for traditional religion remains sound even when the deep future is considered. Furthermore, I assess Schellenberg’s claim (...)
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  39. Affecting future individuals: Why and when germline genome editing entails a greater moral obligation towards progeny.Davide Battisti - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (5):1-9.
    Assisted reproductive technologies have greatly increased our control over reproductive choices, leading some bioethicists to argue that we face unprecedented moral obligations towards progeny. Several models attempting to balance the principle of procreative autonomy with these obligations have been proposed. The least demanding is the minimal threshold model (MTM), according to which every reproductive choice is permissible, except creating children whose lives will not be worth living. Hence, as long as the future child is likely to have a (...)
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  40. Memory, Anticipation, and Future Bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Shen Pan & Rasmus Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    One proposed explanation for a particular kind of temporal preference lies in a disparity between the emotional intensity of memory compared to anticipation. According to the memory/anticipation disparity explanation, the utility of anticipation of a particular event if that event is future, whether positive or negative, is greater than the utility of retrospection of that same event if it is past, whether positive or negative, and consequently, overall utility is maximised when we prefer negative events to be located in (...)
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  41. Moving ego versus moving time: investigating the shared source of future-bias and near-bias.Sam Baron, Brigitte C. Everett, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Hannah Tierney & Jordan Veng Thang Oh - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-33.
    It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the (...)
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  42. Best explanationism and justification for beliefs about the future.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):429-437.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be understood in terms of explanatory coherence: roughly, one's evidence supports a proposition if and only if that proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence. Their thesis has been criticized through alleged counterexamples, perhaps the most important of which are cases where a subject has a justified belief about the future. Kevin McCain has defended the thesis against Byerly's counterexample. I argue (...)
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  43. Future-Bias and Practical Reason.Tom Dougherty - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the (...)
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  44. Beyond the AI Divide: Towards an Inclusive Future Free from AI Caste Systems and AI Dalits.Yu Chen - manuscript
    In the rapidly evolving landscape of artificial intelligence (AI), disparities in access and benefits are becoming increasingly apparent, leading to the emergence of an AI divide. This divide not only amplifies existing socio-economic inequalities but also fosters the creation of AI caste systems, where marginalized groups—referred to as AI Dalits—are systematically excluded from AI advancements. This article explores the definitions and contributing factors of the AI divide and delves into the concept of AI caste systems, illustrating how they perpetuate inequality. (...)
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  45. Back to the Future: Critical Realism, Education Policy, and the Contextual Legacy of Martin Thrupp.Robert Archer - 2024 - New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies 59:627-643.
    The aim of this article is to extend the explanatory power of Martin Thrupp’s legacy within the framework of critical realism. Specifically, it argues that critical realism’s methodological complement, the morphogenetic approach, provides a metatheoretical toolkit that can deepen and expand Thrupp’s realist analysis of school contexts. The article elaborates on how the morphogenetic approach offers a stratified, temporally phased view of causality that integrates structure, agency, and culture (SAC). By foregrounding SAC, it argues for a layered and nuanced understanding (...)
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  46. Insider and the Academia: the Past and the Future of “Going Native in Reverse” in the Study of Esotericism.Stanislav Panin - 2015 - Aliter (5):3-9.
    The concept of “going native in reverse” reflects the fact that nowadays more and more people involved in new religious movements and esoteric groups participate in academic activities related to the study of religion in general and particularly in the study of their movements. On the one hand, these people bring insider’s perspective in the academia. On the other hand, they bring academic knowledge and critical mind in esoteric community and change it. This situation seems to be a positive tendency (...)
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  47. From the Nadir of Negativity towards the Cusp of Reconciliation.Hub Zwart - 2017 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 21 (2/3):175-198.
    This contribution addresses the anthropocenic challenge from a dialectical perspective, combining a diagnostics of the present with a prognostic of the emerging future. It builds on the oeuvres of two prominent dialectical thinkers, namely Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Hegel himself was a pre-anthropocenic thinker who did not yet thematise the anthropocenic challenge as such, but whose work allows us to emphasise the unprecedented newness of the current crisis. I will especially focus on his views (...)
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  48. Toward the Development of a Superordinate Epistemology for Clinical Psychology: A Critique and a Proposal.Elyse Morgan - 1989 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
    This dissertation addresses the problem of how to evaluate and compare the theories that inform diverse approaches to psychotherapy. It is argued that the field needs a superordinate epistemology to provide legitimacy for its theories and for the clinical work that these theories guide. Such a superordinate epistemology would occupy a higher level of analysis than the theories it is used to evaluate. ;Using a constructivist framework, it is argued that much of the epistemological confusion currently characterizing clinical psychology can (...)
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  49.  77
    The Site of Initiative. Towards a Hermeneutic Framework for Analysing the Imagination of Future Threats.Martijn Boven - 2015 - In Susana Araújo, Sandra Bettencourt & Marta Pacheco Pinto (eds.), Fear and Fantasy in a Global World. Boston: Brill Rodopi. pp. 101-121.
    This article develops a hermeneutic framework for analyzing the representation of imminent future threats. The framework will be derived from the later works of Paul Ricoeur, in which he employs the concept of 'imagination' rather than 'fantasy' (both originating from the Greek term phantasia). Ricoeur posits the significance of what shall be referred to as 'the site of initiative'. It is within this site of initiative that two types of events converge: events that happen to us and events that (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Review of Jürgen Habermas, 'The Future of Human Nature'. [REVIEW]Joel Anderson - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):816-821.
    Habermas's collection of essays "The Future of Human Nature" is of particular interest for two sorts of reasons. For those interested in bioethics, it contains a genuinely new set of arguments for placing serious restrictions on using prenatal genetic technologies to “enhance” offspring. And for those interested in Habermas’s moral philosophy, it contains a number of new developments in his “discourse ethics”—not the least of which is a willingness to engage in applied ethics at all. -/- The real key (...)
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