Results for 'emotion, feelings, consciousness'

965 found
Order:
  1. Emotion and consciousness.Naotsugu Tsuchiya & Ralph Adolphs - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):158-167.
    Consciousness and emotion feature prominently in our personal lives, yet remain enigmatic. Recent advances prompt further distinctions that should provide more experimental traction: we argue that emotion consists of an emotion state (functional aspects, including emo- tional response) as well as feelings (the conscious experience of the emotion), and that consciousness consists of level (e.g. coma, vegetative state and wake- fulness) and content (what it is we are conscious of). Not only is consciousness important to aspects of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  2. Hume’s Science of Emotions: Feeling Theory without Tears.Mark Collier - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his suggestions concerning the social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings.Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Andler - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):191-201.
    We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up with an architecture (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  4. Against Emotions as Feelings: Towards an Attitudinal Profile of Emotion.Rodrigo Díaz - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):223-245.
    Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Robinson and Self-Conscious Emotions: Appreciation Beyond (Fellow) Feeling.Irene Martínez Marín - 2019 - Debates in Aesthetics 14 (1):74-94.
    Jenefer Robinson believes that feelings can play an important role in the critical evaluation of artworks. In this paper, I want to put some pressure on two important notions in her theory: emotional understanding and affective empathy. I will do this by focusing on the nature of self-conscious emotions. My strategy will be, firstly, to demonstrate the difficulty that Robinson’s two step theory of emotions has in accommodating higher cognitive emotional responses to art. Secondly, I will discuss how the tight (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.Uriah Kriegel - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  7. A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (10):E2016-E2025.
    Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  8. Mixed Feelings. Carl Stumpf's Criticism of James and Brentano on Emotions.Denis Fisette - 2013 - In Fréchette D. Fisette and G. (ed.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi. pp. 281-306.
    This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. The feeling body: Towards an enactive approach to emotion.Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson - 2008 - In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  10. Consciousness as an Adaptation. What animals feel and why.Pouwel Slurink - 2016 - In Andreas Blank (ed.), Animals: New Essays. Munich: Philosophia. pp. 303-332.
    Evolutionary epistemology (Lorenz, Vollmer) and value-driven decision theory (Pugh) are used to explain the fundamental properties of consciousness. It is shown that this approach is compatible with global workspace theory (Baars) and global neuronal workspace theory (De Haene). The emotions are, however, that what drives consciousness. A hypothetical evolutionary tree of the emotions is given – intended to show that consciousness evolves and is probably qualitatively different in different groups of animals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Emotional imagining and our responses to fiction.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 46:153-176.
    The aim of this article is to present the disagreement between Moran and Walton on the nature of our affective responses to fiction and to defend a view on the issue which is opposed to Moran’s account and improves on Walton’s. Moran takes imagination-based affective responses to be instances of genuine emotion and treats them as episodes with an emotional attitude towards their contents. I argue against the existence of such attitudes, and that the affective element of such responses should (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Emotions and the body. Testing the subtraction argument.Rodrigo Díaz - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (1):47-65.
    Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. Remembering Emotions.Urim Retkoceri - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (5):1-26.
    Memories and emotions are both vital parts of everyday life, yet crucial interactions between the two have scarcely been explored. While there has been considerable research into how emotions can influence how well things are remembered, whether or not emotions themselves can be remembered is still a largely uncharted area of research. Philosophers and scientists alike have diverging views on this question, which seems to stem, at least in part, from different accounts of the nature of emotions. Here, I try (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience.Tom Cochrane - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1454-1475.
    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. Feeling of Self-Worth in Else Voigtländer.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Concise Concepts by Women Philosophers.
    In Vom Selbstgefühl (1910) (identical to Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls), Else Voigtländer undertakes an accurate analysis of a category of feelings named “feeling of self-worth” and its types. This entry presents Voigtländer's definition, characterization and taxonomy of the feeling of self-worth.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. The Emergence of Human Consciousness: From Fetal to Neonatal Life.Hugo Lagercrantz & Jean-Pierre Changeux - 2009 - Pediatric Research 65 (3):255-60.
    A simple definition of consciousness is sensory awareness of the body, the self, and the world. The fetus may be aware of the body, for example by perceiving pain. It reacts to touch, smell, and sound, and shows facial expressions responding to exter- nal stimuli. However, these reactions are probably preprogrammed and have a subcortical nonconscious origin. Furthermore, the fetus is almost continuously asleep and unconscious partially due to endog- enous sedation. Conversely, the newborn infant can be awake, exhibit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  17. Ambivalence, Emotional Perceptions, and the Concern with Objectivity.Hili Razinsky - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2):211-228.
    Hili Razinsky, free downlad at link. ABSTRACT: Emotional perceptions are objectivist (objectivity-directed or cognitive) and conscious, both attributes suggesting they cannot be ambivalent. Yet perceptions, including emotional perceptions of value, allow for strictly objectivist ambivalence in which a person unitarily perceives the object in mutually undermining ways. Emotional perceptions became an explicandum of emotion for philosophers who are sensitive to the unique conscious character of emotion, impressed by the objectivist character of perceptions, and believe that the perceptual account solves a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Self-consciousness and human evil. Proposal for an evolutionary approach (ASSC 22, 2018).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    Theories have been formulated to address the problem of evil [“The concept of Evil”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]. We look here at a possible origin of human evil in pre-human times by using an evolutionary scenario for self-consciousness based on identifications with conspecifics [“Proposal for an evolutionary approach to self-consciousness”. Menant 2014]. The key point is that these identifications have also taken place with suffering or endangered conspecifics, thus creating in the minds of our ancestors a huge anxiety (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Philosophy and the Emotions.Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    This major volume of original essays maps the place of emotion in human nature, through a discussion of the relation between consciousness and body; by analysing the importance of emotion for human agency by pointing to the ways in which practical rationality may be enhanced, as well as hindered, by emotions; and by exploring questions of value in making sense of emotions at a political, ethical and personal level. Leading researchers in the field reflect on the nature of human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  20. "I am feeling tension in my whole body": An experimental phenomenological study of empathy for pain.David Martínez-Pernía, Ignacio Cea, Alejandro Troncoso, Kevin Blanco, Jorge Calderón, Constanza Baquedano, Claudio Araya-Veliz, Ana Useros, David Huepe, Valentina Carrera, Victoria Mack-Silva & Mayte Vergara - 2023 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  55
    Consciousness.Sam Lerman - manuscript
    There are many bodies, neurons, interacting in a brain. For bodies and interactions to produce consciousness might depend on specific matter and matter interactions, such as specifically those of the neural grey matter and voltages of the brain, or abstract representations and information patterns, such as just the neural firing patterns or those that can be simulated on GPUs. My flipbook thought experiment, elaborated on later in this work, reduces the latter possibility to absurdity. We're able to feel complex (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  53
    Husserl on Emotional Expectations and Emotional Dispositions Toward the Future. A Contribution to Mindfulness Debates on Present Moment Awareness and Emotional Regulation.Celia Cabrera - 2023 - In Susi Ferrarello & Christos Hadjioannou (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I approach the anticipatory character of experience and the possibility of focusing on the present from the viewpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I do this by analyzing in particular the emotional dimension of expectations. In the framework of Husserlian phenomenology, the concept of emotional expectation describes a subject´s orientation toward what is coming as an affective tension, that is, an emotional way of “being tensed” toward the future. The general aim of the chapter is thus to explore the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Equal Rights for Zombies?: Phenomenal Consciousness and Responsible Agency.Alex Madva - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):117-40.
    Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is entirely unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is relevant to moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  25. Musical Feelings And Atonal Music.Elina Packalén - 2005 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 2 (2):97-104.
    Several recent studies in many different fields have focused on the question of how music can be expressive of such emotions that only sentient beings can feel. In philosophy of music the adherents of cognitivist theories of expressivity (e.g. Davies 2003, Kivy 2002) try to solve this problem by explaining that we hear music as expressive of emotions, because we hear the events and contours of music as resembling the typical ways in which human beings express their emotions in behaviour (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. The intersubjective community of feelings: Hegel on music.Adriano Kurle - 2017 - Hegel y El Proyecto de Una Enciclopedia Filosófica: Comunicaciones Del II Congreso Germano-Latinoamericano Sobre la Filosofía de Hegel.
    The purpose of this article is to examine the objective side of subjectivity formation through music. I attempt to show how music is a way to configure subjectivity in its interiority, but in a way that it can be shared between other individual subjectivities. Music has an objective structure, but this structure is the temporal and sonorous interiority of subjectivity. It has as its objective manifestation and consequence the feelings and emotions. These feelings are subjective, and in the level of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Experimental Philosophy of Consciousness.Kevin Reuter - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Experimental philosophy of consciousness aims to investigate and explain our thinking about phenomenally conscious states. Based on empirical studies, researchers have argued (a) that we lack a folk concept of consciousness, (b) that we do not think entities like Microsoft feel regret, (c) that unfelt pains are widely accepted, and (d) that people do not attribute phenomenally conscious states to duplicated hamsters. In this article, I review these and other intriguing claims about people’s understanding of phenomenal consciousness. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. (1 other version)The Origin of the Phenomenology of Feelings.Thomas Byrne - 2022 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (4):455-468.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, I present a distinct interpretation of the inception of the phenomenology of feelings. I show that Husserl’s first substantial discussion of intentional and non-intentional feelings is not from his 1901 Logical Investigations, but rather his 1893 manuscript, “Notes towards a Theory of Attention and Interest”. Husserl there describes intentional feelings as active and non-intentional feelings as passive. Second, I show that Husserl presents a somewhat unique account of feelings in “Notes”, which is partly different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29. How Museums Make Us Feel: Affective Niche Construction and the Museum of Non-Objective Painting.Jussi A. Saarinen - 2021 - British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (4):543-558.
    Art museums are built to elicit a wide variety of feelings, emotions, and moods from their visitors. While these effects are primarily achieved through the artworks on display, museums commonly deploy numerous other affect-inducing resources as well, including architectural solutions, audio guides, lighting fixtures, and informational texts. Art museums can thus be regarded as spaces that are designed to influence affective experiencing through multiple structures and mechanisms. At face value, this may seem like a somewhat self-evident and trivial statement to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. (1 other version)The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment.Joshua May - 2018 - In Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms. New York: Oxford Univerisity Press. pp. 286-306.
    I argue that our best science supports the rationalist idea that, independent of reasoning, emotions aren’t integral to moral judgment. There’s ample evidence that ordinary moral cognition often involves conscious and unconscious reasoning about an action’s outcomes and the agent’s role in bringing them about. Emotions can aid in moral reasoning by, for example, drawing one’s attention to such information. However, there is no compelling evidence for the decidedly sentimentalist claim that mere feelings are causally necessary or sufficient for making (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31. When Do Robots Have Free Will? Exploring the Relationships between (Attributions of) Consciousness and Free Will.Eddy Nahmias, Corey Allen & Bradley Loveall - 2019 - In Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.), Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience. Leiden: Brill.
    While philosophers and scientists sometimes suggest (or take for granted) that consciousness is an essential condition for free will and moral responsibility, there is surprisingly little discussion of why consciousness (and what sorts of conscious experience) is important. We discuss some of the proposals that have been offered. We then discuss our studies using descriptions of humanoid robots to explore people’s attributions of free will and responsibility, of various kinds of conscious sensations and emotions, and of reasoning capacities, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32. What are animals conscious of?Alain Morin (ed.) - 2012 - Columbia Press.
    There is little doubt that animals are ―conscious‖. Animals hunt prey, escape predators, explore new environments, eat, mate, learn, feel, and so forth. If one defines consciousness as being aware of external events and experiencing mental states such as sensations and emotions (Natsoulas, 1978), then gorillas, dogs, bears, horses, pigs, pheasants, cats, rabbits, snakes, magpies, wolves, elephants, and lions, to name a few creatures, clearly qualify. The contentious issue rather is: Do these animals know that they are perceiving an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. The Dynamic Role of Breathing and Cellular Membrane Potentials in the Experience of Consciousness.Jerath Ravinder, Shannon M. Cearley, Vernon A. Barnes & Santiago Junca - 2017 - World Journal of Neuroscience 7:66-81.
    Understanding the mechanics of consciousness remains one of the most important challenges in modern cognitive science. One key step toward understanding consciousness is to associate unconscious physiological processes with subjective experiences of sensory, motor, and emotional contents. This article explores the role of various cellular membrane potential differences and how they give rise to the dynamic infrastructure of conscious experience. This article explains that consciousness is a body-wide, biological process not limited to individual organs because the mind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers.Lorna Green - manuscript
    June 2022 A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers We are in a unique moment of our history unlike any previous moment ever. Virtually all human economies are based on the destruction of the Earth, and we are now at a place in our history where we can foresee if we continue on as we are, our own extinction. As I write, the planet is in deep trouble, heat, fires, great storms, and record (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Breaking the World to Make It Whole Again: Attribution in the Construction of Emotion.Adi Shaked & Gerald L. Clore - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (1):27-35.
    In their cognitive theory of emotion, Schachter and Singer proposed that feelings are separable from what they are about. As a test, they induced feelings of arousal by injecting epinephrine and then molded them into different emotions. They illuminated how feelings in one moment lead into the next to form a stream of conscious experience. We examine the construction of emotion in a similar spirit. We use the sensory integration process to understand how the brain combines disparate sources of information (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36. A Phenomenological Critique of Ratcliffe's Existential Feeling: Affect as Temporality.Joshua Soffer - manuscript
    Matthew Ratcliffe’s model of existential feelings can be seen as a critical engagement with perspectives common to analytic, theory of mind and psychological orientations that view psychological functions such as cognition and affectivity within normative objective propositional frameworks. Ratcliffe takes a step back from and re-situates objective reifications within an interactive subject-object matrix inclusive of the body and the interpersonal world. In doing so, he turns a mono-normative thinking into a poly-normative one, in which determinations of meaning and significance are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Evolutionary Scenario linking the Nature of Self-Consciousness to Anxiety Management (Dec 2017).Christophe Menant - manuscript
    Anxiety is a main contributor to human psychological sufferings. Its evolutionary sources are generally related to alert signals for coping with adverse or unexpected situations [Steiner, 2002] or to hunter-gatherer emotions mismatched with today environments [Horwitz & Wakefield, 2012]. We propose here another evolutionary perspective that links human anxiety to an evolutionary nature of self-consciousness. That approach introduces new relations between mental health and human mind. The proposed evolutionary scenario starts with the performance of primate identification with conspecifics [de (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. (1 other version)A Comparative Consideration of Argument for God’ s Existence from Consciousness.Yar Ali Kurd Firuzjaei - 2020 - Journal of Naqd Va Nazar 25 (1):141-161.
    There is an argument for God’ s existence from consciousness. The argument was initially formulated by Swinburne in contemporary Western philosophy. He claims that no one has preceded him in formulating the argument, except John Locke who had a vague reference to it. The argument considers the existence of mental phenomena, such as feelings, emotions, intentions, and thoughts— which are scientifically unexplainable and merely admit of subjective explanations— as evidence for God’ s existence. Swinburne provides an inductive versions of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Emergence of Levels of Self: A New theory of Consciousness.Pooja Soni - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Pertinent Press.
    This book illustrates a new theory of Consciousness attempting to solve the meta-problem of Consciousness and the mind-body problem using Aristotle's soul as the basis of self-hood. It attempts to solve the mind-body problem by illustrating the transition of the Soul as the body into a mind, using emotional experiences turning into experiences of feelings.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Can Emotional Feelings Represent Significant Relations?Larry A. Herzberg - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (2):215-234.
    Jesse Prinz (2004) argues that emotional feelings (“state emotions”) can by themselves perceptually represent significant organism-environment relations. I object to this view mainly on the grounds that (1) it does not rule out the at least equally plausible view that emotional feelings are non-representational sensory registrations rather than perceptions, as Tyler Burge (2010) draws the distinction, and (2) perception of a relation requires perception of at least one of the relation’s relata, but an emotional feeling by itself perceives neither the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Oh You Materialist!G. Strawson & B. Russell - 2021 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 28 (9-10):229-249.
    Materialism in the philosophy of mind — materialismPM — is the view that everything mental is material (or, equivalently, physical). Consciousness — pain, emotional feeling, sensory experience, and so on — certainly exists. So materialismPM is the view that consciousness is wholly material. It has, historically, nothing to do with denial of the existence of consciousness. Its heart is precisely the claim that consciousnessconsciousness! — is wholly material. [2] ‘Physicalism’, the view introduced by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. A computational model of affects.Mika Turkia - 2009 - In D. Dietrich, G. Fodor, G. Zucker & D. Bruckner (eds.), Simulating the mind: A technical neuropsychoanalytical approach. pp. 277-289.
    Emotions and feelings (i.e. affects) are a central feature of human behavior. Due to complexity and interdisciplinarity of affective phenomena, attempts to define them have often been unsatisfactory. This article provides a simple logical structure, in which affective concepts can be defined. The set of affects defined is similar to the set of emotions covered in the OCC model, but the model presented in this article is fully computationally defined, whereas the OCC model depends on undefined concepts. Following Matthis, affects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The mnemonic basis of subjective experience.Hakwan Lau, Matthias Michel, Joseph LeDoux & Stephen Fleming - 2022 - Nature Reviews Psychology.
    Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In this Perspective, we argue that these subjective qualities can be understood in terms of their similarity to other experiences. This account highlights the role of memory in conscious experience, even for simple percepts. How an experience feels depends on implicit memory of the relationships between different perceptual representations within the brain. With more complex experiences such as emotions, explicit memories are also recruited. We draw inspiration from work (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. Mrs.Sahar Zabihidan - manuscript
    For many years, the human need for the group, social life, and the impact of this form of life on mental health and body have been discussed. This is said to be less about loneliness and the role played by human beings. Loneliness is a global issue experienced by all humans more or less and with their lives. In other words, many people with races, cultures, social classes, and at different ages and times each experience some kind of loneliness. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Introspection.D. M. Armstrong - 1994 - In Quassim Cassam (ed.), Self-Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109--117.
    This paper will argue that there is no such thing as introspective access to judgments and decisions. I t won't challenge the existence of introspective access to perceptual and imagistic states, nor to emotional feelings and bodily sensations. On the contrary, the model presented in Section 2 presumes such access. Hence introspection is here divided into two categories: introspection of propositional attitude events, on the one hand, and introspection of broadly perceptual events, on the other. I shall assume that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  46. Some background and further theoretical consequences of the organism-environment approach: A reply to the commentary by Panksepp.Timo Järvilehto - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):311-319.
    Panksepp (2001) has kindly provided an unexpected and critical commentary on my article “Feeling as knowing” (published in two parts in Consciousness & Emotion; Jarvilehto, 2000b, and 2001), in which I try to clarify some conceptual problems in emotion research on the basis of the theory of the organism-environment system (Järvilehto, 1998a, b, 1999, 2000a). While I am always grateful for any criticism of my ideas, because it is the only way to develop them further, the commentary does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. The trans-species core SELF: the emergence of active cultural and neuro-ecological agents through self-related processing within subcortical-cortical midline networks.Jaak Panksepp & Georg Northoff - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):193–215.
    The nature of “the self” has been one of the central problems in philosophy and more recently in neuroscience. This raises various questions: Can we attribute a self to animals? Do animals and humans share certain aspects of their core selves, yielding a trans-species concept of self? What are the neural processes that underlie a possible trans-species concept of self? What are the developmental aspects and do they result in various levels of self-representation? Drawing on recent literature from both human (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  48. Leibniz's Passionate Knowledge.Markku Roinila - 2016 - Blityri (1/2 2015):75-85.
    In §18 of Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason, Leibniz says: ”Thus our happiness will never consist, and must never consist, in complete joy, in which nothing is left to desire, and which would dull our mind, but must consist in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections.” -/- This passage is typical in Leibniz’s Nachlass. Universal perfection creates in us joy or pleasure of the mind and its source is our creator, God. When this joy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. (1 other version)Else Voigtländer.Ingrid Vendrell Ferran - 1920 - In Hilge Landweer & Thomas Szanto (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, New York: Routledge.
    Else Voigtländer (1882–1946) provided one of the first substantial contributions to the phenomenology of the emotions. Her writings, which unfortunately have remained mostly unexplored, anticipate many of the issues that would become major focal points for later phenomenologists working on the topic. Within the phenomenological movement, Voigtländer was one of the first to study phenomena such as Ressentiment, inauthentic feelings and erotic love. In her book Vom Selbstgefühl (On the Feeling of Self-Worth) (1910), she undertakes an exhaustive study of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. The Intentionality of Pleasures.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. New York, NY: Editions Rodopi. pp. 307-337.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
1 — 50 / 965