Results for 'fallibility of cognition'

944 found
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  1. Roy Bhaskar on Scientific Progress and the Fallibility of Cognition: A Critique of Four Approaches.Maryam Poostforush - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (1):131-148.
    So far, various approaches have been proposed to explain the progress of science. These approaches, which fall under a fourfold classification, are as follows: semantic, functional, epistemic, and noetic approaches. Each of these approaches, based on the intended purpose of science, defines progress on the same basis. The semantic approach defines progress based on the approximation to the truth, the functional approach based on problem-solving, the epistemic approach based on knowledge accumulation, and the noetic approach based on increased understanding. With (...)
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  2. Fallible Heuristics and Evaluation of Research Traditions. The Case of Embodied Cognition.Marcin Miłkowski - 2019 - Ruch Filozoficzny 75 (2):223.
    In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics (...)
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  3. On the Cognitive Bases of Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    I develop an epistemic focal bias account of certain patterns of judgments about knowledge ascriptions by integrating it with a general dual process framework of human cognition. According to the focal bias account, judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generally reliable but systematically fallible because the cognitive processes that generate them are affected by what is in focus. I begin by considering some puzzling patters of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and sketch how a basic focal bias account seeks to account (...)
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  4. Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition.David Godden - 2016 - In Paglieri Fabio, Bonelli Laura & Felletti Silvia (eds.), The psychology of argument: Cognitive approaches to argumentation and persuasion. College Publications. pp. 67-83.
    One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we (...)
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  5. Not Esoteric, Just Fallible: Comment on Starmans and Friedman About Philosophical Expertise.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (10):e12896.
    Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that their experiments (...)
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  6. Cartesian Humility and Pyrrhonian Passivity: The Ethical Significance of Epistemic Agency.Modesto Gómez-Alonso - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):461-487.
    While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in any robust sense of the notion, or as ‘acting’ out of sub-personal and social mechanisms. The important point is that the Pyrrhonian advocacy (...)
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  7. Groundwork for a Fallibilist Account of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 7 (4):823-844.
    According to the received view, genuine mathematical justification derives from proofs. In this article, I challenge this view. First, I sketch a notion of proof that cannot be reduced to deduction from the axioms but rather is tailored to human agents. Secondly, I identify a tension between the received view and mathematical practice. In some cases, cognitively diligent, well-functioning mathematicians go wrong. In these cases, it is plausible to think that proof sets the bar for justification too high. I then (...)
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  8. Truth in memory: the humanities and the cognitive sciences.John Sutton - 2003 - In Iain McCalman & Ann McGrath (eds.), Proof and Truth: the humanist as expert. Australian Academy of the Humanities. pp. 145-163.
    Mistakes can be made in both personal and official accounts of past events: lies can be told. Stories about the past have many functions besides truth-telling: but we still care deeply that our sense of what happened should be accurate. The possibility of error in memory and in history implies a commonsense realism about the past. Truth in memory is a problem because, coupled with our desires to find out what really happened, we recognize that our individual and collective access (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Recalcitrant Disagreement in Mathematics: An “Endless and Depressing Controversy” in the History of Italian Algebraic Geometry.Silvia De Toffoli & Claudio Fontanari - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (38):1-29.
    If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. Their ability to (...)
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  10. An Ethics of Uncertainty.C. Thi Nguyen - 2011 - Dissertation, Ucla
    Moral reasoning is as fallible as reasoning in any other cognitive domain, but we often behave as if it were not. I argue for a form of epistemically-based moral humility, in which we downgrade our moral beliefs in the face of moral disagreement. My argument combines work in metaethics and moral intuitionism with recent developments in epistemology. I argue against any demands for deep self-sufficiency in moral reasoning. Instead, I argue that we need to take into account significant socially sourced (...)
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  11. Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination.Francesco Berto - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1277-1297.
    I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the imagined (...)
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  12. Inference Belief and Interpretation in Science.Avijit Lahiri - manuscript
    This monograph is an in-depth and engaging discourse on the deeply cognitive roots of human scientific quest. The process of making scientific inferences is continuous with the day-to-day inferential activity of individuals, and is predominantly inductive in nature. Inductive inference, which is fallible, exploratory, and open-ended, is of essential relevance in our incessant efforts at making sense of a complex and uncertain world around us, and covers a vast range of cognitive activities, among which scientific exploration constitutes the pinnacle. Inductive (...)
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  13. Rights, Values, (the) Meaning in/of Life and Socrates’s ‘How Should One Live?’: A Rationally-Unquestionable Interpretation.Kym Farrand - manuscript
    This paper expands on another which focussed on Socrates’s question: ‘How should one live?’. The present paper also focusses on the ‘meaning of life’ and ‘meaning in life’ issues, and more on rights. To fully rationally answer Socrates’s question, we need to answer the epistemic question: ‘How can one know how one should live?’. This paper attempts to answer both. And knowing how one should live fundamentally involves knowing what values one should live by. This includes which rights one should (...)
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  14. (1 other version)Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  15. Consciousness as a topic of investigation in Western thought.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 73-136.
    Terms for consciousness, used with a cognitive meaning, emerged as count nouns in the 17th century. This transformation repeats an evolution that had taken place in late antiquity, when related vocabulary, used in the sense of conscience, went from being mass nouns designating states to count nouns designating faculties possessed by every individual. The reified concept of consciousness resulted from the rejection of the Scholastic-Aristotelian theory of mind according to which the mind is not a countable thing, but a pure (...)
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    Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Application to Generalised Anxiety Disorder.Paul Franceschi - 2008 - Journal de Thérapie Comportementale Et Cognitive 18:127-131.
    In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. The latter elements, based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, are applied here to generalised anxiety disorder. This allows to describe, on the one hand, the specific distortions related to generalised anxiety disorder, consistently with recent work emphasising the role played by uncertain (...)
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    Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Over-Generalization and Mislabeling.Paul Franceschi - 2009 - Journal de Thérapie Cognitive Et Comportementale 19 (4):136-140.
    In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we introduced some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements allow to define the general cognitive distortions as well as the specific cognitive distortions. This model is extended here to the description of two other classical cognitive distortions: over-generalization and mislabeling. The definition of the (...)
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  18. Theoretical Virtues of Cognitive Extension.Juraj Hvorecky & Marcin Miłkowski - 2024 - In Paulo Alexandre E. Castro (ed.), Challenges of the Technological Mind: Between Philosophy and Technology. Cham: Springer. pp. 103-119.
    This chapter argues that the extended mind approach to cognition can be distinguished from its alternatives, such as embedded cognition and distributed cognition, not only in terms of metaphysics, but also in terms of epistemology. In other words, it cannot be understood in terms of a mere verbal redefinition of cognitive processing. This is because the extended mind approach differs in its theoretical virtues compared to competing approaches to cognition. The extended mind approach is thus evaluated (...)
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  19. The Formats of Cognitive Representation: A Computational Account.Dimitri Coelho Mollo & Alfredo Vernazzani - 2023 - Philosophy of Science.
    Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety (...)
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  20. Varieties of Cognitive Integration.J. Adam Carter & Jesper Kallestrup - 2019 - Noûs (4):867-890.
    Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent’s cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster-model functionalism—which finds application (...)
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  21. Varieties of cognitive achievement.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1603-1623.
    According to robust virtue epistemology , knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We propose (...)
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  22. (1 other version)A property cluster theory of cognition.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (3):1-30.
    Our prominent definitions of cognition are too vague and lack empirical grounding. They have not kept up with recent developments, and cannot bear the weight placed on them across many different debates. I here articulate and defend a more adequate theory. On this theory, behaviors under the control of cognition tend to display a cluster of characteristic properties, a cluster which tends to be absent from behaviors produced by non-cognitive processes. This cluster is reverse-engineered from the empirical tests (...)
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  23. (1 other version)The metaphysics of cognitive artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):78-93.
    This article looks at some of the metaphysical properties of cognitive artefacts. It first identifies and demarcates the target domain by conceptualizing this class of artefacts as a functional kind. Building on the work of Beth Preston, a pluralist notion of functional kind is developed, one that includes artefacts with proper functions and system functions. Those with proper functions have a history of cultural selection, whereas those with system functions are improvised uses of initially non-cognitive artefacts. Having identified the target (...)
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  24.  67
    Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Personalization.Paul Franceschi - 2007 - Journal de Thérapie Comportementale Et Cognitive 20 (2):51-55.
    In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we did present some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements led to distinguish between the general cognitive distortions (dichotomous reasoning, disqualification of one pole, minimization, maximization) and the specific cognitive distortions (disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction, catastrophism). By also distinguishing between three levels of (...)
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  25. Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search, and the Division of Cognitive Labor.Jason McKenzie Alexander, Johannes Himmelreich & Christopher Thompson - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):424-453,.
    This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led (...)
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  26. Means of cognition and the shifty split between subjective and objective.Debajyoti Gangopadhyay - 2022 - In Bhattacharya Roy (ed.), Nalanda Dialogue Series, Volume 4. Navanalanda Mahavihara , Nalanda. pp. 362-378.
    As the process of formation of knowledge is a perennial concern of philosophical investigation, any systematic study of philosophy, irrespective of Eastern and Western origins, starts with a thorough assessment of our valid means of cognition. Needless to say, that our means of cognitions play a crucial role in scientific knowledge formation also. But the question of delimiting clearly the objective means of cognition from the subject of cognition continues to stimulate epistemological troubles. This has been dramatized (...)
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  27. Who’s afraid of cognitive diversity?Miguel Egler - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1462-1488.
    The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic differences in intuitions, then in line with the CCD there would be a good reason to challenge (...)
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  28. Aesthetic Feelings in Scientific Reasoning.M. Miyata-Sturm - 2024 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (XLIII/1):5-27.
    Scientists regularly invoke broadly aesthetic properties like elegance and simplicity when evaluating theories, but why should we expect aesthetic pleasure to signal an epistemic good? I argue that aesthetic judgements in science are best understood as a special case of affective cognition, and that the feelings on which these judgements are based are the upshots of metacognitive monitoring of the quality of our engagement with theory and evidence. Finding a theory beautiful fallibly signals that it fits well with our (...)
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  29. Moral imagination: implications of cognitive science for ethics.Mark Johnson - 1993 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Using path-breaking discoveries of cognitive science, Mark Johnson argues that humans are fundamentally imaginative moral animals, challenging the view that morality is simply a system of universal laws dictated by reason. According to the Western moral tradition, we make ethical decisions by applying universal laws to concrete situations. But Johnson shows how research in cognitive science undermines this view and reveals that imagination has an essential role in ethical deliberation. Expanding his innovative studies of human reason in Metaphors We Live (...)
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  30. Role of Cognitive Style of a Manager in the Development of Tourism Companies’ Dynamic Capabilities.Oleksandr P. Krupskyi & Tatyana Grynko - 2018 - Tourism and Hospitality Management 1 (24):1-21.
    Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between cognitive styles of managers working in tourism companies and dynamic capabilities of these companies. Design – The research relies on a quantitative questionnaire. Methodology – To answer the research question, the bivariate (Pearson) correlation was applied. A number of 268 answers from people working in tourism were received. Findings – We found a positive correlation between different dimensions of dynamic capabilities of tourism companies. These capabilities are influenced (...)
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  31. Resistant beliefs, responsive believers.Carolina Flores - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
    Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...)
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  32. A taxonomy of cognitive artifacts: Function, information, and categories.Richard Heersmink - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):465-481.
    The goal of this paper is to develop a systematic taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, i.e., human-made, physical objects that functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task. First, I identify the target domain by conceptualizing the category of cognitive artifacts as a functional kind: a kind of artifact that is defined purely by its function. Next, on the basis of their informational properties, I develop a set of related subcategories in which cognitive artifacts with similar properties can be grouped. In this (...)
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  33. Autonomy and the Limits of Cognitive Enhancement.Jonathan Lewis - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (1):15-22.
    In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy-based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition-enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to (...)
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  34. principles of cognitive biology and the concept of biocivilisations.Predrag Slijepcevic - 2024 - Biosystems 235.
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  35. Elements of Cognitive Sciences and Artificial Intelligence in Gayatri Mantra.Varanasi Ramabrahmam - 2006 - In Ramabrahmam Varanasi (ed.), Proceedings of National seminar on Bharatiya Heritage in Engineering and Technology, May 11-13, 2006, at Department of Metallurgy and Inorganic Chemistry, I.I.Sc., Bangalore, India. pp. 249-254.
    The syllables and series of sounds composing Gayatri Mantra, and the sense and meaning attached to them are analyzed using Upanishadic Wisdom, Advaitha Philosophy and Sabdabrahma Siddhanta. The physical structure of mind as revealed by this analysis is presented. An insight of various phases of mind, their rise and set, their significance and implications to cognitive sciences and natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence are discussed. The possible applications of such an insight in the fields of cognitive sciences, modeling (...)
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  36. Williamson on Indicatives and Suppositional Heuristics.Franz Berto - 2022 - Synthese (1):1-12.
    Timothy Williamson has defended the claim that the semantics of the indicative ‘if’ is given by the material conditional. Putative counterexamples can be handled by better understanding the role played in our assessment of indicatives by a fallible cognitive heuristic, called the Suppositional Procedure. Williamson’s Suppositional Conjecture has it that the Suppositional Procedure is humans’ primary way of prospectively assessing conditionals. This paper raises some doubts on the Suppositional Procedure and Conjecture.
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  37. Is behavioural flexibility evidence of cognitive complexity? How evolution can inform comparative cognition.Irina Mikhalevich, Russell Powell & Corina Logan - 2017 - Interface Focus 7.
    Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning, metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight precisely (...)
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  38. The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):744-754.
    This is the first in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  39. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
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  40. The Myth of Cognitive Enhancement Drugs.Hazem Zohny - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (3):257-269.
    There are a number of premises underlying much of the vigorous debate on pharmacological cognitive enhancement. Among these are claims in the enhancement literature that such drugs exist and are effective among the cognitively normal. These drugs are deemed to enhance cognition specifically, as opposed to other non-cognitive facets of our psychology, such as mood and motivation. The focus on these drugs as cognitive enhancers also suggests that they raise particular ethical questions, or perhaps more pressing ones, compared to (...)
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  41. Teleosemantic modeling of cognitive representations.Marc Artiga - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (4):483-505.
    Naturalistic theories of representation seek to specify the conditions that must be met for an entity to represent another entity. Although these approaches have been relatively successful in certain areas, such as communication theory or genetics, many doubt that they can be employed to naturalize complex cognitive representations. In this essay I identify some of the difficulties for developing a teleosemantic theory of cognitive representations and provide a strategy for accommodating them: to look into models of signaling in evolutionary game (...)
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  42. Towards Model-Based Model of Cognition.Karlis Podnieks - 2009 - The Reasoner 3 (6):5--6.
    Models are the ultimate results of all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific) kinds of cognition. Therefore, philosophy of cognition should start with the following fundamental distinction: there are models, and there are means of model-building. Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means of model-building. If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn't we obtain a (...)
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  43. The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.
    This is the second in a series of two articles that serve as an introduction to recent debates about cognitive phenomenology. Cognitive phenomenology can be defined as the experience that is associated with cognitive activities, such as thinking, reasoning, and understanding. What is at issue in contemporary debates is not the existence of cognitive phenomenology, so defined, but rather its nature and theoretical role. The first article examines questions about the nature of cognitive phenomenology, while the second article explores the (...)
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  44. Richard Burthogge’s Theory of Cognition as a Prefiguration of Kantian idealism.Bartosz Żukowski - 2019 - Studia Philosophica Kantiana 1:42-58.
    The paper focuses on the theory of cognition developed by Richard Burthogge, the lesser known seventeenth-century English philosopher, and author, among other works, of Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) and An Essay upon Reason and the Nature of Spirits (1694). Although his ideas had a minimal impact on the philosophy of his time, and have hitherto not been the subject of a detailed study, Burthogge’s writings contain a highly original concept of idealistic constructivism, anticipating Kant’s idealism. Therefore, a closer (...)
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  45. (1 other version)Topological foundations of cognitive science.Barry Smith - 1994 - In Topological foundations of cognitive science. Hamburg: Graduiertenkolleg Kognitionswissenschaft. pp. 3-22.
    This is a revised version of the introductory essay in C. Eschenbach, C. Habel and B. Smith (eds.), Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Hamburg: Graduiertenkolleg Kognitionswissenschaft, 1994, the text of a talk delivered at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science in Buffalo in July 1994.
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  46. The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2):220-242.
    A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws (...)
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  47. A Defense of Cognitive Penetration and the Face-Race Lightness Illusion.Kate Finley - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-28.
    Cognitive Penetration holds that cognitive states and processes, specifically propositional attitudes (e.g., beliefs), sometimes directly impact features of perceptual experiences (e.g., the coloring of an object). In contrast, more traditional views hold that propositional attitudes do not directly impact perceptual experiences, but rather are only involved in interpreting or judging these experiences. Understandably, Cognitive Penetration is controversial and has been criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I focus on defending it from the latter kind of objection and in doing (...)
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  48. Autonomy, understanding, and moral disagreement.C. Thi Nguyen - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):111-129.
    Should the existence of moral disagreement reduce one’s confidence in one’s moral judgments? Many have claimed that it should not. They claim that we should be morally self-sufficient: that one’s moral judgment and moral confidence ought to be determined entirely one’s own reasoning. Others’ moral beliefs ought not impact one’s own in any way. I claim that moral self-sufficiency is wrong. Moral self-sufficiency ignores the degree to which moral judgment is a fallible cognitive process like all the rest. In this (...)
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  49. The Character of Cognitive Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge. pp. 25-43.
    Recent discussions of phenomenal consciousness have taken increased interest in the existence and scope of non-sensory types of phenomenology, notably so-called cognitive phenomenology. These discussions have been largely restricted, however, to the question of the existence of such a phenomenology. Little attention has been given to the character of cognitive phenomenology: what in fact is it like to engage in conscious cognitive activity? This paper offers an approach to this question. Focusing on the prototypical cognitive activity of making a judgment (...)
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  50. Reliability of Cognitive Faculties: A Critic on Plantinga’s View on Atheist Naturalism.Religious Thought, Ahmad Ebadi & Maryam Salehi - 2020 - JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 20 (77):127-150.
    In the naturalism and evolutionism context, the ultimate objective and function of cognitive faculties is adaptation, survival and reproduction. Our cognitive faculties are not developed to generate true beliefs, therefore, but to have adapt behavior. Alvin Planatinga is not at ease with naturalism idea. To him, the problem with naturalism is the non-existence of proper understanding on the manner by which the belief and behavior are interrelated, thus, he concludes that the reliability of cognitive faculties are founded on low naturalistic (...)
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