This article offers an overview of the main first-order ethical questions raised by robots and Artificial Intelligence (RAIs) under five broad rubrics: functionality, inherent significance, rights and responsibilities, side-effects, and threats. The first letter of each rubric taken together conveniently generates the acronym FIRST. Special attention is given to the rubrics of functionality and inherent significance given the centrality of the former and the tendency to neglect the latter in virtue of its somewhat nebulous and contested character. (...) In addition to exploring some illustrative issues arising under each rubric, the article also emphasizes a number of more general themes. These include: the multiplicity of interacting levels on which ethical questions about RAIs arise, the need to recognise that RAIs potentially implicate the full gamut of human values (rather than exclusively or primarily some readily identifiable sub-set of ethical or legal principles), and the need for practically salient ethical reflection on RAIs to be informed by a realistic appreciation of their existing and foreseeable capacities. -/- . (shrink)

Theorists have long debated whether John Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness can be extended to nonideal (i.e. unjust) social and political conditions, and if so, what the proper way of extending it is. This paper argues that in order to properly extend justice as fairness to nonideal conditions, Rawls’ most famous innovation – the original position – must be reconceived in the form of a “nonideal original position.” I begin by providing a new analysis of the ideal/nonideal theory distinction (...) within Rawls’ theoretical framework. I then systematically construct a nonideal original position, showing that although its parties must have Rawls’ principles of ideal justice and priority relations as background aims, the parties should be entirely free to weigh those aims against whatever burdens and benefits they might face under nonideal conditions. Next, I show that the parties ought to aim to secure for themselves a special class of nonideal primary goods: all-purpose goods similar to Rawls’ original primary goods, but which in this case are all-purpose goods individuals might use to (A) promote Rawlsian ideals under nonideal conditions, (B) weigh Rawls’ principles of ideal justice and priority relations against whatever burdens and benefits they might face under nonideal conditions, and (C) effectively pursue their most favored weighting thereof. I then defend a provisional list of nonideal primary goods which include opportunities to participate effectively in equitable and inclusive grassroots reform movements guided by a series of substantive aims. Finally, I briefly speculate on how the parties to the nonideal original position might deliberate to principles of nonideal justice for distributing nonideal primary goods, suggesting that those goods should be distributed in proportion to unjust disadvantage. (shrink)

Since its inception, philosophy has been engaged in comprehending the unity of the world, and its main focus was determined by the intention to reduce to a single basis all the changing diversity of not only natural, but also social phenomena. But that didn't happen. Thus, the search for grounds for the integration of natural science and humanities knowledge is currently a rather serious problem, which has no theoretical solution yet. To solve the problem of integration of knowledge, I propose (...) a new conceptual apparatus of philosophy in the form of a cumulative series of comparative concepts lying between the ultimate abstractions of identification and distinction, which are the concepts of "identity" and "difference". -/- . (shrink)

Two-step proportionality-balancing [TSPB] has become the standard method for human and constitutional rights decision-making. The first step consists in determining whether a rights-provision has been infringed/limited; if the answer to that first question is positive, the second step consists in determining whether the infringement/limit is reasonable or justified according to a proportionality analysis. TSPB has regularly been the target of some criticism. Critiques have argued that both its ‘two-step’ and ‘proportionality’ elements distort reality by (...) promoting a false picture of rights and constitutional decision-making. This would cause negative moral consequences. This article seeks to defend TSPB against these criticisms and to depict it in a more appropriate and favourable light. First, it is argued that both aspects of TSPB do not have the dire moral consequences that opponents suggest they have. Second, it is argued that TSPB, deploying notions such as burdens, presumptions and prima facie/defeasible propositions, constitutes a valuable framework for public argumentation and authoritative decision-making. (shrink)

The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more (...) fact-oriented and less theoretical than physics. However, the key leverageable idea is that careful extension of the science of living systems can be more effectively applied to some of our most vexing modern problems than the prevailing scheme, derived from abstractions in physics. While these have some universal application and demonstrate computational advantages, they are not theoretically mandated for the living. A new set of mathematical abstractions derived from biology can now be similarly extended. This is made possible by leveraging new formal tools to understand abstraction and enable computability. [The latter has a much expanded meaning in our context from the one known and used in computer science and biology today, that is "by rote algorithmic means", since it is not known if a living system is computable in this sense (Mossio et al., 2009).] Two major challenges constitute the effort. The first challenge is to design an original general system of abstractions within the biological domain. The initial issue is descriptive leading to the explanatory. There has not yet been a serious formal examination of the abstractions of the biological domain. What is used today is an amalgam; much is inherited from physics (via the bridging abstractions of chemistry) and there are many new abstractions from advances in mathematics (incentivized by the need for more capable computational analyses). Interspersed are abstractions, concepts and underlying assumptions “native” to biology and distinct from the mechanical language of physics and computation as we know them. A pressing agenda should be to single out the most concrete and at the same time the most fundamental process-units in biology and to recruit them into the descriptive domain. Therefore, the first challenge is to build a coherent formal system of abstractions and operations that is truly native to living systems. Nothing will be thrown away, but many common methods will be philosophically recast, just as in physics relativity subsumed and reinterpreted Newtonian mechanics. -/- This step is required because we need a comprehensible, formal system to apply in many domains. Emphasis should be placed on the distinction between multi-perspective analysis and synthesis and on what could be the basic terms or tools needed. The second challenge is relatively simple: the actual application of this set of biology-centric ways and means to cross-disciplinary problems. In its early stages, this will seem to be a “new science”. This White Paper sets out the case of continuing support of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for transformative research in biology and information processing centered on paradigm changes in the epistemological, ontological, mathematical and computational bases of the science of living systems. Today, curiously, living systems cannot be said to be anything more than dissipative structures organized internally by genetic information. There is not anything substantially different from abiotic systems other than the empirical nature of their robustness. We believe that there are other new and unique properties and patterns comprehensible at this bio-logical level. The report lays out a fundamental set of approaches to articulate these properties and patterns, and is composed as follows. -/- Sections 1 through 4 (preamble, introduction, motivation and major biomathematical problems) are incipient. Section 5 describes the issues affecting Integral Biomathics and Section 6 -- the aspects of the Grand Challenge we face with this project. Section 7 contemplates the effort to formalize a General Theory of Living Systems (GTLS) from what we have today. The goal is to have a formal system, equivalent to that which exists in the physics community. Here we define how to perceive the role of time in biology. Section 8 describes the initial efforts to apply this general theory of living systems in many domains, with special emphasis on crossdisciplinary problems and multiple domains spanning both “hard” and “soft” sciences. The expected result is a coherent collection of integrated mathematical techniques. Section 9 discusses the first two test cases, project proposals, of our approach. They are designed to demonstrate the ability of our approach to address “wicked problems” which span across physics, chemistry, biology, societies and societal dynamics. The solutions require integrated measurable results at multiple levels known as “grand challenges” to existing methods. Finally, Section 10 adheres to an appeal for action, advocating the necessity for further long-term support of the INBIOSA program. -/- The report is concluded with preliminary non-exclusive list of challenging research themes to address, as well as required administrative actions. The efforts described in the ten sections of this White Paper will proceed concurrently. Collectively, they describe a program that can be managed and measured as it progresses. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of numbers based on the numerical equivalence schema, which consists of all sentences of the form ‘#x.Fx=n if and only if ∃nx Fx’, where # is the number-of operator and ∃n is defined in standard Russellian fashion. In the first part of the paper, I point out some analogies between the NES and the T-schema for truth. In light of these analogies, I formulate a minimalist account of numbers, based on the NES, which strongly (...) parallels the minimalist account of truth. One may be tempted to develop the minimalist account in a fictionalist direction, according to which arithmetic is useful but untrue, if taken at face value. In the second part, I argue that this suggestion is not as attractive as it may first appear. The NES suffers from a similar problem to the T-schema: it is deductively weak and does not enable the derivation of any non-trivial generalizations. In the third part of the paper, I explore some strategies to deal with the generalization problem, again drawing inspiration from the literature on truth. In closing this paper, I briefly compare the minimalist to some other accounts of numbers. (shrink)

The APA has recently taken steps to address concerns related to teaching and supporting philosophers and students who come from less privileged backgrounds. I want to add to this project by fleshing out some concrete ways that philosophy professors contribute to the challenges faced by first-generation and financially disadvantaged philosophers and students. I hope that in making these behaviors explicit, it may be easier for faculty to acknowledge and overcome them.

This collection addresses two different audiences: 1) historians and philosophers of the life sciences reflecting on collaborations across disciplines, especially as regards defining and addressing Grand Challenges; 2) researchers and other stakeholders involved in cross-disciplinary collaborations aimed at tackling Grand Challenges in the life and medical sciences. The essays collected here offer ideas and resources both for the study and for the practice of goal-driven cross-disciplinary research in the life and medical sciences. We organise this introduction in three sections. The (...) first section provides some background and context. The second motivates our take on this topic and then outlines the central ideas of each paper. The third section highlights the specificity and significance of this approach by considering: a) how this collection departs from existing literature on inter- and trans-disciplinarity, b) what is characteristic about this approach, and c) what role this suggests for the history and philosophy of the life sciences in addressing Grand Challenges. (shrink)

Contemporary political philosophy in the West is the philosophy of democracy, is democratic theory. Philosophy under democracy has become complacent. Even the recent reaffirmation of communism by influential philosophers such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek failed to inspire a significant following. There has been no radical philosophical reaction to the near-collapse of the capitalist economic system, mainly because any criticism of capitalism would imply a criticism of democracy ("the best possible political shell for capitalism", as Lenin said). Techno-philosophical alternatives (...) to democracy, such as anarcho-capitalist "seasteading", and calls for the suspension of democracy to cure climate change are originating outside academic departments of philosophy. Is there still philosophy if everyone agrees? Is philosophy still philosophy if discontent with the-one-and-only-truth can only be voiced from outside the academy? Or does political philosophy more and more resemble Plato's cave? This paper will venture outside the cave, outside the comfort zone of western academic philosophy as always-already-democratic. Only in this way can it seek to engage in a meaningful dialogue with non-western worldviews. Only by stepping into the light will we illuminate why still, in the twenty-first century, scholars may be justified in studying not democracy, but anti-democracy. Where are the niches of anti-democratic thought that may yet save us from the destruction wrought upon the world by the failing capitalist-democratic complex? What are the political trends against democracy we miss at our peril and what are their philosophical implications, worldwide? What are the new alternatives to democracy that emerge in our day? Free of self-imposed prejudice, this paper rejects the boycott of thought that does not comply with western inhibitions, and refuses to shy away from the encounter of philosophical positions emanating from non-democratic political practices. Philosophy is not blind, it does not condone any ideologies uncritically, and philosophy does not equal democracy. (shrink)

The literature of Twelve Step groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous contains apparently contradictory implications regarding powerlessness and personal responsibility. In this essay I examine the treatment of these concepts in Twelve Step literature and their implications for the self-conception of people in these programs. In the first section, I examine the literature to demonstrate that addicts are presented as powerless over, yet responsible for, their addictive behaviors. In the second section, I outline two potential ways people in (...) Twelve Step programs might reconcile this contradiction within their self-conception, but I argue that neither is satisfactory. In the third section, I draw on Paul Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity to develop an account of how someone ni a Twelve Step group could coherently understand herself as both powerless and responsible. (shrink)

Purpose To first articulate and then illustrate a descriptive theoretical model of documentation (i.e., document creation) suitable for analysis of the experiential, first-person perspective. Design/methodology/approach Three models of documentation in the literature are presented and synthesized into a new model. This model is then used to understand the findings from a phenomenology-of-practice study of the work of seven visual artists as they each created a self-portrait, understood here as a form of documentation. Findings A number of themes are (...) found to express the first-person experience of art-making in these examples, including communicating, memories, reference materials, taking breaks and stepping back. The themes are discussed with an eye toward articulating what is shared and unique in these experiences. Finally, the themes are mapped successfully to the theoretical model. Research limitations/implications The study involved artists creating self-portraits, and further research will be required to determine if the thematic findings are unique to self-portraiture or apply as well to art-making, to documentation generally, etc. Still, the theoretical model developed here seems useful for analyzing documentation experiences. Practical implications As many activities and tasks in contemporary life can be conceptualized as documentation, this model provides a valuable analytical tool for better understanding those experiences. This can ground education and management decisions for those involved. Originality/value This paper makes conceptual and empirical contributions to document theory and the study of the information behavior of artists, particularly furthering discussions of information and document experience. (shrink)

Baseball is an exceptionally superstitious sport. But what are we to say about the rationality of such superstitious behavior? On the one hand, we can trace much of the superstitious behavior we see in baseball to a type of irrational belief. But how deep does this supposed irrationality run? It appears that superstitions may occupy various places on the spectrum of irrationality — from motivated ignorance to self-deception to psychological compulsion —depending on the type of superstitious belief at work and (...) on the means of formation and/or maintenance of that belief. In this paper, I first examine the various types of superstitions we find in baseball culture, in an attempt to see what these different kinds of superstitions might have in common. I then lay out a working definition of superstition within a baseball context by examining the general psychology underlying such behavior, in an attempt to ascertain the possible causal and/or motivational reasons for the acquisition of superstitious beliefs and practices in sports like baseball. Finally, I argue that, in addition to superstitions acquired merely via the workings of a type of biasing mechanism, there also appear to be genuine cases of superstition acquisition and maintenance, in which the agent may be said to be actively engaged. I claim that in at least some cases of superstitious belief, it is possible that agents are employing an awareness of their own rational epistemic standards to allow themselves to believe and act irrationally, and that the result of such “pseudo-rational” behavior is perhaps a form of self-deceptive superstitious belief. (shrink)

Sabine Hohl and Dominic Roser argue that states that emit their fair share of greenhouse gases have a duty to step in for states that emit more than their fair share. In this comment I ask two questions: First, given that Hohl and Roser are right, how relevant is the duty to step in for the polluters in practice? Second, is there such a duty on more non-ideal approaches than the one taken by Hohl and Roser as (...) well? I argue that the duty to step in for the polluters is not very relevant (because of considerations of demandingness and fairness) and that on more extremely non-ideal approaches there may be only a limited duty to take up the slack, or no such duty at all (because the duty must be weighed against other duties, and because states are poorly motivated to act in conformity with it). (shrink)

For among most contemporaries, the concept of Eros seems to have nothing to do with Christianity. Sifting through the psychoanalysis of sexual fantasy, theologically it says nothing. Our study gives reasons showing that for theologians since the dawn of the Christian era, Eros-love plays a fundamental role.. The connotations of this concept, however, are different from those of today, when its sensory meaning is more restricted to sexuality. Greek theologians of the first centuries after Christ, taught the concept of (...) Plato enshrined as a unifying enthusiasm, the attraction of inferior to superior states, as “hungry and thirsty” for something continuously higher, developing, and enriching the connotation. The work of Dionysius Areopagite, the Idea of Good, leads us step by step up the ascent of the erotically chaste, and is identified with the One-God, who is the very source of love. Consequently, Eros-love originates from God, Eros- love being not only an ascending but firstly a descending love, which calls for a reciprocal communion. (shrink)

Invited papers from PT-AI 2011. - Vincent C. Müller: Introduction: Theory and Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence - Nick Bostrom: The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents - Hubert L. Dreyfus: A History of First Step Fallacies - Antoni Gomila, David Travieso and Lorena Lobo: Wherein is Human Cognition Systematic - J. Kevin O'Regan: How to Build a Robot that Is Conscious and Feels - Oron Shagrir: Computation, Implementation, Cognition.

Will I die? As a hypothesis, in my natural scientific understanding, the psyche, is nothing more than, and exclusively just some states of my living brain – I will die as a result of his death. -/- In presented answer, psyche – itself own immediate reality itself, that is – undoubted. -/- This work was performed in reality “in the first person” (“subjective reality”, “phenomenal consciousness”). To realize, how, what it is the reality of the “in the first (...) person” let’s imagine ourselves as an experimenter, who does not replace reality with reasoning about it. – Now for us, as experimenters, how (what it is) psychic is an immediate and undoubted reality. And the awareness of “I am” is a direct reality, and not knowledge about it, which is always doubtful. That is, in psychic reality, nothing prevents us from answering undoubtedly and definitively the question, asked by this psychic reality itself about itself. The author acts from the position of “being in reality – not going beyond its limits, for example, into philosophy” (philosophy, including methodology, is the replacement of reality itself with always dubious reasoning about reality) – explores phenomenal consciousness (“psychic”) directly and as an immediate reality. That is, this work is the mastery of psychic reality through subjective-psychical experimentation – don’t philosophize, but experiment! -/- For example, Descartes, introspectively experimenting in his own psyche reality with his own psyche, informed us about the immutability of the “mind” and proposed to understand this immutability as our own immortality: “the mind does not represent any combination of accidents, it is a pure substance, and although all its accidents are subject to change, it understands some things, it desires others or feels others, etc. – nevertheless, in itself it does not change; and as for the human body, it changes, if only because they are subject to a change in the shape of some of its parts. It follows from this that the body perishes very easily, while the mind, by its very nature, is immortal” (Декарт Р., p. 13). Note that, Descartes did not realize that he was immortal, but logically deduced his own immortality from the immutability of the mind. However, Descartes’ unchanging “mind” itself is such that there is something to die. And in my natural scientific understanding, the immutability of the mind does not imply its immortality – it will die without changing in its subjective self-perception, while instantly fading away as a result of brain death. Psyche (psychical) – a designation of the fact that this is one’s own immediate reality (that is, undoubtedly) – how (what) I myself am immediately, undoubtedly, and that immediate reality of mine, how and through which I myself and everything in general for me there is, and which is exclusively the only one for me. It should be noted that while I am unconscious (brain injury or dreamless sleep), there is nothing at all. -/- But this does not mean that “I”, having completely gone into oblivion, I'll die. This does not exclude that, I will disappear completely into oblivion and does not exist, but (at the same time) “I” – am. So, let’s define immortality as the impossibility of dying because there is nothing to die (psychic, but is such that there is nothing to die – is immortal) and will make a conclusion important for this work: if I am, as psyche, exclusively only is such that there is something to die and nothing else, then, therefore, my death is not excluded. But am I like that? The idea of this work is that I, as a psyche can to manifest (reveal) and realize myself as such (I such), that there is nothing to die, but (at the same time) I – am. I will realize of myself as immortal – such that to die (to decease) nothing. In other words, if I will approach with a bias and, acting purposefully, will reveal the subjective reality “I (psyche) such is that to die (to decease) nothing, but I – am”, that is – I am immortal, that the hypothesis “I will die” will falsified and excluded. -/- To realize this in the work, it is proposed to use the subject-object model, shift the boundary of “I” to the pole of the subject and become objectless, manifesting (revealing) oneself as such that there is nothing to die. Therefore, the aim (goal) of the work – to realize: I – am, but such that there is to die (decease) nothing. To become objectless and wondering about the possibility to dying, as a result, or I will exclude the immortality of the manifested state, or I will manifest (will reveal) immortal undoubtedly and definitively. -/- At the same time, I, as a subject, am “a necessary pole of subject-object relations. … An object is what the activity of … a subject is directed at. … In fact, everything that exists can become an object. … it is important to keep in mind the fundamental fact that the object is always outside the subject, does not merge with it. This externality also takes place when the subject deals with the states of his own consciousness, his Self ... it is important to emphasize that the relation of the subject and the object is not the relation of two different worlds, but only two poles as part of some unity” (Лекторский В.А., p. 6-7). That is, everything that I find existing in myself, this (such) is as an object. “The subject always refers to all “objects”, but it can never become an object for itself” (Титлин Л.И., p. 23). “… you will not be able to see the seeing vision ...” (Титлин Л.И., p. 40), and in this model this implies the “limit” of the subject. As the limit of the subject, I am “objectless”. And, therefore, in its own pole the subject is “ideal” – in its (own) limit (as its own limit, its own limit), I do not exist for myself (non-existent). -/- Using the “fact of the mobility of the boundaries of the subject” (for example, Тхостов А.Ш., p. 16), I have the opportunity to “pull” the boundary of the “I” into myself and become my own limit. At the same time, it is necessary to realize and accept that “inside” the limit of the subject and behind – “beyond of the subject”, and in general the very “inside” and “behind” in this version – unreality. In such a subject limit, the required paradoxical subjective state is assumed – I exist and see, but at the same time I am such that I do not exist for myself, that is, I am, but (subjectively such that) there is nothing to die (“immortality”). -/- Accordingly, the following tasks are indicated in the experiment: 1. In the object-subject sphere of visual perception, shift (and shift) the boundary of “I” into oneself –» to run into one’s own limit and become one’s own limit (without thickness: without depth, without “from within” and without reverse side) –» 2. Having become your own limit, which in its own limit is, but for myself I do not exist (non-existent), realize: • Myself – I am and this is real; • Will I die? – or there is nothing to die, which of the options is to me, as a psyche (as itself the psychic “I”), is applicable: • or I am such that it is not impossible that I will die, and the realized state is not immortal; • or “I” am such that “I” – am (is reality), but such that myself “I” to die nothing, that is, my own immortality – I am immortal; • Is this real? -/- Instruction for reproducing the target result: sequence of actions and results in a subjective-psychic experiment (hereinafter referred to as SPE) -/- At a distance of 25-40 cm from the wall (so that the wall occupies the entire field of view or its overwhelming part), • Here and now, focus on your face: “I am” – reality (and not is the knowing about it). • In yourself step back and look out of yourself at this wall. • Without moving your head, cover the field of vision with your attention as wide as possible and at the same time perceive everything at once (all this) as a single whole. • Perceive a high and wide wall (option: look up at an angle of 135-150 degrees in front of you) in such a way that the space (volume) surveyed by you without turning your head is a closed asymmetrical “lens” • limited in a circle in the periphery of the field of view, • convex in you; You – the beholder, rearwards concave in self (“subject”) – which one of you are watching? • Without moving your head, perceive the field of view as a single whole –» • Into yourself “draw in” –» “backing away” –» step back from everything –» • lean back into yourself –» up to dead-end limit –» • become a dead end itself – a concave (reflector-like) limit-plane. • You – into yourself – backward concave – a perceiving visual screen (limit-dead end), plane –» • lean back and press –» • something in general somehow inside the dead-end plane and behind the dead-end plane, as well as “inside” and “behind”, “behind the dead-end plane” – unreality; • myself – a dead-end plane without thickness (depth), without “inside”, without a reverse side for oneself. • –» That is, as a psychic reality (what is it psychically) will I die? –» or • Something there is, and that is I will die (it is possible); or • I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am. or • Subjective-psychic experiment is incomplete… • –» Realize that this is reality (realize the reality of it) and emphasize (answer). -/- As a result, “I” am, but there is nothing to die/not to die, that is, the hypothesis “I will die” is unrealistic. -/- Remarks -/- • Each completed SPE is completed with the target result: “I am such that there is nothing to die, but I – am”. And the that what I will die (not excluded) does not correspond to this, that is unreality and is excluded by this. • But I am not such that I will not die. The concepts “I will die/ I will not die” to me, as a psyche are not applicable. That is, I, as a psyche, is immortal, but I am not eternal (not eternal – endlessly lasting, such that there is something to last) – to last, to be eternal and to end there is nothing. This is “immortality”. • In the target result of this work, I – am, but such that there is nothing to die/not die (“immortality”). And such a “I” is not the Atman of the Hindu schools of Nyaya, Vaisheshika and Purva Mimamsa, which E.A. Torchinov. Since the “I” – psychic, and not a substance with the psyche as an attributes. • According to illusionism, what I am as a result of the experiment given in the work is an illusion. And the impression of immortality is a product of the brain. But in reality I am such that I will die (it is not excluded). However, it is necessary to realize that illusionism is a detached reasoning about the “I”, but not is the self itself. And to what I am (as psiche), reasoning and questions about the reality of the “I” (for example, question: am I really like this, what am I like as psyche?) and other expressing illusionism do not correspond. That is, subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), the illusionism of the “I” is unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this is undeniable and final. • Reasoning about what such a “I” is in this (mine) or not in this brain, as well as (for example, holding a real skull in my hands), questions like “how (or, but now where is it here) such “I” – how is it after brain death?” – To the fact that is such an “I” these questions do not correspond and is falsified by this. • After being unconscious, the impression remains that I'm is not and that there is nothing at all. That is, my “unconsciousness” is psychic indistinguishable from my non-existence. However, science has not shown, but and it is not excluded that before and after I exist physically (there is something to die), I still or I no longer exist, there is still or nothing to die as a soul, substance, or otherwise. But what I am in the target result of this work is what I – am, and not “died and already now or still unreality” and I am such that there is nothing to die, this is – reality. That is, I will die? – there is nothing (to die), but I – am (reality), even if I am not (don’t exist). Or I do not exist as something. • I am such that there is nothing to be and die, but I am. And subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), this immortality is – reality. But this reality eludes my rational explanation. -/- Conclusion -/- Will I die? – In the target result the I am, but at the same time I am such that there is nothing to die. That is, I am immortal, but at the same time, I am not eternal (“I” not something eternal (endlessly continuing)) – I am such that to be eternal there is nothing. And, if we accept the subjective (psychic, “first person”, in first person perspective) reality without trying to understand it rationally, then I am exactly like that – I realize that this is my undoubted nature. That is, “I will die / I will not die” is an unreality. Subjectively (psychic, in the psychic reality of the “first person”, in first person perspective), it is undoubted and final. Despite the unscientific nature, this work is a way of mastering reality. The author would be grateful for the identified and shown unreality of the fact that the “I” – am, but such that there is nothing to die, and ideally, the awareness: “I will die (not excluded).” -/- Bibliography -/- Декарт Р., Размышления о первой философии //Декарт Р. Соч.: В 2 т. Т. 2. М., 1994. Лекторский В.А. Субъект в истории философии: проблемы и достижения // Методология и история психологии. 2010. Том 5. Выпуск 1. С. 5-18. Титлин Л.И. Проблема субъекта в индийской философии («Пудгалавинишчая» Васубандху) [Текст] / [Л. И. Титлин]; Федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение науки Институт философии Российской академии наук. – Москва: ОнтоПринт: Сделано-Сказано, 2018. – 361, [1] с. Тхостов A. Ш. Культурно-историческая патопсихология: монография, – М.: Канон+ РООИ «Реабилитация», 2020. – 320 с. Торчинов Е.А. «Словарик индуизма» (Дата написания: 2003; дата файла: 15.06.2007). Торчинов Е.А. Пути философии Востока и Запада: познание запредельного — СПб.: «Азбука-классика», «Петербургское Востоковедение», 2005. — 480 с. ISBN 5-352-01371-5 (Азбука-классика) ISBN 5-85803-258-3 (Петербургское Востоковедение). -/- Скончаюсь? – я бессмертен (как осознать бессмертие «от первого лица») -/- Скончаюсь? В качестве гипотезы в моем естественно-научном понимании психическое (каково психически), это не более чем, и исключительно только всего лишь некоторые состояния моего живого мозга – скончаюсь в результате его смерти. -/- В представленном ответе психическое – сама собственная непосредственная реальность, то есть, то, каково психически, это – несомненно. -/- Данная работа выполнена в реальности «первого лица» («субъективная реальность», «феноменальное сознание»). Чтобы осознать то, как, каково это, представим себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для нас, как экспериментаторов, то, как (каково) психически, это непосредственная и несомненная реальность. И осознание «я есть», это непосредственная реальность, а не знание об этом, которое всегда сомнительно. То есть, в психической реальности, на вопрос, заданный самой этой психической реальностью самой себе о себе самой, нам ничто не запрещает ответить несомненно и окончательно. Автор действует с позиции «быть в реальности – не выходить за ее пределы, например, в философию» (философия, включая методологию, это подмена самой реальности всегда сомнительными рассуждениями о реальности) – исследует феноменальное сознание («психическое») непосредственно и в качестве непосредственной реальности. То есть, данная работа, это овладение психической реальностью посредством субъективно-психического экспериментирования – не философствуй, а экспериментируй! -/- Например Декарт, интроспективно экспериментируя в собственной психической реальности с собственным психическим, сообщил нам о неизменности «ума» и предложил эту неизменность понять в качестве нашего собственного бессмертия: «ум не представляет какого-то соединения акциденций, являет собой чистую субстанцию и, хотя все его акциденции подвержены изменению — он то понимает какие-то вещи, то желает другие или чувствует третьи и т.д.,— тем не менее сам по себе он не изменяется; а что касается тела человека, то оно изменяется хотя бы уже потому, что подвержены изменению формы некоторых его частей. Из этого следует, что тело весьма легко погибает, ум же по самой природе своей бессмертен» /Декарт Р., стр. 13. Заметим, Декарт не осознавал себя бессмертным, а логически вывел собственное бессмертие из неизменности ума. Однако, неизменный «ум» Декарта таков, что скончаться есть чему. А в моем естественно-научном понимании из неизменности ума не следует его бессмертие – он, не изменяясь в своем субъективном само-восприятии, при этом мгновенно угаснув в результате смерти мозга, скончается. Психически (психическое) – обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. -/- Но это не значит, что «я» ушедши в небытие окончательно – скончаюсь. Этим не исключено, что таковой ушедший в небытие «я» не существую, но (при этом) есть. Итак, определим бессмертие, как невозможность скончаться потому, что скончаться нечему (например, если «умерший» психически есть, но уже таков, что скончаться больше нечему, то теперь он бессмертен) и сделаем важный для данной работы вывод: если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, то, что скончаюсь, это не исключено. Но таков ли я? Идея данной работы в том, что мне удастся проявить (выявить) и осознать себя таковым (я таков), что скончаться нечему, но (при этом) я есть. Иначе выражаясь, если я подойду предвзято и действуя целеустремленно, выявлю субъективную реальность «я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему» – то смерть мне, как психическому несвойственна, то есть, я бессмертен – гипотеза возможности субъективно скончаться («я скончаюсь») будет фальсифицирована и исключена. -/- Чтобы это реализовать в работе предлагается воспользоваться субъект-объектной моделью, сдвинуть границу «я» в полюс субъекта и стать безобъектным, проявившись (выявившись) собой таковым, что скончаться нечему. Следовательно, цель работы – осознать: я таков, что есть, но скончаться нечему. Стать безобъектным и задаваясь вопросом о возможности скончаться, или исключу бессмертие проявленного состояния, или проявлюсь (выявлюсь) бессмертным несомненно и окончательно. -/- При этом, я, как субъект, являюсь «необходимым полюсом субъектно-объектных отношений. … Объект – то, на что направлена активность … субъекта. … В действительности объектом может стать все, что существует. … важно иметь в виду тот принципиальный факт, что объект всегда внеположен субъекту, не сливается с ним. Эта внеположность имеет место и тогда, когда субъект имеет дело с состояниями собственного сознания, своим Я … важно подчеркнуть, что отношение субъекта и объекта – это не отношение двух разных миров, а лишь двух полюсов в составе некоторого единства» /Лекторский В.А., стр. 6-7. То есть, всё, что нахожу в себе существующим, это (таковое) есть в качестве объекта. «Субъект – всегда относится ко всем «объектам», но он никогда не может стать объектом для самого себя» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 23. Иначе это выражая – «ты не сможешь увидеть видящего видение…» /Титлин Л.И., стр. 40, и в данной модели таковое предполагает «предел» субъекта. Как предел субъекта я «безобъектен». То есть, «идеален» – своим (собственным) пределом (в качестве собственного предела) самим для себя не существую (несуществующий). -/- Используя «факт подвижности границ субъекта» /например, Тхостов А.Ш., стр. 16, я имею возможность границу «я» в себя-назад «втянуть» и стать собственным пределом. При этом необходимо осознать и принять, что внутри предела субъекта и сзади – «за пределом субъекта», и вообще само «внутри» и «сзади» в этой модели – нереальность. Таким субъектным пределом предполагается требуемое парадоксальное субъективное состояние – я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что для себя не существую, то есть, я есть, но (психически таков, что) умереть нечему («бессмертие»). -/- Соответственно, в эксперименте обозначаются следующие задачи: 1. В объект-субъектной сфере зрительного восприятия сдвинуть (и сдвинув) границу «я» в себя-назад –» упереться в собственный предел и стать самим собственным пределом (без толщены: без глубины, без «внутри» и без обратной стороны) –» 2. Став собственным пределом, которым есть, но для себя не существую (несуществующий), осознать: • Себя – я есть и это реально; • Скончаюсь? – есть ли чему скончаться или скончаться нечему, какой из вариантов мне (как психическому «я») свойственен: • или я таков, что то, что скончаюсь не исключено, и реализованное состояние не бессмертно; • или я есть, но таков, что скончаться нечему, то есть, собственное бессмертие – я бессмертен; • Реальность ли это. -/- Инструкция воспроизведения целевого результата: последовательность действий и результатов в субъективно-психическом эксперименте (далее СПЭ) -/- На расстоянии 25-40 см от стены (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть), • Здесь и сейчас сосредоточьтесь на своём лице: «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом). • В себе отстранитесь назад и смотрите из себя на эту стену. • Не двигая головой, охватите поле зрения вниманием предельно широко и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспримите единым целым. • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотрите вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспримите так, что обозреваемое вами без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская с противоположной вам стороны • и выпуклая в вас; Вы – вогнутый в себя-назад смотрящий («субъект») – каков? – кто из вас сейчас на всё это смотрит? • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспримите единым целым –» • В себя-назад «втянитесь» –» и «пятьтесь» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад вытесняясь –» от всего вообще взад отстранитесь –» • собой в себя-назад подайтесь и упершись в собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый) тупиковый предел –» • станьте самим пределом-тупиком – в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной) пределом-плоскостью смотрящей – воспринимающим зрительным экраном –» станьте плоскостью-тупиком –» • «проскользните» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватите вниманием целиком –» • собой – самим плоскостью-тупиком назад надавить, нажать –» • осознать: что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика и сзади за плоскостью-тупиком, и там вообще «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет. • –» То есть – в качестве психической реальности (каково психически) я скончаюсь? –» или • скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено). или • я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть. или • субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. • –» Осознайте, что это – реальность (осознать реальность этого) и подчеркните (ответ). -/- В результате я есть, но скончаться/не скончаться нечему, то есть гипотеза «скончаюсь» – нереальность. -/- Замечания -/- • Каждый завершённый СПЭ завершён целевым результатом: «я таков, что скончаться нечему, но я есть». И тому, каков я в результате СПЭ, то, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) не соответствует, то есть нереальность и этим исключено. • То есть, я и не таков, что не скончаюсь. «Я скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» ко мне, как к психике, неприменимо. Иначе это выражая, тому, каков я, смерть несвойственна. То есть, я, как психика (психическое), бессмертен, но я не вечен (не вечный – бесконечно длящийся, таковой, что есть чему длиться) – длиться, быть вечным и не скончаться нечему. Таково «бессмертие». • В целевом результате данной работы я есть, но таков, что скончаться/не скончаться нечему («бессмертие»). И таковой «я» не Атман индуистских школ ньяя, вайшешика и пурва-миманса, о котором сообщает Е.А. Торчинов. Так как «я» психичен, а не субстанция с психическим в качестве атрибута. • Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков я в результате данного в работе эксперимента, это иллюзия. И впечатление бессмертия, это порождение мозга. А реально я таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что иллюзионизм, это отстраненные рассуждения о «я», но не сам я непосредственно. И тому, каков я психически (каково психически), рассуждения и вопросы о реальности «я» (например, таков ли я реально, каков психически?) и другие выражающие иллюзионизм «я» не соответствуют. То есть, каково психически, иллюзионизм «я» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. • Рассуждения о том, что таковой «я» в этом (моем) или не в этом мозге, а также (например, держа в руках реальный череп), вопросы, типа «а как же (или, но теперь где же здесь) таковой «я» – как это после смерти мозга?» тому, каков таковой «я» эти вопросы не соответствуют. • После пребывания без сознания остается впечатление, что без сознания меня нет и ничего никак нет вообще. То есть, моё «бессознание» психически неотличимо от моего несуществования (небытия). Однако, наукой не показано и не исключено то, что до и после того, как я есть физически (скончаться есть чему), меня ещё или уже нет, скончаться ещё или уже нечему в качестве души, субстанции или как-то иначе. Но, то, каков я в целевом результате данной работы, таковой я есть, а не «скончался и уже теперь или ещё нереальность» и я таков, что скончаться нечему – реален (реалия). То есть, скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но я есть, даже если меня нет (не существую). • Я таков, что быть и скончаться нечему, но я есть. И то, как (каково) психически, это бессмертие – реальность. Но эта реальность ускользает от моего рационального её объяснения. -/- Заключение -/- Скончаюсь? – в целевом результате я есть и вижу, но при этом я таков, что умереть (скончаться) нечему. То есть, я бессмертен, но при этом я не вечен (не нечто вечное (бесконечно длящееся)) – быть вечным нечему. И, если принять психическое реальностью не пытаясь понять это рационально, то я именно таков – осознаю, что такова моя несомненная для меня природа. То есть, «скончаюсь/не скончаюсь» – нереальность. Психически, это несомненно и окончательно. Несмотря на ненаучность, данная работа – способ овладения реальностью. Автор был бы признателен за выявленную и показанную нереальность целевого результата данной работы, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)». -/- Annex 2. The key essence of this work (only in Russian to convey the nuances without distortion) -/- Performed, expressed and transmitted initially by means of Russian, the native language of the author, and, in order to avoid distortions in the correspondence of the linguistic nuances of the reproduced subjective reality, it assumes an independent translation into the language of the experimenter by the experimenter himself in the process of reproducing the target result of this work. -/- «Я» скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть. Will “I” die (decease)? – to die (decease) nothing, but “I” am. -/- Заметить: • Выполнено, выражено и передано изначально посредством русского – родного для автора языка и, чтобы избежать искажений соответствия языковых нюансов воспроизводимой психической реальности, предполагается самостоятельный перевод на язык экспериментатора самим экспериментатором в процессе воспроизведения целевого результата данной работы. • В «кавычки» взяты слова и выражения, требующие «субъективного» приведения в соответствие психическому содержанию. Подготовка: • Вам потребуется уединённое место (там, где вас не отвлекут). • На первоначальном этапе понадобится некоторое (возможно длительное) время для того, чтобы усвоить предложенный алгоритм действий в психической реальности в процессе реализации и воспроизвести целевой результат впервые. • Возможно, результату поспособствует отклонение от предложенного алгоритма «психических действий», импровизация в направлении целевого результата. • В процессе эксперимента количество попыток не ограничено и затраченное на это время не имеет значения. Необходим исключительно только именно целевой результат. Реализация: • В уединении встать перед плоской широкой и высокой (достаточно большой, чтобы её границы были на периферии вашего поля зрения) стеной, например, покрытой однородной светлой (но не белой) керамической, не глянцевой (не отражающей на вас свет или отвлекающих внимание изображений, не дающей бликов) плиткой с лёгким текстурным рисунком (позволяющим глазам «зацепиться» за стену и отчётливо воспринимать перед собой поверхность, а не «утонуть» в однородном (монотонном) пространстве), на расстоянии 25-40 см от неё (так, чтобы стена занимала всё поле зрения или его подавляющую часть) –» • Скончаюсь (1)? – каково психически (психическое), в моем естественно-научном понимании – это (я) не более чем и исключительно только некоторые состояния функционирующего (живого) мозга – скончаюсь, как и уже скончался каждый умерший мозг – того каждого, кто скончался, как реальности (реального, реалии) (2) уже теперь нет окончательно. Теоретически, если психически я исключительно только таков, что скончаться есть чему и ни каков иначе, то, следовательно, что (я) скончаюсь, это не исключено. • Глядя на стену, здесь и сейчас сосредоточиться на своём лице (и осознать): «я есть» – реальность (а не знание об этом) –» • В себе «отстраниться» назад – смотрю из себя на эту стену –» • Не двигая головой, охватить поле зрения вниманием предельно широко (поднять (вздернуть) брови, если это расширит поле зрения) и одновременно всё сразу (всё это) воспринять единым целым –» • Высокую и широкую стену (вариант: смотреть вверх под углом 135-150 градусов перед собой) воспринять так, что обозреваемое без поворота головы пространство (объем), это – ограниченная по окружности в периферии поля зрения замкнутая несимметричная «линза» • плоская (ограниченная стеной) с противоположной мне стороны • и «выпуклая в меня» –» • Я – «вогнутый» в «себя-назад» смотрящий, каков? – кто из меня сейчас на всё это смотрит? –» • Не двигая головой, поле зрения воспринять единым целым –» • в себя-назад «втянуться» –» и «пятиться» –» «за мысли» и за всё вообще –» из этого всего назад «вытесняясь» –» от всего вообще «взад отстраниться» –» • «собой» в себя-назад «податься» и «упершись» в «собственный (себя) задний к объектному обращённый (развернутый)» «предел тупиковый» («тупо-уперто») –» • «стать» самим «пределом-тупиком» – «в себя-назад вогнутой (рефлектор-подобной)» «пределом-плоскостью» смотрящей – воспринимающим «зрительным экраном» –» стать «плоскостью-тупиком» –» • «проскользнуть» по себе – плоскости-тупику и охватить вниманием целиком –» • собой — самим плоскостью-тупиком «назад надавить, нажать»: • осознать: «что-то как-то внутри плоскости-тупика» и «сзади – за плоскостью-тупиком», и «там вообще» «что-то как-то», а также само «внутри» и «сзади», «за плоскостью-тупиком» и вообще «там» – нереальность; • самого себя – плоскости-тупика без толщины (глубины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны для себя нет –» Собой – плоскостью-тупиком: • без глубины (толщины), без «внутри», без обратной стороны таков, что скончаться есть чему – скончаюсь (не исключено) –» • смотрю –» смотря –» «Непосредственно-психически» -/- Заметить: • Специфику используемых в данной работе слов (терминов), названий и выражений необходимо осознать в соответствии с (4.1.) (данный пункт смотрите ниже). • Необходимо от себя – (как) «смотрящего плоскости-тупика», такового, что скончаться есть чему, оттождествиться собой — «самим психическим» (каково психически) (3) –» • –» «отличить (4)» «Я» –» «Я-лик». • Отличив, и себя такового обозначая, но не имея в языке отличающего местоимения, именую «Я» (5). • «Соединённое-через-дефис-в-кавычках» реализовать и/или воспринять «одним-единым-целостным»; • Последовательность слов и знаков предполагает последовательность психических действий (алгоритм действий в собственном психическом); • Вопросительность слова, фразы или отдельной её, именно вопросительной части задаётся знаком «?» расположенным перед и после них. Требование к действию задаётся знаком «!» расположенным перед и после слова (фразы); • Субъективно-психический эксперимент завершён, если воспроизведен (4.1.), иначе субъективно-психический эксперимент не завершён. -/- Собой – плоскостью-тупиком … смотрю –» смотря –» -/- «Психически» (6) 1. ?кто? видит –» !отличить «Я»! –» 2. –» !«Я-видящий-лик»! –» 3. –» !«Я-лик»! –» 4. –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-надавить(нажать)»: «Я» ?скончаюсь?! –» !«Я-ликом» всем «психически-назад-давить(жать)»: (4.1.) – нечему (7), но «Я» есть.! -/- Признательность: Согласно иллюзионизму, то, каков «Я» (как (каково) «скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.»), реально, это не так (не таково). То есть, таковой «Я» нереален (нереальность), а реально – таков, что скончаюсь (не исключено). Однако, необходимо осознать, что это «отстраненные» от «Я» рассуждения о «Я», но не сам «Я» непосредственно. И тому, каков «Я» (как (каково) скончаться нечему, но «Я» есть.) таковое (рассуждения) не соответствует. То есть, эти рассуждения о «Я» – заблуждение. Это (как осознание) несомненно и окончательно. Не так? – за выявленную и показанную нереальность (того, что) «Скончаюсь? – нечему (скончаться), но «Я» есть.», за показанную реальность того, что скончаться не исключено, а в идеале, за осознание: «скончаюсь (не исключено)» я был бы признателен. -/- (Сноски) (1) Именно «скончаюсь, скончался», то есть – как реальности (реального, реалии) нет окончательно. (2) Реалия, реально, реален, реальность, реальное – само то, что (каково это) непосредственно, как само таковое – само то, каково познаваемое и как-либо моделируемое вне его познания и иного (вообще) моделирования. То есть, само само-осознание себя реальностью, например, «я-реалия», «я есть» или «скончаться – нечему, но «Я» есть.» – реальность. То есть – нам ничто не запрещает ответить на вопрос «скончаюсь?» несомненно и окончательно. (3) Психически (психическое) – то, как (каково) я сам непосредственно, несомненно, и та моя непосредственная реальность, как и посредством чего я сам и всё вообще для меня есть, и которое для меня исключительно единственное. Следует заметить, что пока бываю без сознания (травма мозга или сон без сновидений), ничего и никак нет вообще. Также само обозначение того, что это сама собственная непосредственная реальность (то есть – несомненно). И чтобы её осознать, представьте себя экспериментатором, который не подменяет реальность рассуждениями о ней. – Теперь для вас, как экспериментатора, то, как (каково) психически, это – несомненно (непосредственная несомненная реальность). Не философствуй (не рассуждай, не моделируй её), а экспериментируй! (4) «Я-Лик» – специфическое выражение, соответствующее психическому в данный момент СПЭ. (5) «Я» – целевой (конечный, «предельный») и «ключевой» результат данной работы. «Я» в данной работе не склоняется, выделено полужирным подчеркнутым шрифтом и заключено в кавычки. (6) «Каково психически» – то, как (каково) «Я» сам непосредственно, несомненно – само «первое лицо» (субъект психического), а также обозначение принятия позиции «первого лица» и сообщения «от первого лица». (7) Пока я бываю без сознания («бессознание», например, сплю без сновидений), моего сознания нет (оно сведено на нет, угасло) – ничего и никак нет вообще (это моё абсолютное небытие) – (каково) психически, мне скончаться нечем. А в целевом результате данной работы, психически (то есть – непосредственно), «Я» таков, что скончаться не нечем, а именно нечему, но при этом «Я» есть. (shrink)

يلقي سوسا ( -1940) في هذا الكتاب المسائل الكلاسيكية والمعاصرة في نظرية المعرفة، ويعرض مشكلاتها، ويقترح لها الحلول. بداية من الشكية، ومرورا بمشكلة جيتير، والنزاع بين نزعة الأسس ونزعة الاتساق على بنية المعرفة، والخلاف بين النزعة الخارجية والنزعة الداخلية على طبيعة المعرفة، وانتهاء بالدفاع عن إبستمولوجيا الفضيلة التي أسسها واستهل البحث فيها عام 1980، ويناقش العلاقة بين أنصار الثقة وأنصار المسئولية في هذا الفرع المعرفي الجديد. وأنت حين تطالع عرض سوسا لمسائل المعرفة إنما تطالع عقلا ناقدا وفكرا دقيقا في طبيعة (...) المعرفة، ومجالها، وأنواعها ومستوياتها، وقيمتها، والفضيلة أو القدرة المعرفية التي تكون هذه المعرفة. وستجد أيضا أنه يكشف المضمون الحقيقي لفلسفة ديكارت في المعرفة مع مصادرها القديمة، ويقدم تطويرا معاصرا للبناء الديكارتي يقوم على العلم والحس المشترك وليس اللاهوت كما فعل ديكارت. شكلت كتابات سوسا معالم البحث المعرفي المعاصر على مدار أربعة عقود أو يزيد. ومن الخير أن يظهر قراء العربية على هذا الكتاب الخليق بالعناية، وعلى فلسفة مؤلفه الحقيق أن يلقب الآن بعميد الإبستمولوجيا. وقيل عن المؤلف والكتاب:"لا يوجد فيلسوف حي في الوقت الحاضر يفهم الإبستمولوجيا فهما مفصلا وشاملا وواضحا مثلما يفهمها إرنست سوسا. وهذا كتاب تنويري ومرشد كأشد ما يكون التنوير والإرشاد". -/- In this concise book, one of the world’s leading epistemologists provides a sophisticated, revisionist introduction to the problem of knowledge in Western philosophy. Modern and contemporary accounts of epistemology tend to focus on limited questions of knowledge and skepticism, such as how we can know the external world, other minds, the past through memory, the future through induction, or the world’s depth and structure through inference. This book steps back for a better view of the more general issues posed by the ancient Greek Pyrrhonists. Returning to and illuminating this older, broader epistemological tradition, Ernest Sosa develops an original account of the subject, giving it substance not with Cartesian theology but with science and common sense. Descartes is a part of this ancient tradition, but he goes beyond it by considering not just whether knowledge is possible in the first place, but also how we can properly attain it. In Cartesian epistemology, Sosa finds a virtue-theoretic account, one that he extends beyond the Cartesian context. Once epistemology is viewed in this light, many of its problems can be solved or fall away. The result is an important reevaluation of epistemology that will be essential reading for students and teachers. -/- . (shrink)

Although the Chunqiu fanlu traditionally ascribed to Han dynasty scholar Dong Zhongshu (c. 195 − 115 BCE) is considered to be an extremely important book for the development of Chinese ethical and philosophical thought, it has been long neglected and has lacked proper non-Chinese scholarly attention. Up to the 2016 translation by Sarah A. Queen and John S. Major, only partial translations of the Chunqiu fanlu had been published in English. Part of the reason for the neglect of the study (...) of the Chunqiu fanlu and consequently its late translation lies in the complexity of the text, connected to a number of obscurities about its origin, authorship and nature. Sarah Queen and John Major have made an important step forward in redressing this neglect. They produced a complete English translation and study of the Chunqiu fanlu. Besides focusing on the first complete English translation of the Chunqiu fanlu, this article reviews central questions and problems regarding that text and attempts to summarize the current state of research on it. (shrink)

When product design teams gather at the whiteboard in big-tech office parks and startup garages around the world, they ask themselves: How will customers use our technology? Is it better than our competitors’? How much money can we make? But one question that’s rarely asked: does our technology advance human flourishing? -/- In a new white paper by Harvard professor Danielle Allen and her colleagues Eli Frankel, Woojin Lim, Divya Siddarth, Josh Simons, and Glen Weyl entitled “The Ethics of Decentralized (...) Social Technologies: Lessons from Web3, the Fediverse, and Beyond,” the authors not only ask this question but offer a powerful framework for answering it. Drawing on the accumulated wisdom of democratic societies, the authors show that the values of democratic governance that have promoted human flourishing can be translated into a rubric for judging new technologies. -/- In this short research brief, we unpack and comment on the four-step logic at the core of their case. Ultimately, their argument demonstrates the power and the challenge – and above all, the urgency – of placing human flourishing at the center of technology governance. (shrink)

Open science will make science more efficient, reliable, and responsive to societal challenges. The European Commission has sought to advance open science policy from its inception in a holistic and integrated way, covering all aspects of the research cycle from scientific discovery and review to sharing knowledge, publishing, and outreach. We present the steps taken with a forward-looking perspective on the challenges laying ahead, in particular the necessary change of the rewards and incentives system for researchers (for which various actors (...) are co-responsible and which goes beyond the mandate of the European Commission). Finally, we discuss the role of artificial intelligence (AI) within an open science perspective. (shrink)

In this paper, a horizontally moving suspended mass pendulum base is designed and controlled using robust control theory. H  optimal loop shaping with first and second order desired loop shaping function controllers are used to improve the performance of the system using Matlab/Simulink Toolbox. Comparison of the H  optimal loop shaping with first and second order desired loop shaping function controllers for the proposed system have been done to track the desired angular position of the pendulum (...) using step and sine wave input signals and a promising result has been obtained succesfully. (shrink)

In a recent opinion paper, it was argued that individuals with multiple retractions or a record of academic misconduct should not serve as editors, including as editors-in-chief, on the editorial boards of scholarly or academic journals. As a first step towards appreciating how such a policy could be applied in practice, the presence of 30 individuals listed on the Retraction Watch Leaderboard on editorial boards was screened. Six cases are highlighted to gain an appreciation of the potential reputational (...) risks that journals and publishers might incur by including individuals with a tainted academic record on editorial boards. Given the reputational, legal and other risks associated with this type of assessment and decision, more formal positioning and guidance are needed by global ethics policy-related bodies such as COPE, the ICMJE, and the CSE, even more so in journals that claim to follow these organizations’ ethical guidelines. (shrink)

What follows is a first step towards an ontology of conscious mental processes. We provide a theoretical foundation and characterization of conscious mental processes based on a realist theory of intentionality and using BFO as our top-level ontology. We distinguish three components of intentional mental process: character, directedness, and objective referent, and describe several features of the process character and directedness significant to defining and classifying mental processes. We arrive at the definition of representational mental process as a (...) process that is the bringing into being, sustaining, modifying, or terminating of a mental representation. We conclude by outlining some benefits and applications of this approach. (shrink)

This essay takes a first step in comparative ethics by looking to Aristotle and the Aztec's conceptions of the good life. It argues that the Aztec conception of a rooted life, neltiliztli, functions for ethical purposes in a way that is like Aristotle's eudaimonia. To develop this claim, it not only shows just in what their conceptions of the good consist, but also in what way the Aztecs conceived of the virtues (in qualli, in yectli).

One aim of this essay is to contribute to understanding aesthetic communication—the process by which agents aim to convey thoughts and transmit knowledge about aesthetic matters to others. Our focus will be on the use of aesthetic adjectives in aesthetic communication. Although theorists working on the semantics of adjectives have developed sophisticated theories about gradable adjectives, they have tended to avoid studying aesthetic adjectives—the class of adjectives that play a central role in expressing aesthetic evaluations. And despite the wealth of (...) attention paid to aesthetic adjectives by philosophical aestheticians, they have paid little attention to contemporary linguistic theories of adjectives. We take our work to be a first step in remedying these lacunae. In this paper, we present four experiments that examine one aspect of how aesthetic adjectives ordinarily function: the context-sensitivity of their application standards. Our results present a prima facie empirical challenge to a common distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives because aesthetic adjectives are found to behave differently from both. Our results thus also constitute a prima facie vindication of some philosophical aestheticians’ contention that aesthetic adjectives constitute a particularly interesting segment of natural language, even if the boundaries of this segment might turn out to be different from what they had in mind. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state. This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom. -/- Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science Without Numbers (...) (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first step towards a genuinely intrinsic and nominalistic account of quantum mechanics. I will also compare the present account to Mark Balaguer’s (1996) nominalization of quantum mechanics and discuss how it might bear on the debate about “wave function realism.” In closing, I will suggest some possible ways to extend this account to accommodate spinorial degrees of freedom and a variable number of particles (e.g. for particle creation and annihilation). -/- Along the way, I axiomatize the quantum phase structure as what I shall call a “periodic difference structure” and prove a representation theorem as well as a uniqueness theorem. These formal results could prove fruitful for further investigation into the metaphysics of phase and theoretical structure. -/- (For a more recent version of this paper, please see "The Intrinsic Structure of Quantum Mechanics" available on PhilPapers.). (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to develop a systematic taxonomy of cognitive artifacts, i.e., human-made, physical objects that functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task. First, I identify the target domain by conceptualizing the category of cognitive artifacts as a functional kind: a kind of artifact that is defined purely by its function. Next, on the basis of their informational properties, I develop a set of related subcategories in which cognitive artifacts with similar properties can be grouped. In (...) this taxonomy, I distinguish between three taxa, those of family, genus, and species. The family includes all cognitive artifacts without further specifying their informational properties. Two genera are then distinguished: representational and non-representational (or ecological) cognitive artifacts. These genera are further divided into species. In case of representational artifacts, these species are iconic, indexical, or symbolic. In case of ecological artifacts, these species are spatial or structural. Within species, token artifacts are identified. The proposed taxonomy is an important first step towards a better understanding of the range and variety of cognitive artifacts and is a helpful point of departure, both for conceptualizing how different artifacts augment or impair cognitive performance and how they transform and are integrated into our cognitive system and practices. (shrink)

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more (...) thorough inquiry of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain (...) qualified modal tie to the truth. This result is then used as the basis of the defense of the Autonomy and Authority theses. The paper closes with a defense of the two theses against a potential threat from scientific essentialism. (shrink)

Value pluralists believe in multiple dimensions of value. What does betterness along a dimension have to do with being better overall? Any systematic answer begins with the Strong Pareto principle: one thing is overall better than another if it is better along one dimension and at least as good along all others. We defend Strong Pareto from recent counterexamples and use our discussion to develop a novel view of dimensions of value, one which puts Strong Pareto on firmer footing. We (...) conclude by defending Dimensionalism, the hypothesis that overall value relations are determined solely by how things compare along value dimensions. These are first steps towards a more systematic value pluralism. (shrink)

The central claim of this paper is that surface-faithful word-by-word update is feasible and desirable, even in languages where word order is supposedly free. As a first step, in sections 1 and 2, I review an argument from Bittner 2001a that semantic composition is not a static process, as in PTQ, but rather a species of anaphoric bridging. But in that case the context-setting role of word order should extend from cross-sentential discourse anaphora to sentence-internal anaphoric composition. This (...) can be spelled out as a two-part hypothesis. First, in all languages anaphoric composition derives incremental updates based on the topological order rather than the syntactic hierarchy. And secondly, rigid vs. free word order is simply rigid vs. free mapping from syntax to topology. To formalize this hypothesis, I first present, in section 3, Sevensorted Logic of Change with Centering. This makes it possible, in section 4, to articulate a system of constraints on basic meanings in Kalaallisut — a polysynthetic language with free word order, ideally suited to test the hypothesis of incremental update. The key assumptions about topology as the input to anaphoric composition are spelled out in section 5, which concludes the development of a general formal framework. This formal framework then serves, in sections 6 through 8, t o explicate topologically based incremental updates for increasingly more complex samples of an actual Kalaallisut text. This reveals ubiquitous patterns of prominence-guided anaphora, in all semantic domains, t o increasingly more complex types of discourse referents. These anaphoric patterns show that the context-setting role of word order indeed does extend from discourse to word-to-word anaphora. And this, in turn, strongly supports the hypothesis of topologically based anaphoric composition. Finally, in section 9 I adduce evidence from English that this hypothesis also holds for languages with rigid word order, albeit the fixed mapping keeps the topology close to the syntax. I conclude that both free and rigid word orders receive a natural account if semantic composition is viewed as topologically based anaphoric bridging.. (shrink)

The epistemic probability of A given B is the degree to which B evidentially supports A, or makes A plausible. This paper is a first step in answering the question of what determines the values of epistemic probabilities. I break this question into two parts: the structural question and the substantive question. Just as an object’s weight is determined by its mass and gravitational acceleration, some probabilities are determined by other, more basic ones. The structural question asks what (...) probabilities are not determined in this way—these are the basic probabilities which determine values for all other probabilities. The substantive question asks how the values of these basic probabilities are determined. I defend an answer to the structural question on which basic probabilities are the probabilities of atomic propositions conditional on potential direct explanations. I defend this against the view, implicit in orthodox mathematical treatments of probability, that basic probabilities are the unconditional probabilities of complete worlds. I then apply my answer to the structural question to clear up common confusions in expositions of Bayesianism and shed light on the “problem of the priors.”. (shrink)

The problem of merging several ontologies has important applications in the Semantic Web, medical ontology engineering and other domains where information from several distinct sources needs to be integrated in a coherent manner.We propose to view ontology merging as a problem of social choice, i.e. as a problem of aggregating the input of a set of individuals into an adequate collective decision. That is, we propose to view ontology merging as ontology aggregation. As a first step in this (...) direction, we formulate several desirable properties for ontology aggregators, we identify the incompatibility of some of these properties, and we define and analyse several simple aggregation procedures. Our approach is closely related to work in judgment aggregation, but with the crucial difference that we adopt an open world assumption, by distinguishing between facts not included in an agent’s ontology and facts explicitly negated in an agent’s ontology. (shrink)

Many of the items that humans consume are produced in ways that involve serious harms to persons. Familiar examples include the harms involved in the extraction and trade of conflict minerals (e.g. coltan, diamonds), the acquisition and import of non- fair trade produce (e.g. coffee, chocolate, bananas, rice), and the manufacture of goods in sweatshops (e.g. clothing, sporting equipment). In addition, consumption of certain goods (significantly fossil fuels and the products of the agricultural industry) involves harm to the environment, to (...) future persons, and to current persons in low-lying and developing countries, by way of their impacts on climate change. When it comes to such large-scale harms, it's easy for the individual to feel helpless. Even if she sincerely wishes things were otherwise, she may wonder what she could possibly do to make them so. In this paper I briefly explore several promising avenues for generating duties in individuals to consume ethically, and develop one in particular: that an individual ought to signal her commitments to others, as a first step in collectivizing to act against unjust global labour practices. (shrink)

According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content (...) of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of changeinvolves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy’s Second Philosophy is one of the most well-known ap- proaches in recent philosophy of mathematics. She applies her second-philosophical method to analyze mathematical methodology by reconstructing historical cases in a setting of means-ends relations. However, outside of Maddy’s own work, this kind of methodological analysis has not yet been extensively used and analyzed. In the present work, we will make a first step in this direction. We develop a general framework that allows us to clarify the (...) procedure and aims of the Second Philosopher’s investigation into set-theoretic methodology; pro- vides a platform to analyze the Second Philosopher’s methods themselves; and can be applied to further questions in the philosophy of set theory. (shrink)

Calls to hold artificial intelligence to account are intensifying. Activists and researchers alike warn of an “accountability gap” or even a “crisis of accountability” in AI. Meanwhile, several prominent scholars maintain that accountability holds the key to governing AI. But usage of the term varies widely in discussions of AI ethics and governance. This chapter begins by disambiguating some different senses and dimensions of accountability, distinguishing it from neighboring concepts, and identifying sources of confusion. It proceeds to explore the idea (...) that AI operates within an accountability gap arising from technical features of AI as well as the social context in which it is deployed. The chapter also evaluates various proposals for closing this gap. I conclude that the role of accountability in AI ethics and governance is vital but also more limited than some suggest. Accountability’s primary job description is to verify compliance with substantive normative principles—once those principles are settled. Theories of accountability cannot ultimately tell us what substantive standards to account for, especially when norms are contested or still emerging. Nonetheless, formal mechanisms of accountability provide a way of diagnosing and discouraging egregious wrongdoing even in the absence of normative agreement. Providing accounts can also be an important first step toward the development of more comprehensive regulatory standards for AI. (shrink)

A fundamental fact is “pure” just in case it has no grounded entities—ex. Tokyo, President Biden, the River Nile, {Socrates}, etc.—among its constituents. Purity is the thesis that every fundamental fact is pure. I argue that Purity is false. My argument begins with a familiar conditional: if Purity is true, then there are no fundamental “grounding facts” or facts about what grounds what. This conditional is accepted by virtually all of Purity’s defenders. However, I argue that it is also the (...) first step toward Purity’s undoing. For, if every grounding fact has a ground, then some grounded entities have “groundmates” or distinct grounded entities that share their full grounds. But, if there are groundmates, then Purity is false. So Purity leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it is false. I close by noting that my argument against Purity also gives us a powerful reason to think that some grounding facts are fundamental. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a general theory of topological explanations, and illustrate its fruitfulness by showing how it accounts for explanatory asymmetry. My argument is developed in three steps. In the first step, I show what it is for some topological property A to explain some physical or dynamical property B. Based on that, I derive three key criteria of successful topological explanations: a criterion concerning the facticity of topological explanations, i.e. what makes it true of a (...) particular system; a criterion for describing counterfactual dependencies in two explanatory modes, i.e. the vertical and the horizontal; and, finally, a third perspectival one that tells us when to use the vertical and when to use the horizontal mode. In the second step, I show how this general theory of topological explanations accounts for explanatory asymmetry in both the vertical and horizontal explanatory modes. Finally, in the third step, I argue that this theory is universally applicable across biological sciences, which helps to unify essential concepts of biological networks. (shrink)

Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices (...) is partially based on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally. (shrink)

The world faces grave global problems. These have been made possible by modern science and technology. We have put knowledge-inquiry into academic practice – a seriously irrational kind of inquiry that seeks knowledge and technological know-how dissociated from a more fundamental concern to seek and promote wisdom. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in academic inquiry, so that knowledge-inquiry becomes wisdom-inquiry – a kind of inquiry rationally designed and devoted to helping humanity make progress towards a wiser world. (...) In this paper I indicate what needs to change if knowledge-inquiry is to become wisdom-inquiry, and I indicate a number of recent developments, mainly in universities in the UK, that can be regarded as first steps towards wisdom-inquiry. (shrink)

The type of principles which cognitive engineers need to design better work environments are principles which explain interactivity and distributed cognition: how human agents interact with themselves and others, their work spaces, and the resources and constraints that populate those spaces. A first step in developing these principles is to clarify the fundamental concepts of environment, coordination, and behavioural function. Using simple examples, I review changes the distributed perspective forces on these basic notions.

Most consciousness researchers, almost no matter what their views of the metaphysics of consciousness, can agree that the first step in a science of consciousness is the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (the NCC). The reason for this agreement is that the notion of ‘correlation’ doesn’t by itself commit one to any particular metaphysical view about the relation between (neural) matter and consciousness. For example, some might treat the correlates as causally related, while others might view (...) the correlation as evidence for identity between conscious states and brain states. The common ground therefore seems to be that the scientific search for the NCC is largely independent of the metaphysics of consciousness. (shrink)

According to Wringe 2006 we have good reasons for accepting the existence of Global Collective Obligations - in other words, collective obligations which fall on the world’s population as a whole. One such reason is that the existence of such obligations provides a plausible solution a problem which is sometimes thought to arise if we think that individuals have a right to have their basic needs satisfied. However, obligations of this sort would be of little interest – either theoretical or (...) practical – if they did not give rise, either directly or indirectly, to any kinds of reasons for individuals to behave in certain ways. -/- In this paper, I shall argue that in many situations, forward-looking global obligations give rise to an obligation on individuals to work towards bringing into existence and support an institutional system which will enable their obligations to be met. My argument for this conclusion involves two steps. In the first step, I address a general question about how collective obligations can give rise to individual obligations without being reducible to them, and which obligations they give rise to. Here I give a Kant-inspired argument, based on the principles that ‘ought implies can’ and that the content of the moral law is given by reflecting on how agents should legislate in a kingdom of ends, which is designed to show that collective obligations can give rise to individual obligations. In the second step I apply this principle to the case of global forward-looking obligations. (shrink)

Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. (...) Specifically, a formal study of swap structures for LFIs is developed, by adapting concepts of universal algebra to multialgebras in a suitable way. A decomposition theorem similar to Birkhoff’s representation theorem is obtained for each class of swap structures. Moreover, when applied to the 3-valued algebraizable logics J3 and Ciore, their classes of algebraic models are retrieved, and the swap structures semantics become twist structures semantics. This fact, together with the existence of a functor from the category of Boolean algebras to the category of swap structures for each LFI, suggests that swap structures can be seen as non-deterministic twist structures. This opens new avenues for dealing with non-algebraizable logics by the more general methodology of multialgebraic semantics. (shrink)

An organizing theme of the dissertation is the issue of how to make philosophical theories useful for scientific purposes. An argument for the contention is presented that it doesn’t suffice merely to theoretically motivate one’s theories, and make them compatible with existing data, but that philosophers having this aim should ideally contribute to identifying unique and hard to vary predictions of their theories. This methodological recommendation is applied to the ranking-theoretic approach to conditionals, which emphasizes the epistemic relevance and the (...) expression of reason relations as part of the semantics of the natural language conditional. As a first step, this approach is theoretically motivated in a comparative discussion of other alternatives in psychology of reasoning, like the suppositional theory of conditionals, and novel approaches to the problems of compositionality and accounting for the objective purport of indicative conditionals are presented. In a second step, a formal model is formulated, which allows us to derive quantitative predictions from the ranking-theoretic approach, and it is investigated which novel avenues of empirical research that this model opens up for. Finally, a treatment is given of the problem of logical omniscience as it concerns the issue of whether ranking theory (and other similar approaches) makes too idealized assumptions about rationality to allow for interesting applications in psychology of reasoning. Building on the work of Robert Brandom, a novel solution to this problem is presented, which both opens up for new perspectives in psychology of reasoning and appears to be capable of satisfying a range of constraints on bridge principles between logic and norms of reasoning, which would otherwise stand in a tension. (shrink)

In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, (...) and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible and desirable. (shrink)

Leibniz is not commonly numbered amongst canonical writers on toleration. One obvious reason is that, unlike Locke, he wrote no treatise specifically devoted to that doctrine. Another is the enormous amount of energy which he famously devoted to ecclesiastical reunification. Promoting the reunification of Christian churches is an objective quite different from promoting the toleration of different religious faiths – so different, in fact, that they are sometimes even construed as mutually exclusive. Ecclesiastical reunification aims to find agreement at least (...) on the most important doctrines. Religious toleration involves accepting and respecting disagreement even on the most important doctrines. If one regards these two projects as alternative rather than complementary strategies for dealing with religious diversity, Leibniz might more readily be characterised as an ecumenist rather than a tolerationist. Such appears to be the conclusion, at any rate, implicit in the balance of critical literature on these topics: whereas a steady stream of studies has discussed Leibniz’s project of ecclesiastical reunification, only a meager trickle has been devoted to his views on toleration; and some of these studies go so far as to conclude that Leibniz had no doctrine of toleration at all. This paper will attempt to show, on the contrary, that a robust, many-layered, and unusually inclusive doctrine of toleration can be gleaned from Leibniz’s writings. This doctrine operated at least at three different levels: philosophical, theological, and pragmatic. As this implies, the doctrine of religious toleration, rather than being in collision with Leibniz’s core project of ecclesiastical reunification, was an essential element of that very project: it should be seen, in other words, not as a competing goal, but as a necessary first step toward ecclesiastical reunification. Yet at the same time it will also emerge that Leibniz’s doctrine of toleration was no mere function of this intra-Christian project of reunification: rather it was a still more fundamental principle which extended beyond the ecumenical project as well. It had the resources for accepting and respecting irreducible religious diversity and disagreement on points of importance not only between Christian communities, but also between Christians and non-Christians, including, in principle, even the atheists. These points will emerge from a discussion of statements on the philosophical, theological, and pragmatic justifications of religious toleration scattered throughout Leibniz’s sprawling corpus of writings. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the first step of rational belief acquisition. It, thus, focuses on justificatory relations between perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs, and between their contents, respectively. In particular, the paper aims at outlining how it is possible to reason from the content of perceptual experiences to the content of perceptual beliefs. The paper thereby approaches this aim by combining a formal epistemology perspective with an eye towards recent advances in philosophy of cognition. Furthermore the paper restricts (...) its focus, it concentrates on the case of color perception and perceptual beliefs about color. (shrink)

We begin by describing recent developments in the burgeoning discipline of applied ontology, focusing especially on the ways ontologies are providing a means for the consistent representation of scientific data. We then introduce Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), a top-level ontology that is serving as domain-neutral framework for the development of lower level ontologies in many specialist disciplines, above all in biology and medicine. BFO is a bicategorial ontology, embracing both three-dimensionalist (continuant) and four-dimensionalist (occurrent) perspectives within a single framework. We (...) examine how BFO-conformant domain ontologies can deal with the consistent representation of scientific data deriving from the measurement of processes of different types, and we outline on this basis the first steps of an approach to the classification of such processes within the BFO framework. (shrink)