Open science will make science more efficient, reliable, and responsive to societal challenges. The European Commission has sought to advance open science policy from its inception in a holistic and integrated way, covering all aspects of the research cycle from scientific discovery and review to sharing knowledge, publishing, and outreach. We present the steps taken with a forward-looking perspective on the challenges laying ahead, in particular the necessary change of the rewards and incentives system for researchers (for which various actors (...) are co-responsible and which goes beyond the mandate of the European Commission). Finally, we discuss the role of artificial intelligence (AI) within an open science perspective. (shrink)

L’analyse logiciste des constructions savantes a pour but de mettre à nu leurs composantes symboliques : une base de données (observations et présuppositions) et un ensemble d’opérations de réécriture exprimant le raisonnement qui relie cette base aux thèses de la construction. Les travaux inspirés de ce programme depuis une vingtaine d’années soulèvent des questions intéressantes dans les perspectives d’une épistémologie pratique maintes fois exposées. L’étude des conflits d’interprétation y tient une large place ; elle s’apparente à l’analyse des controverses scientifiques (...) mais vise moins à expliquer celles-ci, du point de vue socio-historique, qu’à mieux définir les voies choisies pour les résoudre, les éluder ou les dépasser, selon les cas. Le questionnement logiciste porte sur les conséquences intellectuelles et institutionnelles de ces choix. L’affirmation de sa pérennité procède à la fois d’un constat et d’un pari, l’un et l’autre argumentés dans cet article. (shrink)

The issue of the definition and position of archaeology as a discipline is examined in relation to the dispute which took place from 1980 to 2009 between the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron. This case study enables us to explore the actual conceptual relationships between archaeology and the other sciences (as opposed to those wished for or prescribed). The contrasts between the positions declared by the two researchers and the rooting of their arguments (...) in their disciplines are examined: where the sociologist makes use of his philosophical training, the archaeologist relies mainly on his work on semiology and informatics. Archaeology ultimately plays a minor role in the arguments proposed. This dispute therefore cannot be considered as evidence for the movement of concepts between archaeology and the social sciences. A blind spot in the debate, relating to the ontological specificities of archaeological objects, nevertheless presents itself as a possible way of implementing this movement. (shrink)

Terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales es el título del libro escrito por Jean Claude Larchet, publicado en el 2014 por Ediciones Sígueme, traducido del original francés: Thérapeutique des maladies spirituelles, Les Éditions du Cerf; del año 2000. En este texto el autor nos presenta la vida espiritual como una dimensión real del ser humano, que así como en su dimensión física trabaja por su salud, lo debe hacer también en el ámbito de su vida espiritual; no hacerlo, lo (...) conduce a enfermarse, leve o gravemente. El libro plantea la descripción de esas enfermedades espirituales que aquejan al ser humano y cuál es su terapéutica. (shrink)

Dans un texte désormais célèbre, Ferdinand de Saussure insiste sur l’arbitraire du signe dont il vante les qualités. Toutefois il s’avère que le symbole, signe non arbitraire, dans la mesure où il existe un rapport entre ce qui représente et ce qui est représenté, joue un rôle fondamental dans la plupart des activités humaines, qu’elles soient scientifiques, artistiques ou religieuses. C’est cette dimension symbolique, sa portée, son fonctionnement et sa signification dans des domaines aussi variés que la chimie, la théologie, (...) les mathématiques, le code de la route et bien d’autres qui est l’objet du livre La Pointure du symbole. -/- Jean-Yves Béziau, franco-suisse, est docteur en logique mathématique et docteur en philosophie. Il a poursuivi des recherches en France, au Brésil, en Suisse, aux États-Unis (UCLA et Stanford), en Pologne et développé la logique universelle. Éditeur-en-chef de la revue Logica Universalis et de la collection Studies in Universal Logic (Springer), il est actuellement professeur à l’Université Fédérale de Rio de Janeiro et membre de l’Académie brésilienne de Philosophie. SOMMAIRE -/- PRÉFACE L’arbitraire du signe face à la puissance du symbole Jean-Yves BÉZIAU La logique et la théorie de la notation (sémiotique) de Peirce (Traduit de l’anglais par Jean-Marie Chevalier) Irving H. ANELLIS Langage symbolique de Genèse 2-3 Lytta BASSET -/- Mécanique quantique : quelle réalité derrière les symboles ? Hans BECK -/- Quels langages et images pour représenter le corps humain ? Sarah CARVALLO Des jeux symboliques aux rituels collectifs. Quelques apports de la psychologie du développement à l’étude du symbolisme Fabrice CLÉMENT Les panneaux de signalisation (Traduit de l’anglais par Fabien Shang) Robert DEWAR Remarques sur l’émergence des activités symboliques Jean LASSÈGUE Les illustrations du "Songe de Poliphile" (1499). Notule sur les hiéroglyphes de Francesca Colonna Pierre-Alain MARIAUX Signes de vie Jeremy NARBY Visualising relations in society and economics. Otto Neuraths Isotype-method against the background of his economic thought Elisabeth NEMETH Algèbre et logique symboliques : arbitraire du signe et langage formel Marie-José DURAND – Amirouche MOKTEFI Les symboles mathématiques, signes du Ciel Jean-Claude PONT La mathématique : un langage mathématique ? Alain M. ROBERT. (shrink)

Nous envisagerons dans cet article la possibilité d'un abord pratique de la relation entre linguistique et psychanalyse : la modélisation linguistique des données mises au jour par la psychanalyse à partir de corpus tirés du discours courant. La validation de tels modèles d'après les critères requis par l'« approche logiciste » de J.-C. Gardin et J. Molino sera examinée sur un exemple précis que nous exposerons en détail : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives, modèle développé, publié et enseigné par nous depuis (...) près de vingt ans. (shrink)

La querelle qui oppose la sémantique cognitive à la linguistique "orthodoxe" contemporaine: structuralisme et grammaire générative (Claude Vandeloise, ce numéro), éveille, en histoire des sciences du langage, des échos lointains mais familiers. Car, par bien des aspects, se trouve rappelée une querelle épistémologique ancienne de grande envergure, celle qui, dans l'Antiquité grecque, opposa les anomalistes aux analogistes, les anomalistes de l'école stoïcienne de Pergame aux analogistes de l'école aristotélicienne d'Alexandrie.

Jean-Claude Milner’s Le sage trompeur (2013), a controversial recent piece of French Spinoza literature, remains regrettably understudied in the English-speaking world. Adopting Leo Strauss’ esoteric reading method, Milner alleges that Spinoza dissimulates his genuine analysis of the causes of the persecution and survival of the Jewish people within a brief “manifesto” found at the end of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Chapter 3. According to Milner, Spinoza holds that the Jewish people themselves are responsible for the hatred of the (...) Jewish people, and that the engine of their longevity is the hatred they engender. Additionally, claims Milner, Spinoza covertly insinuates that the solution to this persistent state of hatred consists in the mass apostasy of the Jewish people under the leadership of a Sabbatai Zevi-like figure. This article presents the Milner–Spinoza controversy to the English-speaking public along with the larger context of French-language scholarship on Spinoza’s relation to Judaism. While refuting Milner’s reading of Spinoza, I simultaneously clarify relevant elements of Spinoza’s discussions of Judaism in the TTP, such as Spinoza’s examination of Jewish identity and the nature of divine election, Spinoza’s understanding of the causes of national hatred, and Spinoza’s appeals to Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, and Turkish political history. (shrink)

Larche equals person and individual, and there comes his misunderstanding of Zizioulas. He does not understand that person is a word for relation,and that way staying among the borders of classic scholastic thought. In the other hand, he understands the nature to be a realistic different entity in whichpersons participate. Because, the Fathers that Larche mentions in many places are directly opposite to Larches thought, he is forced to stretch his interpreta-tion, and is forced to come up with contradictory statements, (...) of many whichwe have shown. (shrink)

Community detection is a major issue in network analysis. This paper combines a socio-historical approach with an experimental reconstruction of programs to investigate the early automation of clique detection algorithms, which remains one of the unsolved NP-complete problems today. The research led by the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin from the 1950s on non-numerical information and graph analysis is retraced to demonstrate the early contributions of social sciences and humanities. The limited recognition and reception of Gardin's innovative computer application to (...) the humanities are addressed through two factors, in addition to the effects of historiography and bibliographies on the recording, discoverability, and reuse of scientific productions: (1) funding policies, evidenced by the transfer of research effort on graph applications from temporary interdisciplinary spaces to disciplinary organizations related to the then-emerging field of computer science; and (2) the erratic careers of algorithms, in which efficiency, flaws, corrections, and authors’ status, were determining factors. (shrink)

1. Une dispute épistémologique 1.1 Quatre itinéraires à proximité puis à distance des structuralismes 1.2 Un différend sur les « usages réglés du rationalisme » en sciences de l’homme 2. Les mots et les descriptions en sciences de l’homme 2.1 Une commune limitation du déterminisme linguistique 2.2 Un problème philosophique implicite : descriptions définies et noms propres 2.3 L’usage des descriptions définies en sciences de l’homme 2.4 Les (semi-)noms propres des sciences historiques 2.5 Le degré de généralité des concepts employés (...) et ses conséquences sur les raisonnements 3. La spécificité des raisonnements en sciences de l’homme 3.1 Quelle logique pour raisonner sur les phénomènes humains ? 3.2 Les usages d’une référence commune : la logique naturelle 3.3 Propositions et énoncés : divergences sur l’analyse des raisonnements 4. Le juste degré de formalisation du langage et des raisonnements 4.1 La formalisation des descriptions 4.2 Les modèles et la formalisation des raisonnements 4.3 Des formalisations qui s’ignorent 5. Le caractère historique des sciences de l’homme 5.1 Formaliser implique-t-il de dé-historiciser ? 5.2 Les mécanismes du changement scientifique 5.3 Pragmatique de l’intervention théorique. (shrink)

Rousseau argues that holding the talented in high public esteem leads the less talented to esteem their natural virtues less highly and therefore to neglect the cultivation of these virtues. D’Holbach’s response to Rousseau indicates a sense in which esteeming talent can avoid these detrimental consequences. The starting point of d’Holbach’s defense of the sciences and arts is an analysis of the impact that despotic regimes have on esteeming talent. He argues that there is not only a problem of over-valuing (...) talent but also a problem of under-valuing talent. These considerations form the background for his conception of valuing talent in the right way. The phenomenon of political deception in despotic regimes indicates a sense in which talent can be regarded as a tool for solving a pressing political problem: Genuinely estimable uses of talent are those that oppose despotism and support republican virtues. Esteeming such talent does not lead to a loss of esteem and self-esteem for ordinary people because republican virtues themselves are a source of esteem and self-esteem. Comparison with some aspects of the response of d’Holbach’s friend, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, to Rousseau will accentuate the specific strengths of d’Holbach’s argument. (shrink)

RENÉ DESCARTES: UMA BIOGRAFIA -/- RENÉ DESCARTES: A BIOGRAPHY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - CAP-UFPE, IFPE-BJ e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399. -/- -/- Nascido em 1596 em Haia, nas fronteiras de Touraine e Poitou, em uma família nobre, René Descartes vem ao mundo ao mesmo ano em que Johannes Kepler (1671-1630), em seu primeiro trabalho publicado (Mysterium cosmographicum), prova a superioridade da astronomia moderna (a de Nicolau Copérnico (1473-1543)) da astronomia antiga (a de Ptolomeu (90-168 (...) d.C.)). Ao mesmo tempo, Galileu Galilei (1564-1642), que detém a cadeira de matemática da Universidade de Pádua, funda o método experimental. As descobertas de Galileu tiveram forte impacto sobre o Colégio Real de La Fleche, realizado pelos jesuítas e onde Descartes recebeu, a partir de 1606, uma forte educação. Ele menciona, no Discurso do Método, seu “desejo extremo” em aprender, seguido, no final de seus estudos, de uma grande decepção: decepção com a filosofia ensinada, cujas controvérsias perpétuas revelam um caráter questionável, e que não pode fornecer um alicerce, em seu estado atual, para outras ciências. Também é proferido um desapontamento, mas esse desapontamento é inverso e diz respeito às matemática, capaz de fornecer esse fundamento que a filosofia não confere, mediante sua certeza e evidências, mas sobre o qual ainda não construímos nada. -/- -/- Numa Europa marcada pelo choque do tradicionalismo católico e do mercantilismo protestante, o lento declínio do poder espanhol e a luta dos Países Baixos pela sua independência, Descartes escolheu, primeiramente, após a graduação, a carreira militar. Engajado no exército do Príncipe Maurício de Nassau, ele é retirado da ociosidade da vida da guarnição pelo encontro, em 1618, de um jovem cientista holandês, Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637), que se tornou seu amigo íntimo por algum tempo. Conhecedor de todas as pesquisas científicas do momento e partidário da nova concepção “mecanicista” da natureza, Beeckman compartilhou com Descartes um entusiasmo que foi acompanhado, segundamente, da ambição de realizar a ciência universal por si mesma, mediante um método único: na noite de 10 de novembro de 1619, ele concebe em três “sonhos”, “os alicerces de uma ciência admirável”. -/- Nos anos seguintes a essa iluminação decisiva, Descartes viajou por toda a Europa, estimando, como Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), que a demonstração de boas maneiras e costumes diferentes podem gerar muitos preconceitos. Toda sua vida, além disso, esteve vagando, isto é, foi marcada por múltiplas mudanças de residências, e a recusa de estabelecer um vínculo muito de perto com alguém. Foi na Holanda que ele, finalmente, buscará a tranquilidade que não encontrara na França ainda abalada pelas guerras religiosas, antes de ser assim pelas convulsões da Fronda. Todavia, mesmo na Holanda, ele não pôde evitar os ataques de calvinistas e polemicas teológicas que o repugnaram, como evidenciado em suas discussões com a Universidade de Utrecht entre 1643 à 1645 e a Universidade de Leiden em 1647. -/- -/- Além de sua amizade com Beeckman, outro encontro teve uma influência indubitavelmente decisiva sobre o destino de Descartes: o encontro com o cardeal de Bérulle. Fundador da congregação do Oratório (ao qual pertencem Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) e Jean-Baptiste Massillon (1663-1742)), o cardeal de Bérulle enxerga na nova física mecanicista, um meio de lutar contra o naturalismo resultante do Renascimento e seu paganismo latente: em uma longa entrevista com Descartes, no outono de 1647, ele fez dessa última uma obrigação de consciência para se dedicar, nesse sentido, à filosofia. -/- Em 1628, Descartes começa a escrever as Regras para a direção do espírito, um tratado inacabado e que não foi publicado durante a vida do autor. Em 1631, desenvolvera a geometria analítica que combina curvas geométricas com equações algébricas. Em 1633 escreveu O Tratado do Homem e preparava-se para publicar O Tratado do Mundo quando a notícia da condenação de Galileu Galilei pelo Santo Ofício (a Inquisição) o deixou receoso e decide, por prudência, não publicar o seu Tratado no qual a tese do movimento da Terra ao redor do Sol é apoiada. Alguns anos depois, foi divulgado em público cultivada de algumas de suas descobertas científicas: além da geometria, a dioptria (a teoria da refração da luz) e meteoros (teoria dos fenômenos atmosféricos luminosos). Esses três tratados aparecem no apêndice do Discurso do Método, e como “ensaios” desse método, em 1637. No século XIX, Victor Cousin (1792-1867) publicou pela primeira vez o Discurso sozinho, sem os ensaios. -/- Então vem a principal obra de Descartes no ramo da metafísica: as seis Meditações, aumentadas pelas objeções dos mais famosos filósofos da época (incluindo Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) e Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)), e as respostas a essas objeções, apareceram em 1641. Ansioso para expor sua filosofia para que pudesse ser ensinada, ele também a caracteriza em forma de manual com os Princípios da Filosofia de 1644. -/- Além dos trabalhos publicados, foi por meio das cartas trocadas com personalidades do mundo erudito que Descartes encontrou a oportunidade de esclarecer vários pontos de sua filosofia. Seus principais correspondentes foram o Prade Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), o Padre Denis Mesland (1615-1672), Pierre Chanut (1601-1662), Claude Clerselier (1614-1684), Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) e Henry More (1614-1687). A partir de 1643, Descartes sustentou, com a Princesa Isabel da Boêmia (1596-1662), uma correspondência dedicada essencialmente a questões morais, que lhe permitiu a formulação de suas ideias nesse campo: esse esforço conduziu, em 1649, ao tratado das Paixões da alma. -/- Nesse mesmo ano, 1649, a Rainha Cristina da Suécia (1626-1689) o convida para ir a Estocolmo, que ele aceitou após muita hesitação. Recebido com todas as honras, mas forçado a um modo de vida bastantemente distinto daquele que era acostumado, e submetido a um clima do qual não se adequou, ele sucumbiu a pneumonia em fevereiro de 1650. -/- Descartes deixou-nos uma espécie de autobiografia intelectual na primeira parte do Discurso do Método: em seus anos de treinamento, seus entusiasmos e suas decepções. O discurso é, também, o primeiro livro para quem busca compreender o projeto filosófico cartesiano desde sua gênese até sua realização. Existem expostos, o método claro (na segunda parte), mas também a moral (terceira parte), a metafísica (quarta parte) e finalmente a física (quinta e sexta partes). (shrink)

The Louvre Museum is the largest of the world's art museums by its exhibition surface. These represent the Western art of the Middle Ages in 1848, those of the ancient civilizations that preceded and influenced it (Oriental, Egyptian, Greek, Etruscan and Roman), and the arts of early Christians and Islam. At the origin of the Louvre existed a castle, built by King Philip Augustus in 1190, and occupying the southwest quarter of the current Cour Carrée. In 1594, Henri IV decided (...) to unite the palace of the Louvre with the palace of the Tuileries built by Catherine de Medicis. The Cour Carrée was built by the architects Lemercier and then Le Vau, under the reign of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. The Department of Paintings currently has about 7,500 paintings (of which 3,400 are exposed), covering a period that goes from the Middle Ages to 1848 (date of the beginning of the Second Republic). By including the deposits, the collection is, with 12,660 works, the largest collection of ancient paintings in the world. With rare exceptions, the works after 1848 were transferred to the Musée d'Orsay when it was created in 1986. CONTENTS: Louvre Museum - Variety of exhibited works - The Royal Palace - The collections - - Eastern antiquities - - Arts of Islam - - Egyptian Antiquities - - Greek, Etruscan and Roman Antiquities - - Paintings - - - French school - - - Northern Schools (Flanders, Netherlands, Germany) - - - Italian School - - - Other schools Painting - Definitions - Painting genres - - The landscape - - Still life Paintings - FRANCOIS BOUCHER - - Vulcan presenting arms to Venus for Aeneas - RAPHAEL - - Portrait of Baldassare Castiglione - RUBENS - - Helena Fourment with children - LOUIS DAVID - - Madame Récamier - REMBRANDT - - Portrait of Heindrickje Stoffels - VELAZQUEZ - - Portrait of the Infanta Margarita - SIMONE MEMMI - - Jesus Christ walking on Calvary - JAN STEEN - - The Bad Company - HANS HOLBEIN - - Erasmus - CORREGGIO - - Mystic Marriage of Saint Catherine - LANCRET - - Conversation - JAN VAN DER MEER (VERMEER) - - The Lacemaker - VAN DYCK - - Charles I at the Hunt - FRANÇOIS CLOUET - - Elisabeth of Austria (1554-1592), Wife of Charles IX and Queen of France (1570 - 1574) - DELACROIX - - The Barque of Dante - EL GRECO - - Saint Louis, King of France, and a page - REMBRANDT - - Pilgrims at Emmaus (The Supper at Emmaus) - GERARD DAVID - - Marriage at Cana - RAPHAEL - - Portrait of Dona Isabel de Requesens, Vice-Queen of Naples - RUBENS - - La Kermesse (The Village Fête, or Noce de village) - FRANS HALS - - The Gypsy Girl - DECAMPS - - The Sonneurs - HOLBEIN THE YOUNGER - - Anne of Cleves - P. PRUD’HON - - Psyche transported to Heaven - PHILIPPE DE CHAMPAIGNE - - Portrait of Richelieu - LANCRET - - The Autumn - L. DAVID - - Madame Seriziat - COROT - - Recollection of Mortefontaine - LEONARDO DA VINCI - - La belle ferronnière - CORREGGIO - - Venus and Cupid with a Satyr - WATTEAU - - Pilgrimage to Cythera (The Embarkation for Cythera) - NICOLAS POUSSIN - - The Inspiration of the Poet - PRUD’HON - - The Empress Josephine (1763-1814) - FRAGONARD - - The Bathers - H. RIGAUD - - Louis XIV (1638–1715) - TERBURG - - The Concert - LEOPOLD ROBERT - - The Pilgrimage to the Madonna of the Arch - LARGILLIERE - - Family Portrait - MANTEGNA - - Parnassus - MEMLING - - The Virgin and Child between St James and St Dominic - FRAGONARD - - The Music Lesson - JEAN VAN EYCK - - The Virgin of chancellor Rolin - PAOLO VERONESE - - Susannah and the Elders - FRANÇOIS BOUCHER - - Diana leaving her bath - GÉRICAULT - - The Raft of the Medusa - MURILLO - - Assumption of the Virgin - CLAUDE GELLEE (LORRAIN) - - Ulysses returning Chryseis to her father (Marine, setting sun) - INGRES - - Madame Riviere - E. MURILLO - - The Young Beggar - GREUZE - - The Broken Pitcher - PIETER DE HOOCH - - Card players in an opulent interior - POUSSIN - - Et in Arcadia ego - QUENTIN MATSYS - - The moneylender and his wife - ANDREA SOLARIO - - Madonna with the Green Cushion - TITIEN - - Woman with a Mirror - DAVID TENIERS (the Younger) - - The Works of Mercy - LEONARDO DA VINCI - - Mona Lisa (La Gioconda) - Armand Dayot . (shrink)

Chapitre méthodologique d'un livre co-écrit par Éliane Pons et J.-J. Pinto. Ce dernier, pour raisons professionnelles, n'avait indiqué son nom que dans cette partie intitulée "Esquisse d'une psychanalyse scientifique" (allusion respectueuse au titre de Freud "Esquisse d'une psychologie scientifique"), où se trouve expliquée en détail la méthode originale d'analyse de discours inventée et enseignée par lui : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives© (A.L.S.©).

Jean-Luc Nancy takes the concept of "essence" in order to indicate its drawbacks on the singularity of being. The concept of essence is not a universal and necessary origin, but contingent and historical meanings for Nancy. This historicity in meaning leads Nancy to question the concept of the individual and the rules of the social/public sphere allocated through individuality. Nancy's argument on the ontological environment of finite beings aims to highlight those beings are mixed singular, not belonging to a (...) universal unit. This allows us to discover that being is singular and also singular-plural to the extent that it is with the other. Thus, essential historical concepts invalidate individual or social organizations at this point. Nancy calls this “finitude” which is the only transcendental concept that makes possible the “being with” (Mitsein). It is possible to think that finitude is the only property to make a community of singularities rather than ready-made concepts of social sciences. I argue that this position is methodological for an alternative socio-ontology. (shrink)

Often associated with themes in political philosophy and aesthetics, the work of Jean-François Lyotard is most known for his infamous definition of the postmodern in his best-known book, La condition postmoderne, as incredulity towards metanarratives. The claim of this article is that this famous claim of Lyotard is actually embedded in a philosophy of technology, one that is, moreover, still relevant for understanding present technoscience. The first part of the article therefore sketches Lyotard’s philosophy of technology, mainly by correcting (...) three common misconceptions: that La condition postmoderne would only be about metanarratives, whereas in fact, it is mainly about what replaces them, namely performativity; that performativity would be shorthand for capitalism, whereas in reality, capitalism is the latest instance of a longer history of performativity; and that Lyotard’s reflections on science and technology would be restricted to this book alone, whereas in reality, a well-articulated philosophy of technology, centered around the concept of technoscience, is found in his later work. The second part of the article then aims to highlight the contemporary relevance of this philosophy of technoscience through a brief examination of two contemporary technosciences: synthetic biology and data science. (shrink)

W artykule tym przedstawiam koncepcję rozwoju autorstwa wybitnego nigeryjskiego myśliciela i demokraty Claude’a Akego. Ake zaproponował abstrakcyjny paradygmat rozwoju społeczeństw afrykańskich w warunkach demokracji. Paradygmat ten opiera się na rolnej strategii rozwoju, zgodnie z którą powinien być on uzyskiwany małymi krokami i pierwotnie generowany na wsi. Ake zdefiniował rozwój jako proces, „poprzez który ludzie kształtują i zmieniają siebie oraz swoją sytuację życiową, by osiągać wyższe poziomy cywilizacyjne, zgodnie z własnymi wyborami i wartościami”. Zdaniem nigeryjskiego myśliciela, rozwój jako proces zbiorowy (...) powinien być wytwarzany przez tych, którzy mają go doświadczać. Ake krytykował dominujący, jego zdaniem, zachodni paradygmat rozwoju Afryki, zgodnie z którym rozwój może zostać narzucony Afrykanom z zewnątrz, a demokratyczna władza wcale nie musi stanowić warunku sine qua non rozwoju. W opinii Akego, zachodnie próby zintensyfikowania rozwoju w Afryce, które cechował brak zrozumienia dla afrykańskich uwarunkowań kulturowych, w tym sposobów myślenia i życia Afrykanów, skończyły się porażką. Koncepcja Akego, choć ciekawa i poparta ważnymi argumentami oraz przykładami, nie jest wolna od uogólnień i sprzeczności. Co więcej, jak się wydaje, nigeryjski myśliciel zaprezentował model rozwoju bliski autarkii i wyzuty z realiów współczesnej ekonomii. W konsekwencji krytycznie oceniam część opinii Akego i ukazuję podstawowe, moim zdaniem, ich mankamenty. (shrink)

The article intends to demonstrate that, when building his science, Claude Lévi- Strauss abandons the categories used by the traditional studies of the myth and creates singular epistemological tools, suggested by the music, by the natural science and by the plastic arts. These tools, which we can denominate aesthetic operators, light up, in an exemplary way, the dissolution process that suffers the mythical matter when transforming in the time and in the space. When establishing that new form of thinking, (...) the myth, that reconciles the sensitive experience with the intelligible, Lévi-Strauss proposes to overcome the permanent dichotomy between knowing archaic and modern, between magical and scientific thought, between magic and Science. (shrink)

(Back Cover:) « La pensée métaphysique renaîtra demain. Ce sont des savants qui ont le goût et le sens de la pensée conduite jusqu’au terme de ses exigences internes, et des philosophes initiés aux sciences expérimentales qui, en commun, la feront. » L’œuvre de Claude Tresmontant (1925-1997) illustre parfaitement cette recherche de la métaphysique d’un monde en devenir, qui sait écouter et se modeler sur la transformation – la métamorphose – promise à une Création finalisée. Le trait commun aux (...) exposés ici présentés sous forme définitive a été cette recherche autour d’une pensée qui renouvelle de l’intérieur la métaphysique en réalisant le vœu de Bergson qu’elle devienne « auscultatrice », que l’énigme que pose l’homme face à son origine et sa destinée ne soit pas recouverte par une pensée qui se perdrait dans la description des choses ou dans l’esprit de système, mais qui non plus n’irait se recroqueviller sur elle-même, en narrant sa propre expérience subjective sous le mode de la déréliction. Claude Tresmontant a su penser l’être en genèse, et il a cherché à renouveler la question de l’existence de Dieu, en en transformant la problématique en dialogue avec les sciences contemporaines. À ce goût de l’être dont les sciences ont renouvelé l’approche, il a également voulu infuser un « supplément d’âme », en repensant la réalité de la création et l’horizon de la cause finale, toujours à partir de la nature ultimement théologique de la réponse à la question « qu’est-ce que l’homme ? » Contributeurs : Yves Tourenne, Philippe Gagnon, Fabien Revol, Brunor, Frédéric Crouslé, Bertrand Souchard, Emmanuel Gabellieri. Table of Contents: Note Liminaire (Ph. Gagnon) - 7 En quoi la pensée de Claude Tresmontant nous stimule-t-elle encore ? Hommage et critique (Y. Tourenne) - 13 L’imbrication de la preuve de Dieu et de la cosmologie chez Tresmontant représente-t-elle une preuve ? (Ph. Gagnon) - 27 L’usage apologétique de la philosophie de Tresmontant dans les Indices pensables de Brunor (F. Revol) - 49 Réponse à Fabien Revol (Brunor) - 77 Qu’est-ce qui cloche dans la théologie de Claude Tresmontant ? (Fr. Crouslé) - 85 Les métaphysiques principales de Claude Tresmontant : la foi biblique est-elle à part de la raison philosophique grecque ? (B. Souchard) - 109 Maurice Blondel et Claude Tresmontant (E. Gabellieri) - 123 La vision informationnelle de Tresmontant, surtout en référence au problème de l’âme (Ph. Gagnon) - 133. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of (...) consciousness’ which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Při výběru z teorií, které bychom mohli aplikovat na problém, jímž se zabýváme, je pro nás účinnost jejich použití jedním z nejdůležitějších kritérií. Jinými slovy, naše hodnocení teorií se odvíjí o jejich schopnosti řešit problémy. V tomto eseji nejprve ukáži, jaké druhy problémů jsou pro sociální vědy klíčové, a s pomocí strukturalistické kritiky funkcionalismu nabídnu ilustrace těchto problémů. Budu přitom tvrdit, že Lévi-Straussovy přísliby spojené s jeho metodou nebyly nikdy naplněny a že je strukturální antropologie neuspokojivá.

Original title : 「ドガの『舞姫』」『深田康算全集』[Œuvres complètes de Fukada Yasukazu]. Machida, Tamagawa Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1972–1973, 3 : 9–15.

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...) level of intentional mode or attitude. I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non-epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non-epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of acknowledging values. (shrink)

Within Jean Paul Sartre’s atheistic program, he objected to Christian mysticism as a delusory desire for substantive being. I suggest that a Christian mystic might reply to Sartre’s attack by claiming that Sartre indeed grasps something right about the human condition but falls short of fully understanding what he grasps. Then I argue that the true basis of Sartre’s atheism is neither philosophical nor existentialist, but rather mystical. Sartre had an early mystical atheistic intuition that later developed into atheistic (...) mystical experience. Sartre experienced the nonexistence of God. (shrink)

Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism is a classic critique of France's policies in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s and inspired much subsequent writing on colonialism, post-colonialism, politics, and literature. It includes Sartre's celebrated preface to Fanon's classic Wretched of the Earth. Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism had a profound impact on French intellectual life, inspiring many other influential French thinkers and critics of colonialism such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, Frantz Fanon, Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Derrida.

Taking his critique of totalitarianizing conceptions of community as a starting point, this text examines Jean-Luc Nancy's work of an ‘ontology of plural singular being’ for its political implications. It argues that while at first this ontology seems to advocate a negative or an anti-politics only, it can also be read as a ‘theory of communicative praxis’ that suggests a certain ethos – in the form of a certain use of symbols that would render the ontological plurality of singulars (...) perceptible and practically effective. Finally, some recent texts by Nancy even sidestep the ontology of being-with and face the question of what politics, faced with demands of justice, could be and what a democratic politics could provide. Both of these aspects in Nancy's work, however, still remain to be spelled out more politically. (shrink)

In this lyrical meditation on listening, Jean-Luc Nancy examines sound in relation to the human body. How is listening different from hearing? What does listening entail? How does what is heard differ from what is seen? Can philosophy even address listening, écouter, as opposed to entendre, which means both hearing and understanding? Unlike the visual arts, sound produces effects that persist long after it has stopped. The body, Nancy says, is itself like an echo chamber, responding to music by (...) inner vibrations as well as outer attentiveness. Since “the ear has no eyelid” (Quignard), sound cannot be blocked out or ignored: our whole being is involved in listening, just as it is involved in interpreting what it hears. The mystery of music and of its effects on the listener is subtly examined. Nancy’s skill as a philosopher is to bring the reader companionably along with him as he examines these fresh and vital questions; by the end of the book the reader feels as if listening very carefully to a person talking quietly, close to the ear. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to critically explore the understanding, the goals and the meaning of education in the philosophy of education by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his educational novel Emile: or On Education [Emile ou De l’éducation] he depicts his account of the natural education. Rousseau argues that all humans share one and the same development process which is independent of their social background. He regards education as an active process of perfection which is curiosity-driven and intrinsic to (...) each child. Rousseau’s educational goals are autarky, happiness and freedom. (shrink)

This paper explores Jean Starobinski's often tacit conception of the implied author, with a view to clarifying his intellectual legacy for literary criticism. It argues that it is plausible to trace a certain strand in the intellectual genealogy of Starobinski's literary theory from the descriptive psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey to twentieth-century psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Accordingly, the question "Who is Jean Starobinski?" is formulated in a sense which seeks to move beyond the bare facticity of biographical detail, a sense (...) that can be expected to differentiate between scholarly and purely journalistic enquiry to ask: who, exactly, is the Jean Starobinski that we encounter in his major works - works like "The Living Eye" and "Transparency and Obstruction"? It is from this vantage point that the discussion proceeds to clarify Starobinski's ambivalent relations to both Rousseau and Freud, and thereby to illuminate some of the tensions and nuances inherent in his notion of the implied author. (shrink)

Je montre dans ce texte que la thèse de Jean Wahl sur les Pluralistes d'Angleterre et d'Amérique n'est pas tant un tableau des pensées pluralistes qu'une problématisation du pluralisme. La révélation que Wahl va trouver à rebours de certains textes de William James, c'est celle d'un restant moniste, attentif au fond non relationnel de l'expérience, ce qui va le conduire à explorer, beaucoup plus hardiment que nombre de ses contempo- rains, les proximités entre James et Bradley. Cette voix moniste, (...) que l'on retrouverait derrière la lettre des «philosophies pluralistes», est le véritable enjeu de la thèse de 1920 qui, après un inventaire des critiques de l'unité abstraite, propose dans sa méditation conclusive une vision du monde dans laquelle, une fois la critique des abstractions du pluralisme opérée, subsiste ce sens du « particulier concret » qui en est la marque propre. Ce sera l'objet de la deuxième section. Alors qu'une partie du public français lit l'empirisme radical à travers la «volonté de croire», les derniers textes à partir des premiers, traduits et présentés dès leur parution par Renouvier dans La Critique, Wahl semble au contraire retrouver, dans les premiers textes l'accent des derniers, à travers l'insistance sur le fait brut de l'existence, hypothèse qui sera éclairée dans la troisième section. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

Physicien théoricien, philosophe de la physique et historien des théo­ries physiques, le savant catholique français Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) a profondément marqué la pensée du vingtième siècle. Chacun connaît le Système du monde, dont les dix volu­mes ont contribué à la redécouverte de la science médiévale, et La théorie physique, qui a notamment donné lieu à la célèbre «thèse Duhem-Quine». Si Clio a donc gardé de Duhem le sou­venir d’un grand historien des sciences et d’un philosophe perspicace de la physique, lui-même (...) cependant n’aspirait qu’à être reconnu comme physicien. Son œuvre est en effet traver­sée par un projet scientifique qui consiste à ordonner et à réunir les diverses branches de la physique sous l’égide de la thermo­dynamique dans le cadre d’une théorie représentative et non explicative du réel. C’est ce projet que Duhem a voulu réaliser dans ses publications scientifiques, exposer dans ses écrits philoso­phiques, et finalement cautionner par ses recherches historiques. Cependant l’investissement toujours plus important de Duhem en histoire des sciences et la présence dans son œuvre de con­sidéra­tions apologétiques et d’écrits patriotiques peuvent don­ner à penser qu’il s’est progressivement détourné de ce projet primordial au profit d’autres préoccupations. De même, les tensions qui, à l’inté­rieur de ce projet scientifique, subsistent entre sa volonté unificatrice et sa revendication phénoménaliste peuvent conduire à une relativi­sation de cette dernière, conçue comme une demande contextuelle, passa­gère et finalement peu significative. Sans ignorer ces préoccu­pations historiques, religieuses ou patriotiques, sans négliger ce con­flit d’intérêt entre les deux parties constitutives du projet duhémien, cette étude entend tout d’abord réaffirmer que ce projet scientifique ne sera jamais ni abandonné, ni amputé. Toutefois, dès lors que sont maintenues la permanence, la prio­rité et l’intégralité de ce projet, trois paradoxes surgissent im­médiatement. Si Duhem se voulait avant tout physicien et souhaitait être reconnu comme tel, par quelle extravagance de l’histoire est-il finalement connu pour ses recherches histori­ques et ses travaux philosophiques et non pour ce qui lui tenait le plus à cœur? S’il ne voulait être qu’un illustre physicien, pourquoi s’est-il acharné, au retour du laboratoire, à exhumer de l’oubli les manuscrits et les théories scientifiques des au­teurs médiévaux? Enfin, s’il voulait vraiment établir une physi­que qui soit unifiée, cohérente et parfaite, pourquoi se prive-t-il du réa­lisme et s’embarrasse-t-il du phénoménalisme? Basée sur la corres­pondance inédite de Duhem, cette étude, centrée plus particu­liè­rement sur ce troisième paradoxe, contribue fina­lement à élucider chacun d’eux. (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be non-trivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be non-trivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

Jean Piaget's theory of human mental development mirrors many issues related to human. According to this theory, one's view of himself, nature/universe and God is changing. According to this theory, which is basically divided into four main periods and subtitles, the thinking skill of man changes according to age, physical development, education and society. These differences affect the way individuals obtain information. Individuals who acquire knowledge with an emotional intuition before the age of seven acquire information through an inductive (...) way, in other words, through concrete intuition, through concrete processes, experimentation and observation, in parallel with the development of the brain and senses. At the age of eleven and after which intellectual reasoning develops, information becomes abstract and information is obtained through abstract intuition based on theories, hypotheses and assumptions. In the love experience of Rumi, a mystical thinker, knowledge is obtained only with emotional intuition, and it is claimed that the only way to obtain information is love-based emotional intuition. In this love-based emotional intuition, the ways of obtaining concrete/experimental and abstract/rational knowledge requiring high level mental skills are rejected and these methods are said to be 'devil’s work'. In this study, Rumi's approach to human, universe and God in this one-sided and emotional way is criticized and its inconsistency is revealed. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

Book review of Jean-Louis Schefer's The Ordinary Man of Cinema (2016) with particular attention to Schefer's conception of affect and its influence on Deleuze.

A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...) , or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...) access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion. (shrink)

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre is rarely discussed in the philosophy of religion. In 2009, however, Jerome Gellman broke the silence, publishing an article in which he argued that the source of Sartre’s atheism was neither philosophical nor existential, but mystical. Drawing from several of Sartre’s works – including Being and Nothingness, Words, and a 1943 review entitled ‘A New Mystic’ – I argue that there are strong biographical and philosophical reasons to disagree with Gellman’s conclusion that Sartre was a ‘mystical atheist’. (...) Moreover, I question the likelihood of drawing any definitive conclusions regarding the sources of Sartre’s ambiguous atheism. (shrink)

The problem of evil and the injustice it brings out has a long history in western philosophy and it has been one of the core arguments against the existence of God as an all-powerful and all-good Being. In a number of texts Meillassoux agrees with this line of argument, but he also argues that atheism fails to take into account the injustice of evil. His central thesis is that while the existence of evil discounts the existence of the ‘revealed’ God, (...) he proposes a messianic vision where we can hope for the arrival of a God who will have the power to rectify the injustices that have been committed. To justify the possible arrival of such a being Meillassoux describes the world as a contingent place such that things happen without a necessary reason. This explains why, in the past, novel and inexplicable situations (‘advents’) have arisen and, possibly, others might arise. One such possibility is the arrival of a God who will redeem all the injustices suffered within the world. (shrink)

This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that emotions are evaluative. Moreover, many authors suppose that emotions are important or valuable as evaluations. According to the currently dominant version of cognitivism, emotions are evaluative insofar as they make us aware of value properties of their intentional objects. In attributing to emotions an epistemic role, this view conceives of them as epistemically valuable. In this paper, I argue that proponents of this account mischaracterize the evaluative character of emotions and, a fortiori, their value. Moreover, (...) I propose an alternative view of emotional evaluation, according to which emotions are practically rather than epistemically important. As I argue, emotions are ways of acknowledging their intentional objects as (dis)valuable. As such, they do not apprehend values but make them count. I elaborate this idea by drawing an analogy with legal and political sanctions. The resulting view has it that emotions are practically important in that they affirm the cares and concerns which serve as standards of emotional evaluation. (shrink)

State-dependent utility is a problem for the behavioural branch of decision theory under uncertainty. It questions the very possibility that beliefs be revealed by choice data. According to the current literature, all models of beliefs are equally exposed to the problem. Moreover, the problem is solvable only when the decision-maker can influence the resolution of uncertainty. This article gives grounds to reject these two views. The various models of beliefs can be shown to be unequally exposed to the problem of (...) state-dependent utility. The problem can be argued to be solved even when the decision-maker has no influence over the resolution of uncertainty. The implications of such reappraisal for a philosophical appreciation of the revealed preference methodology are discussed. (shrink)

Pierre Bayle shows that, in order to avoid devastating objections, materialism should postulate that the property of thinking does not emerge from certain material combinations but is present in matter from the start and everywhere—a hypothesis recently revived and labelled “panpsychism”. There are reasons for entertaining the idea that Bayle actually considers this enhanced materialism to be tenable, as it might use the same line of defence that Bayle outlined for Stratonism. However, this would lead to a view similar to (...) Locke’s superaddition theory, and I contend that such cannot be Bayle’s position because he embraces the Cartesian principle that each substance has only one principal attribute. This makes untenable, in his eyes, any system that conjoins thought with matter in the same simple substance. By contrast, this makes clear which kinds of metaphysics and epistemology panpsychists need to adopt to defend their view. (shrink)