Results for 'good for'

995 found
Order:
  1. Against ‘Good for’/‘Well-Being’, for ‘Simply Good’.Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):803-22.
    This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘ (...) for’ expresses is distinctively ‘subject-relative’. One concerns the ground of this value, or the properties that make something good for you; it says these must involve some relation to you. The other concerns the resulting value itself, or what supervenes on this ground; it says that too involves a relation. Neither interpretation, the paper argues, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental evaluative concept is just ‘simply good’. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Good-for-nothings.Susan Wolf - 2010 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 85 (2):47-64.
    Many academic works as well as many works of art are such that if they had never been produced, no one would be worse off. Yet it is hard to resist the judgment that some such works are good nonetheless. We are rightly grateful that these works were created; we rightly admire them, appreciate them, and take pains to preserve them. And the authors and artists who produced them have reason to be proud. This should lead us to question (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  3. The Locative Analysis of Good For Formulated and Defended.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JESP) 6 (1):1-27.
    THE STRUCTURE OF THIS PAPER IS AS FOLLOWS. I begin §1 by dealing with preliminary issues such as the different relations expressed by the “good for” locution. I then (§2) outline the Locative Analysis of good for and explain its main elements before moving on to (§3) outlining and discussing the positive features of the view. In the subsequent sections I show how the Locative Analysis can respond to objections from, or inspired by, Sumner (§4-5), Regan (§6), and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  4. What is good for an octopus?Heather Browning - 2019 - Animal Sentience 4 (26).
    Mather (2019) has brought together the current empirical research in support of the claim that octopuses possess minds; and the weight of the evidence does appear to support octopus sentience. Being sentient means an organism has welfare concerns, a subjective experience of life that can go well or poorly. Protecting welfare requires knowing what conditions will have a positive or negative impact. Understanding what is in the mind of an octopus will give us valuable insight into what is good (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. What Is Goodness Good For?Christian Piller - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics: Volume 4. pp. 179-209.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. On Susan Wolf’s “Good-for-Nothings".Ben Bramble - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1071-1081.
    According to welfarism about value, something is good simpliciter just in case it is good for some being or beings. In her recent Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, “Good-For-Nothings”, Susan Wolf argues against welfarism by appeal to great works of art, literature, music, and philosophy. Wolf provides three main arguments against this view, which I call The Superfluity Argument, The Explanation of Benefit Argument, and The Welfarist’s Mistake. In this paper, I reconstruct these arguments and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Is it good for them too? Ethical concern for the sexbots.Steve Petersen - 2017 - In John Danaher & Neil McArthur (eds.), Robot Sex: Social Implications and Ethical. Cambridge, USA: MIT Press. pp. 155-171.
    In this chapter I'd like to focus on a small corner of sexbot ethics that is rarely considered elsewhere: the question of whether and when being a sexbot might be good---or bad---*for the sexbot*. You might think this means you are in for a dry sermon about the evils of robot slavery. If so, you'd be wrong; the ethics of robot servitude are far more complicated than that. In fact, if the arguments here are right, designing a robot to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Good and Good For.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - In Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  9.  67
    What is good for an octopus?Heather Browning - 2019 - Animal Sentience 26 (7).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. Eavesdropping: What is it good for?Jonathan Phillips & Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Semantics and Pragmatics.
    Eavesdropping judgments (judgments about truth, retraction, and consistency across contexts) about epistemic modals have been used in recent years to argue for a radical thesis: that truth is assessment-relative. We argue that judgments for 'I think that p' pattern in strikingly similar ways to judgments for 'Might p' and 'Probably p'. We argue for this by replicating three major experiments involving the latter and adding a condition with the form 'I think that p', showing that subjects respond in the same (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Going green is good for you: Why we need to change the way we think about pro-environmental behavior.Michael Prinzing - 2020 - Ethics, Policy and Environment (1):1-18.
    Awareness and concern about climate change are widespread. But rates of pro-environmental behaviour are low. This is partly due to the way in which pro-environmental behaviour is framed—as a sacrifice or burden that individuals bear for the planet and future generations. This framing elicits well-known cognitive biases, discouraging what we should be encouraging. We should abandon the self-sacrifice framing, and instead frame pro-environmental behaviour as intrinsically desirable. There is a large body of evidence that, around the world, people who are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Is Moral Status Good for You?Thomas Douglas - forthcoming - In Stephen Clarke, Hazem Zohny & Julian Savulescu (eds.), Rethinking Moral Status. Oxford, UK:
    Should we cognitively alter animals in ways that might change their moral status? There has been some discussion of this question. For example, Chan (2009) and Chan and Harris (2001) consider whether we should radically enhance the cognitive capacities of animals, while Thompson (2008) and Shriver (2009) argue that we should in fact substantially disenhance some animals to protect them from suffering. More controversially, some have countenanced radical and possibly moral status-altering transformations of human persons. ... One question relevant to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  81
    What’s Good for Them? Best Interests and Severe Disorders of Consciousness.Jennifer Hawkins - 2016 - In Walter Sinnott Armstrong (ed.), Finding Consciousness. Oxford, UK: pp. 180-206.
    I consider the current best interests of patients who were once thought to be either completely unaware (to be in PVS) or only minimally aware (MCS), but who, because of advanced fMRI studies, we now suspect have much more “going on” inside their minds, despite no ability to communicate with the world. My goal in this chapter is twofold: (1) to set out and defend a framework that I think should always guide thinking about the best interests of highly cognitively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Generosity, terror, and the good for humans.Jorge Secada - 2009 - In Matthew J. Morgan (ed.), The Impact of 9/11 on Religion and Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This is a discussion of the moral psychology of monstrous evil. It suggests that deliberate monstrously evil acts committed in the name of the good by moral agents arises from a peculiar vice which blinds them to the humanity of others. It also examines an opposing virtue, generosity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Reasons of Love and Conceptual Good-for-Nothings.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - In Michael Frauchiger & Markus Stepanians (eds.), Themes from Susan Wolf. Berlin: De Gruyter.
    What reasons do we have to use certain concepts and conceptions rather than others? Approaching that question in a methodologically humanistic rather than Platonic spirit, one might seek “reasons for concept use” in how well concepts serve the contingent human concerns of those who live by them. But appealing to the instrumentality of concepts in meeting our concerns invites the worry that this yields the wrong kind of reasons, especially if the relevant concerns are nonmoral ones. Drawing on Susan Wolf’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  19
    Are Philosophy and Children Good for Each Other?Maughn Gregory - 2002 - Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 16 (2):9-11.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. What is Good for Spock? A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism.Isaac Shur - 2019 - Ephemeris 19:46-57.
    Attitudinal Hedonism is a theory of well-being which claims that welfare consists in states of attitudinal pleasure. Fred Feldman characterizes attitudinal pleasure as a state of consciousness similar to attitudes of hope and fear or belief and doubt. He employs the term, enjoyment for the relevant conscious state of attitudinal pleasure and disenjoyment for attitudinal pain. Attitudinal pleasures and pains contrast with sensory pleasures like sex or drugs and sensory pains like cuts or bruises which are felt with the senses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul.Myles Burnyeat - 2000 - In T. Smiley (ed.), Mathematics and Necessity: Essays in the History of Philosophy. pp. 1-81.
    Anyone who has read Plato’s Republic knows it has a lot to say about mathematics. But why? I shall not be satisfied with the answer that the future rulers of the ideal city are to be educated in mathematics, so Plato is bound to give some space to the subject. I want to know why the rulers are to be educated in mathematics. More pointedly, why are they required to study so much mathematics, for so long?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  19. What are Collections and Divisions Good for?Jens Kristian Larsen - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy 40 (1):107-133.
    This article defends three claims. First, that collection and division in the Phaedrus are described as procedures that underlie human speaking and thinking in general, as well as philosophical inquiry, and are not identified with either. Second, that what sets the dialectical use of these procedures apart from their ordinary use are philosophical suppositions independent of the procedures of collection and division themselves; for that reason, collection and division cannot be identified with dialectic as such. Third, that the second part (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. What are definitions of life good for? Transdisciplinary and other definitions in astrobiology.Tarja Knuuttila & Andrea Loettgers - 2017 - Biology and Philosophy 32 (6):1185-1203.
    The attempt to define life has gained new momentum in the wake of novel fields such as synthetic biology, astrobiology, and artificial life. In a series of articles, Cleland, Chyba, and Machery claim that definitions of life seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of life—something that such definitions cannot, and should not do. We argue that this criticism is largely unwarranted. Cleland, Chyba, and Machery approach definitions of life as classifying devices, thereby neglecting their other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  21. Landscapes, surfaces, and morphospaces: what are they good for?Massimo Pigliucci - 2012 - In E. Svensson & R. Calsbeek (eds.), The Adaptive Landscape in Evolutionary Biology. Oxford University Press. pp. 26.
    Few metaphors in biology are more enduring than the idea of Adaptive Landscapes, originally proposed by Sewall Wright (1932) as a way to visually present to an audience of typically non- mathematically savvy biologists his ideas about the relative role of natural selection and genetic drift in the course of evolution. The metaphor, how- ever, was born troubled, not the least reason for which is the fact that Wright presented different diagrams in his original paper that simply can- not refer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Epistemological Naturalness: What is a good heuristic strategy good for?Matej Drobňák - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 27 (1):85-104.
    According to the standard interpretation of Lewis’s theory of predicate meaning (the U&N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically - as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically - as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&N theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  76
    Not Quite Non‐Consequentialism: The Implications of Pettit's ‘Three Mistakes about Doing Good ’ for Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy.Fiona Woollard - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 35 (1):47-53.
    As its title indicates, Philip Pettit’s “Three Mistakes about Doing Good (and Bad)” identifies and rejects three common claims restricting what can count as a good (or bad ) effect of action. The key question here is how do we work out how much good you have brought about by your action? The first common claim is that only causal effects or consequences of action can count as goods that are brought about by an action. The second, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. What is philosophy of science good for?Massimo Pigliucci - 2004 - Philosophy Now 44:45.
    What is the purpose of philosophy of science? Here are some answers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  26. Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness.Eric Brown - 2006 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 22 (1):221-256.
    Aristotle's account of external goods in Nicomachean Ethics I 8-12 is often thought to amend his narrow claim that happiness is virtuous activity. I argue, to the contrary, that on Aristotle's account, external goods are necessary for happiness only because they are necessary for virtuous activity. My case innovates in three main respects: I offer a new map of EN I 8-12; I identify two mechanisms to explain why virtuous activity requires external goods, including a psychological need for external goods; (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.
    The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  28. For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics.Alex John London - 2021 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    The foundations of research ethics are riven with fault lines emanating from a fear that if research is too closely connected to weighty social purposes an imperative to advance the common good through research will justify abrogating the rights and welfare of study participants. The result is an impoverished conception of the nature of research, an incomplete focus on actors who bear important moral responsibilities, and a system of ethics and oversight highly attuned to the dangers of research but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. How to design AI for social good: seven essential factors.Luciano Floridi, Josh Cowls, Thomas C. King & Mariarosaria Taddeo - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (3):1771–1796.
    The idea of artificial intelligence for social good is gaining traction within information societies in general and the AI community in particular. It has the potential to tackle social problems through the development of AI-based solutions. Yet, to date, there is only limited understanding of what makes AI socially good in theory, what counts as AI4SG in practice, and how to reproduce its initial successes in terms of policies. This article addresses this gap by identifying seven ethical factors (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  30.  30
    Good reasons for obscure writing?Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    I identify two seemingly good reasons for obscure writing, one to do with avoiding plagiarism or near-plagiarism (which I have identified before), and the other to do with avoiding attracting readers who prefer accessible writing but nevertheless have no space for you in the structure of roles they envisage.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  77
    Good science and good ethics: why we should discourage payment for eggs in stem cell researchonation.Donna Dickenson - 2009 - Nature Reviews Genetics 10 (11):743.
    Payment for eggs used in stem cell research puts women at unacceptable risk and encourages exploitative commodification of the female body. Thanks to the development of induced pluripotent stem cells, however, we no longer face a choice between good science and good ethics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. AI4People—an ethical framework for a good AI society: opportunities, risks, principles, and recommendations.Luciano Floridi, Josh Cowls, Monica Beltrametti, Raja Chatila, Patrice Chazerand, Virginia Dignum, Christoph Luetge, Robert Madelin, Ugo Pagallo, Francesca Rossi, Burkhard Schafer, Peggy Valcke & Effy Vayena - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (4):689-707.
    This article reports the findings of AI4People, an Atomium—EISMD initiative designed to lay the foundations for a “Good AI Society”. We introduce the core opportunities and risks of AI for society; present a synthesis of five ethical principles that should undergird its development and adoption; and offer 20 concrete recommendations—to assess, to develop, to incentivise, and to support good AI—which in some cases may be undertaken directly by national or supranational policy makers, while in others may be led (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  33. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Does Plato Make Room for Negative Forms in His Ontology?Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Cosmos and History 13 (3):154–191.
    Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. No Good Arguments for Causal Closure.Keith Buhler - 2020 - Metaphysica 21 (2):223-236.
    Many common arguments for physicalism begin with the principle that the cosmos is “causally closed.” But how good are the arguments for causal closure itself? I argue that the deductive, a priori arguments on behalf of causal closure tend to beg the question. The extant inductive arguments fare no better. They commit a sampling error or a non-sequitur, or else offer conclusions that remain compatible with causal openness. In short, we have no good arguments that the physical world (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1‐2):12-28.
    Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  36. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
    Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   133 citations  
  37. Good AI for the Present of Humanity Democratizing AI Governance.Nicholas Kluge Corrêa & Nythamar De Oliveira - 2021 - AI Ethics Journal 2 (2):1-16.
    What does Cyberpunk and AI Ethics have to do with each other? Cyberpunk is a sub-genre of science fiction that explores the post-human relationships between human experience and technology. One similarity between AI Ethics and Cyberpunk literature is that both seek a dialogue in which the reader may inquire about the future and the ethical and social problems that our technological advance may bring upon society. In recent years, an increasing number of ethical matters involving AI have been pointed and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Responsible nudging for social good: new healthcare skills for AI-driven digital personal assistants.Marianna Capasso & Steven Umbrello - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (1):11-22.
    Traditional medical practices and relationships are changing given the widespread adoption of AI-driven technologies across the various domains of health and healthcare. In many cases, these new technologies are not specific to the field of healthcare. Still, they are existent, ubiquitous, and commercially available systems upskilled to integrate these novel care practices. Given the widespread adoption, coupled with the dramatic changes in practices, new ethical and social issues emerge due to how these systems nudge users into making decisions and changing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39. Stimulating good practice - What an embodied cognition approach could mean for Deep Brain Stimulation practice.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 5 (4).
    We whole-heartedly agree with Mecacci and Haselager(2014) on the need to investigate the psychosocial effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS), and particularly to find out how to prevent adverse psychosocial effects. We also agree with the authors on the value of an embodied, embedded, enactive approach (EEC) to the self and the mind–brain problem. However, we do not think this value primarily lies in dissolving a so-called “maladaptation” of patients to their DBS device. In this comment, we challenge three central (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. must we vote for the common good?Annabelle Lever - 2016 - In Trerise (ed.), Political Ethics. Routledge.
    Must we vote for the common good? This isn’t an easy question to answer, in part because there is so little literature on the ethics of voting and, such as there is, it tends to assume without argument that we must vote for the common good. Indeed, contemporary political philosophers appear to agree that we should vote for the common good even when they disagree about seemingly related matters, such as whether we should be legally required to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41.  43
    The Goodness-Character Threshold for Praiseworthiness.Blake Harris - manuscript
    In this paper, I seek to offer a threshold for when an agent is praiseworthy for an action: that is, an account of what factors need to be present in an agent’s action for the agent to deserve praise. I first argue that praise is not just the opposite of blame and thus, that a theory of blameworthiness is insufficient for a comprehensive theory of praiseworthiness. Given this, I then offer my threshold for praiseworthiness that I call the “Goodness-Character Threshold.” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Reading for the Good Life?Katharina Hanel & Ludger Jansen - 2001 - In Angela Kallhoff (ed.), Martha C. Nussbaum: Ethics and Political Philosophy: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 2000. Distributed in North America by Transaction Publishers. pp. 4--119.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. After-word. Which (good-bad) man? For which (good-bad) polity?Paolo Silvestri - 2012 - In Paolo Heritier & Paolo Silvestri (eds.), Good government, Governance and Human Complexity. Luigi Einaudi’s Legacy and Contemporary Society. Olschki. pp. 313-332.
    In this afterword I will try to re-launch the inquiry into the causes of good-bad polity and good-bad relationships between man and society, individual and institutions. Through an analogy between Einaudi’s search for good government and Calvino’s “Invisible cities”, I will sketch an account of the human and invisible foundations – first of all: trust/distrust – of any good-bad polity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  77
    Review of For the Common Good: Philosophical Foundations of Research Ethics. [REVIEW]Douglas MacKay - 2022 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 32 (3):13-28.
    The principal goal of Alex John London's For the Common Good is to "articulate a new vision for the philosophical foundations of research ethics" which "moves issues of justice from the periphery of the field to the very center." At the core of this new vision is an understanding of research as a "collaborative social activity between free and equal persons," which aims to develop the knowledge public institutions require to establish and maintain a social order in which people (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Gratitude to God for Our Own Moral Goodness.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    Someone owes gratitude to God for something only if God benefits her and is morally responsible for doing so. These requirements concerning benefit and moral responsibility generate reasons to doubt that human beings owe gratitude to God for their own moral goodness. First, moral character must be generated by its possessor’s own free choices, and so God cannot benefit moral character in human beings. Second, owed gratitude requires being morally responsible for providing a benefit, which rules out owed gratitude to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Knowing and Not‐knowing For Your Own Good: The Limits of Epistemic Paternalism.Emma C. Bullock - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy:433-447.
    Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that a paternalistic interference with an individual's inquiry is justified when it is likely to bring about an epistemic improvement in her. In this article I claim that in order to motivate epistemic paternalism we must first account for the value of epistemic improvements. I propose that the epistemic paternalist has two options: either epistemic improvements are valuable because they contribute to wellbeing, or they are epistemically valuable. I will argue that these options constitute the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. 80,000 Hours for the Common Good: A Thomistic Appraisal of Effective Altruism.Ryan Miller - forthcoming - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association.
    Effective Altruism is a rapidly growing and influential contemporary philosophical movement committed to updating utilitarianism in both theory and practice. The movement focuses on identifying urgent but neglected causes and inspiring supererogatory giving to meet the need. It also tries to build a broader coalition by adopting a more ecumenical approach to ethics which recognizes a wide range of values and moral constraints. These interesting developments distinguish Effective Altruism from the utilitarianism of the past in ways that invite cooperation and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  58
    For their own good? The unseen harms of disenhancing farmed animals.Susana Monsó & Sara Hintze - forthcoming - In Cheryl Abbate & Christopher Bobier (eds.), New Omnivorism and Strict Veganism: Critical Perspectives. Routledge.
    In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would, according to these authors, result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While we agree with this overall assessment, we believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some generally unseen (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Plato on the Desire for the Good.Rachel Barney - 2010 - In Sergio Tenenbaum (ed.), Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good. Oxford University Press. pp. 34--64.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  50. How Must We Be for the Resurrection to Be Good News?Chad Engelland - 2015 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 89:245-261.
    While the promise of the resurrection appears wonderful, it is also perplexing: How can the person raised be one and the same person as the one that dies? And if the raised person is not the same, why should any of us mortals regard the promise of the resurrection as good news? In this paper, I articulate the part-whole structure of human nature that supports belief in the sameness of the resurrected person’s identity and the desirability of the resurrection: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 995