Like previous theorists of natural law, Kant believes in the possibility of a rational theory of ius, but also claims that the very concept of ius naturae and the method of investigation of its principles must be thoroughly reformulated. I will maintain that Kant solves the methodological problem of natural law theories by stating that a rational doctrine of Right concerns pure rational knowledge. Right must be conceived as a metaphysical doctrine in which its principles and laws are determined (...) a priori. By conceiving the idea of a “metaphysics of morals” and linking Right with it, he finds a way both to conserve the notion of ius naturae ) and to purify it from any empirical or anthropological element. (shrink)

Los autores hacen en este ensayo un análisis crítico del texto original de John Stuart Mill [1861/1863] titulado “El utilitarismo”, en el que el autor inglés busca hacer compatibles dos doctrinas: la doctrina del mayor bien para el mayor número de personas y, la doctrina del ius naturalismo que considera que existe un canon moral a priori que introduce conceptos absolutos como el bien intrínseco o el mal en sí como criterios para la toma de decisiones. En este trabajo, se (...) subraya la influencia que el pragmatismo clásico ejerció, y ejerce, como teoría de pensamiento jurídico y, sobre todo, para la acción y la decisión. El utilitarismo, interpreta al mundo desde diversos enfoques epistemológicos, especialmente desde el derecho, la economía y la política. Los autores concluyen que el utilitarismo queda justificado como precepto válido para la aplicación del derecho positivo, en el que debe juzgarse la acción no por su intencionalidad, sino por sus consecuencias evidentes. (shrink)

En este artículo se plantean algunas consideraciones clásicas que santo Tomás de Aquino formuló sobre la fundamentación de la ley como producto de la razón y su relación con las leyes de los hombres. Se analiza el papel de la sindéresis como vínculo del individuo con la ius naturae y se concluye que la vida buena tiene un referente en el “estado de derecho” y en la práctica sistemática de las virtudes morales.

I argue that by considering Kant’s engagement with previous theorists of natural right, we can gain a clearer understanding of how he transformed the discipline from its foundations. To do this, I focus my analysis on Kant’s (critical) reception of two models of natural right with which he was very familiar: one from Alexander Baumgarten’s Elements of First Practical Philosophy [Initia philosophiae practicae primae], the other from Gottfried Achenwall’s Natural Law [Ius naturae]. The Initia served as a basis for (...) Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy for over three decades and may thus be considered as having played an important role in shaping his practical philosophy as a whole. Achenwall’s Ius naturae was the textbook that Kant employed in his lectures on natural right for over two decades. I argue that Kant distances himself from previous models of natural right in three main regards: the identification of moral laws with laws of nature, the normative connection between the principles of right and a natural end, and the place of God as the author of moral laws. I then briefly discuss what Kant retains of Baumgarten’s and Achenwall’s models of natural right. Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals preserves the view that a rational doctrine of right belongs to a broader systematic doctrine that comprehends the entire system of duties. I address the question of the division of the Sittenlehre into two branches and claim that, whereas Kant did not consider Baumgarten’s answer to the problem of distinguishing juridical from ethical principles to be satisfactory, he found a key piece of his own resolution in Achenwall’s Ius naturae, namely the definition of right as a power to coerce. (shrink)

This article raises certain classic considerations that Saint Thomas Aquinas formulated about the grounding of law as the product of reason and its relationship with the laws of men. The role of synderesis as a link between the individual and the ius naturae is analized, and it is concluded that the good life has its referent in “the rule of law” and in the practice of the moral virtues.

The aim of this essay is to examine recent contributions to Schelling research that appeared in three miscellanies in 2020. Their common thread is Schelling’s philosophy of nature, which, because of its dynamic and processual characteristics, is considered relevant in the debate on realism, philosophy of biology and environmental ethics. In the historical-philosophical field, many contributions highlight Schelling’s debt to Kant and Spinoza and his close relationship with the Romantic movement. Lastly, the essay analyses contributions concerning the Spätphilosophie, showing how (...) Schelling’s philosophy is to be considered first and foremost as historical philosophy. (shrink)

The abstract Everyone who gets to know deeper with the Nietzsche philosophy is forced to think about a mutual relationship of a culture and a biology. The main problem to correct show of above relationships is the understanding of the meaning of a language with reference to the culture and the biology. Considerations which are represented here are inspired by the Nietzsche philosophy. They are split by three parts. In the first part there is shown the meaning of the language (...) to create the herd in the Nietzsche philosophy. The second part develops his qualification of the language as a shortening of communication. The final part tries to refer the functioning of the language to the sphere of a biological human being. As I think, only the biological perspective permits to overstep the rhetoric of the individualism expressed in the Nietzsche philosophy by the opposition among weak and strong, or else among a priest and a superman. Thanks to drawn consequence from accepted by Nietzsche of the reduction my to the animal sort we are forced to the reversal of the perspective of his thought. The herd is not a centre to create the superman as the aim of the all mankind, but the sense of the exceptionality of an each subject is a centre to a fixation of the reproduction of the genetic definite population. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that sportspersonship is a means of performing fundamental sociality; it is about the conversion of a foe (inimicus) into an enemy (hostis). Drawing on Carl Schmitt’s distinction between enemy and foe – inimicus and hostis – as well as his discussion of the ius publicum Europaeum, I suggest a model of sportspersonship that sees it as expressing the competitive relations between equals that undergird the most minimal form of sociality; relations that any deeper union takes (...) as its foundation. It is the performance of this fundamental sociality, I argue, that grounds the value of sport in general (though this does not mean that there cannot be other, contingent values in sport). (shrink)

For the prominent figures of dystopic posthumanism biotechnological progress means not only new possibilities of solving the most nagging problems, but also many extremely dangerous consequences: a modification of social organization, an undermining of morality, and some changes in the way we understand our identity. Thinkers such as Fukuyama, Kass, Sandel and Habermas consider those consequences as a threat to human nature. In the article I examine the way they construct the latter notion (i.e. human nature) in their arguments.

The paper is divided in two parts. The first presents my exegesis of the fourth chapter of the Gospel of John. My main claim is that the composer of the text manipulates the chronological order of miracles in his "signs source" in order to approach the story of the woman from Samaria together to the healing of the son of the roman officer in Kapharnaus. The two episodes deal with two different ways to convert to faith. Consequently, they provide a (...) complete phenomenology of the formation process of religious belief. The second part considers two fundamental interpretations of the johannine notion of faith, i.e. the fideistical and the existentialist. I reject both: the first is logically inconsistent within the Johannine framework (the Gospel of John assumes principles whose consequences contradict the fideistic interpretation of faith); the second is ontologically senseless. (shrink)

The subject matter of this work covers the issues or problems listed below: * The problem of the ontological status of language signs and a more general philosophical problem connected with it: * What is language as a system of signs, which – on the one hand – serves to: 1) represent our knowledge about the reality which is being recognized, and, on the other one to: 2) a. explore and better cognize or discover it, b. describe it in an (...) adequate manner, and c. enable users to make interpersonal communication? All the pragmatic functions of language require carrying out its logical-philosophical analysis, and this means both regarding its syntax and semantics. Such an analysis is not possible without determining the following: How are signs perceived and what is their ontological nature in the so-called functional approach towards logical semiotics of natural language, founded on two ways of their usage: either as signs which we use in concrete situational or situational-language contexts or as isolated signs detached from such contexts? In the first case, they are language tokens (concretes), existing material objects perceived through the senses, with a fixed temporal-spatial location, in the other one – they are non-concretes and as such (as the majority of researchers in the field of philosophy and linguistics accept) – abstract objects, language types. The type-token distinction (differentiation between abstract and concrete) has already acquired a certain status in contemporary philosophy and is of considerable importance to metaphysics and epistemology in particular. Indeed, it is most often illustrated with reference to language signs (words, expressions) as the distinction type/token of a sign, introduced into semiotics by Ch. S. Peirce. In the semiotic analysis, and also in the linguistic one, there are used both types and tokens of signs, however, often without paying due attention to when it is said about types and when about tokens. This is related to the problems which are still considered by the philosophy of language: What is the type? What is the token (specimen)? What are the mutual relations between the type and the token? Disputes concerning providing answers to these questions are related to existential issues dealing with the ontological status of these language signs and two currents within the ontology of language, remaining under the influence of two fundamental concepts formed in the debate: nominalism and realism. The author presents in brief different stances on the above-mentioned issues or problems, as well as argues that from the logical point of view: 1) working out any theoretical conception of language must take into account its bi-aspectual characteristics: as a language of expression-tokens and as a language of expression-types; 2) advocating either of the standpoints: (a) types exist independent of their tokens, or (b) it is not so, can be omitted in syntactic considerations on language; 3) mutual relations between sign-tokens differ from the mutual relations between sign-types, yet; 4) determination of the mutual relation between sign-types and sign-tokens depends on accepting either of the standpoints: (a) or (b); 5) semantic or semantic-pragmatic concepts of language, such as meaning, denotation, interpretation should be defined exclusively for types of tokens, but their definitions require certain reference to the functions which sign-tokens perform in the language (words, expressions), or to relations between them; 6) The concept of an act of language communication differs from general language communication: the first one is defined by means of sign-tokens, whereas the other one – with the use of sign-types. (shrink)

A critical survey of the main metaphysical theories concerning the nature of material objects (substratum theories, bundle theories, substance theories, stuff theories) and their identity conditions, both synchronic (monist vs. pluralist theories) and diachronic (three-dimensionalism, four-dimensionalism, sequentialism).

În acest studiu, îmi propun să arăt că modelul social intuiţionist al judecăţii morale propus de Haidt este la rândul său prea restrictiv faţă de influenţa raţionării morale, poate tot aşa cum modelul raţionalist subestima influenţa emoţiilor morale. Mai întâi, voi prezenta modelul raţionalist despre natura judecăţii morale şi voi evidenţia rezultatele empirice care au contribuit la erodarea sa. Apoi, voi prezenta şi critica modelul social intuiţionist revigorat de revoluţia „afectivă” din psihologia morală, argumentând că rezultatele din psihologia experimentală, neuroştiinţă (...) şi psihologia evoluţionistă acordă raţionării morale o influenţă cauzală mai mare decât admite Haidt. (shrink)

Just War Theory debates discussing the principle of the Moral Equality of Combatants involve the notion of Invincible Ignorance; the claim that warfi ghters are morally excused for participating in an unjust war because of their epistemic limitations. Conditions of military deployment may indeed lead to genuinely insurmountable epistemic limitations. In other cases, these may be overcome. This paper provides a preliminary sketch of heuristics designed to allow a combatant to judge whether or not his war is just. It delineates (...) the sets of relevant facts uncontroversially accessible and inaccessible to contemporary professional soldiers. Relevant facts outside these two sets should by default be treated as inaccessible until proven otherwise. Even such a rudimentary heuristic created in this way demonstrates that practical recommendations of MEC-renouncing Just War Theory are not too challenging to follow and still signifi cantly impact a compliant combatant’s behavior. (shrink)

Schmidt's main thesis is that Lucretius did not exclusively use the writings of Epicurus in composing De rerurn natura, and that it is emphatically doubtful that Epicurus was even his principal source. Rather, Schmidt argues that it is virtually certain that early Epicurean writings are used in several passages, and that they are the most probable sources for the whole poem. Schmidt sees Lucretius as closely caught up with the current polemics between the Stoic and Epicurean schools of his time. (...) Schmidt is broadly successful in making his case that Lucretius did not exclusively follow Epicurus, but also had early Epicurean sources. The indices are helpful and the survey of competing views is scrupulously inclusive. This book deserves to be seriously considered by future researchers into the sources of De rerum natura inasmuch as it has certainly advanced the discussion. (shrink)

The way of laws is as much a defining feature of the modern period as the way of ideas; but the way of laws is hardly without its forks. Both before and after Descartes, there are philosophers using the concept to carve out a very different position from his, one that is entirely disconnected from God or God’s will. I argue that Francis Bacon and Baruch Spinoza treat laws as dispositions that derive from a thing’s nature. This reading upends the (...) currently orthodox treatment of Spinoza’s laws as infinite modes, and calls for a re-conception of his metaphysics of causation. (shrink)

The article focuses on Patočka early phenomenological thought developed around the concept of the natural world. More precisely, the aim of the article is to explore Patočka recently published manuscript studies and fragments, dating from the first half of the 1940s, in which Patočka attempts to establish a deeper living correlation between man and world based on a certain metaphysical conception of nature which is not, as for Husserl, just one of the horizons which experiencing creates around itself, nor it (...) is just a basis on which the harmony of experiencing and its evironment must develop, but in which nature also includes an aspect which is closed and alien to subjectivity. In this way, the article shows that Patočka makes a step beyond of Husserl's and Heidegger's schemes of a correlation of life and world, understanding and being. The article thus shows that Patočka early writings throw a certain amount of light on his later phenomenological work that had been most notably developed from 1960s onwards. (shrink)

ENG: We all have our own ideas about what it is like to be intelligent. Indeed, even the experts disagree on this topic. This has generated diverse theories on the nature of intelligence and its genetic and environmental bases. Many scientific and philosophical questions thus remain unaddressed: is it possible to characterize intelligence in scientific terms? What do IQ tests measure? How is intelligence influenced by genetics, epigenetics, and the environment? What are the ethical and social implications of the research (...) on this topic? This book aims to provide the readers with the conceptual resources to critically analyze scientific findings and orientate themselves in this multi-faceted debate across biology, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and anthropology. -/- ITA: Ognuno di noi ha una propria idea di cosa significhi essere intelligenti, tanto che anche gli scienziati esperti in materia hanno opinioni differenti al riguardo. Ciò ha contribuito a generare teorie contrastanti sulla natura dell’intelligenza e su quali siano le sue basi genetiche e ambientali. Non è un caso, dunque, che diverse domande scientifiche e filosofiche restino ancora aperte: è possibile caratterizzare scientificamente l’intelligenza? Cosa misurano i test del QI? In che modo genetica, epigenetica e ambiente influenzano l’intelligenza? Quali sono le implicazioni etiche e sociali della ricerca sull’argomento? Oltre ad analizzare questi problemi, il testo intende fornire gli strumenti concettuali necessari per leggere criticamente i dati scientifici e orientarsi in uno sfaccettato e affascinante dibattito a cavallo tra biologia, psicologia, neuroscienze, filosofia e antropologia. (shrink)

This chapter describes the process of institutionalization of natural law at the University of Pisa, essential to interpreting the conditions in which the first public law chair of Italy was founded. The study of legal education in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century will allow a more in-depth understanding of both the development of natural law in teaching practice throughout the long eighteenth century, and the features of the two processes of reception, respectively for educational and political purposes. In (...) fact, although both processes were founded on appreciation of the centrality of Roman law and philosophy in the construction of doctrines by the so-called ‘modern natural law school’, and developed through mediation of traditional Roman legal culture of the Pisan ‘historical-critical school’, there were some differences. In this initial phase, the didactic reception was indirect, although not entirely implicit, whereas the political reception was direct and explicit. (shrink)

This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly (...) expressed without the employment of disjunction. (shrink)

Feeding is a fundamental physiological need that falls within the realm of what we consider natural. However, throughout history, human beings have developed and employed several techniques to produce and manipulate food. Therefore, if the classical metaphysical distinction between natural and artefactual entities must be accepted, our food seems to predominantly fall into the latter category. Yet, discussions of artefacts do not typically involve organisms but rather material objects that cannot be found “in nature”. Thus, food may appear as a (...) sui generis artefact. This paper, after an analysis of the relationships holding between food and human beings, suggests that the former, rather than being an unusual artifact is the quintessential artifact, one that seems to reflect better than any other the complex connections between Homo sapiens and its environment. (shrink)

I argue that the difference between the 17th century new moral science and Scholastic Natural Law Theory derived primarily from the skeptical challenge the former had to face. Pufendorf's project of a 'scientia practica universalis' was the paramount expression of an anti-skeptical moral science, a «science» both explanatory and normative, but also anti-dogmatic in so far as it tried to base its laws on those basic phenomena of human life that supposedly were outside the scope of skeptical doubt. Of the (...) Scholastic legacy to the new moral science, a dichotomy between an «intellettualistic» and a «voluntaristic» view of natural law (or between lex immanens and lex imposita). Voluntarism lays at the root both of theological views such as those of Calvinism and of political views such as those of Hobbes and Locke. A need to counterbalance undesirable implications of estreme voluntarism may account for much of 17th and 18th centuries developments in ethics and politics. Scottish natural jurisprudence, an expression of such quest for a third way between scepticism and extreme voluntarism, is less secular and more empirical than received wisdom admits of. One of its side-effects, namely a systematic, self-contained, and empirical economic theory, results from the search for a normative theory of social life on an empirical basis. The main tool for building such a theory, namely a view of societal laws as embedded in trans-individual mechanisms, derives from the voluntarist view of natural law as «imposed» law. Subsequent discussions of social issues based on the opposition of economic and ethical reasons originated partly from gross misreading of the Scottish natural jurisprudential framework for economic theory. (shrink)

Qual è il rapporto tra la mente cosciente e la natura? A tale questione fondamentale si può rispondere in modi molto diversi, a seconda di come si concepiscono sia la mente che la natura. Questo lavoro offre una risposta originale, integrando la fenomenologia husserliana e la concezione enattiva all’interno di una prospettiva unitaria chiamata fenomenologia enattiva. Nel percorso qui sviluppato, il lettore troverà un’analisi ricca e aggiornata di alcune tra le questioni più dibattute nella filosofia della mente e nelle scienze (...) cognitive contemporanee: il “problema difficile” della coscienza e il suo rapporto con l’intenzionalità, lo statuto epistemologico e ontologico delle qualità sensibili, la filosofia del colore, il dibattito sulla cognizione incorporata (embodiment) e l’approccio fenomenologico allo studio del mentale. L’autore sviluppa infine una proposta generale che si articola in una metafisica monistico-neutrale, processuale e relazionale della natura e della coscienza. (shrink)

The work of Richard H. Popkin both introduced the concept of skeptical fideism and served to impressively document its importance in the philosophies of a diverse range of thinkers, including Montaigne, Pascal, Huet, and Bayle. Popkin’s landmark History of Scepticism, however, begins its coverage with the Renaissance. In this paper I explore the roots of skeptical fideism in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, with special attention to Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, the oldest surviving text to clearly develop a skeptical fideist (...) perspective. (shrink)

This essay examines the way in which the modal concept of necessity was discussed and analyzed in some eleventh- and early twelfth-century sources, such as Peter Damian’s De divina omnipotentia, Anselm of Canterbury’s Cur deus homo and several anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione that were presumably composed in the first two decades of the twelfth century by logicians connected to William of Champeaux’s and Peter Abelard’s milieu. My aim is to offer a comparison of these different sources with respect (...) to their use of the Boethian distinction between two types or kinds of necessity, namely, the “absolute” or “simple” necessity that is involved in statements like “God is necessarily immortal” or “it is necessary for humans to be animals”, and the “conditional” or “temporal” necessity that is at stake when we say, for instance, that someone necessarily walks when he is walking. (shrink)

I discuss how criticism of social sciences taken up in Sartre's ‘Critique of Dialectical Reason’ is conditioned by Sartre’s own assumptions concerning nature, the mind-matter relationship, human beings’ bodily dimension. Although he looked at Husserl’s ‘Crisis of the European Sciences’ as a model for his own criticism of the social sciences, he didn't consider the criticism of the concept of nature undertaken by Husserl himself. Such criticism eventually leads to overcome Cartesian dualism. Sartre, on the contrary, superposes phenomenological ways of (...) thinking to an unavowed Cartesian ontology which he never challenged. The consequence is that he looks at the subject and the object, or mind and matter, as radically opposite. Sartre's own vindication of methodological dualism between natural and social sciences – closely following Lukacs – is flawed by heavily relying on an uncritically presupposed ontological dualism. (shrink)

Resumen: La investigación analiza el concepto de justicia en el contexto de la justicia premial consagrada en la legislación colombiana. El presente artículo, que hace parte de una investigación de mayor alcance, realiza primeramente un análisis del concepto de justicia en sentido filosófico, para luego analizar el concepto de justicia premial. Finalmente, se intercepta el concepto de justicia premial con el concepto más general de justicia, a partir de las nociones de paranomos y pleonektès de Aristóteles. Se concluye que el (...) concepto de justicia premial se cataloga como una institución justa tal como la define este filósofo, por lo que no le es dado al intérprete desde esta perspectiva atribuir criterios de injusto a las decisiones que ponen fin a las controversias por intermedio de la justicia premial. (shrink)

The Catena aurea entium of Henry of Herford is part of the work of re-elaboration of Aristotle’s natural-philosophical corpus, which characterised the European intellectual environment in the Late Middle Ages. In the central books of his encyclopaedia, Henry comments on the works of natural philosophy of Albert the Great, placing himself in continuity with the cultural project started by Albert in Cologne. The present article aims to compare the 5th book of the Catena aurea entium, which consists of a comment (...) per modum quaestionis on the Meteora of Albert the Great, with some meteorological quaestiones composed between the 13th and 15th centuries. This analysis will lead me to grasp the philosophical orientations and interpretation of Henry and also his reception of Albert the Great’s meteorology. In the 5th book, Henry introduces an extensive medical section taken from the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, in which he applies the Galenic medical principles to meteorology. Besides, in the quaestio 105 (V 1 105), he interprets Albert through the theological-poetic explanation of ancient origins on the sacrality of the number three and an excerpt from the Liber proverbiorum. (shrink)

L’Exercitium academicum circa praescientiam daemonum (1666), pubblicato nella riformata Jena, tematizza una questione dibattuta nella Scolastica fra XIII e XIV secolo ma le cui radici risalgono ad Agostino d'Ippona, cui si deve il primo testo sull'argomento: la prescienza dei demoni. L'analisi segue la traccia del De divinatione daemonum agostiniano, mentre appare critica nei confronti delle posizioni di Tommaso d'Aquino e dei tomisti. Ad esse, in particolare riguardo alla natura delle facoltà intellettive demoniche, egli contrappone Giovanni Duns Scoto, Durando di san (...) Porziano e non meglio specificati nominales, accomunati in un indistinto riferimento alla teoria delle species. Ciò non toglie che il testo segua poi Tommaso nell'articolazione delle forme di prescienza dei demoni e nella definizione di questa come conoscenza congetturale. Scopo del nostro intervento sarà infatti mostrare, attraverso l'analisi che per la prima volta sarà condotta sul testo, lo spaccato di una comunità conversazionale nella quale le linee di forza e le distinzioni che animano il dibattito si mostrano autonome rispetto alle posizioni storiche di cattolici e riformati. Nell’Exercitium, Duns Scoto è contrapposto ai tomisti e, con Agostino e Durando di san Porziano – che costituisce una fonte comune del dibattito secentesco insieme a Bonaventura, Aureolo, Suarez, Vazquez, Gregorio di Valencia, e in tale veste sarà ripreso di lì a poco da Leibniz -, è cooptato tra gli autori a sostegno della sua tesi. Lungi dall'essere un esercizio di eclettismo o la stanca ripetizione di formule scolastiche, lo scritto getta luce su un dibattito universitario nel quale le fonti sono usate non come auctoritates ma quale repertorio di teorie da smontare e rimontare; ad esse l’Exercitium attinge per soluzioni che si definiscono in relazione a finalità filosofiche o dottrinali, ma non politiche né confessionali. (shrink)

Thomistic commentators agree that Thomas Aquinas at least nominally allows for 'to be' (esse) to signify not only an act contrasted with essence in creatures, but also the essence itself of those creatures. Nevertheless, it is almost unheard of for any author to interpret Thomas's use of the word 'esse' as referring to essence. Against this tendency, this paper argues that Thomas's In V Metaphysics argument that every predication signifies esse provides an important instance of Thomas using esse to signify (...) essence. This reading of In V Metaphysics, which this paper defends against an alternative interpretation, entails significant reinterpretations of Thomas's technical terms 'esse substantiale' and 'esse in rerum natura' as well as Thomas's use of 'is,' both as a copula and as a principal predicate. (shrink)

Aus dem Inhalt Vorrede 7 Ontologie der Substanz 12 Die Letztbegründung der Welt 24 Metaphysik und Transzendenz 40 Das Nichts 54 Zur Erkenntnistheorie 65 Möglichkeit und Kausalität 102 Subjekt, Determination, Freiheit 120 Bewusstsein - Unbewusstes 148 Gesellschaft und Sein 157 Versuch über Sartre 165 Philosophie der Geschichte 182 -/- .

In Berkeley’s writings the topic of light is discussed in two different ways, within a theory of perception and within a metaphysics of nature of a Platonic stamp. In his first work, the original Essay for a New Theory of Vision, light and colours are regarded as condition and object of vision; they are examined as contents of visual perception distinct from tangible perception. Light will be dealt with in a completely different manner in Berkeley’s last work, Siris, in which (...) a spiritualistic reading of the natural world is superimposed on modern science in general and on Newtonian physics in particular. In Siris, light is the instrument by which the causal activity of divine Intellect orders and permeates the natural world. A detailed analysis of the topic of light in the two aforementioned contexts shows inconsistencies and strained interpretations which derive from the apologetic use of the theory of vision in Berkeley’s early immaterialism and from the multi-layered and confused speculations of his late Siris. On the whole, Berkeley conceives light within the idealistic frame inherited from Platonic metaphysics of light; however, the specific themes examined in the Essay for a New Theory of Vision and in Siris derive from acquisitions of modern science, and are recast within a spiritualistic interpretation which intended both to neutralize scientific ideas through their phenomenistic reading and to exploit them for apologetic ends. (shrink)

Questo non è un libro perfetto, ma è unico, e se scorri le prime 400 pagine o giù di lì, le ultime 300 (circa 700) sono un buon tentativo di applicare ciò che è noto sul comportamento ai cambiamenti sociali nella violenza e nelle maniere nel tempo. L'argomento di base è: come fa la nostra genetica a controllare e limitare il cambiamento sociale? Sorprendentemente non riesce a descrivere la natura della selezione dei parenti (idoneità inclusiva) che spiega gran parte della (...) vita sociale animale e umana. Egli manca anche (come quasi tutti) manca di un quadro chiaro per descrivere la struttura logica della razionalità (termine preferito di John Searle) che preferisco chiamare la Psicologia descrittiva del Pensiero dell'Ordine Superiore (DPHOT). Avrebbe dovuto dire qualcosa sui molti altri modi di abusare e sfruttare le persone e il pianeta, dal momento che questi sono ora molto più gravi da rendere quasi irrilevanti altre forme di violenza. Estendere il concetto di violenza per includere leconseguenze globali a lungoterminedella replicazione dei geni diqualcuno, e avere una comprensione della natura di come funziona l'evoluzione (cioè la selezione dei parenti) fornirà una prospettiva molto diversa sulla storia, gli eventi attuali e come le cose probabilmente andranno nei prossimi centinaia di anni. Si potrebbe iniziare notando che la diminuzione della violenza fisica nel corso della storia è stata abbinata (e resa possibile) dallo stupro spietato in costante aumento del pianeta (cioè dalla distruzione del futuro del proprio discendente).’ Pinker (come la maggior parte delle persone) è spesso distratto dalle superficialità della cultura quando è la biologia che conta. Guarda le mie recenti recensioni di Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' e 'SuperCooperators' di Nowak e Highfield qui e in rete per un breve riassunto della vacuità del 'vero altruismo'(selezione di gruppo), e l'operazione di selezione dei parenti e l'inutilità e la superficialità di descrivere il comportamento in termini culturali. Questo è il classico problema della natura/nutrimento e la natura vince nutrita --infinitamente. Ciò che conta veramente è la violenza fatta sulla terra dall'incessante aumento della popolazione e della distruzione delle risorse (a causa della medicina e della tecnologia e della repressione dei conflitti da parte della polizia e dei militari). Circa 200.000 persone in più al giorno (un altro Las Vegas ogni 10 giorni, un'altra Los Angeles ogni mese), le 6 tonnellate o giù di lì di pisolino che vanno in mare / persona / anno – circa l'1% del totale del mondo che scompare ogni anno, ecc. significa che se qualche miracolo accadrà la biosfera e la civiltà crollerà in gran parte durante i prossimi due secoli, e ci sarà fame, violenza e violenza di ogni tipo su scala impressionante. Le maniere, le opinioni e le tendenze delle persone a commettere atti violenti non hanno alcuna importanza a meno che non possano fare qualcosa per evitare questa catastrofe, e non vedo come ciò accadrà. Non c'è spazio per gli argomenti, e nessun punto sia (sì io sono un fatalista), quindi mi limiterò a fare alcuni commenti come se fossero fatti. Non immaginate di avere un'informazione personale nel promuovere un gruppo a spese degli altri. Io sono 78, nonhanno discendenti e non hanno parenti stretti e non si identificano con alcun gruppo politico, nazionale o religioso e considerano quelli a cui appartengo di default come ripugnanti come tutti gli altri. I genitori sono i peggiori nemici della vita sulla Terra e, tenendo la vista generale delle cose, le donne sono violente come gli uomini se si considera il fatto che la violenza delle donne (come la maggior parte di quella fatta dagli uomini) è in gran parte fatta al rallentatore, a distanza nel tempo e nello spazio e per lo più effettuata per procura dai loro discendenti e dagli uomini. Sempre più spesso, le donne portano figli indipendentemente dal fatto che abbiano un compagno e l'effetto di impedire a una donna di riprodursi è in media molto maggiore dell'arresto di un uomo, poiché sono il collo di bottiglia riproduttivo. Si può ritenere che le persone e la loro prole meritino riccamente qualsiasi miseria arrivi la loro strada e (con rare eccezioni) i ricchi e famosi sono i peggiori trasgressori. Meryl Streep o Bill Gates o J.K Rowling e ognuno dei loro figli può distruggere 50 tonnellate di suolo ogni anno per generazioni nel futuro, mentre un contadino indiano e il suo possono distruggere 1 tonnellata. Se qualcuno nega che va bene, e ai loro discendenti dico "Benvenuti all'inferno sulla Terra" (WTHOE). Oggi l'accento è sempre posto sui diritti dell'uomo, ma è chiaro che se si vuole che la civiltà abbia una possibilità, le responsabilità umane devono sostituire i diritti umani. Nessuno ottiene diritti senza essere un cittadino responsabile e la prima cosa che ciò significa è ladistruzione ambientalemi nimal. La responsabilità più fondamentale non è quella dei bambini a meno che la vostra società non vi chieda di produrli. Una società o un mondo che permette alle persone di allevare a caso sarà sempre sfruttato dai geni egoisti fino a quando non crolla (o raggiunge un punto in cui la vita è così orribile che non vale la pena di vivere). Se la società continua a mantenerei diritti umani come primari, ai loro discendenti si può dire con fiducia "WTHOE". Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

One of the most interesting aspects of Leibniz's philosophy is the distinction between "art" and "nature"; the core of this matter is the possibility (or even the impossibility) of distinguishing as clearly as possible between two ontological domains: on one hand the products of technique (such as "artificial machines"), on the other hand all the beings that can be defined as natural ("natural machines"). The question raised in this paper is if it is possibile to build ontological criteria which can (...) be clear enough to distinguish between the products of nature and those of technique in the field of the "res" that they are. (shrink)

Till just few decades ago, scholars used to use the label ‘Ockhamism’ to mark a turning-point in the history of mediaeval philosophy, above all in the history of natural philosophy. That turning-point was exemplified by the once so-called ‘Buridanian school’, today known simply as ‘Parisian school of natural philosophy’, whose leading representative was for sure John Buridan. But looking carefully at some crucial points of the Picard master’s idea of ‘nature’, concerning specifically the relationship between God and secondary causes on (...) one side, and the role played by free will, both the divine and the human one, on the other side, one will find out that Buridan’s ‘Ockhamism’ is at least questionable: Scotus’ modal logic is the conceptual framework, within which he redetermines the boundaries of natural laws, but the ‘pure ockhamist’ idea of the prevalence of the will on the intellect in God’s nature is the source of an image of the world in which voluntary behaviours and natural laws are intertwined. Therefore, Buridan’s natural philosophy results as a peculiar synthesis of two of the main divergent lines of thinking of late mediaeval philosophy. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness (“justice”) are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution (through adequate definitions), the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war (...) theory.” However, “just war theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare (reducing it to an incomprehensible individual level, as if a group of people entered a battle in hopes of finding another group of people willing to respond). Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability (obtained through laws), is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability (which could simply be incompetence, or because peace, as a specific articulation of distribution of social power, is not tenable anymore) forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time (and expressed in customary and legal rules of warfare), with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)

The 2016-17 Iraqi offensive that recaptured the city of Mosul from the Islamic State have demonstrated the inability of contemporary armed forces to retake urban areas from a determined and ruthless enemy without either suffering debilitating casualties or causing thousands of civilian deaths and virtually destroying the city itself. The enemy’s willingness to refuse civilian evacuation via a humanitarian corridor and effectively take the inhabitants hostage is all it takes to impose this tragic dilemma on an attacking force. The civilian (...) death toll of the battle of Mosul alone is estimated to have reached between seven and forty thousand, with almost one million people internally displaced and large portions of the city levelled. Avoiding another such tragedy should be a priority for all practitioners and theorists of urban warfare. Indeed, confronting and defeating this challenge may be the most important task for ethics, theory and practice of urban combat in the coming decade. I argue that the only viable way of escaping the hostage siege dilemma consists of incorporating large numbers of unmanned and autonomous weapon systems into the blue force structure and using these to substitute for artillery and aerial fires presently being used to overpower defenders. While other measures may be used to marginally improve the outcome of hostage city assaults, only the automatization of the assault can dramatically change the calculus and in result either discourage rogue actors from creating hostage city dilemmas or defeat them decisively while suffering unequivocally proportional casualties. I proceed as follows: first, I provide an account of the 2016-17 Coalition assault on Mosul, giving special attention to the events and features relevant to the hostage city dilemma. I then use this case study to introduce the theoretical concept of the hostile city and the ethical dilemma it creates, discussing possible objections and making the case that the circumstances of the Battle of Mosul are bound to repeatedly transpire in the future. This generates a duty to find a way out of the hostage city dilemma. I argue that widespread use of unmanned and autonomous weapon platforms constitutes a viable way of assaulting hostage cities in a manner that assures respect for the ius in bello principles, proposing several ways in which such weapons may be designed and used to drastically limit both military and civilian casualties. Concluding that it may be not only permissible but morally required to employ autonomous weapons in the hostage city scenario, I briefly discuss the implications of this conclusion for a wider debate concerning the moral feasibility of autonomous weapons. (shrink)

The paper presents anthropological issues as one of the main topics of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I begin with how Nietzsche defines the goals of his anthropological reflection and then I identify the perspective of naturalism as its central interpretational tool. Subsequently I try to show how it is instrumentalized in order to develop correct – according to Nietzsche – characteristics of human being, and as a mean of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics. In this way conceiving man as “homo natura” allows to (...) reflect on human in axiological context not limited by old metaphysical beliefs. This attempt of combining naturalistic dimension with axiological one determines specific character and importance of Nietzsche’s anthropology. (shrink)

This paper argues that Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy contains a coherent, albeit implicit, defense of the legitimacy of capital punishment, one that refutes the most important objections leveled against it. I first show that Kant is consistent in his application of the ius talionis. I then explain how Kant can respond to the claim that death penalty violates the inviolable right to life. To address the most significant objection – the claim that execution violates human dignity – I argue that (...) motives of honor, as Kant conceives it, require a rational person to will her own execution, were she to commit murder. (shrink)

L’osservazione della natura con l’intento di capire l’origine della varietà di forme e fenomeni in cui si manifesta ha origini remote. All’inizio il rapporto con i fenomeni naturali era dominato da sentimenti quali paura e stupore che conducevano a supporre l’esistenza di entità sfuggenti alla percezione diretta che permeavano gli elementi animandoli. Ecco dunque che la magia rappresenta l’elemento dominante della filosofia naturale primitiva caratterizzata da una unicità degli eventi e dalla impossibilità di capirli e dominarli in quanto frutto della (...) volontà di essenze a noi estranee e non governabili. Con il nascere della civiltà ed il suo progredire il tempo dedicato ai lavori necessari per il sostentamento e la sopravvivenza diminuì e nella ripartizione dei compiti alcuni individui potevano dedicare parte del loro tempo alla osservazione della natura ed alla sua interpretazione in termini non trascendenti. Nella natura, intesa come tutto ciò che ci circonda composto da esseri viventi e da materia inorganica nelle sua varie aggregazioni sulla terra e nel cosmo, ciò che attirò l’attenzione fin dall’inizio furono furono i fenomeni regolari e periodici come i moti della luna, dei pianeti e delle stelle. Nel contempo dopo una spinta iniziale dettata da esigenze pratiche come contare gli oggetti o misurare i campi, la matematica si era sviluppata autonomamente e si rivelò idonea a descrivere in termini quantitativi i moti dei corpi celesti. La terra era al centro dell’universo mentre il moto degli altri corpi celesti risultava da una composizione di moti circolari uniformi. Questa visione geocentrica e pitagorica (armonia delle sfere) dell’universo ha prevalso fino agli albori della scienza moderna, anche se una descrizione eliocentrica, basata su validi argomenti, era stata proposta. Per quanto riguarda la struttura della materia i presocratici avevano già proposto i quattro elementi mentre gli atomisti avevano ricondotto tutto ad entità elementari primigenie, il cui aggregarsi e disgregarsi da luogo a tutti gli stati e le molteplici forme della materia. Queste intuizioni si ritrovano nella fisica moderna che contempla quattro stati di aggregazione, che hanno come unico sostrato comune gli atomi. La fisica moderna nasce con Galileo e Newton, la cui dinamica si sviluppa a partire dalle leggi di Keplero che descrivono il moto dei pianeti nel sistema eliocentrico, per potersi poi applicare ad un qualunque sistema materiale. Pertanto nei due secoli successivi si ritenne che un modello meccanico potesse essere sviluppato per un qualunque sistema fisico e quindi per l’universo intero la cui evoluzione doveva essere matematicamente prevedibile. Per i fenomeni termici tuttavia vennero formulate leggi ad hoc come quelle della termodinamica che mostrano come i processi macroscopici siano irreversibili in contrasto con le leggi della meccanica. Si deve a Boltzmann1 il tentativo di ricondurre la termodinamica alla meccanica per un gran numero di particelle dei cui moti disordinati viene data una lettura di carattere statistico. L’aumento della entropia e la irreversibilità seguono dalla ipotesi di caos molecolare ossia che i moti siano così disordinati che si perde rapidamente memoria dello stato iniziale. L’idea di introdurre una misura di probabilità nel contesto della meccanica sembra antitetica con la natura stessa della teoria rivolta fino ad allora allo studio di sistemi con moti regolari, reversibili e prevedibili individualmente su tempi lunghi. Tuttavia l’analisi probabilistica diventa essenziale per lo studio di sistemi caratterizzati da forti instabilità, e da orbite irregolari per i quali la previsione richiede una conoscenza della condizioni iniziali con precisioni fisicamente non raggiungibili. Combinando la evoluzione deterministica della meccanica di Newton o di Hamilton con la descrizione statistica attraverso una opportuna misura invariante di probabilità nello spazio delle fasi, nasce la teoria dei sistemi dinamici2 che consente di descrivere non solo i sistemi ordinati o i sistemi caotici ma anche tutti quelli che vedono coesistere in diverse proporzioni ordine e caos e che presentano una straordinaria varietà di strutture geometriche e proprietà statistiche, tanto da fornire almeno se non proprio un quadro teorico per lo meno metafore utili per la descrizione dei sistemi complessi. Anche se non c’è unanime consenso ci sembra appropriato definire complessi non tanto sistemi caratterizzati da interazioni non lineari tra i suoi componenti e da proprietà emergenti, che rientrano a pieno titolo nel quadro dei sistemi dinamici, ma piuttosto i sistemi viventi o quelli di vita artificiale che ne condividono le proprietà essenziali3. Tra queste possiamo certamente annoverare la capacità di gestire la informazione e di replicarsi, consentendo tramite un meccanismo di mutazione e selezione di dare origine a strutture di crescente ricchezza strutturale e dotate di capacità cognitive sempre più elaborate. Una teoria dei sistemi complessi non esiste ancora, anche se la teoria degli automi sviluppata da Von Neumann4 e la teoria della evoluzione di Darwin5 ne possono fornire alcuni pilastri importanti. Recentemente la teoria delle reti è stata utilizzata con successo per descrivere le proprietà statistiche delle connessioni tra gli elementi costitutivi (nodi) di un sistema complesso6. Le connessioni che non sono né completamente casuali né completamente gerarchiche, consentono una sufficiente robustezza rispetto a malfunzionamenti o danneggiamenti dei nodi unita a un adeguato livello di organizzazione per consentirne un funzionamento efficiente. Nei sistemi fisici il modello base è un insieme di atomi o molecole interagenti, che danno luogo a strutture diverse quali un gas, un liquido o un cristallo, come risultato di proprietà emergenti. Nello stesso modo per i sistemi complessi possiamo proporre un sistema automi interagenti come modello base. Le molteplici forme che il sistema assume anche in questo caso vanno considerate come proprietà emergenti del medesimo sostrato al mutare delle condizioni esterne e frutto delle i replicazioni, ciascuna delle quali introduce piccole ma significative varianti. Questa è la grande differenza tra un sistema fisico ed un sistema complesso: il primo fissate le condizioni esterne ha sempre le medesime proprietà, il secondo invece cambia con il fluire del tempo perché la sua organizzazione interna muta non solo al cambiare di fattori ambientali ma anche con il succedersi delle generazioni. C’è dunque un flusso di informazione che cresce con il tempo e che consente agli automi costituenti ed alla intera struttura di acquisire nuove capacità. Questo aumento di ordine e ricchezza strutturale avviene naturalmente a spese dell’ambiente circostante, in modo che globalmente i la sua entropia cresce in accordo con la seconda legge della termodinamica. In assenza di una teoria formalizzata paragonabile a quella dei sistemi dinamici, per i sistemi complessi si possono fare osservazioni e misure, sia puntuali sui costituenti elementari e sulle loro connessioni, sia globali sull’intero sistema, oppure costruire modelli suscettibili di essere validati attraverso la simulazione. Se di un sistema si riesce infatti a fornire una descrizione sufficientemente dettagliata, è poi possibile osservare come questo si comporti traducendo le regole in algoritmi e costruendo quindi una versione virtuale, anche se semplificata del sistema stesso. Il passaggio più difficile è il confronto tra il sistema simulato ed il sistema vero, che passa necessariamente attraverso la valutazione di una numero limitato di parametri che ne caratterizzino e proprietà. La codifica del progetto è una proprietà cruciale dei sistemi complessi perché questa si realizza con un dispendio di massa ed energia incomparabilmente più piccolo rispetto a quello necessario per realizzare l’intera struttura; nello stesso tempo apportare piccole modifiche ad un progetto è rapido ed economico. In questo processo che comporta la continua introduzione di varianti si aprono molteplici strade e con lo scorrere del tempo si realizza una storia in modo unico e irripetibile. Anche il susseguirsi di eventi fisici caratterizzati da processi irreversibili e dalla presenza di molteplici biforcazioni da origine ad una storia che non si può percorrere a ritroso, né riprodurre qualora fossimo in grado ripartire dalle stesse condizioni iniziali. Tuttavia esiste una differenza profonda tra la storia di un sistema fisico come il globo terrestre e la storia della vita. La prima registra i molteplici cambiamenti che ha subito la superficie del nostro pianeta ove montagne e mari nascono e scompaiono senza un chiaro disegno soggiacente. La storia della vita è caratterizzata da una progressiva crescita della ricchezza strutturale e funzionale e accompagnata da una crescita della complessità progettuale. La rappresentazione di questa storia prende la forma di un albero con le sue ramificazioni che mostra la continua diversificazione delle strutture e la loro evoluzione verso forme sempre più avanzate. La direzione in cui scorre il tempo è ben definita: le strutture affinano le capacità sensoriali mentre cresce la potenza degli organi che elaborano la informazione. Un sistema complesso è anche caratterizzato da un molteplicità di scale, tanto più alta quanto più si sale sulla scala evolutiva. La ragione è che il procedere verso strutture sempre più elaborate avviene utilizzando altre strutture come mattoni per cui l’immagine che si può fornire è quella di una rete di automi a più strati: partendo dal basso una rete con le sue proprietà emergenti diventa il nodo di una rete di secondo livello, cioè un automa di secondo livello che interagisce con altri automi dello stesso tipo e così via. Nei sistemi inorganici, dove non esiste un progetto, si distinguono di norma solo due livelli, quello dei costituenti elementari e quello su scala macroscopica. I sistemi fisici sono riconducibili a poche leggi universali, che governano i costituenti elementari della materia, ma il passaggio dalla descrizione dalla piccola alla grande scala è impervio e consentito soltanto dalla simulazione numerica, quando ci allontaniamo dalle situazioni più semplici caratterizzate da un equilibrio statistico. I limiti che il disegno riduzionista incontra già per i sistemi fisici diventano decisamente più forti nel caso dei sistemi complessi. (shrink)

This paper examines Hobbes’s criticisms of Robert Boyle’s air-pump experiments in light of Hobbes’s account in _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_ of the relationship of natural philosophy to geometry. I argue that Hobbes’s criticisms rely upon his understanding of what counts as “true physics.” Instead of seeing Hobbes as defending natural philosophy as “a causal enterprise … [that] as such, secured total and irrevocable assent,” 1 I argue that, in his disagreement with Boyle, Hobbes relied upon his understanding of natural (...) philosophy as a mixed mathematical science. In a mixed mathematical science one can mix facts from experience with causal principles borrowed from geometry. Hobbes’s harsh criticisms of Boyle’s philosophy, especially in the _Dialogus Physicus, sive De natura aeris_, should thus be understood as Hobbes advancing his view of the proper relationship of natural philosophy to geometry in terms of mixing principles from geometry with facts from experience. Understood in this light, Hobbes need not be taken to reject or diminish the importance of experiment/experience; nor should Hobbes’s criticisms in _Dialogus Physicus_ be understood as rejecting experimenting as ignoble and not befitting a philosopher. Instead, Hobbes’s viewpoint is that experiment/experience must be understood within its proper place – it establishes the ‘that’ for a mixed mathematical science explanation. (shrink)

The paper examines the justification of warfare. The main thesis is that war is very difficult to justify, and justification by invoking “justice” is not the way to succeed it. Justification and justness are very different venues: while the first attempts to explain the nature of war and offer possible schemes of resolution, the second aims to endorse a specific type of warfare as correct and hence allowed – which is the crucial part of “just war theory.” However, “just war (...) theory,” somewhat Manichean in its nature, has very deep flaws. Its final result is criminalization of war, which reduces warfare to police action, and finally implies a very strange proviso that one side has a right to win. All that endangers the distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello, and destroys the collective character of warfare. Justification of war is actually quite different – it starts from the definition of war as a kind of conflict which cannot be solved peacefully, but for which there is mutual understanding that it cannot remain unresolved. The aim of war is not justice, but peace, i.e. either a new articulation of peace, or a restoration of the status quo ante. Additionally, unlike police actions, the result of war cannot be known or assumed in advance, giving war its main feature: the lack of control over the future. Control over the future, predictability, is a feature of peace. This might imply that war is a consequence of failed peace, or inability to maintain peace. The explanation of this inability forms the justification of war. Justice is always an important part of it, but justification cannot be reduced to it. The logic contained here refers to ius ad bellum, while ius in bello is relative to various parameters of sensitivity prevalent in a particular time, with the purpose to make warfare more humane and less expensive. (shrink)