Results for 'like'

954 found
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  1. Please Like This Paper.Lucy McDonald - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):335-358.
    In this paper I offer a philosophical analysis of the act of ‘liking’ a post on social media. First, I consider what it means to ‘like’ something. I argue that ‘liking’ is best understood as a phatic gesture; it signals uptake and anoints the poster’s positive face. Next, I consider how best to theorise the power that comes with amassing many ‘likes’. I suggest that ‘like’ tallies alongside posts institute and record a form of digital social capital. Finally, (...)
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  2. Belief-Like Imagining and Correctness.Alon Chasid - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160.
    This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the (...)
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  3. Belief-like imaginings and perceptual (non-)assertoricity.Alon Chasid & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):731-751.
    A commonly-discussed feature of perceptual experience is that it has ‘assertoric’ or ‘phenomenal’ force. We will start by discussing various descriptions of the assertoricity of perceptual experience. We will then adopt a minimal characterization of assertoricity: a perceptual experience has assertoric force just in case it inclines the perceiver to believe its content. Adducing cases that show that visual experience is not always assertoric, we will argue that what renders these visual experiences non-assertoric is that they are penetrated by belief- (...) imaginings. Lastly, we will explain why it is that when belief-like imaginings—as opposed to beliefs (and other cognitive states)—penetrate visual experience, they render visual experiences non-assertoric. (shrink)
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    Content feels like little nuggets of wisdom.Shed Shed - 2024 - Sm3D Portal.
    This book offers a refreshing mix of science, personal stories, and reflections on the nature of thought. I really liked how the author uses simple yet deep anecdotes like the clever paradox of the sage and the king to explore complex ideas in an approachable way. The writing flows smoothly, and the content feels like little nuggets of wisdom that make you pause and think.
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  5. On Liking Aesthetic Value.Keren Gorodeisky - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):261-280.
    According to tradition, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to a certain feeling of liking or pleasure. Is that true? Two answers are on offer in the field of aesthetics today: 1. The Hedonist answers: Yes, aesthetic value is non-contingently connected to pleasure insofar as this value is constituted and explained by the power of its possessors to please (under standard conditions). 2. The Non-Affectivist answers: No. At best, pleasure is contingently related to aesthetic value. The aim of this paper is (...)
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  6. Knowing What It is Like and Testimony.Yuri Cath - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):105-120.
    It is often said that ‘what it is like’-knowledge cannot be acquired by consulting testimony or reading books [Lewis 1998; Paul 2014; 2015a]. However, people also routinely consult books like What It Is Like to Go to War [Marlantes 2014], and countless ‘what it is like’ articles and youtube videos, in the apparent hope of gaining knowledge about what it is like to have experiences they have not had themselves. This article examines this puzzle and (...)
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  7. Knowing What It's Like.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):187-209.
    This paper argues that knowledge of what it’s like varies along a spectrum from more exact to more approximate, and that phenomenal concepts vary along a spectrum in how precisely they characterize what it’s like to undergo their target experiences. This degreed picture contrasts with the standard all-or-nothing picture, where phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge lack any such degreed structure. I motivate the degreed picture by appeal to (1) limits in epistemic abilities such as recognition, imagination, and inference, (...)
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  8. Like-Mindedness: Plato’s Solution to the Problem of Faction.Nicholas D. Smith & Catherine McKeen - 2018 - In Gerasimos Santas & Georgios Anagnostopoulos (eds.), Democracy, Justice, and Equality in Ancient Greece: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 139-159.
    Plato recognizes faction as a serious threat to any political community. The Republic’s proposed solution to faction relies on bringing citizens into a relation of ὁμόνοια. On the dominant line of interpretation, ὁμόνοια is understood along the lines of “explicit agreement” or “consensus.” Commentators have consequently thought that the καλλίπολις becomes resistant to faction when all or most of its members explicitly agree with one another about certain fundamentals of their political association—for example, they agree regarding who should govern in (...)
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  9. AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change.Rafael R. Testa, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Márcio M. Ribeiro - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):632-672.
    Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three (...)
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  10. How Is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking?Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):408-435.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
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  11. On Liking and Enjoyment: Reassessing Geiger’s Account of Aesthetic Pleasure.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2020 - Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 8 (2):207 - 232.
    This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1, while sect. 2 presents Moritz Geiger’s distinction between two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: liking, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of the artwork; and enjoyment, which is understood to be an emotional response. Sect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Geiger’s account in the light of current research. In particular, I provide arguments in favor of (...)
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  12. Quantum-like models cannot account for the conjunction fallacy.Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Sébastien Duchêne & Eric Guerci - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):479-510.
    Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue (...)
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  13. Robots Like Me: Challenges and Ethical Issues in Aged Care.Ipke Wachsmuth - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9 (432).
    This paper addresses the issue of whether robots could substitute for human care, given the challenges in aged care induced by the demographic change. The use of robots to provide emotional care has raised ethical concerns, e.g., that people may be deceived and deprived of dignity. In this paper it is argued that these concerns might be mitigated and that it may be sufficient for robots to take part in caring when they behave *as if* they care.
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  14. "I like how it looks but it is not beautiful" -- Sensory appeal beyond beauty.Claudia Muth, Jochen Briesen & Claus-Christian Carbon - 2020 - Poetics 79.
    Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it is (...)
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  15. What Is It Like to Have Visual Imagery?Fiona Macpherson - 2018 - In Susan Aldworth & Matthew MacKisack (eds.), Extreme Imagination: Inside the Eye's Mind. pp. 21-29.
    How does visual imagination differ from visual perceptual experience? And how should we describe experiences of visual imagery? Moreover how can people who have visual imagery convey what it is like to have it to those who have never had it – congenital aphantisics? This paper addresses these questions using examples of illusions and other perceptual phenomena to hone in on the answers.
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  16. Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory.Iris Marion Young - 1990
    Feminist social theory and female body experience are the twin themes of Iris Marion Young's twelve outstanding essays written over the past decade and brought together here. Her contributions to social theory raise critical questions about women and citizenship, the relations of capitalism and women's oppression, and the differences between a feminist theory that emphasizes women's difference and one that assumes a gender-neutral humanity. Loosely following a phenomenological method of description, Young's essays on female embodiment discuss female movement, pregnancy, clothing, (...)
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  17. Human-like Knowledge Invention: A Non Monotonic Reasoning framework.Antonio Lieto - 2023 - In Model Based Reasoning Conference, 2023, Rome. Springer.
    Inventing novel knowledge to solve problems is a crucial, creative, mechanism employed by humans, to extend their range of action. In this paper, we present TCL (typicality-based compositional logic): a probabilistic, non monotonic extension of standard Description Logics of typicality, and will show how this framework is able to endow artificial systems of a human-like, commonsense based, concept composition procedure that allows its employment in a number of applications (ranging from computational creativity to goal-based reasoning to recommender systems and (...)
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  18. ‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.
    ‘What it is like’ talk (‘WIL-talk’) — the use of phrases such as ‘what it is like’ — is ubiquitous in discussions of phenomenal consciousness. It is used to define, make claims about, and to offer arguments concerning consciousness. But what this talk means is unclear, as is how it means what it does: how, by putting these words in this order, we communicate something about consciousness. Without a good account of WIL-talk, we cannot be sure this talk (...)
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  19. Quantum-like non-separability of concept combinations, emergent associates and abduction.P. Bruza, K. Kitto, B. Ramm, L. Sitbon & D. Song - 2012 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 20 (2):445-457.
    Consider the concept combination ‘pet human’. In word association experiments, human subjects produce the associate ‘slave’ in relation to this combination. The striking aspect of this associate is that it is not produced as an associate of ‘pet’, or ‘human’ in isolation. In other words, the associate ‘slave’ seems to be emergent. Such emergent associations sometimes have a creative character and cognitive science is largely silent about how we produce them. Departing from a dimensional model of human conceptual space, this (...)
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  20. Toll-like receptor signaling in vertebrates: Testing the integration of protein, complex, and pathway data in the Protein Ontology framework.Cecilia Arighi, Veronica Shamovsky, Anna Maria Masci, Alan Ruttenberg, Barry Smith, Darren Natale, Cathy Wu & Peter D’Eustachio - 2015 - PLoS ONE 10 (4):e0122978.
    The Protein Ontology provides terms for and supports annotation of species-specific protein complexes in an ontology framework that relates them both to their components and to species-independent families of complexes. Comprehensive curation of experimentally known forms and annotations thereof is expected to expose discrepancies, differences, and gaps in our knowledge. We have annotated the early events of innate immune signaling mediated by Toll-Like Receptor 3 and 4 complexes in human, mouse, and chicken. The resulting ontology and annotation data set (...)
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  21. Society, like the market, needs to be constructed.Carlos Palacios - 2018 - History of the Human Sciences 31 (1):74-96.
    It has been commonplace to equate Foucault’s 1979 series of lectures at the Collège de France with the claim that for neoliberalism, unlike for classical liberalism, the market needs to be artificially constructed. The article expands this claim to its full expression, taking it beyond what otherwise would be a simple divulgation of a basic neoliberal tenet. It zeroes in on Foucault’s own insight: that neoliberal constructivism is not directed at the market as such, but, in principle, at society, arguing (...)
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  22. Knowing what it is like and the three "Rs".Yuri Cath - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    There is an intimate relationship between our experiences and our knowledge of what it is like to have those experiences. For having an experience of Φ-ing is clearly an important way of coming to know what it is Φ, and some philosophers have even suggested that it is the only way of coming to possess such knowledge. But despite this intimate connection, we often possess WIL-knowledge after any generating experience has ended. How is this possible? One popular suggestion, roughly (...)
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  23. What-it’s-like talk is technical talk.Erlend Owesen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (4):1-18.
    It is common to characterise phenomenal consciousness as _what it is like_ to be in a mental state. This paper argues that the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in this context has a technical meaning, i.e. a meaning for which the association to the relevant expression is peculiar to a theoretical community. The relevant theoretical community is philosophy and some parts of cognitive science, so on this view, only philosophers and cognitive scientists use the ‘what-it’s-like’-phrase in the way that is characteristic in (...)
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  24. What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. (...)
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  25. Likeness-Making and the Evolution of Cognition.Hajo Greif - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (1):1-24.
    Paleontological evidence suggests that human artefacts with intentional markings might have originated already in the Lower Paleolithic, up to 500.000 years ago and well before the advent of ‘behavioural modernity’. These markings apparently did not serve instrumental, tool-like functions, nor do they appear to be forms of figurative art. Instead, they display abstract geometric patterns that potentially testify to an emerging ability of symbol use. In a variation on Ian Hacking’s speculative account of the possible role of “likeness-making” in (...)
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  26. (1 other version)Imagine what it feels like.Íngrid Vendrell-Ferran - 2022 - In Anja Berninger & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. New York, NY: Routledge.
    Often in our everyday lives, for instance, in decision-taking, empathizing with others, and engaging with fictions, we are able to imagine what a particular emotion feels like. This chapter analyzes the structure of these imaginings as a kind of experiential imagining. After introducing the topic (section 1), I argue that these imaginings cannot be explained exclusively by their content and that a focus on the mode of imagining is required. We not only imagine having emotions, but we also imagine (...)
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  27. 'More Likely Than Not' - Knowledge First and the Role of Statistical Evidence in Courts of Law.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - In Carter Adam, Gordon Emma & Jarvis Benjamin (eds.), Knowledge First,. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-292.
    The paper takes a closer look at the role of knowledge and evidence in legal theory. In particular, the paper examines a puzzle arising from the evidential standard Preponderance of the Evidence and its application in civil procedure. Legal scholars have argued since at least the 1940s that the rule of the Preponderance of the Evidence gives rise to a puzzle concerning the role of statistical evidence in judicial proceedings, sometimes referred to as the Problem of Bare Statistical Evidence. While (...)
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  28. Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. (...)
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  29. Knowing what things look like.Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the (...)
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  30. Bending it like beckham: Movement, control and deviant causal chains.Markus E. Schlosser - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):299-303.
    Like all causal theories in philosophy, the causal theory of action is plagued by the problem of deviant causal chains. I have proposed a solution on the basis of the assumption that mental states and events are causally efficacious in virtue of their contents. This solution has been questioned by Torbjörn Tännsjö (2009). First, I will reply to the objection, and then I will discuss Tännsjö’s alternative.
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  31. Developing Artificial Human-Like Arithmetical Intelligence (and Why).Markus Pantsar - 2023 - Minds and Machines 33 (3):379-396.
    Why would we want to develop artificial human-like arithmetical intelligence, when computers already outperform humans in arithmetical calculations? Aside from arithmetic consisting of much more than mere calculations, one suggested reason is that AI research can help us explain the development of human arithmetical cognition. Here I argue that this question needs to be studied already in the context of basic, non-symbolic, numerical cognition. Analyzing recent machine learning research on artificial neural networks, I show how AI studies could potentially (...)
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  32. How beliefs are like colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7889-7918.
    Double dissociations between perceivable colors and physical properties of colored objects have led many philosophers to endorse relationalist accounts of color. I argue that there are analogous double dissociations between attitudes of belief—the beliefs that people attribute to each other in everyday life—and intrinsic cognitive states of belief—the beliefs that some cognitive scientists posit as cogs in cognitive systems—pitched at every level of psychological explanation. These dissociations provide good reason to refrain from conflating attitudes of belief with intrinsic cognitive states (...)
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  33. Explaining Thermodynamic-Like Behavior in Terms of Epsilon-Ergodicity.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):628-652.
    Gases reach equilibrium when left to themselves. Why do they behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the systems have to be ergodic. This answer has been criticised on different grounds and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that some of the main arguments against Boltzmann's answer, in particular, arguments based on the KAM-theorem and the Markus-Meyer theorem, are beside the point. We then argue that something (...)
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  34. The Concept of Like in Aristotle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Like (ὃμοιος) has the following functions in Aristotle’s philosophy: 1. We know from Aristotle that some thinkers believed that ‘like is known by like.’ (ἡ δέ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ). (Met. , B, 1000b5-6 and So., A, 5, 410a27-29 about Empedocles; So., A, 2, 404b16-18 about Plato; So., A, 2, 405b12-16 and b26-28 about those who define the soul by its power of knowing) This, however, is a problematic theory in Aristotle’s point of view. One major (...)
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  35. Treating like a child.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (2):73-89.
    Analytic Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 2, Page 73-89, June 2022.
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  36. Trickster-Like Teachings in Tibetan Buddhism: Shortcuts towards Destroying Illusions.Z. ma - 2018 - Asian Research Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 5 (1):01-09.
    Trickster-like Dharma teachings in Tibetan Buddhism behave as a kind of shortcuts in the approach to leading people along the path of enlightenment. This essay collects three such teachings of different levels towards destroying illusions, i.e., Buddha’s silence, Guru’s paradox, and Ego’s kleshas. They are necessary as “an ace up the sleeve” for Buddha to destruct disciples’ metaphysical quagmire, for Guru to lead community toward perfect transcendence, and for individuals to attain self-consciousness.
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    Ascorbic acid has an anxiolytic-like effect in the presence of flumazenil in rats.Suhera M. Aburawi - 2024 - Mediterranean Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences 4 (3):57-64.
    Ascorbic acid (vitamin C) is a water-soluble vitamin; it is present in the highest concentration in the brain. Ascorbic acid in high doses acts as a potential treatment for various neuropathological and psychiatric conditions. Flumazenil is a benzodiazepine antagonist; it competitively inhibits the activity of benzodiazepine and non-benzodiazepine substances that interact with benzodiazepine receptors site on the GABA/benzodiazepine receptor complex. This study aims to investigate the effect of flumazenil on the anxiolytic action of ascorbic acid using an elevated plus maze (...)
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  38. “What is it like to be a bat?”—a pathway to the answer from the integrated information theory.Tsuchiya Naotsugu - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3):e12407.
    What does it feel like to be a bat? Is conscious experience of echolocation closer to that of vision or audition? Or do bats process echolocation nonconsciously, such that they do not feel anything about echolocation? This famous question of bats' experience, posed by a philosopher Thomas Nagel in 1974, clarifies the difficult nature of the mind–body problem. Why a particular sense, such as vision, has to feel like vision, but not like audition, is totally puzzling. This (...)
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  39. Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.
    Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 , pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism (...)
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  40. Like Marginalia in the Canon of the Oppressors: Critical Theorizing at the Margin and Attempts for Redemptive Alternatives.Renz M. Villacampa - 2023 - Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture 7 (1):65-80.
    Bestrewn with relics of subjugation, the frameworks that hinge on social progress have failed to appraise the plight of the marginalized in the democratic discourse. This is the case in the Philippines, as in other fringed spaces caught in hegemonic world-building. In this setup, emancipation is anchored in salvific attempts – salvaging the marginalized from a messianic standpoint. This tends to produce a pejorative image of the marginalized as incapable of self-determination. I argue in a three-part discussion: (1) reexamine the (...)
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  41. What it Might Be like to Be a Group Agent.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Neuroethics 14 (3):437-447.
    Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel argues that yes, collective entities, may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer, Tononi and Koch, and List reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. I argue here (...)
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  42. What Is It Like To Be Past?Ernani Magalhaes - manuscript
    The Growing Block Theory of time asserts that temporal reality encompasses all present and past things. The world grows as things come to be present. When something becomes past it does not cease to be, it simply moves away from the growing edge of reality. Thus past things are just like present ones, except not present. But if past things are just as real as present ones, and qualitatively just like them, how can I tell if what is (...)
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  43. Are Language Models More Like Libraries or Like Librarians? Bibliotechnism, the Novel Reference Problem, and the Attitudes of LLMs.Harvey Lederman & Kyle Mahowald - 2024 - Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics 12:1087-1103.
    Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could (...)
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  44. There’s No Place Like ‘Here’ and No Time Like ‘Now’.Albert Atkin - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):271-80.
    Is it possible for me to refer to someone other than myself with the word "I"? Or somewhere other than where I am with the word "here"? Or some time other than the present with the word "now"? David Kaplan, who provides the best worked out semantics for pure-indexical terms like "I," "here," and "now" suggests, quite intuitively, that I could not. Put simply, "I am here now" looks as though I can never utter it and have it turn (...)
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  45. How Much Are Games Like Art?Thomas Hurka - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):287-296.
    This paper challenges Thi Nguyen's argument, in Games: Agency as Art, a central part of the value of game-play comes from the aesthetic experiences it allows, especially of our own agency, so playing a game is importantly like engaging with art. It challenges three arguments Nguyen makes in support of this view and argues, to the contrary, that the principal value in game-play rests in the achievments it allows.
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  46. Knowing What Things Look Like: A reply to Shieber.Matthew McGrath - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (9):3280-3297.
    In ‘Knowing What Things Look Like,’ I argued against the immediacy of visual objectual knowledge, i.e. visual knowledge that a thing is F, for an object category F, such as avocado, tree, desk, etc. Joseph Shieber proposes a challenging dilemma in reply. Either knowing what Fs look like requires having concepts such as looks or it doesn’t. Either way my argument fails. If knowing what Fs look like doesn’t require having such concepts, then he claims we can (...)
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  47. An Ebola-Like Microbe and The Limits of Kind-Based Goodness.Berman Chan - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (2):451-471.
    Aristotelian theory, as found in Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, claims that to be good is to be good as a member of that kind. However, I contend that something can satisfy kind-relative standards but nonetheless be bad—I propose a hypothetical Ebola-like microbe that meets its kind-standards of being destructive for its own sake, but it would plausibly be bad for doing so. I anticipate an Aristotelian objection that evaluations should only be made from "within" the lifeform conception rather (...)
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  48. Defending Aesthetic Internalism: Liking, Loving, and Wholeheartedness.James Harold - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Aesthetic internalism claims a link between judgement and motivation: aesthetic judgements bring with them motivations to act in characteristic ways. Critics object that there is a difference between merely liking something and judging it to be aesthetically good, and that it is our likings, not our aesthetic judgements, that motivate us. This paper develops a version of aesthetic internalism that can respond to this criticism. Wholehearted aesthetic judgements are characterized by stability, attention, and motivation. Making such judgements is an important (...)
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  49. Early Thinking about Likings and Dislikings.Thomas A. Blackson - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (2):176-195.
    In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates argues that ‘the many’ are confused about the experience they describe as ‘being overcome by pleasure’. They think the cause is ‘something other than ignorance’. He argues it follows from what they believe that the cause is ‘ignorance’ and ‘false belief’. I show that his argument depends on a premise he does not introduce but they should deny: that when someone is overcome by pleasure, the desire stems from a belief. To explain why Plato does not (...)
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  50. There’s No Time Like the Present: Present-Bias, Temporal Attitudes and Temporal Ontology.Natalja Deng, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    This paper investigates the connection between temporal attitudes (attitudes characterised by a concern (or lack thereof) about future and past events), beliefs about temporal ontology (beliefs about the existence of future and past events) and temporal preferences (preferences regarding where in time events are located). Our aim is to probe the connection between these preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, in order to better evaluate the normative status of these preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that there is a three-way association between (a) (...)
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