El presente trabajo, se avoca a determinar cuál es el status ontológico del principio de no-contradicción -(P -P). Rechazo que la exigencia que dicho principio implica, sea de naturaleza entitativa, es decir, que sea una dimensión constitutiva de los entes exteriores a la función racional de la mente humana. Afirmo que la exigencia que impone dicho principio, se reduce a ser nada más que una exigencia emanada de la humana mente racional, siempre que ésta participe como uno de los (...) miembros de la relación mente-objeto. (shrink)

Este artículo compara el supuesto 'neoparmenidismo' de la filosofía de Severino con Polo como filósofo 'antiparmenidiano'. Siguiendo la visión de Polo, puede dilucidarse el método fundamental seguido por Severino, que consiste en asumir la mismidad de Parménides y en proyectarla en la dialéctica de Hegel. Al usar el principio de no contradicción, Severino recurre preferentemente a la operación mental de negar.

Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s metaphysics dissolves the necessary relationship between immateriality, immortality and thought. While in her youth this leads her to admit the possibility of thinking matter, in her mature work, it allows her to conceive space as non-thinking immaterial substance that links non-thinking material substance and thinking immaterial substance. To ground this conception of space, she draws on the thesis of the great chain of being. However, the possibility of thinking matter is not consistent with the hierarchy of beings, (...) because within this frame matter occupies the lowest place. My aim is to evaluate whether there is any alternative within Trotter's philosophy to solve this contradiction. -/- La metafísica de Catharine Trotter Cockburn disuelve la relación necesaria entre inmaterialidad, inmortalidad y pensamiento. Mientras que en su juventud esto la lleva a admitir la posibilidad de la materia pensante, en su madurez le permite concebir al espacio como sustancia inmaterial no pensante que oficia como eslabón entre la sustancia material no pensante y la sustancia inmaterial pensante. Para ello, apela también a la tesis de la gran cadena del ser. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de la materia pensante no es consistente con la tesis de la jerarquía de seres, porque en ella la materia ocupa el lugar más bajo. Me propongo estudiar si existe alguna alternativa dentro de la filosofía de Trotter que permita resolver esta contradicción. (shrink)

En el presente artículo abordaremos el marco político y jurídico de la atención sanitaria intercultural de mujeres indígenas en Argentina, en particular, en la provincia de Neuquén. El objetivo es realizar una revisión sistemática del marco jurídico normativo producido en los distintos programas sanitarios que propician la atención de salud con un enfoque intercultural, centrada concretamente en las mujeres mapuce de Neuquén. Finalmente, nos enfocaremos en la contradicción que se produce cuando, por un lado, se defiende un enfoque sanitario (...) intercultural desde los marcos político-discursivo y jurídico, y, por el otro, se aplica un modelo sanitario biomédico, con tintes patriarcalistas. (shrink)

Pronpongo una nueva manera de concebir la aceptación de proposiciones y su relación con la creencia y la inferencia. Argumento además que adoptar esta propuesta nos permite resolver de manera relativamente sencilla algunas paradojas aparentemente tan disímbolas cómo la del prefacio, la lotería y el sorites. Según esta propuesta, el error detrás de la paradoja sorítica es pensar que quién cree que hay una línea divisoria entre lo que cae dentro de la extensión de un término y lo que cae (...) fuera de él debe creer también de algún lugar que ahí se encuentra dicha línea divisoria. Espero convencerlos de que no es así, y que por lo tanto, nuestros juicios de sentido común no nos llevan a ninguna contradicción. (shrink)

“La ‘modernidad’ a través de la imagen de la comida y la digestión”. Ésta es la tarea y el programa de la genealogía fisiológica y psicológica identificada con claridad por Nietzsche en un fragmento del otoño de 1888 y firmemente perseguida en toda su obra. El diagnóstico es implacable y es posible por un uso extendido de la metáfora gastronómica, aplicada a todos los campos de la experiencia y el lenguaje por una escritura temeraria de la historia. Como Valéry y (...) Péguy también lo ilustran, la experiencia de los hombres contemporáneos es pobre y enferma y se caracteriza por una duplicidad radical y una contradicción sin síntesis. No sólo las cosas, como además lo muestra en sus análisis sobre las mercancías como nuevos jeroglíficos que marcan el espacio saturado de la metrópolis, sino también el hombre es doble, así como su corporizada y profundamente fisiológica economía. Su estómago hambriento tiene dos caras, porque todo lo toma pero no nutre en absoluto; vocifera acerca de entusiasmos varios y heterogéneos, no sobre un verdadero alimento para ser absorbido y transformado. En resumen, vive por un instante sin pasado ni futuro. El opuesto de esta lógica de la enfermedad y la insensibilidad en busca de muchas sensaciones y shocks sensacionales, y el reverso de este olvido por rapidez excesiva, es un ser anti- o incluso premoderno en extremo. En los tiempos modernos, el entrenamiento de un criticismo genuino acerca de los prejuicios y el supuesto auto-conocimiento implican una regresión y una alteración de las propias identidades históricas, las creencias y los valores. Finalmente, como Benjamin y Warburg lo revelaron, el criticismo es como tornarse otra vez animal y la interpretación es como recuperar la lentitud y la melancolía de un eterno masticar, al igual que un perro o una vaca. (shrink)

El artículo plantea relaciones entre la subjetividad contemporánea y la hiperconectividad. Empezaremos indagando los rasgos principales del homo psychologicus burgués y de su esfera privada como articuladora de una autenticidad interior. A continuación, identificaremos algunas transformaciones que la hiperconectividad y ciertos repertorios culturales ocasionaron en una subjetividad contemporánea que, a diferencia de su antecesora, parece constituirse en la exteriorización, la visibilidad y la transparencia de la extimidad. Para ello nos apoyaremos en la noción de Baudrillard del éxtasis de la comunicación (...) como “extroversión de la interioridad” e “inyección de la exterioridad”. Intentaremos identificar algunas contradicciones de la subjetividad contemporánea y de las prácticas y tecnologías del yo que la constituyen en el contexto actual de hiperconectividad. (shrink)

The main thesis of this work is as follows: there are versions of Yablo’s paradox that, if Cook is right about the non-circular character of his version of it, are truly paradoxical and genuinely non-circular, and Cook’s version of Yablo’s paradox is one of them. Here I will not evaluate the"circular" or"non-circular" side to Cook’s proposal. In fact, I think that he is right about it, and that his version of Yablo’s list is non-circular. But is it paradoxical? In order (...) to be so, the principles that lead to (i) the derivation of a contradiction, or (ii) the impossibility to give a stable assignment of truth values to the relevant set of sentences, must be acceptable. I will explore two ways to argue that they are not. I will conclude that these attempts lead to a very narrow conception of a theory of truth, or to deny that a paradigmatic case of paradox, such as the"Old-Fashioned Liar," is truly paradoxical. La tesis principal de este trabajo es la siguiente: hay versiones de la paradoja de Yablo tales que, si Cook está en lo cierto acerca del carácter no-circular de su propia versión de ella, son genuinamente paradójicas y auténticamente no-circulares, y la versión de Cook en cuestión es una de ellas. Aquí no voy a evaluar su carácter circular o no-circular. Creo, de hecho, que Cook está en lo correcto sobre el punto. Pero, ¿es su versión auténticamente paradójica? Para que lo fuera, los principios que llevan a (i) derivar una contradicción, o (ii) la imposibilidad de dar una asignación de valores de verdad estables al conjunto relevante de oraciones, deben ser aceptables. Voy a explorar dos modos de argumentar que no lo son. voy a concluir que estos intentos llevan a una concepción de la teoría de la verdad muy estrecha, o a negar que un caso paradigmático de paradoja, como el"mentiroso Tradicional", sea auténticamente paradójica. (shrink)

En este artículo se presentan dos demostraciones del teorema de interpolación: Una para la lógica proposicional y otra para la lógica de primer orden. Ambas se realizan en el contexto de la teoría de modelos. El teorema de interpolación afirma que si A y B son fórmulas, donde A no es una contradicción, B no es válida, y B es una consecuencia lógica de A, entonces existe una fórmula C que esta escrita en el lenguaje común al de A (...) y de B, tal que C es una consecuencia lógica de A y B es una consecuencia lógica de C. El teorema de interpolación fue demostrado por primera vez para la lógica de primer orden por William Craig en 1957, y desde entonces se ha investigado la posibilidad de generalizarlo o aplicarlo. Dicho teorema tiene generalizaciones o aplicaciones en teoría de la demostración, teoría de modelos abstracta, ciencias de la computación, lógica modal, lógica intuicionista, etc. Se presentan ejemplos de aplicaciones o generalizaciones de la propiedad de interpolación relacionados con lógicas infinitarias, cuantificadores generalizados, segundo orden, no clásicas, abstractas, etc. También se ofrecen referencias de problemas abiertos sobre interpolación en el contexto de la teoría de modelos abstracta. (shrink)

Panel de discusión del Cuerpo Académico de Estética y Arte realizado en los marcos del Tercer Coloquio Nacional de la Asociación Mexicana de Estudios en Estética, en el que fueron expositores los doctores José Ramón Fabelo Corzo, Gerardo de la Fuente Lora e Isabel Fraile Martín. El doctor Fabelo realizó una presentación general sobre los antecedentes del tema, su significación y perspectivas de desarrollo, en particular sobre las posibilidades de introducción de nuevas categorías, entre ellas la de la “colonialidad del (...) valer”. El doctor De la Fuente, por su parte, centró su intervención en las contradicciones que debe resolver la teoría de la colonialidad para no terminar realizando ella misma una apología a la colonialidad, refiriéndose al papel que en ello puede y debe desempeñar la estética. La doctora Fraile llama la atención sobre lo que podría considerarse el lado positivo de las relaciones de colonialidad que permitieron, entre otras consecuencias, un mutuo enriquecimiento cultural, algo que muestra mediante el análisis del traspaso de imaginarios visuales para los artistas de América Latina. (shrink)

Los más diversos teóricos de la modernidad suelen presentar este período como un proceso continuo de desarrollo tecnológico y económico, progreso en las artes y las ciencias, expansión de la democracia y racionalización de las instituciones y las costumbres. Sin embargo, persisten las contradicciones del capitalismo, el colapso de la civilización es inminente y el Pueblo no vive ni ha vivido en la modernidad tal y como sus teóricos la describen. Esto es tanto más cierto en nuestro país, habitado por (...) una suerte de magdaleniense o pre-Tartessos lleno de cacharritos con iconos, llamadas, avisos, avatares, tamagotchies, móviles y juegos online integrados sin la menor discrepancia sobre una capa de rituales del año de la polka, fetiches, incienso, lágrimas, sangre, joyas, ofrendas, sacrificios, reliquias de miembros de santos y matriarcas fenicio-neolíticas devenidas madres de Cristo al tiempo que supporters del equipo de fútbol local. El ultrarracionalismo se presenta como un nuevo método y movimiento filosófico cuya voluntad es afrontar los desafíos del futuro sin dejar de hacer justicia a esta auténtica marejada de lo grotesco. (shrink)

El objetivo de esta nota es mostrar que no hay ningún motivo para llamar irracionalista a Miguel de Unamuno. Unamuno puso límites a la razón y rechazó lo que, a su juicio, constituía una violación de dichos límites (el cientificismo y el intelectualismo), pero en ningún momento despreció el uso de la razón.

En su célebre artículo sobre la ideología y los aparatos ideológicos de estado, Althusser indicaba que las evidencias por las cuales una palabra “designa una cosa” o “posee una significación” se ubicaban, junto con la evidencia de ser sujetos, al nivel de los efectos ideológicos fundamentales. Por otra parte, Althusser destacaba la carencia de una teoría de la garantía ideológica. Con la primera observación, Althusser se limitaba a señalar un paralelo, sin establecer una conexión. Con la segunda, llegaba a fijar (...) una meta teórica. En el presente trabajo intentaremos reconstruir el trayecto recorrido por Michel Pêcheux para establecer una conexión allí donde Althusser designó una analogía, e intentaremos mostrar cómo el desarrollo de esta conexión permite establecer las líneas generales de una teoría de la garantía ideológica. Nos concentramos en Les vérités de La Palice (1975), en particular en la operación que, siguiendo los límites de lo que Pêcheux denomina “el materialismo de Frege”, intenta convertir en regla lo que en el campo del pensamiento fregeano se presentaba como un non-sens: que el sentido de las palabras, expresiones y proposiciones se viera afectado por su asociación con otras palabras, expresiones y proposiciones. A partir de allí seguimos la construcción de los conceptos fundamentales con los que Pêcheux intenta definir un “nuevo objeto”: formación discursiva, proceso discursivo, interdiscurso, discurso transverso e intradiscurso, guiado por dos mecanismos discursivos extrapolados de la reflexión fregeana: el de lo preconstruido y el de la articulación o efecto de sostén (grosso modo: procesos metafóricos y metonímicos). Intentaremos destacar dos puntos: que los mecanismos discursivos identificados están sometidos a una divergencia (décalage), a partir del cual pueden comenzar a pensarse las paradojas de la interpelación ideológica sin sucumbir a sus evidencias. La divergencia a la que aludimos consiste en que la inscripción del proceso sin sujeto en la ideología requiere la duplicación de los elementos para que puedan actuar sobre sí como si fueran otros que sí mismos. Insistiremos en que es esta divergencia o contradicción, interna a la forma sujeto, y no la propia forma sujeto, lo que constituye el motor del proceso. Por otra parte, intentaremos mostrar que los dos mecanismos aludidos dan lugar a una concepción dual del sujeto ideológico, por el cual éste está sometido a la “garantía empírica”, por la que el sujeto se identifica a sí mismo, a los otros y al mundo de objetos que lo rodea, y a la “garantía especulativa”, que produce el retorno de lo universal de la formación discursiva en el discurso del sujeto. El paso continuo de una forma de garantía a la otra (de la posición del sujeto del discurso como enunciador a su posición de sujeto universal, pretendido “sujeto de la ciencia” por medio de la identificación con el otro) da cuenta del hecho de que “la ideología no tiene afuera”, ya que tiende a absorber espontáneamente cualquier discrepancia en la forma sujeto, o ruptura con la misma, en el interior de la forma sujeto. (shrink)

En este ensayo el autor supera la contradicción teórica existente entre la Relatividad General que define el campo gravitacional como un aspecto geométrico del espaciotiempo, bien como potencial o curvatura, y la Gravedad Cuántica que lo define como una fuerza de interacción fundamental, con el cambio de la concepción del espaciotiempo de propiedad geométrica estructural del campo gravitacional, a la concepción del espaciotiempo propiedad geométrica estructural de la materia en movimiento. El espaciotiempo no es continente de la materia (Substancialismo) (...) sino que por el contrario está contenido en la materia en cuanto constituye la estructura geométrica que le da su forma y permite sus cambios, a la cual como espacio le confiere su capacidad de contener y como tiempo su capacidad de devenir. Tampoco, el espaciotiempo es la categoría de las relaciones geométricas de los cuerpos materiales y sus eventos (Relacionismo), puesto que, no es una propiedad relacional de la materia sino la propiedad estructural espacio-temporal geométrica de la materia, a la cual la dota con sus capacidades de auto contenerse y transformarse. La teoría del autor sobre el espaciotiempo es la de la materia intrínsecamente dinámica, dotada estructuralmente de las cuatro dimensiones de espaciotiempo, autocontenida espacialmente y auto deviniendo temporalmente, puesto, que la materia en su capacidad de contener dinámicamente ésta ensimisma contenida y transformándose. La partícula-onda, de la materia y del campo, no existe en el espaciotiempo, sino que éste es la propiedad geométrica intrínseca estructural de la partícula-onda, por lo tanto, adherida a su propia naturaleza interna, como su propiedad geométrica dimensional intrínseca, que con fuerza de ley se manifiesta en sus mediciones cuantitativas, bien cuando es tomada la partícula-onda en sí o en relación con otras. Así, sólo son posibles las teorías sobre la gravedad provenientes de la Gravedad Cuántica, aunque, deben reformularse renunciando a integrarlas con la visión geométrica derivada de las ecuaciones de la llamada “General Relatividad”. (shrink)

Abstract: The article elucidates the potential merits and demerits that are normally faced by students who are willing to deal with the issues of job and study simultaneously.

Philosophy begins and ends in disagreement. Philosophers disagree among themselves in innumerable ways, and this pervasive and permanent dissent is a sign of their inability to solve philosophical problems and establish substantive truths. This raises the question: What should I do with my philosophical beliefs in light of philosophy's epistemic failure? In this open-access book, János Tozsér develops four possible answers into comprehensive metaphilosophical visions and argues that we cannot find peace either by committing ourselves to one of these visions (...) or by abandoning our philosophical beliefs. Tozsér calls this disheartening insight "the experience of breakdown", making the case that philosophy's truth-seeking and justificatory tools are unsuitable for establishing truths. Shedding light on the epistemic status of our philosophical beliefs, Tozsér adopts a broad approach to assess the metaphilosophical visions used by philosophers to interpret their own activity and determine their epistemic self-esteem. Open access was funded by the Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungary. (shrink)

Nomophobia (no-mobile-phone phobia) is the fear and anxiety of being without a mobile phone. This study pioneers the investigation of nomophobia in Afghanistan using the Nomophobia Questionnaire (NMP-Q), addressing a crucial gap in the field. We collected statistical data from 754 undergraduate medical students, comprising men (56.50 %) and women (43.50 %), and analyzed the dimensions of nomophobia. While results revealed that all but two participants were nomophobic, they identified three significant dimensions affecting the level of nomophobia among participants: (a) (...) gender, (b) age, and (c) marital status. The study's contributions are precious, given the peculiarity of Afghan political turmoil, security, and human rights issues, especially for women. For example, the study's data collection was abruptly halted in December 2022 due to the Taliban regime's decision to make it illegal for women to enroll in universities as students. Therefore, while examining the characteristics of nomophobia across societies is imperative, it is also vital to investigate what is true of one society, Afghanistan, at one point in time and space. The study concludes by emphasizing the need to broaden participants' scope in future studies to better understand the prevalence of nomophobia across broader societal contexts and forces. (shrink)

One of the most unpredictable things the pandemic brought to our societies was the closure of hospitals and other health services to visitors. Preventing the spread of infection was the main reason for these decisions in the early days of the pandemic when there was no clarity about the means of transmission and the origin of the virus. However, in view of the persistence of the restrictions to date and the numerous negative consequences they have had on the professional and (...) personal quality of life of doctors, nurses, patients and carers, the aim of this article is to analyse in depth the reasons why these decisions have been and, above all, are still being applied, also considering the hypothesis that the choices made so far in the training of health professionals should be questioned. The persistence of restrictions, the constant reduction of human and economic resources in the face of an increase in the demand for care have exacerbated the distance between health professionals and users, to the point of escalating into actual acts of violence and aggression. According to the Critical Pedagogy approach, educators can play a central role in activating formative and collaborative strategies, such as maieutic groups, to rebuild an alliance between those who today find themselves on opposite sides: health professionals on the one hand, and patients and families on the other. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with learners who aim to learn patterns in infinite binary sequences: shown longer and longer initial segments of a binary sequence, they either attempt to predict whether the next bit will be a 0 or will be a 1 or they issue forecast probabilities for these events. Several variants of this problem are considered. In each case, a no-free-lunch result of the following form is established: the problem of learning is a formidably difficult one, in that (...) no matter what method is pursued, failure is incomparably more common that success; and difficult choices must be faced in choosing a method of learning, since no approach dominates all others in its range of success. In the simplest case, the comparison of the set of situations in which a method fails and the set of situations in which it succeeds is a matter of cardinality (countable vs. uncountable); in other cases, it is a topological matter (meagre vs. co-meagre) or a hybrid computational-topological matter (effectively meagre vs. effectively co-meagre). (shrink)

Several philosophers, both in Buddhist and Western philosophy, claim that the self does not exist. The no-self view may, at first glance, appear to be a reason to believe that life is meaningless. In the present article, I argue indirectly in favor of the no-self view by showing that it does not entail that life is meaningless. I then examine Buddhism and argue, further, that the no-self view may even be construed as partially grounding an account of the meaning of (...) life. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to articulate a specific desideratum for any theory of Latinidad, namely, that there is no adequate conception of Latinx without an attendant conception of Afro-Latinx. In order to be reflective of those whom it purports to describe in the U.S. and elsewhere in the hemisphere, the term Latinx must be plastic enough to encompass the many internal differences, and even antagonisms, between its different constituent parts. Within it, we argue here in particular, it must (...) include its Afro-descended history, which includes not just African-descended people but also a denial of the influences of African-descended culture writ large. Our central claim here, then, is that a certain African-descendedness is constitutive of Latinidad in multiple registers, including history, cultural practices, and social identificatory processes despite Latinidad’s pernicious exclusionary history. (shrink)

This paper explains how the practice of ‘no platforming’ can be reconciled with a liberal politics. While opponents say that no platforming flouts ideals of open public discourse, and defenders see it as a justifiable harm-prevention measure, both sides mistakenly treat the debate like a run-of-the-mill free speech conflict, rather than an issue of academic freedom specifically. Content-based restrictions on speech in universities are ubiquitous. And this is no affront to a liberal conception of academic freedom, whose purpose isn’t just (...) to protect the speech of academics, but also to give them the prerogative to determine which views and speakers have sufficient disciplinary credentials to receive a hearing in academic contexts. No platforming should therefore be acceptable to liberals, in principle, in cases where it is used to support a university culture that maintains rigorous disciplinary standards, by denying attention and credibility to speakers without appropriate disciplinary credentials. (shrink)

I argue that a certain type of naturalist should not accept a prominent version of the no-miracles argument (NMA). First, scientists (usually) do not accept explanations whose explanans-statements neither generate novel predictions nor unify apparently disparate established claims. Second, scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) is an explanans that makes no new predictions and fails to unify disparate established claims. Third, many proponents of the NMA explicitly adopt a naturalism that forbids philosophy of science from using any methods (...) not employed by science itself. Therefore, such naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept the version of scientific realism that appears in the NMA. (shrink)

On an evidentialist position, it is epistemically rational for us to believe propositions that are (stably) supported by our total evidence. We are epistemically permitted to believe such propositions, and perhaps even ought to do so. Epistemic rationality is normative. One popular way to explain the normativity appeals to epistemic teleology. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that appeals to epistemic teleology do not support that we ought to believe what is rational to believe, only that we (...) are permitted to do so. In arguing for that, I defend an epistemic teleological position that is radical in nature. It involves no commitment to aiming at the truth. I conclude by dispelling some worries that have been raised about my position. (shrink)

This article demonstrates a priori cosmopolitan values of restraint and harm limitation exist to establish a cosmopolitan “no-harm” duty in warfare, predating utilitarianism and permeating modern international humanitarian law. In doing so, the author exposes the atemporal and ahistorical nature of utilitarianism which introduces chaos and brutality into the international legal system. Part 2 conceptualises the duty as derived from the “no-harm” principle under international environmental law. Part 3 frames the discussion within legal pluralism and cosmopolitan ethics, arguing that divergent (...) legal jurisdictions without an international authority necessitates a “public international sphere” to mediate differences leading to strong value-commitment norm-creation. One such norm is the “no-harm” duty in warfare. Part 4 traces the duty to the Stoics, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, African traditional culture, Hinduism, and Confucianism. Parts 5 and 6 explain how the duty manifests in principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law. (shrink)

According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face (...) a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world? (shrink)

In this paper I will examine the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as the alleged tensions between them appear in diagnoses about the crisis of liberal democracy. The issue is approached through the arguments of the German jurist Martin Kriele, who holds the thesis that there can be no sovereign in the constitutional State. I will begin by explaining this thesis as well as the justification offered by Kriele. According to him, the guarantee of rights and freedoms is only possible (...) within the framework of the constitutional State. Hence, he advances a second related thesis, that democracy can only be developed in the constitutional State, that is, as constitutional democracy. However, this second thesis seems in contradiction with the first if the democratic principle implies popular sovereignty. To resolve this apparent antinomy, I will distinguish with Kriele two rival conceptions of democracy in order to point out the danger of misinterpreting the meaning of constitutional democracy. -/- En este trabajo examino la relación entre constitucionalismo y democracia, puesto que las supuestas tensiones entre ambos aparecen en los diagnósticos sobre la crisis de la democracia liberal. La cuestión se aborda a través de los argumentos del jurista alemán Martin Kriele, quien defiende la tesis de que no puede haber soberano en el Estado constitucional. Empezaré por explicar dicha tesis así como la justificación de ella que ofrece Kriele, para quien la garantía de los derechos y libertades sólo es posible en el marco del Estado constitucional. De ahí que avance una segunda tesis relacionada, cuando sostiene que la democracia sólo puede desarrollarse en dicho Estado constitucional, esto es, como democracia constitucional. Sin embargo, esta segunda tesis parece contradictoria con la primera si identificamos el principio democrático con la soberanía popular. Para resolver esa aparente antinomia, se distinguiré con Kriele dos concepciones rivales de la democracia, a fin de señalar el peligro de malinterpretar el sentido de la democracia constitucional. (shrink)

Recent work in the philosophy of religion has resurrected Leibniz’s idea that there is a best possible world, perhaps ours. In particular, Klaas Kraay’s [2010] construction of a theistic multiverse and Nevin Climenhaga’s [2018] argument from infinite value theory are novel defenses of a best possible world. I do not think that there is a best world, and show how both Kraay and Climenhaga may be resisted. First, I argue that Kraay’s construction of a theistic multiverse can be resisted from (...) plausible assumptions about set theory. Next, I argue against the value-theoretic assumptions that underlie Climenhaga’s argument and show how to give an infinite value theory where there is no best world. (shrink)

The belief that Christianity has a relevancy and a truth to convey is one thing, a reason to be heard is another. Christians are to be grounded in the Word, ready to give a reason for their hope (1 Peter 3:15). But, as has been experienced by the Church over the centuries ‘no one cares how much you know, until they know how much you care.’.

La pandemia de la COVID-19 ha levantado sospechas de edadismo y gerontofobia en diversas prácticas de racionamiento sanitario. La edad es un criterio de triaje controvertido. En este artículo se esclarece la relevancia ética de la edad dentro de los sistemas de triaje, analizando particularmente su rol dentro de los principios de equidad y de eficiencia. La equidad requiere dar más oportunidades a aquellos que han cumplido menos ciclos vitales. La eficiencia tiene en cuenta la edad de manera subrepticia al (...) tratar de maximizar los beneficios a corto plazo (salvar vidas) y a largo plazo (salvar años de vida). Finalmente, la edad no debe ser la última ratio de las decisiones de triaje, aunque es una variable a tener en cuenta debido a su presencia implícita en principios fundamentales de priorización. The COVID-19 pandemic has raised suspicions of ageism and gerontophobia in various health rationing practices. Age is a controversial triage criterion. This article clarifies the ethical relevance of age within triage systems, particularly its role within the principles of fairness and efficiency. Fairness requires giving more opportunities to those who have completed fewer life cycles. Efficiency takes age into account surreptitiously when trying to maximize short-term (saving lives) and long-term (saving years of life) benefits. Finally, age should not be the final rationale in triage decisions, although it is a variable to be taken into account because of its implicit presence in fundamental principles of prioritization. (shrink)

The practice of ‘management euthanasia’, in which zoos kill otherwise healthy surplus animals, is a controversial one. The debate over the permissibility of the practice tends to divide along two different views in animal ethics—animal rights and animal welfare. Traditionally, those arguments against the practice have come from the animal rights camp, who see it as a violation of the rights of the animal involved. Arguments in favour come from the animal welfare perspective, who argue that as the animal does (...) not suffer, there is no harm in the practice and it is justified by its potential benefits. Here, I argue that an expansion of the welfare view, encompassing longevity and opportunities for positive welfare, give stronger considerations against management euthanasia, which then require greater benefits to justify its use. (shrink)

In “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions”, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier -style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Car case, but failed to detect a cross - cultural difference. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI’s 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross - cultural difference about (...) the intuition concerning the Gettier car case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication studies, our results provide strong evidence that the purported cross - cultural difference in Gettier intuitions does not exist. (shrink)

Since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits, knowledge-first epistemology has become increasingly influential within epistemology. This paper discusses the viability of the knowledge-first program. The paper has two main parts. In the first part, I briefly present knowledge-first epistemology as well as several big picture reasons for concern about this program. While this considerations are pressing, I concede, however, that they are not conclusive. To determine the viability of knowledge-first epistemology will require philosophers to carefully evaluate the (...) individual theses endorsed by knowledge-first epistemologists as well as to compare it with alternative packages of views. In the second part of the paper, I contribute to this evaluation by considering a specific thesis endorsed by many knowledge-first epistemologists – the knowledge norm of assertion. According to this norm, roughly speaking, one should assert that p only if one knows that p. I present and motivate this thesis. I then turn to a familiar concern with the norm: In many cases, it is intuitively appropriate for someone who has a strongly justified belief that p, but who doesn't know that p, to assert that p. Proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion typically explain away our judgments about such cases by arguing that the relevant assertion is improper but that the subject has an excuse and is therefore not blameworthy for making the assertion. I argue that that this response does not work. In many of the problem cases, it is not merely that the subject’s assertion is blameless. Rather, the subject positively ought to make the assertion. Appealing to an excuse cannot be used to adequately explain this fact. (Nor can we explain this fact by appealing to some other, quite different, consideration.) Finally, I conclude by briefly considering whether we should replace the knowledge norm of assertion with an alternative norm. I argue that the most plausible view is that there is no norm specifically tied to assertion. (shrink)

I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...) apparent cases of downward causation can be analyzed away. (shrink)

No-futurists ('growing block theorists') hold that that the past and the present are real, but that the future is not. The present moment is therefore privileged: it is the last moment of time. Craig Bourne (2002) and David Braddon-Mitchell (2004) have argued that this position is unmotivated, since the privilege of presentness comes apart from the indexicality of 'this moment'. I respond that no-futurists should treat 'x is real-as-of y' as a nonsymmetric relation. Then different moments are real-as-of different times. (...) This reunites privilege with indexicality, but entails that no-futurists must believe in ineliminably tensed facts. (shrink)

Ethical analyses of the effects of neural interventions commonly focus on changes to personality and behavior, interpreting these changes in terms of authenticity and identity. These phenomena have led to debate among ethicists about the meaning of these terms for ethical analysis of such interventions. While these theoretical approaches have different criteria for ethical significance, they agree that patients’ reports are concerning because a sense of self is valuable. In this paper, I question this assumption. I propose that the Buddhist (...) theory of no‐self offers a novel approach to making ethical sense of patients’ claims following deep brain stimulation. This alternative approach is based on the value of insight into patterns of cause and effect among mental states and actions. (shrink)

¿Es el desideratum secularista de separación Iglesia-Estado capaz de enfrentar las consecuencias negativas de la revitalización política de los conservadurismos religiosos y la instrumentalización de la religiosidad popular para fines antiigualitarios? La respuesta negativa es la tesis de la que parto para analizar por qué los liberalismos secularistas y postsecularistas no pueden procesar ni en la teoría ni en la práctica la reordenación política de las iglesias cristianas conservadoras (católicas y evangélicas) en nuestra región. Esto no me conduce a abrazar (...) una teología política ni un relativismo abstencionista. Me interesa estudiar la plausibilidad de desarrollar una postura ético-política anticlerical que no desprecia la religiosidad popular ni el potencial emancipador en los fenómenos religiosos, en un mundo en el que no es ni moral ni históricamente viable soslayarlos insistiendo en colocarlos en la esfera inasible de lo privado o en un pasado sublimado en procesos de secularización. La hipótesis guía de este artículo es que la cuestión normativa y política básica sobre la que tratan la mayor parte de los debates sobre secularización en la actualidad es la participación de las iglesias en lo político por medio de la formación del juicio y la voluntad públicos. -/- . (shrink)

Deidealization as a topic in its own right has attracted remarkably little philosophical interest despite the extensive literature on idealization. One reason for this is the often implicit assumption that idealization and deidealization are, potentially at least, reversible processes. We question this assumption by analyzing the challenges of deidealization within a menu of four broad categories: deidealizing as recomposing, deidealizing as reformulating, deidealizing as concretizing, and deidealizing as situating. On closer inspection, models turn out much more inflexible than the reversal (...) thesis would have us believe, and deidealization emerges as a creative part of modeling. (shrink)

The No-Miracle Argument (NMA) is one of the main argumentation frameworks of scientific realism. Many rebuttals have been offered by antirealists around NMA, the important of which are the Pessimistic Meta-induction (PMI), the Circular Argument, and the Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence. This essay attempts to defend NMA and scientific realism by refuting these three major refutations.

This is the English (and extended version) of an interview originally published in Estonian in October 2018. In the interview, Simpson summarizes a particular way of defending the practice of no-platforming. The varying appeal of different defences of the practice in different socio-historical contexts (i.e. the UK/US versus a post-Soviet country such as Estonia) is discussed also.

‘No-fault unbelief’ can be named the view that there are those who do not believe in God through no moral or intellectual fault of their own. This view opposes a more traditional one, which can be named ‘flawed unbelief’ view, according to which religious unbelief signals a cognitive or moral flaw in the non-believer. Since this charge of mental or moral flaw causes a certain uneasiness, I oppose the former view, i.e. ‘no-fault unbelief’, with a strategy that has nothing to (...) do with the latter. I assume that ‘no-fault unbelief’ is correct and show what consequences follow for both unbelievers and believers. I conclude that the assumption in question is superficially beneficial but deeply detrimental to unbelievers, and by contrast, it is superficially detrimental and deeply beneficial to believers. (shrink)

Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine (...) the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality. (shrink)

Analytic theologians have proposed numerous “solutions” to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), mostly versions of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI). Both types of solution are controversial, but many hold out hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may yield some as yet unimagined, and somehow importantly different, solution to the LPT. I first give a precise definition of the LPT and of what would count as a solution to it. I then show how, though there are infinitely (...) many possible solutions, all solutions can be grouped together into a finite, exhaustive taxonomy, based precisely on those features which make them either controversial, heretical, or inconsistent. The taxonomy reveals why ST and RI have been the major proposed solutions, and also proves that there can be no importantly different, new solutions to the LPT. (shrink)

Biological evolution is a complex blend of ever changing structural stability, variability and emergence of new phe- notypes, niches, ecosystems. We wish to argue that the evo- lution of life marks the end of a physics world view of law entailed dynamics. Our considerations depend upon dis- cussing the variability of the very ”contexts of life”: the in- teractions between organisms, biological niches and ecosys- tems. These are ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate and even unprestatable: we do not know ahead of (...) time the ”niches” which constitute the boundary conditions on selec- tion. More generally, by the mathematical unprestatability of the ”phase space”, no laws of mo- tion can be formulated for evolution. We call this radical emergence, from life to life. The purpose of this paper is the integration of variation and diversity in a sound concep- tual frame and situate unpredictability at a novel theoretical level, that of the very phase space. Our argument will be carried on in close comparisons with physics and the mathematical constructions of phase spaces in that discipline. The role of symmetries as invariant preserving transformations will allow us to under- stand the nature of physical phase spaces and to stress the differences required for a sound biological theoretizing. In this frame, we discuss the novel notion of ”enablement”. Life lives in a web of enablement and radical emergence. This will restrict causal analyses to differential cases. Mutations or other causal differ- ences will allow us to stress that ”non conservation princi- ples” are at the core of evolution, in contrast to physical dynamics, largely based on conservation principles as sym- metries. Critical transitions, the main locus of symmetry changes in physics, will be discussed, and lead to ”extended criticality” as a conceptual frame for a better understanding of the living state of matter. (shrink)

Generating an account that can sidestep the disagreement among substantive theories of well-being, while at the same time still providing useful guidance for well-being public policy, would be a significant achievement. Unfortunately, the various attempts to remain agnostic regarding what constitutes well-being fail to either be an account of well-being, provide useful guidance for well-being policy, or avoid relying on a substantive well-being theory. There are no theory-free lunches in well-being policy. Instead, I propose an intermediate account, according to which (...) well-being is constituted by endorsed veridical experiences. This account refers back to theories of well-being but does so as agnostically as possible. An intermediate account of well-being is meant as a policy guiding compromise between the different theories of well-being that make claims regarding what constitutes well-being. An intermediate account does as well as can be hoped for in providing a basis for well-being policy. (shrink)

Our conscious minds exist in the Universe, therefore they should be identified with physical states that are subject to physical laws. In classical theories of mind, the mental states are identified with brain states that satisfy the deterministic laws of classical mechanics. This approach, however, leads to insurmountable paradoxes such as epiphenomenal minds and illusionary free will. Alternatively, one may identify mental states with quantum states realized within the brain and try to resolve the above paradoxes using the standard Hilbert (...) space formalism of quantum mechanics. In this essay, we first show that identification of mind states with quantum states within the brain is biologically feasible, and then elaborating on the mathematical proofs of two quantum mechanical no-go theorems, we explain why quantum theory might have profound implications for the scientific understanding of one's mental states, self identity, beliefs and free will. (shrink)

A globalized world, some argue, needs a global democracy. But there is considerable disagreement about whether global democracy is an ideal worth pursuing. One of the main grounds for scepticism is captured by the slogan: “No global demos, no global democracy.” The fact that a key precondition of democracy—a demos—is absent at the global level, some argue, speaks against the pursuit of global democracy. The paper discusses four interpretations of the skeptical slogan—each based on a specific account of the notion (...) of “the demos”—and concludes that none of them establishes that the global democratic ideal must be abandoned. In so doing, the paper (i) systematizes different types of objections against global democracy, thus bringing some clarity to an otherwise intricate debate and (ii) offers a robust but qualified defense of the global democratic ideal. (shrink)

A frequent caveat in online dating profiles – “No fats, femmes, or Asians” – caused an LGBT activist to complain about the bias against Asians in the American gay community, which he called “racial looksism”. In response, he was asked that, if he himself would not date a fat person, why he should find others not dating Asians so upsetting. This response embodies a popular attitude that personal preferences or tastes are simply personal matters – they are not subject to (...) moral evaluation. In this paper, I argue, against this popular attitude, that a personal preference like racial looksism is indeed wrong. A preference like racial looksism is wrong because it is an overgeneralization that disrespects individuality by treating people as exchangeable tokens of one type, and such disrespect denies its objects appreciation that their dignity entitles them to. As it turns out, there is on my account a relevant moral difference between racial looksism and simple looksism. (shrink)