Results for 'reiterative premise'

997 found
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  1. The Paradoxical Associated Conditional of Enthymemes.Gilbert Plumer - 2000 - In Christopher W. Tindale, Hans V. Hansen & Elmar Sveda (eds.), Argumentation at the Century's Turn [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    Expressing a widely-held view, David Hitchcock claims that "an enthymematic argument ... assumes at least the truth of the argument's associated conditional ... whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument's explicit premises and whose consequent is the argument's conclusion." But even definitionally, this view is problematic, since an argument's being "enthymematic" or incomplete with respect to its explicit premises means that the conclusion is not implied by these premises alone. The paper attempts to specify the ways in which the (...)
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  2. Competing ways of life and ring-composition in NE x 6-8.Thornton Lockwood - 2014 - In Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge, UK: pp. 350-369.
    The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...)
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  3. Single premise deduction and risk.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173.
    It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure. I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. (...)
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  4. The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  5.  44
    Realistics Premises of Epistemic Argumentation for Dynamic Epistemic Logics.Edward Bryniarski, Zbigniew Bonikowski, Jacek Waldmajer & Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2011 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 23 (36):173-187.
    In the paper, certain rational postulates for protocols describing real communicating are introduced.These rational postulates, on the one hand, allow assigning a certain typology of real systems of interactions, which is consistent with the reality of epistemic argumentation in systems of communicating, and on the other one – defining rules of using argumentation in real situations. Moreover, the presented postulates for protocols characterize information networks and administering knowledge in real interactivity systems. Due to the epistemic character of the considerations, the (...)
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  6. In defence of single-premise closure.Weng Tang - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1887-1900.
    It’s often thought that the phenomenon of risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure but not for single-premise closure. But recently, Lasonen-Aarnio and Schechter have challenged this thought. Lasonen-Aarnio argues that, insofar as risk aggregation poses a problem for multi-premise closure, it poses a similar problem for single-premise closure. For she thinks that, there being such a thing as deductive risk, risk may aggregate over a single premise and the deduction itself. Schechter argues that (...)
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  7. Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that reasons are premises of good reasoning – that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this article, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out implications for the (...)
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  8.  87
    Phantom premise and a shape-shifting ism: reply to Hassoun.Kyle Ferguson & Arthur Caplan - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 47 (11).
    In ‘Against vaccine nationalism’, Nicole Hassoun misrepresents our argument, distorts our position and ignores crucial distinctions we present in our article, ‘Love thy neighbor? Allocating vaccines in a world of competing obligations’. She has created a strawman that does not resemble our position. In this reply, we address two features of ‘Against vaccine nationalism’. First, we address a phantom premise. Hassoun misattributes to us a thesis, according to which citizen-directed duties are stronger than noncitizen-directed duties. This thesis is a (...)
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  9. Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):87--120.
    The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of (...)
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  10.  10
    Between Body and Reiterative Morality.Victor Adelino Ausina Mota - manuscript
    Body and Soul, the infinite dualism of existenz.
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  11.  34
    The Rationality Premise.Juliette Christie - 1997 - [email protected] 9 (1):59-83.
    Many contemporary moral theories accept and rely upon a singular (often unstated) premise. Contractualisms, traditionally construed rights theories and Millian utilitarianisms all accept a uniquely indefensible claim about the nature of the moral value of rationality. As a result, these moral theories are, despite their differences, equally and seriously marked for reliance on what I will call "the rationality premise". In this work I explain how it is that said reliance guarantees that a theory is impervious to demonstration (...)
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  12. On Three Philosophical Premises of Religious Tolerance.Konrad Waloszczyk - 2017 - Dialogue and Universalism 27 (3):9-14.
    My contention is to adumbrate three general premises leading to religious tolerance. The first is that emphasis should be laid much more on ethics than on metaphysics. Religions greatly differ in supernatural beliefs but all advocate justice, love, truthfulness, self-control and other virtues. Second, the beliefs about God are not true in their exact meaning, but rather as remote analogies to scientific truth. Religion is more resemblant of poetry than science. Third, real tolerance consists in the readiness to assimilate some (...)
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  13. The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises. Presumptions in Enthymemes.Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele - 2013 - Informal Logic 33 (3):361-389.
    The implicit dimension of enthymemes is investigated from a pragmatic perspective to show why a premise can be left unexpressed, and how it can be used strategically. The relationship between the implicit act of taking for granted and the pattern of presumptive reasoning is shown to be the cornerstone of kairos and the fallacy of straw man. By taking a proposition for granted, the speaker shifts the burden of proving its un-acceptability onto the hearer. The resemblance of the tacit (...)
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  14.  84
    What does the Premise “A Deceiver Deceives Me” Conclude?: Descartes’ Deceiver Argument Reconsidered.Ayumu Tamura - 2019 - Filozofia 74 (4):308-317.
    Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the (...)
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  15. Multimodality as a Premise for Inducing Online Flow on a Brand Website: a Social Semiotic Approach.Daniel-Rareș Obadă & Oana Culache - 2014 - Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 149 (1):261 – 268.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach in the form of multimodality as a semiotic method that can be used by marketers and semioticians to induce online flow, a psychological state, on a brand website. First, we refer to multimodality as a semiotic analysis that can be used for a better optimization of semiotic resource sets in meaning-making, and we distinguish it from another similar concept: multimedia. Second, after a critical literature review, we address the flow (...)
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  16. Protasis in Prior Analytics: Proposition or Premise.J. Corcoran & G. Boger - 2011 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (1):151 - 2.
    The word pro-tasis is etymologically a near equivalent of pre-mise, pro-position, and ante-cedent—all having positional, relational connotations now totally absent in contemporary use of proposition. Taking protasis for premise, Aristotle’s statement (24a16) -/- A protasis is a sentence affirming or denying something of something…. -/- is not a definition of premise—intensionally: the relational feature is absent. Likewise, it is not a general definition of proposition—extensionally: it is too narrow. This paper explores recent literature on these issues.
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  17. Probabilistic opinion pooling generalised. Part two: The premise-based approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  18. Pruss, motivational centrality, and probabilities attached to possibility premises in modal ontological arguments.Graham Oppy - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):65-85.
    This paper is a critique of a paper by Alex Pruss. I argue that Pruss's attempt to motivate acceptance of the key possiblity premise in modal ontological arguments fails.
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  19. Sellars' Exam Question Trilemma - Are Kant's Premises Analytic, or Synthetic A Priori, or A Posterior.James R. O'Shea - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):402-421.
    ABSTRACT Wilfrid Sellars argued that Kant’s account of the conceptual structures involved in experience can be given a linguistic turn so as to provide an analytic account of the resources a language must have in order to be the bearer of empirical knowledge. In this paper I examine the methodological aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy that Sellars took to be fundamental to influential themes in his own philosophy. My first aim here is to clarify and argue for the plausibility of (...)
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  20.  78
    Kant on epigenesis, monogenesis and human nature: The biological premises of anthropology.Alix A. Cohen - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (4):675-693.
    The aim of this paper is to show that for Kant, a combination of epigenesis and monogenesis is the condition of possibility of anthropology as he conceives of it and that moreover, this has crucial implications for the biological dimension of his account of human nature. More precisely, I begin by arguing that Kant’s conception of mankind as a natural species is based on two premises: firstly the biological unity of the human species (monogenesis of the human races); and secondly (...)
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  21. "Eliezer Schweid: Some Premises of a Pragmatic Jewish Thinker" [in Hebrew].Nadav S. Berman - 2020 - In The Philosophy of Eliezer Schweid: Jewish Culture and Universal Perspectives, ed. Yehoyada Amir and Joseph Turner. Jerusalem: Carmel. pp. 103-141.
    This book-chapter briefs Eliezer Schweid's thought, and demonstrates the role of some core-concepts of classical American pragmatism within it.
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  22.  44
    The evolution of moral belief: support for the debunker’s causal premise.Michael T. Dale - 2022 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 44 (2):1-18.
    The causal premise of the evolutionary debunking argument contends that human moral beliefs are explained by the process of natural selection. While it is universally acknowledged that such a premise is fundamental to the debunker’s case, the vast majority of philosophers focus instead on the epistemic premise that natural selection does not track moral truth and the resulting skeptical conclusion. Recently, however, some have begun to concentrate on the causal premise. So far, the upshot of this (...)
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  23.  97
    Flaws in the Premise of Discrimination.Elizabeth Tomaselli - manuscript
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  24. David Boonin on the Non-Identity Argument: Rejecting the Second Premise.Molly Gardner - 2019 - Law, Ethics and Philosophy 7:29-47.
    According to various “harm-based” approaches to the non-identity problem, an action that brings a particular child into existence can also harm that child, even if his or her life is worth living. In the third chapter of The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People, David Boonin surveys a variety of harm-based approaches and argues that none of them are successful. In this paper I argue that his objections to these various approaches do not impugn a harm-based approach that (...)
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  25. On Nudging and Informed Consent—Four Key Undefended Premises.J. S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):31 - 33.
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  26. Justifying the State from Rights-Based Libertarian Premises.J. Mikael Olsson - 2016 - Libertarian Papers 8.
    Although many libertarians share similar moral foundations, they disagree about whether the state can be justified. The most famous libertarian attempt to justify the state is that of Robert Nozick. This attempt has been criticized by, among others, the libertarian anarchist Murray Rothbard. In this article, Nozick’s theory and Rothbard’s critique are discussed, as well as some other attempts to justify the state from libertarian premises. Keeping the criticisms of those theories in mind, an alternative theory, which attempts to bypass (...)
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  27. A Defense of the Crucial Premise of the Third Way.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Aquinas' Third Way is often dismissed as a howler, because he infers from the fact that, since the universe is metaphysically contingent that there was some time in the past when it didn't exist. I offer an argument to justify this inference.
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  28. Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully (...)
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  29. Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions.Kevin Patrick Tobia - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):575-594.
    Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical (...)
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  30. Epistemic and Deontic Should.Fabrizio Cariani - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):73-84.
    Probabilistic theories of “should” and “ought” face a predicament. At first blush, it seems that such theories must provide different lexical entries for the epistemic and the deontic interpretations of these modals. I show that there is a new style of premise semantics that can avoid this consequence in an attractively conservative way.
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  31. Strategy-proof judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
    Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based (...)
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  32. Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...)
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  33. The Founding of Logic: Modern Interpretations of Aristotle’s Logic.John Corcoran - 1994 - Ancient Philosophy 14 (S1):9-24.
    Since the time of Aristotle's students, interpreters have considered Prior Analytics to be a treatise about deductive reasoning, more generally, about methods of determining the validity and invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. People studied Prior Analytics in order to learn more about deductive reasoning and to improve their own reasoning skills. These interpreters understood Aristotle to be focusing on two epistemic processes: first, the process of establishing knowledge that a conclusion follows necessarily from a set of premises (that is, on (...)
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  34. aristotle's demonstrative logic.John Corcoran - 2009 - History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):1-20.
    Demonstrative logic, the study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion, is the subject of Aristotle's two-volume Analytics. Many examples are geometrical. Demonstration produces knowledge (of the truth of propositions). Persuasion merely produces opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations. According to him, a demonstration, which normally proves a conclusion not previously known to be true, is an extended argumentation beginning with premises known to be truths and containing a chain of reasoning showing (...)
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  35. Boole's criteria for validity and invalidity.John Corcoran & Susan Wood - 1980 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 21 (4):609-638.
    It is one thing for a given proposition to follow or to not follow from a given set of propositions and it is quite another thing for it to be shown either that the given proposition follows or that it does not follow.* Using a formal deduction to show that a conclusion follows and using a countermodel to show that a conclusion does not follow are both traditional practices recognized by Aristotle and used down through the history of logic. These (...)
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  36. Presumptions, Assumptions, and Presuppositions of Ordinary Arguments.Gilbert Plumer - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):469-484.
    Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for (...)
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  37. Argumentaciones y lógica.J. Corcoran - 1994 - Agora 13 (1):27.
    Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic (...)
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  38. Aristotle's Many-sorted Logic.J. Corcoran - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (1):155-156.
    As noted in 1962 by Timothy Smiley, if Aristotle’s logic is faithfully translated into modern symbolic logic, the fit is exact. If categorical sentences are translated into many-sorted logic MSL according to Smiley’s method or the two other methods presented here, an argument with arbitrarily many premises is valid according to Aristotle’s system if and only if its translation is valid according to modern standard many-sorted logic. As William Parry observed in 1973, this result can be proved using my 1972 (...)
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  39. Can Literary Fiction be Suppositional Reasoning?Gilbert Plumer - 2020 - In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar & Bart Verheij (eds.), Reason to Dissent: Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation, Vol. III. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 279-289.
    Suppositional reasoning can seem spooky. Suppositional reasoners allegedly (e.g.) “extract knowledge from the sheer workings of their own minds” (Rosa), even where the knowledge is synthetic a posteriori. Can literary fiction pull such a rabbit out of its hat? Where P is a work’s fictional ‘premise’, some hold that some works reason declaratively (supposing P, Q), imperatively (supposing P, do Q), or interrogatively (supposing P, Q?), and that this can be a source of knowledge if the reasoning is good. (...)
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  40. Informal Logic’s Infinite Regress: Inference Through a Looking-Glass.Gilbert Edward Plumer - 2018 - In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference. Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017, Vol. I. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 365-377.
    I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.
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  41. REVIEW OF 1988. Saccheri, G. Euclides Vindicatus (1733), edited and translated by G. B. Halsted, 2nd ed. (1986), in Mathematical Reviews MR0862448. 88j:01013.John Corcoran - 1988 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 88 (J):88j:01013.
    Girolamo Saccheri (1667--1733) was an Italian Jesuit priest, scholastic philosopher, and mathematician. He earned a permanent place in the history of mathematics by discovering and rigorously deducing an elaborate chain of consequences of an axiom-set for what is now known as hyperbolic (or Lobachevskian) plane geometry. Reviewer's remarks: (1) On two pages of this book Saccheri refers to his previous and equally original book Logica demonstrativa (Turin, 1697) to which 14 of the 16 pages of the editor's "Introduction" are devoted. (...)
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  42. Three rules of distribution: one counterexample.John Corcoran - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52:886-887.
    This self-contained one page paper produces one valid two-premise premise-conclusion argument that is a counterexample to the entire three traditional rules of distribution. These three rules were previously thought to be generally applicable criteria for invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. No longer can a three-term argument be dismissed as invalid simply on the ground that its middle is undistributed, for example. The following question seems never to have been raised: how does having an undistributed middle show that an (...)
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  43. What Makes a Kind an Art-kind?Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (4):471-88.
    The premise that every work belongs to an art-kind has recently inspired a kind-centred approach to theories of art. Kind-centred analyses posit that we should abandon the project of giving a general theory of art and focus instead on giving theories of the arts. The main difficulty, however, is to explain what makes a given kind an art-kind in the first place. Kind-centred theorists have passed this buck on to appreciative practices, but this move proves unsatisfactory. I argue that (...)
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  44. Reengineering Metaphysics: Modularity, Parthood, and Evolvability in Metabolic Engineering.Catherine Kendig & Todd T. Eckdahl - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (8).
    The premise of biological modularity is an ontological claim that appears to come out of practice. We understand that the biological world is modular because we can manipulate different parts of organisms in ways that would only work if there were discrete parts that were interchangeable. This is the foundation of the BioBrick assembly method widely used in synthetic biology. It is one of a number of methods that allows practitioners to construct and reconstruct biological pathways and devices using (...)
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  45. How Models Fail.Eckhart Arnold - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma (in the following: RPD-models) are since 30 years considered as one of the standard tools to study the evolution of cooperation (Rangoni 2013; Hoffmann 2000). A considerable number of such simulation models has been produced by scientists. Unfortunately, though, none of these models has empirically been verified and there exists no example of empirical research where any of the RPD-models has successfully been employed to a particular instance of cooperation. Surprisingly, this has not (...)
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  46.  48
    How Models Fail. A Critical Look at the History of Computer Simulations of the Evolution of Cooperation.Eckhart Arnold - 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Explanation, Implementation and Simulation, Philosophical Studies Series. Springer. pp. 261-279.
    Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma have been popular for studying the evolution of cooperation since more than 30 years now. However, there have been practically no successful instances of empirical application of any of these models. At the same time this lack of empirical testing and confirmation has almost entirely been ignored by the modelers community. In this paper, I examine some of the typical narratives and standard arguments with which these models are justified by their authors despite (...)
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  47. How Models Fail. A Critical Look at the History of Computer Simulations of the Evolution of Cooperation.Catrin Misselhorn (ed.) - 2015 - Springer.
    Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma have been popular for studying the evolution of cooperation since more than 30 years now. However, there have been practically no successful instances of empirical application of any of these models. At the same time this lack of empirical testing and confirmation has almost entirely been ignored by the modelers community. In this paper, I examine some of the typical narratives and standard arguments with which these models are justified by their authors despite (...)
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  48. We, the Professional Sages: Analytic philosophy’s arrogation of argument.Marc Champagne - 2009 - Argument Cultures: Proceedings of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation.
    One claim reiterated with increasing boldness by the “analytic” tradition in philosophy is that what sets it apart from long-time rivals is a shared adherence to proper norms of argumentation. Gradated deviancy from this canon by English-speaking practitioners has therefore raised important questions about who can repair under the banner “professional philosopher.” We will portray as deeply worrisome the idea that argumentation should secure not just conclusions, but disciplinary membership as well.
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  49. When it is Not Logically Necessary for a Necessary Condition of Value to be Valuable.Michael Kowalik - manuscript
    The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent application of this premise by Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. Despite this defect the relevant evaluative step could still work just in case of agency if (...)
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  50. Aristotle’s “whenever three terms”.John Corcoran - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):234-235.
    The premise-fact confusion in Aristotle’s PRIOR ANALYTICS. -/- The premise-fact fallacy is talking about premises when the facts are what matters or talking about facts when the premises are what matters. It is not useful to put too fine a point on this pencil. -/- In one form it is thinking that the truth-values of premises are relevant to what their consequences in fact are, or relevant to determining what their consequences are. Thus, e.g., someone commits the (...)-fact fallacy if they think that a proposition has different consequences were it true than it would have if false. C. I. Lewis said that confusing logical consequence with material consequence leads to this fallacy. See Corcoran’s 1973 “Meanings of implication” [available on Academia. edu]. -/- The premise-fact confusion occurs in a written passage that implies the premise-fact fallacy or that suggests that the writer isn’t clear about the issues involved in the premise-fact fallacy. Here are some examples. -/- E1: If Abe is Ben and Ben swims, then it would follow that Abe swims. -/- Comment: The truth is that from “Abe is Ben and Ben swims”, the proposition “Abe swims” follows. Whether in fact Abe is Ben and Ben swims is irrelevant to whether “Abe swims” follows from “Abe is Ben and Ben swims”. -/- E1 suggests that maybe “Abe swims” wouldn’t follow from “Abe is Ben and Ben swims” if the latter were false. -/- E2: The truth of “Abe is Ben and Ben swims” implies that Abe swims. -/- E3: Indirect deduction requires assuming something false. -/- Comment: If the premises of an indirect deduction are true the conclusion is true and thus the “reductio” assumption is false. But deduction, whether direct or indirect, does not require true premises. In fact, indirect deduction is often used to determine that the premises are not all true. -/- Anyway, the one-page paper accompanying this abstract reports one of dozens of premise-fact errors in PRIOR ANALYTICS. In the session, people can add their own examples and comment on them. For example, is the one at 25b32 the first? What is the next premise-fact error after 25b32? Which translators or commentators discuss this? -/- . (shrink)
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