The dignity approach to racist hate speech regulation maintains that hate speech ought to be regulated because it impugns targets’ dignity and poses a threat to their equal treatment. This approach faces the significant causal challenges of showing that hate speech has the power to erode its targets’ dignity and that regulations can successfully protect that dignity. My aim is to show how a friend of the dignity approach can resolve these challenges. To do so, I (...) borrow insights from the critical legal studies (CLS) approach to hate speech. Specifically, I argue that hate speech can erode its targets’ dignity 1) by constituting an act of discrimination, and 2) by enacting norms that call for treating targeted groups as inferior. Yet while I maintain that the CLS approach offers valuable resources for shoring up the dignity approach, I reject the CLS approach in favor of the dignity approach. (shrink)

Mary Kate McGowan’s Just Words offers an interesting account of exercitives. On McGowan’s view, one of the things we do with words is change what’s permitted, and we do this ubiquitously, without any special authority or specific intention. McGowan’s account of exercitives is meant to identify a mechanism by which ordinary speech is harmful, and which justifies the regulation of such speech. It is here that I part ways. I make three main arguments. First, McGowan’s focus on (...) harm is misguided; that ordinary speech is harmful is harder to support, and in turn does not less to support conclusions about whether it is wrong and warrants regulation, than Just Words suggests. Second, if the speech is harmful, McGowan’s account of exercitives is ill-suited to explain why; the relevant instances of ordinary speech seem to express speakers’ views about moral norms, not change social norms. Third, McGowan’s argument for why ordinary speech should be regulated because it is a form of discrimination presupposes a great deal that is controversial about what makes discrimination wrong and legally actionable, and even if it is right it may license the regulation of more speech than many, including McGowan, would deem acceptable. (shrink)

This paper discusses why speech regulations are logically necessary for any account of a moral right to free speech. My argument for limiting the right to free speech (and more widely any right to freedom) will be grounded in compossibility. Rights to freedom, formally speaking, are claims by an agent that other people not interfere with them; a compossible set of rights is one where the domains of permissible actions—permitted by each claim (and its correlative duty) within (...) the set—do not contradict one another across claims. I will argue that in order for claims to be coherent, they cannot generate contradictory domains, and that for a claim to non-interference to not generate contradictory domains across multiple people with the same claim, the claim must be restricted. This account as it currently stands can at least generate conclusions on the permissibility of incitement. (shrink)

In debates over the regulation of communication related to dual-use research, the risks that such communication creates must be weighed against against the value of scientific autonomy. The censorship of such communication seems justifiable in certain cases, given the potentially catastrophic applications of some dual-use research. This conclusion however, gives rise to another kind of danger: that regulators will use overly simplistic cost-benefit analysis to rationalize excessive regulation of scientific research. In response to this, we show how institutional (...) design principles and normative frameworks from free speech theory can be used to help extend the argument for regulating dangerous dual-use research beyond overly simplistic cost-benefit reasoning, but without reverting to an implausibly absolutist view of scientific autonomy. (shrink)

Hate speech, understood broadly, is any form of expression intended to arouse hatred or contempt toward members of a particular social group. When university administrators have reason to believe that a planned speaking event on campus may feature hate speech (at least in the eyes of some), how should they respond? In this paper I address this question as it arises for Canadian universities. I argue that, where the regulation of campus speech is concerned, the right (...) course of action for university administrators is nearly always to do absolutely nothing. They will have reason to become actively involved only in order to ensure that a speaking event proceeds safely, or when it threatens to disrupt the functioning of the university, or when it is itself threatened with disruption by protesting groups. In those instances the justification for intervention will be to protect and facilitate speech, not to shut it down. (shrink)

At the center of the hate speech controversy is the question whether it constitutes conduct. If hate speech is not conduct, then restricting it runs counter to free speech. But even if it could be shown that it is a kind of conduct, complicated questions arise. Does it necessarily follow that we restrict speech? Practically speaking, can speech even be restricted, either through new legislation or the enforcement of existing laws regulating conduct? Are measures such (...) as hate crimes legislation both useful and appropriate in protecting individuals and groups from violence? The present paper aims to address these questions by reconstructing and assessing Judith Butler’s important treatment of speech-acts and hate speech in her book Excitable Speech: The Politics of the Performative. (shrink)

Largely thanks to Mill’s influence, the suggestion that the state ought to restrict the distribution of misinformation will strike most philosophers as implausible. Two of Mill’s influential assumptions are particularly relevant here: first, that free speech debates should focus on moral considerations such as the harm that certain forms of expression might cause; second, that false information causes minimal harm due to the fact that human beings are psychologically well equipped to distinguish truth and falsehood. However, in addition to (...) our moral obligations, we also have a distinct set of epistemic obligations—and even when a false belief doesn’t harm anyone, it constitutes an epistemically bad outcome. Moreover, Mill was profoundly mistaken about human psychology: human beings are vulnerable to the influence of a wide variety of false claims via a wide variety of psychological mechanisms. Consequently, there is a purely epistemic justification for restricting the distribution of misinformation: because each of us has an individual epistemic obligation to avoid unnecessary exposure to misinformation, and because avoiding such exposure is simply too difficult when acting alone, we all have a shared epistemic obligation to establish laws or regulations restricting the widespread distribution of misinformation. (shrink)

Confucianism demands that individuals comport themselves according to the strictures of ritual propriety—specific forms of speech, clothing, and demeanor attached to a vast array of life circumstances. This requires self-regulation, a cognitive resource of limited supply. When this resource is depleted, a person can experience undesirable consequences such as social isolation and alienation. However, one’s cultural background may be an important mediator of such costs; East Asians, in particular, seem to have comparatively greater self-regulatory strength. I offer some (...) considerations as to why this may be so, and what insights it may afford to theories of virtue generally. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the ethical and conceptual relationship between free speech and press freedom. Many authors have argued that, despite there being some common ground between them, these two liberties should be treated as properly distinct, both theoretically and practically. The core of the argument, for this “unbundling” approach, is that conflating free speech and press freedom makes it too easy for reasonable democratic regulations on press freedom to be portrayed, by their opponents, as part (...) of a programme of illiberal censorship. While we acknowledge the important grain of truth in that argument, we try to show how the alternative, “unbundling” approach can also be used to undermine or mischaracterise democratically justifiable opposition to media regulations in despotic regimes. In light of the problems on both sides, we defend a contextually-variable account of the relation between these two liberties. (shrink)

Recommender Systems (RS) on digital platforms increasingly influence user behavior, raising ethical concerns, privacy risks, harmful content promotion, and diminished user autonomy. This article examines RS within the framework of regulations and lawsuits in the United States and advocates for legislation that can withstand constitutional scrutiny under First Amendment protections. We propose (re)framing RS-curated content as commercial speech, which is subject to lessened free speech protections. This approach provides a practical path for future legislation that would allow for (...) effective oversight of RS, particularly in areas of substantial public interest like child safety, national security, and misinformation. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether search engines and other new modes of online communication should be covered by free speech principles. It criticizes the analogical reason-ing that contemporary American courts and scholars have used to liken search engines to newspapers, and to extend free speech coverage to them based on that likeness. There are dissimilarities between search engines and newspapers that undermine the key analogy, and also rival analogies that can be drawn which don’t recommend free speech protection (...) for search engines. Partly on these bases, we argue that an analogical approach to questions of free speech coverage is of limited use in this context. Credible verdicts about how free speech principles should apply to new modes of online com-munication require us to re-excavate the normative foundations of free speech. This method for deciding free speech coverage suggests that only a subset of search engine outputs and similar online communication should receive special protection against government regulation. (shrink)

In light of rampant fake news and disinformation in today's press and social media, I provide a new consequentialist argument that regulations on the media pertaining to certain false verifiable empirical facts are warranted. This contention is based in part on a collection of pre-existing empirical findings that I newly piece together from political science and psychology demonstrating that a post-truth society is likely with current media. My position is then defended from several counters, such as that it violates deontological (...) rights to free speech and to freedom of the press, that free speech leads to the acquisition of truth, and that government regulators can be biased and corrupt. (shrink)

Anonymity promotes free speech by protecting the identity of people who might otherwise face negative consequences for expressing their ideas. Wrongdoers, however, often abuse this invisibility cloak. Defenders of anonymity online emphasise its value in advancing public debate and safeguarding political dissension. Critics emphasise the need for identifiability in order to achieve accountability for wrongdoers such as trolls. The problematic tension between anonymity and identifiability online lies in the desirability of having low costs (no repercussions) for desirable speech (...) and high costs (appropriate repercussions) for undesirable speech. If we practice either full anonymity or identifiability, we end up having either low or high costs in all online contexts and for all kinds of speech. I argue that free speech is compatible with instituting costs in the form of repercussions and penalties for controversial and unacceptable speech. Costs can minimise the risks of anonymity by providing a reasonable degree of accountability. Pseudonymity is a tool that can help us regulate those costs while furthering free speech. This article argues that, in order to redesign the Internet to better serve free speech, we should shape much of it to resemble an online masquerade. (shrink)

Joel Feinberg’s Offense to Others is the most comprehensive contemporary work on the significance of offense in a liberal legal system. Feinberg argues that being offended can impair a person’s liberty, much like a nuisance, and that it is therefore legitimate in principle to regulate conduct because of its offensiveness. In this article, I discuss some overlooked considerations that give us reason to resist Feinberg’s conclusion, even while granting this premise. My key claim is that the regulation of offense (...) can inadvertently increase the incidence of offense, by nurturing offense-taking sensibilities. In the course of defending this claim and spelling out its implications, I explain why concerns about the inadvertent nurturing of offense are now more pressing, given the identity–political character of contemporary offense-based social conflicts, and I discuss why a reluctance to legally regulate offensive conduct need not be insensitive to the identity–political issues that animate those conflicts. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that to properly understand our commitment to a principle of free speech, we must pay attention to what should count as speech for the purposes of such a principle. We defend the view that ‘speech’ here should be a technical term, with something other than its ordinary sense. We then offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. We contrast our view with some influential views about free speech , and show (...) that our view has distinct advantages. Finally, we consider racist hate speech. Here, we argue that if certain theorists are right about what some racist hate speech does, then such speech should fall outside the scope of the free speech principle, and so, should be as regulable as any non-speech action. (shrink)

Background: Many people with aphasia and people without brain injury talk to themselves in their heads, i.e., have “inner speech.” Inner speech may be more preserved compared with spoken speech for some people with aphasia and may serve a variety of functions (e.g., emotion regulation), which motivates us to provide a high-fidelity characterization of it. Researchers have used multiple methods to measure this internal phenomenon in the past, which we combine here for the first time in (...) a single study. -/- Aims: We compare performance between individuals with and without aphasia on inner speech tasks that assess inner speech “inthe- moment” to general subjective impressions of inner speech to tease apart the relationship of aphasia severity to inner speech. Methods and Procedures: Twenty people with mild-moderate aphasia and twenty neurotypical controls completed several inner speech tasks, including objective silent rhyme judgements (picture, written, and auditory), subjective reports of inner speech during naming, and subjective rating scales about inner speech experience more generally. -/- Outcomes and Results: In-the-moment inner speech during silent rhyming tasks was associated with aphasia severity only for picture and written rhyming but not auditory rhyming. In-the-moment inner speech reports during silent naming were not associated with aphasia severity, nor were the subjective ratings about general inner speech experience. Individuals with and without aphasia demonstrated a variety of subjective general inner speech experiences, demonstrating heterogeneity of this phenomenon more broadly. -/- Conclusions: Methods of measuring inner speech complement each other and speak to different facets of the inner speech phenomenon, and clinicians and researchers must carefully choose the method(s) that will provide the information about inner speech that they desire. (shrink)

Contemporary egalitarian liberals—unlike their classical counterparts—have lived through many contentious events where the right to freedom of expression has been tested to its limits—the Skokie, Illinois, skinhead marches, hate speech incidents on college campuses, Internet pornography and hate speech sites, Holocaust deniers, and cross-burners, to name just a few. Despite this contemporary tumult, freedom of expression has been nearly unanimously affirmed in both the U.S. jurisprudence and philosophical discourse. In what follows, I will examine Ronald Dworkin's influential contemporary (...) justification for freedom of expression, which claims that a thoroughgoing right to freedom of expression is justified by the fact that it guarantees and preserves liberalism's commitment to equality by offering everyone an opportunity to speak, whereas any other policy, such as state regulation, would fail to offer this equal opportunity. This justification has been challenged by feminists and critical race theorists, who find the cases of pornography and hate speech to be sufficient threats to the freedom of expression and equality of their targets—women and minorities—to warrant limiting freedom of expression in these cases. I will argue that if Dworkin is to take equality as seriously as he claims to, then, by his own lights, he must back away from an unrestricted freedom of expression, in light of these distinctly contemporary challenges of the harms of systemic racism and sexism, which underlie hate speech and pornography. (shrink)

Reforming Freedom of Speech to Eliminate Dogmatic and Negative Thinking and Behavior -/- Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right that allows individuals to express their thoughts, ideas, and beliefs without fear of government suppression. It has been a cornerstone of democratic societies, enabling progress through open dialogue and the exchange of diverse perspectives. However, freedom of speech also presents challenges, particularly when it allows for the spread of dogmatic thinking, misinformation, negative behavior, and ideological extremism. (...) The question arises: Can we reform freedom of speech to create a cultural mentality free from dogmatic thinking, negative thinking, and harmful behavior without compromising intellectual freedom? -/- The Role of Freedom of Speech in Intellectual and Behavioral Progress -/- Freedom of speech is crucial for intellectual and social development. It allows for questioning of dogma, whether religious, political, or ideological, and encourages open debate that helps refine knowledge and discard outdated or harmful beliefs. However, unrestricted speech can also enable the spread of misinformation, fear-based ideologies, and divisive rhetoric, which can entrench dogmatic thinking and encourage negative behavior. A well-balanced approach to reforming freedom of speech must ensure that while harmful speech and behavior are addressed, intellectual freedom and constructive dialogue remain protected. -/- Reforming Freedom of Speech Without Harming Intellectual and Cultural Growth -/- Rather than imposing rigid restrictions on speech, societies can implement reforms that guide how speech is used in constructive ways. This can be achieved through education, selective regulation, cultural transformation, and behavioral awareness. -/- 1. Education-Based Approach -/- Mandate critical thinking and logic training in schools: Teaching students how to analyze arguments, recognize logical fallacies, and differentiate between rational and emotional reasoning can significantly reduce the spread of dogmatic thinking and negative behaviors. -/- Teach media literacy: In the digital age, misinformation spreads rapidly. Educating individuals on how to verify sources, evaluate evidence, and distinguish propaganda from fact-based information is essential. -/- Encourage scientific literacy: A society that understands scientific principles is less likely to fall prey to ideological extremism and more likely to base decisions on evidence rather than emotion or tradition. -/- Foster emotional intelligence education: Encouraging self-awareness, empathy, and constructive communication can reduce negative behaviors such as hostility, intolerance, and impulsivity. -/- 2. Regulating Harmful Speech and Behavior Without Limiting Thought -/- Laws against incitement to violence, hate speech, and deliberate misinformation: While free speech should be protected, speech that causes direct harm, promotes violence, or spreads falsehoods with malicious intent should be regulated. -/- Promote fact-checking and responsible journalism: Media outlets and digital platforms should be encouraged to uphold ethical standards, ensuring that information shared with the public is accurate and balanced. -/- Encourage platform moderation: Social media platforms play a significant role in shaping public discourse. Implementing policies to prevent echo chambers of radical dogma, misinformation, and toxic behavior can help maintain a balanced and rational discussion environment. -/- 3. Promoting Constructive Speech, Cultural Transformation, and Positive Behavior -/- Encourage public discourse that values logic and evidence: Societies should foster an environment where rational discussion is appreciated over emotional or ideological rhetoric. -/- Promote public intellectuals and role models: Figures who exemplify balanced, critical thinking and positive behavior should be highlighted in media and education to inspire future generations. -/- Shift cultural norms to value evidence-based reasoning and ethical behavior: Encouraging a cultural shift where truth, facts, and rationality are held in high regard while fostering kindness, respect, and constructive interaction can help reduce the influence of dogmatic ideologies and harmful behaviors. -/- Use behavioral psychology insights to design better policies: Governments and institutions can use insights from psychology to craft policies that encourage cooperation, critical thought, and ethical decision-making. -/- Risks of Over-Regulation -/- While reforming speech and behavior policies can have benefits, excessive control poses serious risks: -/- Authoritarian tendencies: Over-regulation can lead to a government or ruling entity dictating acceptable speech and behavior, which may reinforce dogma rather than eliminate it. -/- Self-censorship: People may hesitate to express genuine ideas out of fear of punishment, leading to intellectual stagnation and a culture of conformity. -/- Subjectivity in defining dogma and negativity: If regulations aim to eliminate dogmatic thinking and negative behavior, determining what qualifies could itself become ideological enforcement. -/- A Balanced Solution: Reform Without Censorship -/- The most effective approach to eliminating dogmatic and negative thinking and behavior while preserving freedom of speech is through education, responsible media, and cultural evolution. Instead of limiting speech, societies should: -/- Strengthen education systems that emphasize critical thinking, logic, media literacy, and emotional intelligence. -/- Regulate speech and behavior only when they directly cause harm, such as incitement to violence or deliberate misinformation. -/- Encourage open and respectful debates where diverse viewpoints can be discussed rationally without fear of suppression. -/- Foster community programs that promote constructive discourse and ethical behavior. -/- Conclusion -/- Reforming freedom of speech to eliminate dogmatic and negative thinking and behavior is a delicate but necessary endeavor. Rather than restricting speech outright, societies must focus on education, responsible discourse, and cultural evolution to encourage rational and constructive thinking and interactions. By fostering an environment where critical thought, ethical behavior, and open-mindedness are valued over ideological conformity, humanity can move toward a more enlightened, balanced, and harmonious future. -/- . (shrink)

Unfortunately, many people today see the regulation of lies, disinformation, hate speech, and fake news as an infringement of free speech, at least when such speech is ‘political,’ despite the damage that such speech can do. But this very protective attitude toward speech rests on a mistaken understanding of the role of free speech in a liberal society. The right to free speech is based on the liberal value of freedom, and as (...) such can be no broader than freedom itself. And freedom has always been subject to reasonable limits in a liberal society. Indeed, while the principles of toleration and neutrality are often cited as supporting a broad interpretation of the right to free speech, they also tell us that certain limits apply to that right. We need not tolerate speech that encourages intolerance, and while government should be neutral between reasonable conceptions of the good, it need not be neutral between reasonable and unreasonable conceptions. These ideas form the framework of liberal society, and as I shall show, also provide a guide for understanding what kind of speech is protected in a liberal society and what it is not. (shrink)

At the time of writing, social media is rife with misinformation and disinformation, having very real effects on our political processes and on the vaccination efforts of the COVID pandemic. As the effort to pass new laws and regulations on social media companies gains momentum, concerns remain about how to balance free speech rights and even who, if anyone, should be the one to regulate social media. Drawing on Dewey’s conception of the public, I argue for the regulation (...) of social media companies by the state as part of the effort to curb misinformation and disinformation. (shrink)

Overall, there’s a rich literature on free speech and hate speech. However, there’s been comparatively less discussion on hate speech that brings in empirical psychological and medical evidence on the possible health harms hate speech can have for minorities. I introduce and piece together a set of pre-existing scientific data that’s new to the philosophical literature to help sufficiently establish an argument that governments should ban hate speech. Given the adverse effects hate speech can (...) have on one’s mental and physical health, hate speech causes harm at many times. Since it causes such harm and leads to overridingly negative consequences, the government ought to regulate such speech. (shrink)

The Violation of the Absolute Law of Free Will: The Consequences of Misinformation and the Flaws in Freedom of Speech -/- Introduction -/- Free will is often regarded as humanity’s defining characteristic—the ability to make choices based on conscious thought, personal experience, and available information. However, free will is not merely about the freedom to choose; it is intrinsically tied to the accuracy and reliability of the information upon which those choices are made. The absolute law of free will, (...) when correctly understood, dictates that human decision-making must be 100 percent dependent on correct information. Any deviation from this principle, through misinformation, disinformation, or ignorance, constitutes a violation of this law and results in imbalanced, often detrimental outcomes for individuals and society as a whole. -/- Complicating this issue is the modern interpretation and implementation of freedom of speech and expression. While these freedoms are fundamental to democratic societies, they come with inherent flaws when unchecked. The unregulated dissemination of false or misleading information under the guise of free speech creates significant challenges in maintaining the integrity of information and, consequently, free will. -/- The Foundation of Free Will: Correct Information -/- The exercise of genuine free will requires access to accurate, reliable information. Decisions made under false pretenses or incomplete knowledge are not truly free but are instead manipulated or constrained by external distortions. The mind operates like a system that processes inputs (information) to generate outputs (decisions and actions). If the input is flawed, the output will inevitably be compromised. -/- For instance, when individuals base their choices on misinformation—such as health-related decisions influenced by false medical advice—they act under the illusion of free will. However, their actions, though seemingly voluntary, are dictated by incorrect data. This demonstrates that true free will can only exist when individuals are fully informed by verifiable facts. -/- The Law of Karma and the Feedback Mechanism of Information -/- The universal law of karma, which involves the principle of cause and effect, also applies to the relationship between free will and information. Every decision and action causes a ripple effect that influences future outcomes. When decisions are made based on falsehoods, the resulting negative consequences, such as social conflict, health crises, and societal instability, reflect the karmic response to the imbalance created by misinformation. -/- Information functions as a feedback mechanism within societal systems. When this feedback loop is polluted with inaccuracies, the entire system becomes unstable. For example, the propagation of false information about climate change has delayed necessary global actions, causing environmental deterioration. The violation of free will through the spread of misinformation disrupts the natural balance of societal decision-making, leading to long-term consequences that extend beyond individual choices. -/- The Flaws In the Laws of Freedom of Speech and Expression -/- Freedom of speech and expression is a cornerstone of democratic societies, allowing individuals to voice their opinions, share ideas, and engage in open discourse. However, this freedom is not absolute and, when exercised irresponsibly, can directly violate the absolute law of free will. The flaws within these legal frameworks become evident when misinformation, disinformation, and harmful propaganda are disseminated without accountability. -/- 1. The Spread of Misinformation and Disinformation The unrestricted nature of freedom of speech has led to the proliferation of misinformation across social, political, and scientific domains. False narratives regarding health, such as anti-vaccine propaganda, have endangered public health and undermined free will by providing individuals with inaccurate information on which to base their decisions. -/- 2. The Manipulation of Public Opinion Political propaganda, fake news, and conspiracy theories exploit the principles of free speech to manipulate public perception. Authoritarian regimes and interest groups often use misinformation to influence elections, sway public opinion, and maintain power. When people make decisions based on manipulated narratives, their free will is compromised. -/- 3. The Role of Social Media and Digital Platforms Social media platforms, while fostering global communication, have amplified the spread of misinformation. Algorithms designed to maximize engagement often prioritize sensational or misleading content over factual information. The lack of regulatory measures on these platforms creates an environment where misinformation spreads more rapidly than truth, resulting in collective decision-making that violates the law of balance. -/- 4. The Challenge of Regulation Regulating freedom of speech without infringing upon individual liberties presents a significant challenge. Striking a balance between protecting free expression and preventing the spread of false information requires well-defined legal frameworks, global cooperation, and ethical considerations. -/- 5. Hate Speech and Its Societal Impact The misuse of freedom of speech to propagate hate speech, incite violence, and promote division disrupts societal harmony. Misinformation about certain groups, ethnicities, or religions fosters discrimination and social unrest, further violating the balance required for the proper exercise of free will. -/- The Societal Impact of Misinformation -/- Misinformation has far-reaching effects on societal structures, particularly in democratic systems where public decision-making relies heavily on the availability of correct information. The manipulation of information through propaganda, conspiracy theories, and biased media distorts collective free will, leading to decisions that do not reflect the genuine, informed will of the people. -/- Elections, for instance, are a prime example. When voters are misled by false narratives or deceptive political strategies, their electoral decisions are no longer expressions of true free will. The outcomes of such manipulated decisions often result in societal discord, poor governance, and disillusionment with democratic processes. In this way, misinformation violates the collective free will of entire populations. -/- The Role of Education in Upholding the Absolute Law of Free Will -/- To protect and uphold the absolute law of free will, society must prioritize a holistic educational system that emphasizes critical thinking, information literacy, and scientific inquiry. Education should equip individuals with the ability to discern fact from fiction, understand the sources of information, and recognize the potential biases inherent in various media channels. -/- An educational system grounded in the universal law of balance in nature can act as a safeguard against misinformation. By teaching individuals how to process information through rational, evidence-based methods, we can foster a societal environment where decisions are consistently made based on truth. This, in turn, ensures that free will is exercised in its purest form. -/- The Role of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) in Preserving Free Will -/- The rapid advancement of AGI presents both challenges and opportunities regarding the preservation of free will. If AGI systems are designed based on the universal formula that emphasizes accurate information, natural balance, and critical thinking, they can become powerful tools for protecting free will. These systems can help filter misinformation, verify facts, and provide individuals with reliable data upon which to base their decisions. -/- However, the potential misuse of AGI, such as the intentional spread of disinformation for political or economic gain, represents a significant risk. Ensuring that AGI adheres to principles grounded in the universal law of balance and the law of cause and effect is essential to maintaining the integrity of human decision-making. -/- Conclusion -/- The absolute law of free will is inseparable from the requirement for correct information. Any decision made under the influence of misinformation, disinformation, or ignorance represents a fundamental violation of this law. The consequences of such violations are evident in societal conflicts, poor health outcomes, environmental degradation, and governance failures. -/- The flaws Inherent in the laws surrounding freedom of speech and expression further complicate this issue. While these freedoms are essential for societal growth and the exchange of ideas, their misuse creates significant obstacles to the proper exercise of free will. To safeguard free will, society must invest in education, promote information literacy, implement responsible regulations for free speech, and ensure the ethical development of AGI systems. -/- By adhering to the principle that free will is 100 percent dependent on correct information, humanity can create a more stable, balanced, and harmonious society, where individuals and communities alike can make decisions that align with the natural laws governing human behavior and societal development. -/- . (shrink)

This paper discusses the influence of digital media and its online presence on freedom of speech in Vietnam by analyzing three different kinds of emerging online media tools: blogosphere, electronic/online newspapers, and social media networks (SNSs). As a single- party socialist republic country, the controlling power of the media lays in the hands of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). The Doi Moi reform in 1986, marketization and the introduction of the Internet in 1997 have slightly transformed the Vietnamese (...) media environment, however, it remains highly restricted. This paper explores several sources including academic research, research articles, as well as analysis of online press coverage in the Vietnamese media environment to examine governmental control over the media which influences the free flow of information. Understanding digital media developments within the Vietnamese online media environment helps us to understand how Vietnamese netizens utilize these tools to maximize their online freedom of speech, the CPV"s approach to regulate the Internet in order to maintain its legitimacy, and several challenges facing Vietnamese netizens including bloggers, journalists, and the wider public in the digital age. (shrink)

While ‘cancel culture’ is commonly regarded as limiting freedom of speech and artistic freedom, this article proposes a new understanding of ‘cancel culture’ as emancipatory norm-setting that is key for democratization. On a non-governmental level of the self-regulation of the art world, the argument for artistic freedom ignores the fact that art is permeated by power. The introduction of ‘politically correct’ norms leads to a justified redistribution of such power. On a parastatal level of public broadcasting and state (...) cultural funding, neutrality is necessary but should be understood materially to include marginalized voices. Restrictions of freedom of speech and artistic freedom do occur on the state-level of hate-speech regulation. Here, the danger of a potential shift from emancipatory regulation to a harmful restriction is particularly virulent, as a discussion of the German BDS ban shows. (shrink)

L.S. Vygotsky’s “regulative” account of the development of human thinking hinges on the centralization of “directive” speech acts (commands or imperatives). With directives, one directs the activity of another, and in turn begins to “self-direct” (or self-regulate). It’s my claim that Vygotsky’s reliance on directives de facto keeps his account stuck at Tomasello's level of individual intentionality. Directive speech acts feature prominently in Tomasello’s developmental story as well. But Tomasello has the benefit of accounting for a functional differentiation (...) in directive communication—i.e., in collaborative activity, the command gives way to both the request and informational assertion. Lacking such differentiation, Vygotsky’s account runs the risk of playing to a rather strident conception of the socius, one more Machiavellian than Marxist. (shrink)

Who should decide who gets to say what on online social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube? American legal scholars have often thought that the private owners of these platforms should decide, in part because such an arrangement is thought to serve valuable free speech interests. This standard view has come under pressure with the enactment of statutes like Texas House Bill 20, which forbids certain platforms from “censoring” user content based on viewpoint. Such efforts to regulate the (...) speech policies of online platforms have been challenged for undermining the editorial speech rights of these platforms and allowing the proliferation of hate speech. This Article develops a democratic theory of free speech, according to which one of the most important reasons for protecting robust free speech rights is that free speech can contribute not only to democratic elections but to a democratic culture more generally. To achieve robust cultural democracy, a community’s speech environment must enable people not only to rationally persuade one another about matters of public importance and convey mutual respect to one another as political equals but also allow people to influence each other in a less articulate and rational manner—to “democratically vibe” with one another. This theory yields a qualified normative defense of government regulation of the speech policies of large social media platforms that can help to realize cultural democracy, suggesting that First Amendment doctrine should focus to a greater extent on protecting the speech rights of platform users, rather than platform owners. Although far from a ringing endorsement of H.B. 20 or S.B. 7072, this Article suggests that First Amendment law should be friendlier to state regulation of platform speech than many critics have thought. (shrink)

Politics abounds with bad language: lying and bullshitting, grandstanding and virtue signaling, code words and dogwhistles, and more. But why is there so much bad language in politics? And what, if anything, can we do about it? In this paper I show how these two questions are connected. Politics is full of bad language because existing social and political institutions are structured in such a way that the production of bad language becomes rational. In principle, by modifying these institutions we (...) can reduce the prevalence of bad language. However, as I show, such practical efforts are fraught with difficulties. After first outlining an account of bad language (Section 1), I examine the rationality of three different types of bad language: inaccurate language, insincere language, and unclear language (Section 2). Next, I discuss the possibility of implementing institutional reforms to improve the quality of political discourse (Section 3). However, I then outline and discuss two serious complications for institutional reforms—namely, they create risk of abuse, and they could preclude instances of seemingly bad language that, in fact, are socially beneficial (Section 4). I conclude with some thoughts about how to pursue institutional reform in an appropriately circumspect manner (Section 5). (shrink)

Speech acts are governed by a variety of illocutionary norms. Building on Sbisà’s (2019) work, this chapter attempts to develop a common framework to study them. Four families of illocutionary rules are identified: (i) Validity rules set conditions for (actual) performance; (ii) Cooperative rules set conditions for cooperative performance; (iii) Illocutionary goals set conditions for successful performance; (iv) Illocutionary obligations set conditions for compliance. Illocutionary rules are often taken to play a constitutive role: speech acts are said to (...) be constituted by the unique set of rules that regulates them. Against this view, it is argued that many illocutionary rules are instead best construed as rationally derivable expectations of cooperation. This alternative paradigm provides fertile ground to reconcile scholarly disagreement between speech act theorists, and yields a promising explanation of how illocutionary norms are learned and evolve through time. (shrink)

Law is the main regulator of public relations, and the question of the proper use and understanding of legal language is essential for law enforcement. This topic is of interest to both lawyers and philosophers, who often join efforts to study it. This article attempts precisely to take such an interdisciplinary approach when examining legal rules as specific linguistic conventions. First of all, for the sake of a better and more thorough understanding of legal language, legal norms are viewed both (...) from the point of view of semantics and from the point of view of pragmatics. Therefore, for this purpose, a distinction is made between legal norms and legal provisions as their linguistic equivalent. Legal norms are then explored through Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy, which describes their semantic content. The pragmatic aspect of the question is explained through John Austin's theory, thus treating legal rules as a kind of specific speech act of a conventional nature. (shrink)

According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we (...) understand the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted. (shrink)

The Section 230 debate is a proxy for reevaluating constitutional fundamentals. The modern right and the modern left, both attacking Section 230, have abandoned liberalism, together with free speech, public private divide, and the politics of neutrality. Instead of believing in First Amendment value pluralism, each side of the spectrum wishes to realize their own positive normative vision for the political community which, today, is largely defined in the realm of digital culture. Each side recognizes the political other as (...) an enemy to their own utopia, wishing to control, censor, or simply become sovereign thereover. These existential politics of the “culture war” are formally circumscribed by liberal constitutionalism, including the state action doctrine. Regardless of any formal change of the First Amendment interpretation, the government will continue to exercise soft pressures on platforms, thus outsourcing censorship, and creating a novel regulatory dialectic of pressure and cooperation. The government, to become truly sovereign, realize its normative vision, and exclude the other, needs to delegate part of its sovereignty to virtual governments. The Constitution of the United States may thus be undergoing an informal amendment conducted through the private hands of internet intermediaries, which has largely gone unnoticed in the scholarly debate over Gonzalez v. Google, digital sovereignty, and platform regulation. (shrink)

Self-awareness represents the capacity of becoming the object of one’s own attention. In this state one actively identifies, processes, and stores information about the self. This paper surveys the self-awareness literature by emphasizing definition issues, measurement techniques, effects and functions of self-attention, and antecedents of self-awareness. Key self-related concepts (e.g., minimal, reflective consciousness) are distinguished from the central notion of self-awareness. Reviewed measures include questionnaires, implicit tasks, and self-recognition. Main effects and functions of self-attention consist in selfevaluation, escape from the (...) self, amplification of one's subjective experience, increased self-knowledge, self-regulation, and inferences about others' mental states (Theory-of-Mind). A neurocognitive and socioecological model of self-awareness is described in which the role of face-to-face interactions, reflected appraisals, mirrors, media, inner speech, imagery, autobiographical knowledge, and neurological structures is underlined. (shrink)

Stereotypes are commonly alleged to be false or inaccurate views of groups. For shorthand, I call this the falsity hypothesis. The falsity hypothesis is widespread and is often one of the first reasons people cite when they explain why we shouldn’t use stereotypic views in cognition, reasoning, or speech. In this essay, I argue against the falsity hypothesis on both empirical and ameliorative grounds. In its place, I sketch a more promising view of stereotypes—which avoids the falsity hypothesis—that joins (...) my earlier work on stereotypes in individual psychology with the work of Patricia Hill Collins on cultural stereotypes. According to this two-part hybrid theory, stereotypes are controlling images or ideas that enjoy both a psychological and cultural existence, which serve a regulative social function. (shrink)

This paper argues that social media companies’ power to regulate communication in the public sphere illustrates a novel type of domination. The idea is that, since social media companies can partially dictate the terms of citizens’ political participation in the public sphere, they can arbitrarily interfere with the choices individuals make qua citizens. I contend that social media companies dominate citizens in two different ways. First, I focus on the cases in which social media companies exercise direct control over political (...) speech. They exercise quasi-public power over citizens because their regulation of speech on social media platforms implies the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with citizens’ democratic contestation in the political system. Second, companies’ algorithmic governance entails the capacity to interfere with citizens’ choices about what mode of discursive engagement they endorse in their relationships with fellow citizens. By raising the cost of deliberative engagement, companies narrow citizens’ choice menu. (shrink)

Online service providers —such as AOL, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter—significantly shape the informational environment and influence users’ experiences and interactions within it. There is a general agreement on the centrality of OSPs in information societies, but little consensus about what principles should shape their moral responsibilities and practices. In this article, we analyse the main contributions to the debate on the moral responsibilities of OSPs. By endorsing the method of the levels of abstract, we first analyse the moral responsibilities (...) of OSPs in the web. These concern the management of online information, which includes information filtering, Internet censorship, the circulation of harmful content, and the implementation and fostering of human rights. We then consider the moral responsibilities ascribed to OSPs on the web and focus on the existing legal regulation of access to users’ data. The overall analysis provides an overview of the current state of the debate and highlights two main results. First, topics related to OSPs’ public role—especially their gatekeeping function, their corporate social responsibilities, and their role in implementing and fostering human rights—have acquired increasing relevance in the specialised literature. Second, there is a lack of an ethical framework that can define OSPs’ responsibilities, and provide the fundamental sharable principles necessary to guide OSPs’ conduct within the multicultural and international context in which they operate. This article contributes to the ethical framework necessary to deal with and by endorsing a LoA enabling the definition of the responsibilities of OSPs with respect to the well-being of the infosphere and of the entities inhabiting it. (shrink)

The public sphere should be regulated so the distribution of political speech does not correlate with the distribution of income or wealth. A public sphere where people can fund any political speech from their private holdings is epistemically defective. The argument has four steps. First, if political speech is unregulated, the rich predictably contribute a disproportionate share. Second, wealth tends to correlate with substantive political perspectives. Third, greater quantities of speech by the rich can “drown out” (...) the speech of the poor, because of citizens’ limited attention span for politics. Finally, the normative problem with all this is that it reduces the diversity of arguments and evidence citizens become familiar with, reducing the quality of their political knowledge. The clearest implication of the argument is in favour of strict contribution limits and/or public funding for formal political campaigns, but it also has implications for more informal aspects of the public sphere. (shrink)

Generics are sentences such as Birds fly, which express generalizations. They are prevalent in speech, and as far as is known, no human language lacks generics. Yet, it is very far from clear what they mean. After all, not all birds fly—penguins don’t! -/- There are two general views about the meaning of generics in the literature, and each view encompasses many specific theories. According to the inductivist view, a generic states that a sufficient number of individuals satisfy a (...) certain property—in the example above, it says that sufficiently many birds fly. This view faces the complicated problem of spelling out exactly how many is “sufficiently many” in a way that correctly captures the intuitive truth conditions of generics. -/- An alternative, the rules and regulations view, despairs from this project and proposes instead that generics directly express rules in the world. Rules are taken to be abstract objects, which are not related to the properties of specific individuals. This view faces the difficult problem of explaining how people come to know of such rules when judging the truth of falsity of generics, and accounting for the strong intuition that a sentence such as Birds fly talks about birds, not abstract objects. -/- What seems to be beyond dispute is that generics, even if they do not express rules, are lawlike: they state non-accidental generalizations. Many scholars have taken this fact to indicate that generics are parametric on possible worlds: they refer to worlds other than the actual world. This, again, raises the problem of how people come to know about what happens in these other worlds. However, a rigorous application of standard tests for intensionality shows that generics are not, in fact, parametric on possible worlds, but only on time. This unusual property may explain much of the mystery surrounding generics. -/- Another mysterious property of generics is that although there is no language without them, there is no linguistic construction that is devoted to the expression of genericity. Rather, generics can be expressed in a variety of ways, each of which can also express nongenerics. Yet, each manifestation of generics differs subtly (or sometimes not so subtly) in its meaning from the others. -/- Even when these and other puzzles of genericity are solved, one mystery would remain: Why are generics, which are so easy to produce and understand in conversation, so difficult to analyze? (shrink)

What would a Jewish process theology look like if it also adopted the a priori principles of rabbinic Judaism - among them, the authority of Torah given on Sinai, an historically particular revelation of divine instruction for a particular people, and the authority of the Oral Torah, an historically evolving hermeneutic, according to which that revelation becomes normative practice for communities of observant Jews? I trust this would not be a naturalism, since it would be a theology that found its (...) grammar or regulative logic in a textual hermeneutic rather than in an account of the orders of perception and imagination. It would not, for the same token, be an anti-naturalism, but rather a theology for which the distinction between natural and super- or non-natural was not definitional. For such a theology, for example, the world out there would belong to the order of creation (maaseh bereshit), rather than to "nature." This would mean that, since God creates through words, language (at least some sort of language) and world would be intimately connected rather than extrinsic phenomena, It would mean, furthermore, that for language to "know" the world would not be surprising and that something like a form of realism would not be out of the question, While it would presuppose the authority of divine speech and even of some human interpretations of it, this other-than natural theology would not, as naturalists might suppose, present a heteronomous conception of divine law, If the distinction nature/not nature would not be definitive for this theology, neither would those of autonomy/heteronomy, body/spirit, this world/other world, This theology would present its own variety of neutral monism; in this case, however, the undifferentiated plenum would be termed a plenum of undifferentiated signification (or pure semiosis), of which undifferentiated feeling (or pure experience) was an instance; "prehension" would be another term for interpretation, Max Kadushin was the first and, as far as I know, the only Jewish thinker to articulate a process theology in the service of what he considered the behavioral or halakhic authority of classical rabbinic literature. In this paper, I examine Kadushin's work as the foundation of a rabbinic text process theology, I assume, from the outset, that such a theology may complement a Jewish natural process theology and that a Jewish process theology, in general, would appear as a process of dialogue between textual- andnatural-process theologies. (shrink)

What is unique about art genres? In this paper, I will show that genres are best understood as clusters of regulative rules for appreciation. Evaluation, interpretation, and other appreciative responses to a work of art are sensitive to how the work is categorised, and genres are the categories that play a normative role in this context. Genres as rules have social foundations and arise from a speech act that I distinguish from classification and call framing. Based on this account, (...) I will illustrate genre practices as social practices in which we declare and propose rules of appreciation to each other. (shrink)

Current technology and surveillance practices make behaviors traceable to persons in unprecedented ways. This causes a loss of anonymity and of many privacy measures relied on in the past. These de facto privacy losses are by many seen as problematic for individual psychology, intimate relations and democratic practices such as free speech and free assembly. I share most of these concerns but propose that an even more fundamental problem might be that our very ability to act as autonomous and (...) purposive agents relies on some degree of privacy, perhaps particularly as we act in public and semi-public spaces. I suggest that basic issues concerning action choices have been left largely unexplored, due to a series of problematic theoretical assumptions at the heart of privacy debates. One such assumption has to do with the influential conceptualization of privacy as pertaining to personal intimate facts belonging to a private sphere as opposed to a public sphere of public facts. As Helen Nissenbaum has pointed out, the notion of privacy in public sounds almost like an oxymoron given this traditional private-public dichotomy. I discuss her important attempt to defend privacy in public through her concept of ‘contextual integrity.’ Context is crucial, but Nissenbaum’s descriptive notion of existing norms seems to fall short of a solution. I here agree with Joel Reidenberg’s recent worries regarding any approach that relies on ‘reasonable expectations’ . The problem is that in many current contexts we have no such expectations. Our contexts have already lost their integrity, so to speak. By way of a functional and more biologically inspired account, I analyze the relational and contextual dynamics of both privacy needs and harms. Through an understanding of action choice as situated and options and capabilities as relational, a more consequence-oriented notion of privacy begins to appear. I suggest that privacy needs, harms and protections are relational. Privacy might have less to do with seclusion and absolute transactional control than hitherto thought. It might instead hinge on capacities to limit the social consequences of our actions through knowing and shaping our perceptible agency and social contexts of action. To act with intent we generally need the ability to conceal during exposure. If this analysis is correct then relational privacy is an important condition for autonomic purposive and responsible agency—particularly in public space. Overall, this chapter offers a first stab at a reconceptualization of our privacy needs as relational to contexts of action. In terms of ‘rights to privacy’ this means that we should expand our view from the regulation and protection of the information of individuals to questions of the kind of contexts we are creating. I am here particularly interested in what I call ‘unbounded contexts’, i.e. cases of context collapses, hidden audiences and even unknowable future agents. (shrink)

There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...) and finds independent support from general considerations about the differences between rules and aims. (shrink)

The ongoing digital transformation of almost all areas of human action and agency calls for a readjustment of the norms that regulate these practices. For example, the digitisation of communicative practices poses new challenges to their functioning. This paper explains some of these challenges and argues that they cannot be met by a normative framework that focuses mainly on defensive (free speech and property) rights. In the context of mediated digital communication, the application of such a framework may even (...) have paradoxical consequences. Accordingly, this paper argues for a broader system of communicative rights, understood as rights to meaningful participation in well-functioning communicative practices. (shrink)

This paper aims to show issues raised by lacanian psychoanalyses concerning the reasons of the phenomenon of aggressiveness, mainly due to the frequency of this phenomenon in education. In this paper, it was intended to highlight the philosophical dimension of the problem, since we are using basically the dissertative method. Lacan takes Hegelian and Marxist legacy to develop the thesis of aggressiveness as realization of a dynamic introduced from the gaze and that has its modus operandi in the movements of (...) alienation and non-alienation. The aggressiveness illustrated, for example, by the injuries suffered by teachers shows itself as a tentative to cause the fall of the Other, this fall is considered as the object a of which its appearance is regulated by the Oedipus Complex. Namely, both the way how the parental authority figures are inscribed in the significant chains that compose the individual and how this inscription shapes the existential possibilities of interaction with the opposite sex would be the key to foresee the extent the individual makes use of aggressiveness. In this way, the Oedipus complex, reinvested by the event of puberty would be responsible for the displacement of the libido one time to the ´Other´ and other time to the own subject. The Other, in the theoretical development of Lacan that follows the decade of 1960, comprehends the identifier choices and also what escapes from any identification. The Other, as a teacher, has the role of positioning itself to generate intuitively one process of identification and has the delicate function of sustain the dialectic that emerges in the moment where the Other falls, moment which usually comes after the identification and that happens with a joy capable of unveiling the object a. Although the role of education is not to maintain an auscultation to this object, the education can influence its nonexclusion and make this object be contoured with the advent of singularities. In this moment, the explicitness of the rules which education constitutes itself as well as the empathy from the educator can be a fundamental instrument in education like the subject to be taught. From the text, we can conclude that: we need to put the aggressiveness in our speech as via of achievement of the non-alienation process conjugated with the possibility to support the desire. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Kant, with his 1798 essay The Conflict of the Faculties, relinquishes some progressive stances and retreats to conservative positions. According to several interpreters, this is especially evident from Kant’s discussion of moral progress and public use of reason. Kant avers that moral progress can only occur through state-sanctioned education “from top to bottom” and entrusts the emergence of a state endowed with the relevant resolution and ability to “a wisdom from above” (7:92-93). According to numerous (...) interpreters, this call for state intervention and the accompanying surrender to a superhuman wisdom manifest Kant’s retreat from initially republican to later conservative positions. In Kant’s previous writings, the notion of public use of reason indicates the unrestricted freedom to communicate one’s thoughts, provided that the communication does not take place in the exercise of one’s function as a state official, and potentially encompasses all adult men. Instead, in The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant contrasts university professors’ freedom to make public use of their reason with the other public officials’ obligation “to uphold whatever […] the crown sanctions for them to expound publicly” (07:08). Thus, according to several scholars, Kant ends up disenfranchising the vast majority of people from the public use of reason and adjusting an emancipatory notion to the absolutist conception of speech and civil service. On my reading, with The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant neither retreats to conservative positions nor softens any progressive tenets of critical philosophy. On the contrary, I intend to show that a) the project of a state-sanctioned education constitutes Kant’s republican rebuttal of conservative positions on their ground, and is fully in keeping with critical philosophy; b) Kant sets forth a new notion of public use of reason that reverses the order of moral progress presented in his previous writings, but retains all its emancipatory character. I intend to support my interpretation by a) conducting a rhetorical analysis showing how Kant’s rhetoric aims to persuade the ruler that his interests are best served by fostering the regulative ideas of pure practical reason as discovered by critical philosophy; b) analysing Kant’s use of the term ‘public’ (both as the adjective ‘öffentlich’ and the noun ‘Publikum’) and showing how it retains its wide scope and emancipatory function and even expands them to areas previously subjected to legitimate censorship. (shrink)

The Holistic Governance Model (HGM): A Blueprint for the Future -/- Introduction -/- Governments today face increasing challenges, from economic instability and climate change to corruption and social inequality. No single government system has fully solved these issues, but by integrating the best aspects of existing models, we can create an optimal governance system. -/- The Holistic Governance Model (HGM) is a hybrid system that combines elements from Social Democracy, Technocracy, Semi-Direct Democracy, China’s Whole-Process People’s Democracy, and the Modified Westminster (...) System. It leverages AI-driven policy-making, technocratic expertise, direct citizen participation, and long-term national planning to create a balanced, efficient, and just government system. -/- 1. Core Foundations of the Holistic Governance Model -/- The HGM is built on six fundamental pillars, ensuring that governance is efficient, democratic, and sustainable. -/- 1.1. Economic System: A Hybrid of Capitalism and State Planning -/- Inspired by: Singapore (Technocracy), China (State-Controlled Development), Nordic Model (Social Welfare), and Switzerland (Financial Stability) ✅ Key Industries Under State Control: The government regulates healthcare, energy, and transportation while allowing free-market innovation. ✅ Smart Capitalism: Entrepreneurs and businesses thrive, but AI-driven economic planning ensures fair wealth distribution. ✅ Universal Basic Assets (UBA): Instead of universal basic income (UBI), citizens receive free housing, education, and healthcare, ensuring financial security. ✅ AI-Assisted Economy: AI predicts recessions, optimizes budgets, and prevents financial crises. -/- 1.2. Political System: A Dynamic Semi-Direct Democracy -/- Inspired by: Switzerland (Direct Democracy), Westminster System (Parliament), and Singapore (Meritocratic Leadership) ✅ Two-Tier Voting System: -/- General Elections: Citizens vote for representatives every 4-5 years. -/- National Referendums: Citizens directly vote on major policies twice a year. ✅ Technocratic Advisory Board (TAB): A non-political panel of scientists, economists, and AI experts advises the government. ✅ Decentralized Local Governance: Cities and regions have autonomy while aligning with national laws. -/- 1.3. Education & Human Development: AI-Powered Lifelong Learning -/- Inspired by: Nordic Model (Free Education), Singapore (STEM Focus), and China (AI Integration) ✅ Free Public Education for Life: Every citizen has access to continuous learning, including college and skill retraining. ✅ AI-Based Personalized Learning: Students use AI tutors that adapt to their learning pace. ✅ Ethics & Critical Thinking Curriculum: Courses in philosophy, logic, and decision-making prevent misinformation and ignorance. -/- 1.4. Healthcare & Social Welfare: AI-Driven Preventive Medicine -/- Inspired by: Nordic Model (Universal Healthcare), Singapore (Tech-Driven Healthcare), and China (Mass Coverage) ✅ Government-Funded Universal Healthcare: Citizens receive free basic healthcare, with private options available. ✅ AI & Robotics in Medicine: AI diagnoses diseases early, reducing medical costs. ✅ Preventive Healthcare Policy: Citizens receive incentives for maintaining good health (fitness programs, nutrition plans). -/- 1.5. Environmental & Energy Policies: The Green Industrial Revolution -/- Inspired by: China (Renewable Energy Expansion), Nordic Model (Sustainability Laws), and Singapore (Urban Planning) ✅ Mandatory Green Technology Adoption: Businesses must comply with strict eco-friendly policies. ✅ Carbon Credit Economy: Citizens and companies earn rewards for reducing carbon footprints. ✅ 100% Renewable Energy by 2050: The government funds solar, wind, and AI-optimized energy grids. -/- 1.6. Law & Order: AI-Governed Justice & Anti-Corruption Measures -/- Inspired by: Switzerland (Independent Judiciary), Singapore (Strict Law Enforcement), and China (AI in Governance) ✅ AI-Assisted Judiciary: AI helps judges analyze case laws for fair, unbiased rulings. ✅ Zero-Corruption Policy: Public officials caught in corruption face lifetime bans from government service. ✅ Balanced Civil Rights & Security: -/- Freedom of Speech: Citizens can express opinions, but disinformation is regulated. -/- AI Surveillance for Security: AI prevents crime while protecting privacy. -/- 2. Government Structure of HGM -/- 2.1. Executive Branch: The President, Prime Minister, and Technocrats -/- President (Elected by Public Vote) → Oversees national policies and international relations. -/- Prime Minister (Elected by Parliament) → Manages daily governance. -/- Technocratic Economic Council → Expert-led economic planning. -/- AI-Assisted Policy Bureau → Uses AI for healthcare, infrastructure, and environmental policies. -/- 2.2. Legislative Branch: Semi-Direct Parliament -/- Lower House (Elected Officials) → Creates laws based on citizen participation. -/- Upper House (Experts & Regional Representatives) → Reviews laws for scientific and ethical validity. -/- Referendum System → Citizens directly vote on key national issues. -/- 2.3. Judicial Branch: AI-Assisted Supreme Court -/- Independent Court System → Ensures justice and constitutional balance. -/- AI Legal Analysis → AI helps judges analyze previous cases and evidence. -/- 3. Implementation Strategy: How to Apply HGM Worldwide -/- To implement HGM, a phased approach is needed: -/- Phase 1 (0-5 Years): Research & AI Integration -/- ✅ Establish an HGM Global Research Center to develop AI governance models. ✅ Pilot AI-assisted economic planning in select countries. -/- Phase 2 (5-10 Years): Education & Public Awareness -/- ✅ Introduce HGM-based education systems (critical thinking, AI governance). ✅ Encourage political reforms to adopt hybrid governance models. -/- Phase 3 (10-20 Years): Nationwide Policy Implementation -/- ✅ Countries gradually adopt the HGM framework, with AI monitoring national progress. ✅ Global partnerships for climate change action and digital economy growth. -/- Phase 4 (Beyond 20 Years): Global Standardization -/- ✅ Establish an HGM Alliance for international cooperation. ✅ Implement AI-driven global policies on poverty, sustainability, and digital rights. -/- 4. Why the HGM is the Future of Governance -/- The Holistic Governance Model (HGM) offers the most advanced, efficient, and democratic government system by combining AI governance, citizen participation, economic stability, and social equality. -/- Conclusion: A Government System for the 21st Century -/- The Holistic Governance Model (HGM) combines the best government systems into a single, optimized model. By implementing AI, technocracy, direct democracy, and long-term planning, HGM ensures: ✅ Efficient economic management ✅ Social equality without excessive taxation ✅ Democratic participation with AI-driven transparency ✅ Sustainable environmental policies ✅ Corruption-free governance -/- If adopted globally, HGM could transform human civilization into a more just, advanced, and sustainable society. -/- . (shrink)

This article reviews recent government incursions on questions of free speech at universities and colleges in Ontario and Alberta and presents the challenge they pose to university autonomy. Inherent in university autonomy is the possibility—or the obligation—that universities make decisions based on ethical responsibilities that can extend beyond the limits of current law. As a case study of university autonomy in matters of expressive freedom, I highlight events at the University of British Columbia, which leads me to a discussion (...) of how questions of ethical responsibility have been raised particularly in relation to the speech protection of transgender members of the university. A central issue is the need for universities to adjudicate when free speech rights meet related responsibilities with which they can conflict. I detail how, for instance, the invitation of some anti-trans speakers can pose such a conflict and should lead university communities to consider adjusting their responses in extreme cases so as to be able to more autonomously regulate hateful speech beyond applicable law. (shrink)

Responding to recent calls made within UK Parliament for a government-backed definition of Islamophobia, this article considers the unanticipated consequences of such proposals. I argue that, considered in the context of related efforts to regulate hate speech, the formulation and implementation of a government-sponsored definition will generate unforeseen harms for the Muslim community. To the extent that such a definition will fail to address the government’s role in propagating Islamophobia through ill-considered legislation that conflates Islamist discourse with hate (...) class='Hi'>speech, the concept of a government-backed definition of Islamophobia appears hypocritical and untenable. Alongside opposing government attempts to define Islamophobia (and Islam), I argue that advocacy efforts should instead focus on disambiguating government counter-terrorism initiatives from the government management of controversies within Islam. Instead of repeating the mistakes of the governmental adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism by promoting a new definition of Islamophobia, we ought to learn from the errors that were made. We should resist the gratuitous securitization of Muslim communities, rather than use such definitions to normalize compliance with the surveillance state. (shrink)

There is a fundamental incompatibility between a developmental orientation to education and instrumental and scientistic conceptions of rationality that dominate educational inquiry. An expanded conception of rationality is provided in the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. This study draws on Habermas' work to present a theory of inquiry that is consistent with a developmental perspective. I distinguish three interdependent realms of experience--the objective world of nature, the intersubjective world of society and the subjective world of each individual. Then, I argue (...) that current conceptions of rationality tend to reduce personal and interpersonal experience to the objective material realm. Under prevailing conceptions, human action is rational when it pursues valued ends guided by knowledge about the world and effective means-ends relationships. Both theories of knowledge and theories of value in these conceptions are inadequate for a developmental orientation. -/- First, knowledge is defined as justified true belief. Theories of truth are based on the correspondence of beliefs with an external world; theories of justification are based on perceptual certainty. These conceptions objectify experience by making experience an object of natural science and instrumental action separate from and external to the person. Such conceptions reduce experience to the objective material dimension and cannot adequately account for the personal and interpersonal dimensions of human experience and understanding. -/- Second, because value claims are not capable of justification by these standards, they are considered ultimately irrational and treated as subjectively held empirical properties of individuals. The only standard of rationality is efficiency and economy in the selection of means. Ethics is reduced to empirical science. But the removal of practical questions from public discourse divests action of ethical significance. With its strict separation of descriptive and normative domains, empirical-analytic inquiry can neither acknowledge its standard of instrumental efficiency nor reach into the practical arena to guide the selection of values and ends that orient and gude human action. Practical questions that cannot be framed in terms of technical problems cannot be taken seriously. -/- Whereas these conceptions of rationality are generally derived from theories of experienced based on individual consciousness, Habermas looks to language for a more adequate account of the intersubjective nature of experience. This account provides an expanded conception of rationality with theories for justifying beliefs and actions that incorporate the personal and interpersonal dimensions of experience so critical to a developmental perspective. Through an analysis of the universal pragmatic structure of language directed to the resolution of problematic truth claims and moral claims, this study presents a consensus theory of truth (for a more adequate theory of knowledge) and a communicative theory of ethics (based on a more adequate theory of human values). -/- The concept of truth refers to a universal pragmatic convention of the unforced agreement of an ideal community of inquirers. Ethical conduct is guided by norms that reflect a rational general will and that regulate genuine human needs. Problematic truth claims and moral claims are discursively justified by the force of the better argument under the conditions of an anticipated "ideal speech situation" inherent in the very structure of communication. Furthermore, a theory of inquiry is developed in which inquiry processes are represented as historically evolved extensions of developmental process in the three realms of experience. Three interrelated forms of inquiry are derived--empirical-analytic, hermeneutic and critical. I derive each from its respective experiential realm, and indicate the logic of inquiry, object domain, and kind of knowledge gained from each. -/- An exploration of the relationship between inquiry and development provides a foundation for a developmental orientation to education. Finally, the theory is contrasted with prevailing inquiry approaches in education and illustrated with an application to a particular educational problem. (shrink)

Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) was the first to explain that certain 'traits' were inherited in plants from one generation to the next. These would later become known as genes. Frederich Miescher in 1869 analyzed a substance from the nucleus of cells, which he therefore called nuclein. Further study of nuclein revealed that it contained elements like hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen and phosphorous, with a specific ratio of nitrogen to phosphorous. Then in 1878 Albrecht Kossel determined that nuclein contained nucleic acid, from which (...) he isolated five nucleobases (nitrogen compounds now referred to by the letters C, G, A, T, U representing cytosine, guanine, adenine, thymine, and uracil). It was also discovered that ribose, a sugar was present in the nuclein compound. What Miescher had isolated from the cell nucleus was actually what would latter be identified as DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid). C. H. Waddington (1905 - 1975) first proposed the term “epigenetics” in 1942 to describe the region between the gene and the whole organism (phenotype) [3]. Today, what is called the epigenome refers to all the chromosomal modifications, DNA modifications, chromatin protein modifications and their complexes. It is the epigenome that determines both the expression of the genes and their inheritance. R. A. Jorgenson reports [4], "Many of these modifications appear to be “programmable” and to be “read out” to influence chromosomal functions." Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock stated this revolutionary proposal more clearly in her Nobel lecture [5], “to determine the extent of knowledge the cell has of itself, and how it utilizes this knowledge in a ‘thoughtful’ manner when challenged.” In 1960 R. A. Brinks suggested that chromosomes possess a paragenetic function in addition to their genetic function [7]. The physical nature of the paragenetic function is characterized by the variety of forms or states of chromatin that can reside at any genetic locus. While the genetic function is stable, the paragenetic function is labile and programmable in ontogeny. It is this latter function that allows organisms to transfer informational macromolecules (RNA and proteins) in a systematic and regulated manner over what is known as the “RNA information superhighway.” Given this capacity, organisms may be able to store information at numerous genetic loci in the form of paragenetic chromatin states, which can be reprogrammed during ontogeny or environmental stress [8]. This reprogrammable system could operate over the whole organism as a storage device, allowing it to make informed ‘decisions' during growth and development, or in response to the environment. Such processing capacity could be considered a form of ‘intelligence,' which also could be passed on to future generations. The study of the flow of information within and between cells and organisms represents the cutting edge of modern biological research. While physical correlates of cognitive behavior in living organisms are being discovered, it does not spell reduction to such correlates. The electronic activity within the physical components of a radio, for example, may be minutely determined, but ultimately it is not merely the electrical activity that produces the intelligent speech that is heard. Only the intelligent person whose voice is being broadcast through the radio can explain that. Without the broadcaster, the radio would sit silently even though fully functional. An organism without its living agency also appears to be devoid of metabolic activity although all the chemical components are fully present. How to connect life to matter will be the ultimate challenge that has to be met. This will prove to be a philosophical problem we hope to address in the near future. (shrink)