In the philosophy of time, the neo-positivist is focussed above all else on sustaining the view called the static theory of time, as the very foundation of their scientific metaphysics. This is the deeply held metaphysical conviction of almost all ‘modern philosophical-scientific’ writers on time. In fact it is hardly too much to say that the entire official modern 20th Century philosophy of physics rests on the assumption that the static theory of space-time is the only (...) concept of time we can use in physics. The static theory of time prescribes the representational space for physics as being logically based on space-time – to the point physicists are incapable of conceiving a theory without space-time any longer, and mutter superstitiously among themselves if someone suggests such a thing. By extension, this space-time provides the representation of all reality for the modern scientific materialists, since they believe that everything ultimately reduces to physics. This agenda simultaneously requires discrediting the alternative concept of time flow and the associated traditional metaphysical concepts that it supports. This Chapter explains the concept of time flow and contrasts it with the static or block universe theory as a genuine and natural alternative for a physical ontology. (shrink)

In this chapter, we see one way that time flow may force us to develop our physical theory if we add it back into physics proper. Now of course this is speculative in this context, and should be thought of as a model. The two following extracts are from introductions a more complete unified theory. They explain the basic mathematical models that are required to illustrate the point that such models may be plausible. The second extract, ‘the parable (...) of the ants’, introduces us to the ideological-philosophical conflict that prevents such a development being considered in the present generation, which we will go on to next. (shrink)

According to the No Alternate Possibilities argument, if time passes then the rate at which it passes could be different but time cannot pass at different rates, and hence time cannot pass. Typically, defenders of the NAP argument have focussed on defending premise, and have taken the truth of for granted: they accept the orthodox view of rate necessitarianism. In this paper we argue that the defender of the NAP argument needs to turn her attention to. We (...) describe a series of worlds that appear to contain differential passage: worlds where time passes at different rates in different subregions. If the NAP argument is to succeed, rate necessitarians must show that each of these worlds is either metaphysically impossible, or does not contain differential passage. (shrink)

‘Philosophy’ today has come to mean the academic ideological disputes between various grandiose ‘meta-philosophies’, rather than the content or explanation of the real problems and issues. I illustrate typical expressions of the conventional ‘scientific' anti-realist philosophy of time here, and how far it has infiltrated the scientific world view.

I suggest time flows at 1 B-series second per A-series second.

This chapter starts with a simple conventional presentation of time reversal in physics, and then returns to analyse it, rejects the conventional analysis, and establishes correct principles in their place.

The conventional claims and concepts of 5* - 8* are a hang-over from the classical theory of thermodynamics – i.e. thermodynamics based on a fully deterministic micro-theory, developed in the time of Boltzmann, Loschmidt and Gibbs in the late C19th. The classical theory has well-known ‘reversibility paradoxes’ when applied to the universe as a whole. But the introduction of intrinsic probabilities in quantum mechanics, and its consequent time asymmetry, fundamentally changes the picture.

A fundamental problem in understanding the nature of time is explaining its directionality. This 1990 PhD thesis re-examines the concepts of time flow, the physical directionality of time, and the semantics of tensed language. Several novel results are argued for that contradict the orthodox anti-realist views still dominant in the subject. Specifically, the concept of "metaphysical time flow" is supported as a valid scientific concept, and argued to be intrinsic to the directionality of objective (...) probabilities in quantum mechanics; the common claims that quantum probability theory is time reversible is shown to be based on an analytic error, stemming from a false choice for the criterion for reversibility of probabilistic theories (recognized by Satosi Watanabe in the 1950s but ignored in all philosophical discussions); and a consistent semantics for tensed language (adapted from the tree model of Storrs McCall) is constructed, showing that the common rejection of "time flow" as having no meaningful semantics is false. These debates are still ongoing in almost exactly the same state they were pre-1990, and there is appears to be no visible progress in the subject. Critical points made against errors in the orthodox account (which has been sustained for 70 years by the anti-realist philosophy of time, typified by the "Pittsburg School" of Grunbaum-Earman-Norton-Roberts), are still not recognized in the philosophy of time or physics. Some key technical proofs in this thesis have been published in physics proper. See p.ii-iii for full original abstract. (This pdf is uploaded from the Massey University archive.). (shrink)

Concepts of time as Astronomical Time, Cultural Time, and Absolute Time are defined, and an idea is developed that Absolute Time flows in reverse.

This study presents a new type of foundational model unifying quantum theory, relativity theory and gravitational physics, with a novel cosmology. It proposes a six-dimensional geometric manifold as the foundational ontology for our universe. The theoretical unification is simple and powerful, and there are a number of novel empirical predictions and theoretical reductions that are strikingly accurate. It subsequently addresses a variety of current anomalies in physics. It shows how incomplete modern physics is by giving an example of a theory (...) that is genuinely unified. In doing this, it radically alters the metaphysical interpretation of the nature of time, space and matter currently interpreted from modern physics. It also profoundly challenges materialist expectations about a naturalistic account our own existence. I contend here that there is sufficient evidence to support this theory as a leading paradigm for a unified foundational theory. (shrink)

I offer some responses to Prosser’s ‘Experiencing Time’, one of whose goals is to debunk a view of temporal experience somewhat prevalent in the metaphysics literature, which I call ‘Perceptualism’. According to Perceptualism: it is part of the content of perceptual experience that time passes in a metaphysically strong sense: the present has a metaphysically privileged status, and time passes in virtue of changes in which events this ‘objective present’ highlights, and moreover this gives us evidence in (...) favor of strong passage. Prosser argues that perception cannot be sensitive to whether the strong passage obtains, and therefore cannot represent strong passage in a way that gives us evidence of its truth. Although I accept this conclusion, I argue that Prosser’s argument for it is problematic. It threatens to over-generalize to rule out uncontroversial cases of perceptual knowledge, such as our knowledge that we live in a spatial world. Furthermore, a successful argument ruling out perceptual evidence for strong passage would have to give constraints on the theory/observation distinction of a kind not provided by Prosser’s discussion. I also comment on several other parts of the book. (shrink)

John Steele interviewed Paul Davies on the subject of time. In that interview Davies stated that time is not a flow, which is correct. His reasoning for that conclusion, however, was flawed, based on a confused version of the flowing river analogy with time. A correct version of the analogy is presented, followed by an analysis of Davies’ argument. A detailed explanation is presented of the intrinsic nature of the type of change that time is. (...) Transdisciplinary methodology based on isomorphies is used to bring forth the nature of temporal change, and reveal why time is not a flow. (shrink)

Hoerl & McCormack posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.

In this paper, we articulate a version of non-standard A-theory—which we call Flow Fragmentalism—in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past- and future-tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to (...) accept both past and future-tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B-theory, moving spotlight, and Fine’s and Lipman’s versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past- and future-tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time. (shrink)

This paper explores how talent flow network and the firm life cycle affect the innovative performances of firms. We first established an interorganizational talent flow network with the occupational mobility data available from the public resumes on LinkedIn China. Thereafter, this information was combined with the financial data of China’s listed companies to develop a unique dataset for the time period between 2000 and 2015. The empirical results indicate the following: (1) The breadth and depth of firms’ (...) embedding in the talent flow network positively impact their innovative performances; (2) Younger firms’ innovations are mostly promoted by the breadth of network embedding, but this positive effect weakens as firms increase in age; (3) Mature firms’ innovations are primarily driven by the depth of network embedding, and this positive effect strengthens as firms increase in age. This paper enriches and deepens the studies of talent flow networks, and it provides practical implications for innovation management based on talent flow for various types of firms at different development stages. (shrink)

These are the first two chapters from a monograph (The Time Flow Manifesto, Holster, 2013-14; unpublished), defending the concepts of time directionality and time flow in physics and naturalistic metaphysics, against long-standing attacks from the ‘conventional philosophy of physical time’. This monograph sets out to disprove twelve specific “fallacies of the conventional philosophy”, stated in the first section below. These are the foundational principles of the conventional philosophy, which developed in the mid-C20th from positivist-inspired (...) studies. The first chapter begins by re-presenting the basic analysis of time reversal symmetry in the context of probabilistic or non-deterministic processes, removing the first critical error in the conventional account. The second chapter argues for a law-like explanation of physical time asymmetry and irreversibility, and shows how the ‘reversibility paradoxes’ are explained. (shrink)

By eliminating the need for an absolute frame of reference or ether, Einstein resolved the problem of the constancy of light-speed in all inertial frames but created a new problem in our understanding of time. The resolution of this problem requires no experimentation but only a careful analysis of special relativity, in particular the relativity of simultaneity. This concept is insufficiently relativistic insofar as Einstein failed to recognize that any given set of events privileges the frame in which the (...) events occur; relative to those events, only the privileged frame yields the correct measurement. Instead of equally valid frames occupying different times, one frame is correct and all others incorrect within a shared present moment. I conclude that (1) time is a succession of universal moments and (2) in the context of flowing time, time dilation requires absolute simultaneity, whereas relative simultaneity predicts a nonexistent phenomenon here dubbed time regression. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to evaluate an online self-administered questionnaire for measuring flow, using eye-tracking. We were specifically interested in objectively monitoring when, where and what individuals look at and also in quantifying their visual attention while completing an online flow questionnaire, using the direct and the indirect measurement approaches. Flow is the holistic sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement (Csikszentmihalyi, Larson & Prescott 1977). The main flow measurement methods involve (...) direct and indirect approaches, using questionnaires. Eye-tracking has been used in the field of survey methodology by scholars to infer the cognitive processing of visual layout, instructions, and items. We ran an experiment with 43 participants, using Gazepoint GP3 eye-tracker. After eye-tracking data validation, we obtained 36 valid observations. A series of Wilcoxon Signed-ranks tests indicated a significant difference between direct and indirect flow measurement AOI, based on the time to first fixation, average fixation, time viewed, number of revisitors, and number of average revisit metrics. The main contribution of our study consists in outlining that the indirect measurement of flow requires more time and a higher cognitive effort to be processed than flow description used in direct measurement procedures. Thus, scholars should use the appropriate flow measurement approach and consider participants' willingness and ability to process the text. Finally, we conclude that eye-tracking is a useful method in pretesting self-administered questionnaires. (shrink)

I present a novel view on the nature of time: primitivism. This view is the conjunction of two theses: that presence is concreteness and that the present changes, where change is a fundamental process that cannot be analyzed. After explaining this view in-depth, I look at how it explains the flow of time and solves many puzzles, for example, McTaggart’s famous paradox about the unreality of time.

The notion of the absolute time-constituting flow plays a central role in Edmund Husserl’s analysis of our consciousness of time. I offer a novel reading of Husserl’s remarks on the absolute flow, on which Husserl can be seen to be grappling with two key intuitions that are still at the centre of current debates about temporal experience. One of them is encapsulated by what is sometimes referred to as an intentionalist (as opposed to an extensionalist) approach (...) to temporal experience. The other centres on the thought that temporal experience itself necessarily unfolds over time. I show how some of Husserl’s more enigmatic-sounding remarks about the absolute flow become intelligible if they are read as attempts to accommodate both these intuitions at the same time. However, I also question whether Husserl ultimately provides good reasons for preferring his intentionalist approach to a rival extensionalist one. (shrink)

It is often assumed that it seems to each of us as though time flows, or passes. On that assumption it follows either that time does in fact pass, and then, pretty plausibly, we have mechanisms that detect its passage, or that time does not pass, and we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion. If the former is the case, we are faced with the explanatory task of spelling out which perceptual or cognitive mechanism (or combination (...) thereof) allows us to detect and track time’s passage (§2.1) If the latter, then we are faced with the task of explaining how, and why, we are subject to a pervasive phenomenal illusion (§2.2). There is, however, a third, somewhat less discussed, explanatory project. Rather than assuming that it seems to each of us as though time passes, and then attempting to explain why it seems that way, we jettison that assumption. According to these views it does not seem to us as though time passes; instead, we come to falsely believe that it seems to us as though time passes (§3). This view requires that we explain how we come to have systematically false beliefs about the way our experiences seem to us. This paper aims to motivate this third explanatory strategy and say something about what kind of cognitive mechanisms might be responsible for our having a false belief that it seems as though time passes, (§3.1) and why we might have evolved (some of) those mechanisms (§3.2). In particular, the paper does not aim to argue for this view: rather, it aims to present it as a viable contender alongside other more common views. (shrink)

Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology—a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of the active inference framework, we show that an integrated continuity of time can be achieved by merging Husserlian temporality with a sequential order of time. We (...) also show that a Markov blanket of the present moment integrates past and future moments of both subjective temporality and objective time in an asynchronous manner. By applying the integrated continuity, it is clear that active inference makes use of both subjective temporality and objective time in an integrated fashion. We conclude that active inference, on a temporal note, qualifies as a computational model for phenomenological investigations. (shrink)

We can locate the problematic of time within three philosophical questions, which respectively designate three central areas of philosophical reflection and contemplation. These are: 1) The ontological question, i.e. 'what is being?' 2) The epistemological question, i.e. 'what can we know with certainty?' 3) The existential question, i.e. 'what is the meaning of existence?' These three questions, which are philosophical, but also scientific and political, as they underline the political and moral question of truth and justice, arise from the (...) phenomenon of time, the irreversible constant flow of phenomena that undermines every claim to absolute knowledge. The purpose of this essay is to illuminate the importance of time for philosophical thought and, more generally, for human social and psychical life, in the context of the ontology of Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis, who asserted that " being is time – and not in the horizon of time " , correlated history to society and being to temporality within the social-historical stratum, the ontological plane created by human existence, where " existence is signification ". Time is interpreted as the creation and destruction of forms in a magmatic, layered with a non-regular stratification, reality, where the social-historical manifests as the creation of collective human activity, in the manner of social imaginary significations. This notion of temporality is accompanied by a profound criticism of traditional rationalistic philosophy, to which Castoriadis assigns the name 'ensemblistic/identitary', that highlights the necessity of a new, magmatic ontology, based on the primacy of time. (shrink)

According to the No Alternate Possibilities argument, if time passes then the rate at which it passes could be different. Thus, time cannot pass, since if time passes, then necessarily it passes at a rate of 1 second per second. One response to this argument is to posit hypertime, and to argue that at different worlds, time passes at different rates when measured against hypertime. Since many A-theorists think we can make sense of temporal passage without (...) positing hypertime, we pursue a different response. We describe several worlds that do not contain hypertime, but do contain differential passage: worlds where time passes at different rates in different subregions within the same world. Hence we argue that even if we focus just on the set of worlds that do not contain hypertime (whether this is all, or only some of the worlds) we find that not all these worlds are such that time passes at a rate of 1 second per second. Thus the No Alternate Possibilities argument fails even when restricted to just this set of worlds. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the question of “how fast does time flow?” This question is usually asked as a rejoinder to the view that time is irreducibly tensed, which is motivated by the fact that we experience the passage of time. I consider what the meaning of this question could be and provide a defence of the view that the passage of time is meaningless (due to its rate of passage being dimensionless), undercutting (...) the motivation for a tensed view of time. (shrink)

Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the Transdiagnostic Assessment of Temporal Experience, a structured interview that can be used by researchers and clinicians without a comprehensive phenomenological background to explore abnormal time experiences in persons with abnormal mental conditions regardless of their diagnosis. When extensive data gathered by this scale are available, it will be possible to delineate well-defined anomalous lived temporality profiles for each (...) psychopathological disorder. This instrument may also prove useful for clinicians by providing a more refined assessment of relevant psychopathological symptoms and an in-depth understanding of the patient’s abnormal behaviour as related to specific types of time experience. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenological concept of temporality, including pre-phenomenal and phenomenal time, synthesis, conation and synchronization, and of abnormal time experiences in persons affected by psychopathological conditions. In the following part, we describe the basic structure of the interview that comprises seven categories corresponding to the abnormal features of lived temporality: anomalies of synchrony, of time structure, of implicit time flow, of explicit time flow, and anomalous experiences of the past, the present and the future. The paper also includes a section on administration and scoring of the TATE scale, the complete interview and a Likert table for quantifying the frequency, intensity and interference with daily life of the phenomena explored. (shrink)

The essay offers an original view on the issues of identity and self-identification. Self-identification is being studied in the process of its implementation in different time flows. Two directions of thought (to the past and the future) which are defined according to Hameroff»s hypothesis as the bi-directional time flows, constitute the concept of a dream. Using this concept, the author explains how self-identification is realized in two time flows. The strategy of self-identification is explained using a stochastic (...) algorithm which balances the present and the future states at the same stage. The Kalman filter is used as the stochastic algorithm. (shrink)

The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must (...) examine the classical, spatial metaphysic of space and time, for practical purposes initiated by Galileo, wherein the real has been equated with the quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the material world. In this metaphysic, which sees form as quantitative or computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, with a problem of even greater primacy becoming the “memory” that supports the transforming events of perception, e.g., rotating cubes, buzzing flies, twisting leaves. It is this memory, supporting time-extended, flowing events, that necessarily supports all qualia. The concept of storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion which the classic metaphysic engenders, is unworkable as a solution to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and defined over flowing fields, equally is a quality, equally requires this memory, and since forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed a problem. The counter-proposal becomes Bergson’s temporal metaphysic wherein motion is indivisible (or non-differentiable), the global motion of the universal field itself then carrying an intrinsic form of memory. In this framework, with this field viewed as holographic, Bergson provides a unique solution – one that leaves the problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world. (shrink)

The idea of a moving present or ‘now’ seems to form part of our most basic beliefs about reality. Such a present, however, is not reflected in any of our theories of the physical world. I show in this article that presentism, the doctrine that only what is present exists, is in conflict with modern relativistic cosmology and recent advances in neurosciences. I argue for a tenseless view of time, where what we call ‘the present’ is just an emergent (...) secondary quality arising from the interaction of perceiving self-conscious individuals with their environment. I maintain that there is no flow of time, but just an ordered system of events. (shrink)

Temporal dynamists argue that we should believe that there exists temporal passage because there being passage is the best explanation for the presence of our temporal phenomenology. Some non-dynamists have countered that the presence of passage makes no difference to our temporal phenomenology, and consequently that temporal phenomenology cannot be evidence that there is passage. This paper attempts to bolster this non-dynamist response by offering new arguments for the claim that the presence of passage makes no difference to our phenomenology.

Understanding of time, construed as movement, change and becoming, is explained taking examples from natural sciences. Durational and metrical aspects of time are elaborated. General assumptions about passage of time are listed. Indian, Chinese and later insights of path of passage of time are figured. Physical and psychological times are differentiated and explained using Energy-Presence (Being) and Energy-Transformation (Becoming) concepts. Concepts of Time at rest and Time in motion are proposed. -/- . The meanings (...) of time-space, time-flow, different phases of time-conscious and time-transcendent mind and thought processes are interpreted from basic physics principles and Upanishadic awareness -/- An attempt is made to present a comprehensive insight of nature of time, thought process and conscious states (phases) of mind. (shrink)

Metaphysics is the part of philosophy that asks questions about the nature of reality – about what there is, and what it is like. The metaphysics of time is the part of the philosophy of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality. One central such question is that of whether time passes or flows, or whether it has a dynamic aspect.

Plato's view on time, a key aspect of his doctrine of forms, is influenced by his reception of Parmenides, but the way in which Plato takes up and modifies Parmenides' view is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate. In this article, the author analyzes Plato's revision of Parmenidean time by exploring four temporalities: the eternal present, timeless eternity, the enduring present, and the instant between time and eternity. Through this examination, she uncovers the common origin of both (...) the eternal present of Parmenides' fragment B8 and the flowing present of the phenomenal realm in the instant (ἐξαίφνης) in Plato's Parmenides. This perspective on time offers a promising solution to Plato's problem of participation, bridging the gap between the eternal being of the form and the being in time of the particulars. (shrink)

Conceptual time in our mind has such qualities as authoritative and regular flow, where each unit of time is (artificially made) equal to the same unit of time in the future or in the past. The duration of a second is always the same, there can not be two seconds with different durations. For our daily life this idea sounds obvious and automatically accepted as a basic quality of time itself. But this is so only (...) because the object on which this particular kind of time is based assumed to have certain stable characteristics: the rotation of the Earth and the Sun is assumed to be stable, regular and monotonous. (shrink)

In Simultaneity and Delay: A Dialectical Theory of Staggered Time, the Canadian philosopher Jay Lampert challenges theories that define time in terms of absolute simultaneity and continuous succession. To counter these theories he introduces an alternative: the dialectic of simultaneity and delay. According to Lampert, this dialectic constitutes a temporal succession that is no longer structured as a continuous line, but that is built out of staggered time-flows and delayed reactions. The bulk of the book consists of (...) an attempt to give a conceptual order to the ‘unsystematic analyses of simultaneity and delay sprinkled through the history of philosophy’ (2). This conceptual analysis leads us through ancient (Plato and Plotinus), medieval (Origen) and late modern issues (Kant, Hegel and Lessing), as well as scientific discussions (Einstein, McTaggart), and culminates in the central chapter of the book, which attempts to show ‘how the problems of the great simultaneity philosophers - Husserl and Bergson - might be solved by the great delay philosophers - Derrida and Deleuze’ (147). In this review, I will focus on three points. 1. The problem of synchronization. 2. The problem of synthesis. 3. Theproblem of localization. (shrink)

A deeper understanding of the dynamics of consciousness, not only in the trivial sense of immaterial psychological relations, but as the prerequisite of the universe itself, may lead to an understanding of gravitation. The following argument acknowledges theories of higher dimensions, such as string-M-theory as important descriptive models along with the embedded theories of quantum mechanics and an expanded relativity theory. It is also presumed that the unexploited consequence of special relativity; extreme relativistic aberration , will turn out to be (...) one of the most important keys to a better understanding of the overall unity. (shrink)

The growing importance of Social Networking Sites (SNS) in today's information economy has generated significant interest for understanding and managing shared fake news about brands on social media among academia and industry worldwide. In this context, we consider it is important to discuss the role of flow, also called optimal experience, in sharing fake news about brands on social media. Firstly, we will critically analyze the conceptualizations of the umbrella term „fake news‟ in the so-called „post-truth‟ era and assume (...) a narrow definition from literature. Secondly, we will review different theories from literature (i.e., selective exposure theory, uses and gratifications theory, social comparison theory, rational choice theory and self- determination theory) in order to explain why users share fake news. Furthermore, we will refer to flow theory proposed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975), which could be used as a framework to better the understanding of the user‟s behavior regarding the sharing of fake news about brands on social media. Flow is a hedonistic construct whose importance is widely recognized as having a major impact on the user's behavior in relation to information systems. According to Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1988), flow is a “crucial component of enjoyment” and is “the holistic sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement”. In a flow state, the consumer perceives an effortless action, loss of time and a sense that the experience stands out as being exceptional compared to daily activities (Csikszentmihalyi 1997). Flow is a continuous variable that can occur on different levels, ranging from none to an intense (or complete) state (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi 1988). Flow experience has been studied as an independent variable, as a dependent variable, and lately, as a mediator variable. In this paper we propose a new conceptual model containing 3 variables: (1) fake news spread about brands in SNS, (2) flow state experienced by SNS human users (i.e., optimal experience) and (3) sharing fake news about brands on social media by SNS human users (i.e., social media behavior). We conclude by outlining the need to empirically test the new conceptual model proposed in this paper. (shrink)

In the two feature articles for this volume, Gruber et al and Buonomano & Rovelli focus on what the former call the 'two-times problem', in short, the apparent lack of fit between time as described by physical science and our own temporal experience, where 'experience' involves things like memory, anticipation, and perception of change and motion. In this short note I'll make the case that the twotimes problem is less serious than it is often made out to be in (...) the specific case of features like 'passage ' and 'presentness' that are central to the 'A-theory' of time ---the theory that holds time to be composed of dynamic regions of 'past', 'present' and future', and for time to genuinely flow or pass.My contention is three-fold: (1) the two-times problem is better understood as a three-times problem: rather than a conflict between 'physical' and 'manifest' time, what we have in the case of time is differences between the time of physics, the time of experience, and the 'folk' concept of time. (2) Understanding the problem in this way helps deflate certain problems about the relationship of these three pictures; the time of experience and the time of physics are less obviously in a problematic conflict than often supposed; and the folk concept of time is what brings in problematic features of time hard to fit with either the time of physics of experience. (3) Understanding the time of experience as independent from the folk concept of time better fits the actual aims of the... (shrink)

The concept of time is examined using the second law of thermodynamics that was recently formulated as an equation of motion. According to the statistical notion of increasing entropy, flows of energy diminish differences between energy densities that form space. The flow of energy is identified with the flow of time. The non-Euclidean energy landscape, i.e. the curved space–time, is in evolution when energy is flowing down along gradients and levelling the density differences. The flows (...) along the steepest descents, i.e. geodesics are obtained from the principle of least action for mechanics, electrodynamics and quantum mechanics. The arrow of time, associated with the expansion of the Universe, identifies with grand dispersal of energy when high-energy densities transform by various mechanisms to lower densities in energy and eventually to ever-diluting electromagnetic radiation. Likewise, time in a quantum system takes an increment forwards in the detection-associated dissipative transformation when the stationary-state system begins to evolve pictured as the wave function collapse. The energy dispersal is understood to underlie causality so that an energy gradient is a cause and the resulting energy flow is an effect. The account on causality by the concepts of physics does not imply determinism; on the contrary, evolution of space–time as a causal chain of events is non-deterministic. (shrink)

There seems to be a "what it is like" to the experience of the flow of time in any conscious activity of ours. In this paper, I argue that the feeling that time passes should be understood as a phenomenal modifier of our mental life, in roughly the same way as the blurred or vivid nature of a visual experience can be seen as an element of the experience that modifies the way it feels, without representing the (...) world as being in a certain way. I defend my positions against the deflationary view according to which the passing of time does not have a specific phenomenal character, and the representationalist view according to which the feeling of time passing is a feature of the representational content of our experience, like being red or yellow. (shrink)

The enactive approach to cognition and the phenomenological tradition have in common a wide conception of ‘intentionality’. Within these frameworks, intentionality is understood as a general openness to the world. For classical phenomenologists, the most basic subjective structure that allows for such openness is time-consciousness. Some enactivists, while inspired by the phenomenological tradition, have nevertheless argued that affectivity is more basic, being that which gives rise to the temporal flow of consciousness. In this paper, I assess the relationship (...) between temporality and affectivity from both a phenomenological and an enactive perspective. I argue that, as opposed to the classical phenomenological view (which favours temporality), and to the enactive view (which favours affectivity), we must take affectivity and temporality as co-emergent. Jointly, affectivity and temporality constitute the basic structures of intentionality. Additionally, using examples from phenomenological psychopathology, I conclude that all intentionality is defined by an anticipatory and affective structure that gives rise to general feelings related to our bodily possibilities in the world. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the nature of time. It begins by adopting a model of a unified world, coherent through the fundamental structure of unified space and time. Subsequently, this concept will be challenged due to significant contradictions with empirical data from observations of the world on an extremely small scale. It proposes that organisms, acts to locally reduce informational entropy, creating an illusion of time with a direction distinct from the universal flow. Thus, the (...) possibility of time and space being the sole conditions of the unified world is rejected, showing instead that time is an emergent property. (shrink)

Jorge Luis Borges displays an ambivalence in his writings towards the reality of time’s flow. On the one hand, he seems to accept arguments from various thinkers refuting the reality of time. “And yet, and yet…” Borges appears unable to feel completely reconciled to such a view of time. I argue that this is because a view that refutes time denies the observer too along with it. I conclude with demonstrating how Borges, by trying to (...) identify a reconciliation between a refutation of time and acknowledgment of its reality, addressed this problem. (shrink)

I accept that McTaggart's A-series and B-series are not inter-reducible and that both are needed for a complete temporal description of a physical system. I consider the Wigner's Friend thought experiment. The A-series are associated with each (quantum) system, and relativity is associated with the B-series. I consider temporal evolution through this 'hybrid' time. We may define the rate of temporal flow as 1 B-series second per A-series second.

This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The (...) endurance theory says that objects persist through time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’ persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms, persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences. -/- Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail. Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time. Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms, as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a ‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of ‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory. It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such conventions than are its rivals. (shrink)

I propose that, in addition to the commonly recognized increase of entropy, two more time arrows influence living beings. The increase of damage reactions, which produce aging and genetic variation, and the decrease of the rate of entropy production involved in natural selection are neglected arrows of time. Although based on the statistical theory of the arrow of time, they are distinguishable from the general arrow of the increase of entropy. Physiology under healthy conditions only obeys the (...) increase of entropy arrow. But aging, death, and evolution are determined by the other time arrows as well. Paradoxes emerge from conflicts among the specific determinisms associated with each arrow. These conflicts, along with uncertainties intrinsic to the low-number statistics of the arrows of damage reactions and decrease of the rate of production of entropy, highlight the limits of determinism at different levels of biology and its dependence on time span and number of organisms. The recognition of the three time arrows opens new perspectives for the problem of compatibility of the flow of time in physics and psychology. (shrink)

The unreduced solution to the arbitrary interaction problem, absent in the standard theory framework, reveals many equally real and mutually incompatible system configurations, or "realizations". This is the essence of universal dynamic undecidability, or multivaluedness, and the ensuing causal randomness (unpredictability), non-computability, irreversible time flow (evolution, emergence), and dynamic complexity of every real system, object, or process. This creative undecidability of real-world dynamics provides causal explanations for "quantum mysteries", relativity postulates, cosmological problems, and the huge efficiency of high-complexity (...) phenomena, such as life, intelligence, and consciousness, giving rise to extended applications, far beyond the critical limits of usual science paradigm. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to supplement Gottlieb’s challenge to Dryfus who claims that concepts are not operative in expert’s unreflective actions. First, concepts that an agent develops over time with practice, starting from the stage of novelty, become deeply rooted and persist through his expertise stage, according to common sense. It is unlikely that such rooted concepts become inoperative just when it is time for the agent to put them to use during the time that (...) he is in the zone (i.e., in flow). Second, an expert's inability to remember reasons behind his actions while he is in the zone is insufficient to prove that concepts are inoperative when he is acting in the zone. For an agent to not remember reasons as such could more likely be a consequence of the adequacy of his minimized reflections on his maximized (i.e. expert level) concepts, while he is in such a state. Moreover, not recalling every reason behind every step of an agent’s actions in the zone could be a consequence of his maximum concentration on successful processing and coordination of the task at hand, as opposed to committing his finite mental capacities to memorizing the reasons behind his step-by-step actions when he is performing an expert level action in the zone. Third, I point out to the prevalence of examples when experts or observers provide testimony about use of concepts to strategize or review actions before, during, and after their ‘in the zone’ actions (e.g., review of video replays of a game or a tournament on sports channels), which supports the operations and conceptuality of unreflective actions in flow. (shrink)