Human Nature

The trajectory of Paul Ricoeur’s thought from the fallible to the capable human person offers a hopeful vision of human nature constitutive of our shared political life. Yet, by necessity, hope arises in response to the tragic, which also features in Ricoeur’s work at the existential and ethical levels. At the same time hope and tragedy represent concepts at the limit of philosophical reasoning, introducing meeting points with religious discourse. Exploring those meeting points reveals the contribution of religious thinking to (...) the understanding of hope and tragedy and establishes Ricoeur’s political thinking as ultimately shaped by their interplay. (shrink)

An essay review of Rutger Bregman's "Humankind: A Hopeful History" (2020).

Marilyn McCord Adams’s perspective on the intimacy with God as a way of defeating horrendous evils in the course of a human being’s existence has been met with a series of objections in contemporary scholarship. This is due to the fact that the critiques formulated have focused more on the debilitating impact of suffering on the sufferer’s body and mind, on intimacy as mere intermittent relationships between God and humans, or on what is lost or gained from the presence or (...) absence of this intimacy with the divine being. Focusing on Adams’s appeal to esthetic arguments in theodicy and on her reflection on practical issues in theology, the article presents Adams’s perspective on intimacy as a relation initiated objectively by God at the creation and at Christ’s incarnation and continued subjectively throughout history by both God and every human being. Given its combining of objective and subjective features, this kind of intimacy is not to be understood as an exclusively private relationship of each individual with God, but rather as a process of communal advancing in rehabilitation and mutual healing that is initiated in the antemortem career and fulfilled in the post-mortem existence. (shrink)

Being born into a family structure—being born of a mother—is key to being human. It is, for Jacques Lacan, essential to the formation of human desire. It is also part of the structure of analogy in the Thomistic thought of Erich Przywara. AI may well increase exponentially in sophistication, and even achieve human-like qualities; but it will only ever form an imaginary mirroring of genuine human persons—an imitation that is in fact morbid and dehumanising. Taking Lacan and Przywara at a (...) point of convergence on this topic offers important insight into human exceptionalism. (shrink)

这不是一本完美的书,但它是独特的,如果你浏览前400页左右,最后300页(约700页)是一个很好的尝试,将已知的行为应用于社会变化在暴力和礼仪随着时间的推移。基本的主题是:我们的遗传学如何控制和限制社 会变化？令人惊讶的是,他未能描述亲属选择(包容性健身)的本质,这解释了动物和人类社会生活的很多原因。他还(像几乎每个人都一样)缺乏一个清晰的框架来描述理性的逻辑结构(LSR-John Searle的首选术语),我更愿意称之为高阶思想的描述性心理学(DPHOT)。他应该说一些关于虐待和剥削人和地球的许多其他方式,因为现在这些方式更加严重,以至于使其他形式的暴力几乎无关紧要。扩大暴力的 概念,包括复制某人基因的全球长期后果,并掌握进化过程的性质(即亲属选择),将提供一个完全不同的历史视角,时事,以及未来几百年的情况可能如何发展。人们可能首先指出,历史上身体暴力的减少与地球不断发生的无 情强奸(即人们摧毁自己后代的未来)相吻合(并成为可能)。平克尔(和大多数人一样,大多数时候)常常被文化的肤浅所分心,而生物学才是最重要的。在这里和网上查看我最近对威尔逊的《地球的社会征服》和诺瓦克和高 菲尔德的"超级合作者"的评论,了解"真正的利他主义"(群体选择)的空虚性简要摘要,亲属选择的运作,以及用文化术语描述行为的无用和肤浅。 这是经典的自然/培育问题,自然胜过培育——无限。真正重要的是,人口和资源破坏的无情增加(由于医药和技术以及警察和军队对冲突的镇压),给地球造成了暴力。每天约有20万人(每10天再下一个拉斯维加斯,每月 另一个洛杉矶),6吨左右表土进入大海/人/年——约占全世界每年消失总量的1%,等等,这意味着除非生物圈和文明将在未来两个世纪内大为崩溃,各种饥荒、苦难和暴力将发生惊人规模。 人们实施暴力行为的举止、观点和倾向是没有意义的,除非他们能够做些什么来避免这场灾难,而我看不出这是怎么回事。没有争论的空间,也没有意义(是的,我是一个宿命论者),所以我只做一些评论,好像它们是事实一样 。不要以为我以牺牲他人利益来推销一个团体有个人利益。我78岁,没有后代,没有近亲,不认同任何政治、民族或宗教团体,认为我属于的人,默认和所有其他团体一样令人厌恶。 父母是地球上最可怕的生命敌人,从事物的广义来看,当人们认为女性的暴力(像大多数由男性做的一样)大部分是在慢动作、在时间和空间上保持距离时,女性和男性一样暴力。由代理人 - 由他们的后代和男人。妇女越来越生孩子,无论她们是否有伴侣,阻止一名妇女生育的效果平均远远大于阻止一个男人,因为她们是生殖瓶颈。人们可以认为,无论遭受什么苦难,人们及其后代都值得,(除了极少数例外),富 人和名人是最恶劣的罪犯。梅丽尔·斯特里普或比尔·盖茨或J.K·罗琳和他们每个孩子可能在未来几代人中每年每年销毁50吨表土,而印度农民和他的可能摧毁1吨。如果有人否认那很好,对他们的后代,我说" ;欢迎来到地球上的地狱"(WTHOE)。 现在的重点总是放在人权上,但很明显,如果文明要有机会,人类的责任必须取代人权。没有人没有负责任的公民就得到权利,而这意味着第一件事就是破坏环境。最基本的责任是,除非你的社会要求你生产孩子,否则没有孩子 。一个允许人们随意繁殖的社会或世界总是被自私的基因所利用,直到它崩溃(或者达到生命如此可怕以至于不值得活下去)。如果社会继续以人权为首要,那么对其后代,人们可以满怀信心地说"WTHOE&qu ot;。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年3月(2019年)和21年的自杀乌托邦幻想St世纪4日 (2019) .

In mid-2019, the controversy regarding South African runner Caster Semenya’s eligibility to participate in competitions against other female runners culminated in a Court of Arbitration for Sport judgement. Semenya possessed high endogenous testosterone levels (arguably a performance advantage), secondary to a disorder of sexual development. In this commentary, Aristotelean teleology is used to defend the existence of ‘male’ and ‘female’ as discrete categories. It is argued that once the athlete’s sex is established, they should be allowed to compete in the (...) category of their sex without obligatory medical treatment. Indeed, other athletes who possess advantageous genetic or phenotypic traits that fall outside of the human norm have been allowed to compete as humans without restraint. In both cases, if an athlete possesses the essential attributes of being a human or being male or female they should be permitted to compete in those respective categories; athletes’ eligibilities should not be based upon accidental attributes. (shrink)

[PERSONHOOD IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY]. W artykule została omówiona i poddana analizie debata między dwoma współczesnymi afrykańskimi filozofami Ifeanyim A. Menkitim z Nigerii oraz Kwame Gyekyem z Ghany. Debata ta dotyczy typowych dla niektórych afrykańskich kultur sposobów myślenia o istocie człowieczeństwa, tj. o byciu człowiekiem (osobą, person). Prezentowane przez tych filozofów koncepcje nie odnoszą się do żadnych konkretnych afrykańskich ludów, lecz raczej są pewnymi wzorcami idealnymi, czy też abstrakcyjnymi. Zdaniem Menkitiego w tradycyjnym myśleniu afrykańskim jednostka (individual) stopniowo nabywa pełnię człowieczeństwa w (...) oczach swojej wspólnoty wpierw poprzez internalizację obowiązujących w niej norm, a następnie przez ich przestrzeganie w dorosłym życiu. Jak wskazuje, Afrykanin jest przy tym człowiekiem bardziej w przekonaniu i w odbiorze innych niż w swoim własnym. Ale nawet jego własne przeświadczenie o byciu człowiekiem jest kreowane przez myślenie zbiorowe. Z taką perspektywą nie zgadza się Gyekye, który uważa, że człowieczeństwo nie jest u Afrykanów czymś konstytuowanym bądź potwierdzanym przez zbiorowość. W przekonaniu Gyekyego, w myśleniu afrykańskim człowieka czynią pewne symptomatyczne dlań z natury atrybuty fizyczne i umysłowe oraz towarzyszący im instynkt społeczny (sociality), który, jak mniema, jest również przyrodzony. Choć Afrykanin jest, według Gyekyego, bytem głęboko wspólnotowym, posiada również pewien potencjał niezależności od wspólnoty (lokalnej, etnicznej, religijnej), której jest członkiem. Z opisu Menkitiego wynika zaś, że przeciętny Afrykanin nie jest aktywnym sprawcą rzeczywistości i indywidualnym interpretatorem świata, w którym żyje. Artykuł opublikowany w: "Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria", nr 3 [71]: Status człowieka. Problemy filozoficzne, naukowe i religijne, red. Jacek Hołówka, s. 259-282. (shrink)

Como la mayoría de los escritos sobre el comportamiento humano, estos artículos carecen de un marco coherente y por lo tanto dudo en recomendar este libro a cualquier persona, ya que los experimentados deben tener la misma perspectiva que yo, y los ingenuos en su mayoría estarán perdiendo su tiempo. Dado que encuentro la mayoría de estos ensayos obviamente fuera de la marca o simplemente muy aburrido, no puedo generar mucho entusiasmo por comentar sobre ellos, así que después de proporcionar (...) lo que considero un precis razonable de un marco (ver mis otros artículos para una versión ampliada) proporciono comentarios superficiales sobre los diversos artículos. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo y actualizado para el comportamiento humano desde la vista moderna de dos sistemas pueden consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio por Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La estructura Lógica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), La Estructura Lógica de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre la Ciencia, la Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política , Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el Siglo XXI 5ª ed (2019) y otras. "La confusión y la estérilidad de la psicología no debe explicarse llamándola "ciencia joven"; su estado no es comparable con el de la física, por ejemplo, en sus inicios. (Más bien con la de ciertas ramas de las matemáticas. Teoría del conjunto.) Porque en psicología hay métodos experimentales y confusión conceptual. (Como en el otro caso, confusión conceptual y métodos de prueba.) La existencia del método experimental nos hace pensar que tenemos los medios para resolver los problemas que nos molestan; aunque el problema y el método se pasan unos a otros". Wittgenstein (PI p.232) . (shrink)

Mirvac chief executive Susan Lloyd-Hurwitz, not one usually associated with sympathy for tenants on the rental market, said earlier this year that ‘renting in Australia is generally a very miserable customer experience…the whole industry is set up to serve the owner not the tenant’ Her observation is basically correct and the solution she offers is to change the current situation where small investors, supported by generous government tax concessions, provide effectively all of the country’s private rental housing. Lloyd-Hurwitz wants Mirvac, (...) a property group currently managing over $15 billion of assets, to become an apartment landlord that would own not one or several properties like small investors currently do but rather thousands of properties to rent out. The proposal is for Mirvac to build apartment blocks and then, instead of selling individual apartments, rent them out on long-term or indefinite leases. This build-to-rent housing scheme would of course make the real estate–investment company a great deal of money. At the same time it would do very little to alleviate the current housing crisis. Such schemes are a nonstarter for people who want the security, stability and independence of home ownership, which is a very Australian aspiration that is increasingly becoming unobtainable not only for those experiencing homelessness, but also for the poor and middle-class. Those of us who care about finding a real solution to the housing crisis would do well to consider how we got into this situation in the first place, and then consider how this might inform what we do next. The following then, traces some of the historical and philosophical roots of our understanding of property and their institutionalisation via various levels of government, especially in the Australian context. (shrink)

1. Die Frage nach der Natur des Menschen und die Rede vom „Menschenbild“ 2. Die anthropologischen Definitionsformeln 3. Die Zuständigkeitsfrage 4. Die abenteuerliche Kürze der Definitionsformeln 5. Der Mensch-Tier-Vergleich 6. Warum sollte die menschliche Natur unwandelbar sein? 7. Kategorische und graduelle Unterschiede 8. Ausblick: Die Transformationsthese.

Personal identity is one of the important and complex issues in the field of the philosophy of the soul. It is also related to the philosophy of ethics and metaphysics in different respects and has given rise to some problems in these two areas. The justification of ethical responsibility and man's eternity in the posthumous state have attracted psychologist-philosophers' attention to the significance and necessity of explaining personal identity. This paper examines the issue from the view point of Mulla Sadra. (...) Here, the writer initially refers to some of the most important contemporary theories about personal identity which can generally be divided into two reductionist and non-reductionist branches. Reductionists intend to reduce the human identity to elements such as memory, biological specifications, or continuous psychological states, while non-reductionists are against this. Mulla Sadra's theory in this regard is not in conformity with any of the above theories; however, it is more consistent with the non-reductionist approach from certain aspects. Though relying on the fundamental ontological and psychological principles of his own philosophy, Mulla Sadra tries to present a picture of human identity that, while depending on human nature, reveals personal identity, too. This is an identity in whose process of formation the three elements of habits, intentions, and acts play major roles. The extent of the consistency of these three elements with rationality is the reason behind having people with different identities. It should also be added that no human being enjoys a single and fixed identity; rather, identity is a continuous reality that, while being one, is a plural truth. (shrink)

While drawing from the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler throughout the paper, I commence by highlighting Zoltan Istvan’s representation of transhumanism in the light of its role in politics. I continue by elaborating on the notion of the promise of eternal life. After that I differentiate between subjects that are proper for philosophy (such as the mind or whether life is worth living) and science (measurable and replicable). The arguments mostly concern mind-uploading and at the same time I elaborate on a (...) simple critique of mind-body dualism, which is one of the key imagined orders exploitable by technologies in the narratives of transhumanism present in popular culture. This is reframed as a problem of action. The focus of this article is on the claim that certain transhumanisms are dangerous forms of Neo-Darwinism. It comes from a critical assessment of capital and the exploitation of bodies through market forces. Entropy is a process of growing disorder, while neganthropy is an anthropological struggle against exploitation, not only of bodies, but of all ecosystems of the Earth. The arguments of Stiegler from a collection of lectures are recapitulated, and his claims are presented through the prism of transhuman narrative, with a particular focus on Christian Salmon's position in the book Storytelling: Bewitching the Modern Mind. (shrink)

There is growing concern that a global economic system fueled predominately by financial incentives may not maximize human flourishing and social welfare externalities. If so, this presents a challenge of how to get economic actors to adopt a more virtuous motivational mindset. Relying on historical, psychological, and philosophical research, we show how such a mindset can be instilled. First, we demonstrate that historically, financial self-interest has never in fact been the only guiding motive behind free markets, but that markets themselves (...) are representations of our individual and collective moral identities. Building on this understanding, we review the research on how economic incentives crowd out virtue-oriented concerns. We then introduce the concept of moral self-awareness (MSA), an evolving mindset informed by reflection on moral identity, namely what one’s actions say about oneself given the impacts on others or society that one’s action may effect. MSA comprises three fundamental aspects of virtue-oriented reasoning: pride, shame, and guilt. Finally, we offer a four-stage model anchored in systems theory, yielding ever more refined motivating strategies for maximizing human flourishing and social welfare externalities. (shrink)

In my analysis I deal with some causes and origins of evil and of moral degeneration in the human dimension. My analysis focuses on Plato’s Republic. The origins and causes of the presence of injustice and of vice lie in the very structure of the human soul. The division of the soul into parts which are at least reciprocally independent of each other implies that there is the possibility that they are in conflict with each other. This is the origin (...) of injustice and the root of every form of evil. The correct equilibrium among the parts of the soul, which, in my opinion, are to be interpreted as authentic potencies, can be achieved only by developing the rational part. This development requires a thorough education in philosophy. Throughout my analysis I quote passages in which Plato points out the presence of bad instincts and, in general, of a morally difficult component in our soul. The kind of soul considered in my analysis is the embodied soul. (shrink)

My project examines the pedagogical approach of the Stoic Epictetus by focusing on seven vital lessons he imparts. This study will deepen our understanding of his vocation as a Stoic educator striving to free his students from the fears and foolishness that hold happiness hostage. These lessons are (1) how freedom, integrity, self-respect, and happiness interrelate; (2) real versus fake tragedy and real versus fake heroism; (3) the instructive roles that various animals play in Stoic education; (4) athleticism, sport, and (...) game-playing as analogies for striving to live virtuously; (5) place, time, and progress in the journey to self-realization; (6) how to live with death and exit life fearlessly; (7) how teaching wisdom is one of several ways the Stoic sage loves others. (shrink)

The article deals with the anthropological views of M. Olesnytskyі, a professor at the Kyiv Theological Academy (КТА), whose creative work has not yet been properly studied. It reveals the connection of his anthropological ideas with moral theology and ethical doctrine, which he had taught for a long time in the KTA. Anthropological implications of the moral formation of a human person are also paid attention to, in particular, the dependence of the moral character on anthropological factors. In this context, (...) the writing considers Olesnytskyі’s views on the peculiarities of a person’s body-build. The Kyiv scholar focused on the principles of human corporeality based on natural conditions. In particular, Olesnytskyі stressed that it was the earth’s conditions that formed the bodily nature of man. The article also explores those religious ideas that influenced the anthropological views of the Kyiv scholar, which is quite understandable in view of his Christian outlook. Olenytskyі demonstrates the possibility of effective application of contemporary philosophical studies to the theological and anthropological analysis of man as an individual. In this sense, the conceptual connections of the anthropological views of the Kyiv scholar with the ones of the influential contemporary European philosophers and anthropologists, such as А. Schopenhauer, R. H. Lotze, F. Schleiermacher, E. von Hartmann, and others, become clearly evident. The article emphasizes the significance of the concept of the unconscious for the moral anthropological doctrine of Olesnytskyі; it also argues for the connection of this concept to the leading European doctrines of the unconscious, which were elaborated in philosophy and psychology in the second half of the 19 th century. (shrink)

This is not a perfect book, but it is unique, and if you skim the first 400 or so pages, the last 300 (of some 700) are a pretty good attempt to apply what's known about behavior to social changes in violence and manners over time. The basic topic is: how does our genetics control and limit social change? Surprisingly he fails to describe the nature of kin selection (inclusive fitness) which explains much of animal and human social life. He (...) also (like nearly everyone) lacks a clear framework for describing the logical structure of rationality (LSR—John Searle’s preferred term) which I prefer to call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). He should have said something about the many other ways of abusing and exploiting people and the planet, since these are now so much more severe as to render other forms of violence nearly irrelevant. Extending the concept of violence to include the global long-term consequences of replication of someone’s genes, and having a grasp of the nature of how evolution works (i.e., kin selection) will provide a very different perspective on history, current events, and how things are likely to go in the next few hundred years. One might start by noting that the decrease in physical violence over history has been matched (and made possible) by the constantly increasing merciless rape of the planet (i.e., by people's destruction of their own descendant’s future). Pinker (like most people most of the time) is often distracted by the superficialities of culture when it’s biology that matters. See my recent reviews of Wilson’s ‘The Social Conquest of Earth’ and Nowak and Highfield’s ‘SuperCooperators’ here and on the net for a brief summary of the vacuity of ‘true altruism’ (group selection), and the operation of kin selection and the uselessness and superficiality of describing behavior in cultural terms. -/- This is the classic nature/nurture issue and nature trumps nurture --infinitely. What really matters is the violence done to the earth by the relentless increase in population and resource destruction (due to medicine and technology and conflict suppression by police and military). About 200,000 more people a day (another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month), the 6 tons or so of topsoil going into the sea/person/year –about 1% of the world’s total disappearing yearly, etc. mean that unless some miracle happens the biosphere and civilization will largely collapse during next two centuries, and there will be starvation, misery and violence of every kind on a staggering scale. People's manners, opinions and tendencies to commit violent acts are of no relevance unless they can do something to avoid this catastrophe, and I don't see how that is going to happen. There is no space for arguments, and no point either (yes I'm a fatalist), so I'll just make a few comments as though they were facts. Don't imagine I have a personal stake in promoting one group at the expense of others. I am 78, have no descendants and no close relatives and do not identify with any political, national or religious group and regard the ones I belong to by default as just as repulsive as all the rest. -/- Parents are the worst Enemies of Life on Earth and, taking the broad view of things, women are as violent as men when one considers the fact that women's violence (like most of that done by men) is largely done in slow motion, at a distance in time and space and mostly carried out by proxy -by their descendants and by men. Increasingly, women bear children regardless of whether they have a mate and the effect of stopping one woman from breeding is on average much greater than stopping one man, since they are the reproductive bottleneck. One can take the view that people and their offspring richly deserve whatever misery comes their way and (with rare exceptions) the rich and famous are the worst offenders. Meryl Streep or Bill Gates or J.K Rowling and each of their kids may destroy 50 tons of topsoil each per year for generations into the future, while an Indian farmer and his may destroy 1 ton. If someone denies it that's fine, and to their descendants I say "Welcome to Hell on Earth"(WTHOE). -/- The emphasis nowadays is always on Human Rights, but it is clear that if civilization is to stand a chance, Human Responsibilities must replace Human Rights. Nobody gets rights without being a responsible citizen and the first thing this means is minimal environmental destruction. The most basic responsibility is no children unless your society asks you to produce them. A society or a world that lets people breed at random will always be exploited by selfish genes until it collapses (or reaches a point where life is so horrific it's not worth living). If society continues to maintain Human Rights as primary, to their descendants one can say with confidence "WTHOE". -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the (...) Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by myself and by modern reasoning research, I comment on this first book in a trilogy on Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker, the leading authority on Wittgenstein and one of the best modern philosophers. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

In IVP50S, Spinoza claims that “one who is moved to aid others neither by reason nor by pity is rightly called inhuman. For (by IIIP27) he seems to be unlike a man” (IVP50S). At first blush, the claim seems implausible, as it relies on the dubious assumption that beings will necessarily imitate the affects of conspecifics. In the first two sections of this paper, I explain why Spinoza accepts this thesis and show how this claim can be made compatible with (...) his account of representation. In the third and final section I offer an auxiliary defense of the thesis, showing that, according to Spinoza, to be human is to sociable, and sociability depends on the imitation of the affects. (shrink)

The nature-nurture debate rages so, one cannot help but wonder why the sides are so vehemently partitioned. What's at stake? It is simply not clear why a great amount of people embrace either one side or the other, but dare not even blow a kiss to the opposite opinion. Prinz does an excellent job of arguing for the nurture position, zeroing in on some of the most preciously held nature arguments including the basis of knowledge, thought, and feelings in experience (...) and cultural values, increasing as a child grows. Most prominent of the nature hypothèses that Prinz takes on may be that of language acquisition and the Chomskyean notion of inborn lingusitic knowledge, via the proposed universal language. He contends that children's language acquisition--even the notion that the supposed inborn language device shuts off somewhere in mid-childhood, meaning most people will not be fully bilingual--need not demand such a natural language faculty in the brain, as general learning strategies can account for language acquisition. His arguments can stimulate both nurturists and naturists. Yet, in the end--realizing how much of the human arise from the genes--one still cannot help wonder why the two debated positions so rally to one flag or the other. (shrink)

Gregory of Nyssa’s treatise 'De opificio hominis' was one of the only Greek anthropological texts translated into latin during the early Middle Ages, by Dionysius Exiguus between the late 5th and early 6th centuries and by John Scotus Eriugena in the 9th century. Nicholas of Cusa certainly became acquainted with this work indirectly through the extensive citations in Eriugena’s 'Periphyseon' and through their partial reproduction in the 'Clavis physicae' of Honorius Augustodunensis. Our paper will analyse these and other possible ways (...) of reception –both direct and indirect– of Gregory's text by Cusanus, as well as the influence of certain philosophical themes of Nyssen’s anthropology in his thought, such as the conception of the 'imago Dei', of its ‘living’ character and its simplicity, the incomprehensibility of human intellect or mind (noûs) and theories regarding human free will and man as microcosm. (shrink)

The transcendental approach to understanding narrative argument derives from the idea that for any believable fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of human nature in order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are believable, and how could it be established that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds believability?

This article covers the different stages of the constitution of the person that goes beyond selfishness and self-affirmation and is formed as the inseparable unity of the metaphysical subject that is expressed in the "Other-in-the same" and "Being-for-the-other". This leads one to say that the person is intrinsically relation and exteriority that is realized in the language that transcends the inner self. This relationship, considered internally as a footprint, and in the exterior as visage, invokes a third party that establishes (...) and holds it. The person is shown as an asymmetrical relationship that I call triadic. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger rejects the traditional definition of the human being as the “rational animal” in part because he thinks it fits us into a genus that obscures our difference in kind. Thomas Aquinas shares with Heidegger the concern about the human difference, and yet he appropriates the definition, “rational animal” by conceiving animality in terms of the specifically human power of understanding being. Humans are not just distinct in their openness to being, but, thanks to that openness, they are distinct (...) in their animality, a distinction that changes the very significance of animality itself. Heidegger also thinks the traditional definition closes us to the experience of our essence, but again Aquinas has resources for bringing out the experiential character of rational animality. Aquinas’ inclusion of animation has significance for what Heidegger calls fundamental ontology; by virtue of the human animate body, particular beings can be pointed out and designated as such. (shrink)

1. Naturalismus in der theoretischen Philosophie 2. Anthropologischer Naturalismus 3. Die Natur des ethischen Naturalismus – einige Unterscheidungen 4. Naturalismus und die Natur des Menschen 5. Wie hängen ethischer und anthropologischer Naturalismus zusammen?

Human nature has always been a foundational issue for philosophy. What does it mean to have a human nature? Is the concept the relic of a bygone age? What is the use of such a concept? What are the epistemic and ontological commitments people make when they use the concept? In What’s Left of Human Nature? Maria Kronfeldner offers a philosophical account of human nature that defends the concept against contemporary criticism. In particular, she takes on challenges related to social (...) misuse of the concept that dehumanizes those regarded as lacking human nature (the dehumanization challenge); the conflict between Darwinian thinking and essentialist concepts of human nature (the Darwinian challenge); and the consensus that evolution, heredity, and ontogenetic development results from nurture and nature. After answering each of these challenges, Kronfeldner presents a revisionist account of human nature that minimizes dehumanization and does not fall back on outdated biological ideas. Her account is post-essentialist because it eliminates the concept of an essence of being human; pluralist in that it argues that there are different things in the world that correspond to three different post-essentialist concepts of human nature; and interactive because it understands nature and nurture as interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary levels. On the basis of this, she introduces a dialectical concept of an ever-changing and “looping” human nature. Finally, noting the essentially contested character of the concept and the ambiguity and redundancy of the terminology, she wonders if we should simply eliminate the term “human nature” altogether. (shrink)

Can fictional narration yield knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional? This is the hard question of literary cognitivism. It is unexceptional that knowledge can be gained from fictional literature in ways that are not dependent on its fictionality (e.g., the science in science fiction). Sometimes fictional narratives are taken to exhibit the structure of suppositional argument, sometimes analogical argument. Of course, neither structure is unique to narratives. The thesis of literary cognitivism would be supported if (...) some novels exhibit a cogent and special argument structure restricted to fictional narratives. I contend that this is the case for a kind of transcendental argument. The reason is the inclusion and pattern of occurrence of the predicate ‘believable’ in the schema. Believability with respect to fictional stories is quite a different thing than it is with respect to nonfictional stories or anything else. (shrink)

The term ‘human nature’ can refer to different things in the world and fulfil different epistemic roles. Human nature can refer to a classificatory nature (classificatory criteria that determine the boundaries of, and membership in, a biological or social group called ‘human’), a descriptive nature (a bundle of properties describing the respective group’s life form), or an explanatory nature (a set of factors explaining that life form). This chapter will first introduce these three kinds of ‘human nature’, together with seven (...) reasons why we disagree about human nature. In the main, this chapter focuses on the explanatory concept of human nature, which is related to one of the seven reasons for disagreement, namely, the scientific authority inherent in the term ‘nature’. I will examine why, in a number of historical contexts, it was attractive to refer to ‘nature’ as an explanatory category, and why this usage has led to the continual contestation of the term within the sciences. The claim is that even if the contents of talk about ‘nature’ varied historically, the term’s pragmatic function of demarcation stayed the same. The term ‘nature’ conveys scientific authority over a territory; ‘human nature’ is a concept used to divide causes, as well as experts, and thereby conquer others who threaten to invade one’s epistemic territory. Analysing this demarcation, which has social as well as epistemic aspects, will help us to understand why the explanatory role has been important and why it is unlikely that people will ever agree on either the meaning or the importance of ‘human nature’ as an explanatory category. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether the often-bemoaned loss of unity of knowledge about humans, which results from the disciplinary fragmentation of science, is something to be overcome. The fragmentation of being human rests on a couple of distinctions, such as the nature-culture divide. Since antiquity the distinction between nature (roughly, what we inherit biologically) and culture (roughly, what is acquired by social interaction) has been a commonplace in science and society. Recently, the nature/culture divide has come under attack in various ways, (...) in philosophy as well as in cultural anthropology. Regarding the latter, for instance, the divide was quintessential in its beginnings as an academic dis-cipline, when Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the first professional anthropologists in the US, rallied for (what I call) the right to ignore—in his case, human nature—by adopting a separationist epistemic stance. A separationist stance will be understood as an epistemic research heuristic that defends the right to ignore a specif-ic phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation typical for a disciplinary field. I will use Kroeber’s case as an example for making a general point against a bias towards integration (synthesis bias, as I call it) that is exemplified, for instance, by defenders of evolutionary psychology. I will claim that, in principle, a separationist stance is as good as an integrationist stance since both can be equally fruitful. With this argument from fruitful sepa-ration in place, not just the separationist stance but also the nature/culture di-vide can be defended against its critics. (shrink)

Debate about legal and policy reform has been haunted by a pernicious confusion about human nature, the idea that it is a set of rigid dispositions, today generally conceived as genetic, that is manifested the same way in all circumstances. Opponents of egalitarian alternatives argue that we cannot depart far from the status quo because human nature stands in the way. Advocates of such reforms too often deny the existence of human nature because, sharing this conception, they think it would (...) prevent changes they deem desirable. Both views rest on deep errors about what it is to have a nature and how genetics works. Human nature, like the nature of anything else, is a set of potentials to behave certain ways in given environments, not a nonsocial genetic something that inevitably produces the same result in any environment. To say that existing inequalities, are due to our genes, inalterable because heritable, ignores that genetic propensities may be differently manifested in different environments. Heritability has meaning only relative to an environment and a population and implies nothing about inevitability. A better sort of inegalitarian argument is that a proposed reform, given our nature, would be too costly even if possible. However, this sort of argument is too rarely supported by evidence and generally ignores the costs of existing inequalities. But egalitarians err in supposing that, if behavior is unconstrained by biology, the status quo is easily alterable. The environment may be extremely hard to change. Legal and policy debate should adopt a correct understanding of human nature as a set of propensities and ask of any proposed reform agreed to be otherwise desirable what and how alterable are its causes, genetic, environmental, or more accurately both. (shrink)

Nicole Hassoun and Uriah Kriegel defend the position that infanticide is morally permissible because an infant a few days old does not have a self-concept and thus is not a person. I argue their position is flawed and cannot principally rule out the possible permissibility of slavery.

To bring our topic within manageable limits, the attempt will be made to approach the philosophy of nature in a systematic manner. Borrowing the quantitative categories of one, some and all, nature will be treated as first as singular, then a whole or totality and finally discussed in terms of various distinctions which set nature apart as a part. Past philosophic treatments will be discussed when germane to this treatment, as an example of a particular view of nature. I will (...) argue that nature is not a per se being, cannot be singular or the whole and that the various distinctions that separate the natural from other—the artificial, theconventional, etc.—are inadequate. (shrink)

Human nature is a concept that transgresses the boundary between science and society and between fact and value. It is as much a political concept as it is a scientific one. This chapter will cover the politics of human nature by using evidence from history, anthropology and social psychology. The aim is to show that an important political function of the vernacular concept of human nature is social demarcation (inclusion/exclusion): it is involved in regulating who is ‘us’ and who is (...) ‘them.’ It is a folk concept that is used for dehumanization, for denying (a) membership in humankind or (b) full humanness to certain people in order to include or exclude them from various forms of politically relevant aspects of human life, such as rights, power, etc. (shrink)

Recent philosophical work on the concept of human nature disagrees on how to respond to the Darwinian challenge, according to which biological species do not have traditional essences. Three broad kinds of reactions can be distinguished: conservative intrinsic essentialism, which defends essences in the traditional sense, eliminativism, which suggests dropping the concept of human nature altogether, and constructive approaches, which argue that revisions can generate sensible concepts of human nature beyond traditional essences. The different constructive approaches pick out one or (...) two of the three epistemic roles that are fused in traditional essentialist conceptions of human nature: descriptive, explanatory, definitional, or explanatory and definitional. These turns towards diverging epistemic roles are best interpreted pluralistically: there is a plurality of concepts of human nature that have to be clearly distinguished, each with a legitimate role in respective scientific contexts. (shrink)

Convinced that anthropology constitutes the nucleus of K. Wojtyla's thought, the author attempts to discover what kind of anthropology is at the basis of Wojtyla's philosophical writings and the implications of that anthropology. The analysis of the basic structures of Wojtyla's anthropology (the experience of that which occurs and that of action, the structure of the person-act, the transcendence of the person in truth, gift, etc.) leads the author to hold that Wojtyla's philosophy can be considered a coherent metaphysics of (...) the person since the person who acts is not just the method (the conscience of the action), but also the object of study and, above all, the end, that is, to know and to make known to the person his special dignity. Regarding the contribution of Wojytla's anthropology, the author identifies two central themes: the relationship between person and act, and relationality. Regarding the former, Wojtyla effects a synthesis of metaphysics of being and phenomenology: the person is not relative to his acts, because he is a suppositum; nonetheless, the person is in close relationship to his acts. If it were not for these acts the person could not even know himself as subject and could not perfect himself as a person. Regarding the latter, Wojtyla sustains that the person is not person in the singular but in the plural, since each person is in relation with all the others, and this is shown from the phenomena of participation, solidarity, and, above all, donation. The author concludes by sustaining that the multiplicity and the original relationality of the person is one of the aspects of Wojtyla's anthropology that would be worthy of further study. (shrink)

This paper reconnects the personal and the biological by extending the reach of parental causality. First, it argues that the reproductive act is profitably understood in personal terms as an “invitation” to new life and that the egg and sperm are “ambassadors” or “delegates,” because they represent the potential mother and father and are naturally endowed with causal powers to bring about motherhood and fatherhood, two of the most significant roles a person may have. Second, it argues that even though (...) God alone can create a spiritual soul, the human parents are not just the causes of their child’s body; they are the secondary causes of the whole child. In this way, God acts as a kind of “sponsor” who enables the acceptance of the invitation issued by the parents, and he accepts it on behalf of the new human person that comes to be thanks to their invitation. (shrink)

What can make storytelling “evil” in the sense that the storytelling leads to accepting a view for no good reason, thus allowing ill-reasoned action? I mean the storytelling can be argumentatively evil, not trivially that (e.g.) the overt speeches of characters can include bad arguments. The storytelling can be argumentatively evil in that it purveys false premises, or purveys reasoning that is formally or informally fallacious. My main thesis is that as a rule, the shorter the fictional narrative, the greater (...) the potential for argumentative evil. Here, the notion of length is to be understood such that it is generally a proxy for more abstract features such as how complex and nuanced the piece is. In other argumentative contexts, length generally appears to make no comparable difference. This feature would put fictional narrative arguments in a special class beyond what is determined by obvious features, such as the definitional fact that they in some way(s) collapse two of the four traditional types of discourse: exposition, description, narration, and argument. The nonobvious features that distinguish this class have been a source of puzzlement and inquiry. (shrink)

This paper’s main thesis is that in virtue of being believable, a believable novel makes an indirect transcendental argument telling us something about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. Three related objections are addressed. First, the Stroud-type objection would be that from believability, the only conclusion that could be licensed concerns how we must think or conceive of the real world. Second, Currie holds that such notions are probably false: the empirical evidence “is all against this idea…that (...) readers’ emotional responses track the real causal relations between things.” Third, responding with a full range of emotions to a novel surely requires that it be believable. Yet since we know the novel is fiction, we do not believe it. So in what does its believability consist? (shrink)

This paper defends, and emphasizes the importance of, spaceflight, broadly construed to include human and unmanned spaceflight, space science, exploration and development. Within this discourse, I provide counter-replies to remarks by physicist Dr. Steven Weinberg against my previous support of human spaceflight. In this defense of peaceful spaceflight I draw upon a variety of sources. Although a focus is human spaceflight, human and unmanned modes must not be treated as an either-or opposition. Rather, each has a critical role to play (...) in moving humanity forward as a spacefaring species. In the course of this communication, I also stress NASA’s (and other space agency’s) perennial role as a science and technology-driver, and its function to provide a stable and unified platform for space programs. (shrink)

Il pensiero di Hans Jonas, specie per quel che riguarda la cosiddetta “biologia filosofica”, tratta indirettamente del rapporto tra essere umano e animale. A questo riguardo, Jonas rifiuta sia l’approccio dualistico, sia quello monistico-riduzionistico e propende al contrario per una complessiva reinterpretazione del fenomeno della vita nei termini di quel che egli definisce una “rivoluzione ontologica”. In virtù di ciò, il pensatore rintraccia lo specifico del fenomeno della vita e individua nelle forme viventi una scala naturae di complessità, auto-trascendimento e (...) libertà via via crescenti, le cui tappe significative sono la vita organica, quella animale e quella umana. Per quel che concerne la forma animale, varie specie presentano “potenzialità trans-animali”, che evidenziano un ponte biologico e ontologico verso l’essere umano. In altre parole, l’animale è in qualche modo in grado di prefigurare la forma di vita specificamente umana. Tuttavia, sostiene Jonas, non appena quest’ultima fa la propria comparsa, essa è tale per cui se ne evidenzia al tempo stesso anche lo “iato metafisico” rispetto alla vita animale. La specificità umana si manifesta nella propria capacità di essere responsabile e di preservare le condizioni basilari per una vita autentica sul pianeta. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to show how we can account for a most peculiar feature of human life: i.e. the need to address the real possibility of failing to be ourselves.

In discussions about the ethics of enhancement, it is often claimed that the concept of ‘human nature’ has no helpful role to play. There are two ideas behind this thought. The first is that nature, human nature included, is a mixed bag. Some parts of our nature are good for us and some are bad for us. The ‘mixed bag’ idea leads naturally to the second idea, namely that the fact that something is part of our nature is, by itself, (...) normatively inert. The Inert View claims that nothing normative follows from the mere fact that some trait is a part of our nature. If the Inert View is correct, then appeals to the value or importance of human nature in debates about enhancement are indeed misplaced. We argue that the Inert View is wrong, and that a certain concept of human nature – which we refer to as human form – does have an important role to play in debates about enhancement. (shrink)

This study divides some of the philosophical anthropologies developed after the Holocaust into three frameworks. To do this the author shows how the present modern crisis is an anthropological one and unites the sum of the different crisis dimensions mankind is currently facing. The article approaches the postmodern journey from its two routes—the relativistic and the metaphysical. The second is presented as “status quo-oriented” or as a form of modernized democracy. Because of its popularity, the neologism “transhumanism” is here examined (...) togeth er with the hypothetical coming of a post-human era. This in turn is viewed as a revival of the illustrated myth of the happy world. The author first offers a “status quo” criticism “transhumanism” from the metaphysical anthropology viewpoint and then proposes an approach to a “third way, that is, the convergence of other anthropologies revolving around a person’s dignity born of his or her metaphysical roots together with a recovery of the value of human carnality. The article concludes by putting the different philosophers’ viewpoints face-to-face with the Person of Jesus Christ. (shrink)

There exists a real dearth of literature available to Anglophones dealing with philosophical connections between transhumanism and Marxism. This is surprising, given the existence of works on just this relation in the other major European languages and the fact that 47 per cent of people surveyed in the 2007 Interests and Beliefs Survey of the Members of the World Transhumanist Association identified as “left,” though not strictly Marxist (Hughes 2008). Rather than seeking to explain this dearth here, I aim to (...) contribute to its being filled in by identifying three fundamental areas of similarity between transhumanism and Marxism. These are: the importance of material conditions, and particularly technological advancement, for revolution; conceptions of human nature; and conceptions of nature in general. While it is true that both Marxism and (especially) transhumanism are broad fields that encompass diverse positions, even working with somewhat generalized characterizations of the two reveals interesting parallels and dissimilarities fruitful for future work. -/- This comparison also shows that transhumanism and Marxism can learn important lessons from one another that are complementary to their respective projects. I suggest that Marxists can learn from transhumanists two lessons: that some “natural” forces may become reified forces and the extent to which the productive apparatus is now relevant to revolution. Transhumanists, on the other hand, can learn from Marxist theory the essentially social nature of the human being and the ramifications this has for the transformation of the human condition and for the forms of social organization compatible with transhumanist aims. Transhumanists can also benefit from considering the relevance of Marx’s theory of alienation to their goals of technological advancement. (shrink)

This paper provides a qualified defense of Martin Heidegger’s controversial assertion that humans and animals differ in kind, not just degree. He has good reasons to defend the human difference, and his thesis is compatible with the evolution of humans from other animals. He argues that the human environment is the world of meaning and truth, an environment which peculiarly makes possible truthful activities such as biology. But the ability to be open to truth cannot be a feature of human (...) biology, without making such pursuits as biology, mathematics, and philosophy a biological function of a certain species, homo sapiens. To deny the human difference amounts to species relativism which leaves the normativity of truth unexplained. To reconcile the human evolutionary heritage and the uniquely human openness to meaning and truth, the paper amplifies a distinction occasionally made by Heidegger between condition and cause. (shrink)

Can life be visually represented as a circle? Hegel states that true infinity, when visualized, takes the shape of a circle. The dissertation begins with a hypothesis, "does the progression to the true infinite reflect the notion of life itself?" Then, Hegel's notion of infinity is expanded and applied to the notion of life. This work is trying to explain human evolution and life itself.

Many ideas from Georg Nortoff’s works (published one paper in 2010, mainly his book in 2011, other papers in 2012, 2103, 2014, especially those related to Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer”, the mind-brain problem, default mode network, the self, the mental states and their “correspondence” to the brain) are surprisingly very similar to my ideas published in my article from 2002, 2005 and my book from 2008. In two papers from 2002 (also my paper from 2005 and (...) my book 2008), following Kant’s philosophy, I introduced the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem. After 2010, Nortoff also uses Kant’s philosophy and the notion of the “observer” for the mind-brain problem in a methodology very similar to my methodology (even if his knowledge about Kant’s transcendental philosophy is very superficial!). Moreover, instead of EDWs, Nortoff uses a kind of “transdisciplinary” view, quite close to parallelism – the closest approach to my approach. Northoff’s conclusion within the unicorn world is different than my conclusion. However, in his book 2014 (two volumes) using notions like “correlations” and even “correspondences” many times (exactly my main notion from EDWs perspective), his conclusion is very closed to my EDWs! This dramatic change of framework in 3 years is quite unbelievable!!! (shrink)

Oliva Sabuco's New Philosophy of Human nature (1587) is an early modern philosophy of medicine that challenged the views of the successors to Aristotle, especially Galen and Ibn Sina (Avicenna). It also challenged the paradigm of the male as the epitome of the human and instead offers a gender-neutral philosophy of human nature. Now largely forgotten, it was widely read and influential amongst philosophers of medicine including DeClave, LePois, Harvey,Southey and others, particularly for its account of the role of the (...) nervous system and cerebrospinal fluid in mind-body interaction. In this article I trace its early influence by tracing provenance of the editions produced during the lifetime of its author. (shrink)