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  1. added 2020-06-14
    Неразрешимост на първата теорема за непълнотата. Гьоделова и Хилбертова математика.Vasil Penchev - 2010 - Philosophical Alternatives 19 (5):104-119.
    Can the so-ca\led first incompleteness theorem refer to itself? Many or maybe even all the paradoxes in mathematics are connected with some kind of self-reference. Gбdel built his proof on the ground of self-reference: а statement which claims its unprovabllity. So, he demonstrated that undecidaЬle propositions exist in any enough rich axiomatics (i.e. such one which contains Peano arithmetic in some sense). What about the decidabllity of the very first incompleteness theorem? We can display that it fulfills its conditions. That's (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-04
    Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism.Matti Eklund - 2016 - In Marcus Rossberg & Philip A. Ebert (eds.), Abstractionism.
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  3. added 2020-04-10
    The Physical Impossibility of Machine Computations on Sufficiently Large Integers Inspires an Open Problem That Concerns Abstract Computable Sets X⊆N and Cannot Be Formalized in the Set Theory ZFC as It Refers to Our Current Knowledge on X.Apoloniusz Tyszka & Sławomir Kurpaska - manuscript
    Edmund Landau's conjecture states that the set P(n^2+1) of primes of the form n^2+1 is infinite. Let β=(((24!)!)!)!, and let Φ denote the implication: card(P(n^2+1))<ω ⇒ P(n^2+1)⊆(-∞,β]. We heuristically justify the statement Φ without invoking Landau's conjecture. The set X = {k∈N: (β<k) ⇒ (β,k)∩P(n^2+1) ≠ ∅} satisfies conditions (1)--(4). (1) There are a large number of elements of X and it is conjectured that X is infinite. (2) No known algorithm decides the finiteness/infiniteness of X . (3) There is (...)
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  4. added 2019-10-14
    Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10.Bruno Bentzen - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (4):617-637.
    This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Frege's solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to resolve the "problem of indeterminacy of reference" in section 10 of Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination, which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for value-ranges. It (...)
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  5. added 2019-06-05
    Russell on Logicism and Coherence.Conor Mayo-Wilson - 2011 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 31 (1):89-106.
    According to Quine, Charles Parsons, Mark Steiner, and others, Russell's logicist project is important because, if successful, it would show that mathematical theorems possess desirable epistemic properties often attributed to logical theorems, such as a prioricity, necessity, and certainty. Unfortunately, Russell never attributed such importance to logicism, and such a thesis contradicts Russell's explicitly stated views on the relationship between logic and mathematics. This raises the question: what did Russell understand to be the philosophical importance of logicism? Building on recent (...)
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  6. added 2019-05-28
    The Enhanced Indispensability Argument, the Circularity Problem, and the Interpretability Strategy.Jan Heylen & Lars Arthur Tump - forthcoming - Synthese:1-13.
    Within the context of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, one discussion about the status of mathematics is concerned with the ‘Enhanced Indispensability Argument’, which makes explicit in what way mathematics is supposed to be indispensable in science, namely explanatory. If there are genuine mathematical explanations of empirical phenomena, an argument for mathematical platonism could be extracted by using inference to the best explanation. The best explanation of the primeness of the life cycles of Periodical Cicadas is genuinely mathematical, according to Baker (...)
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  7. added 2018-01-17
    Tuples All the Way Down?Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We can introduce singular terms for ordered pairs by means of an abstraction principle. Doing so proves useful for a number of projects in the philosophy of mathematics. However there is a question whether we can appeal to the abstraction principle in good faith, since a version of the Caesar Problem can be generated, posing the worry that abstraction fails to introduce expressions which refer determinately to the requisite sort of object. In this short paper I will pose the difficulty, (...)
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  8. added 2017-01-14
    Subregular Tetrahedra.John Corcoran - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):411-2.
    This largely expository lecture deals with aspects of traditional solid geometry suitable for applications in logic courses. Polygons are plane or two-dimensional; the simplest are triangles. Polyhedra [or polyhedrons] are solid or three-dimensional; the simplest are tetrahedra [or triangular pyramids, made of four triangles]. -/- A regular polygon has equal sides and equal angles. A polyhedron having congruent faces and congruent [polyhedral] angles is not called regular, as some might expect; rather they are said to be subregular—a word coined for (...)
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  9. added 2017-01-10
    Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-Relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-08
    Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy.Matti Eklund - 2009 - Synthese 170 (3):393-414.
    A central element in neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics is the focus on abstraction principles, and the use of abstraction principles to ground various areas of mathematics. But as is well known, not all abstraction principles are in good standing. Various proposals for singling out the acceptable abstraction principles have been presented. Here I investigate what philosophical underpinnings can be provided for these proposals; specifically, underpinnings that fit the neo-Fregean's general outlook. Among the philosophical ideas I consider are: general views on (...)
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  11. added 2015-08-24
    What Do I Know With Certainty?Adekanmi Obasa - 2015 - Thoughts on Paper.
    I was faced with a question I thought I could not answer. -/- What do I know, with certainty? -/- I know with absolute certainty that every thought I have is based on my belief system. My beliefs may change and when they do, my thoughts will be directly related to my belief.
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  12. added 2015-03-22
    Neo-Logicism and Its Logic.Panu Raatikainen - 2019 - History and Philosophy of Logic 41 (1):82-95.
    The rather unrestrained use of second-order logic in the neo-logicist program is critically examined. It is argued in some detail that it brings with it genuine set-theoretical existence assumptions and that the mathematical power that Hume’s Principle seems to provide, in the derivation of Frege’s Theorem, comes largely from the ‘logic’ assumed rather than from Hume’s Principle. It is shown that Hume’s Principle is in reality not stronger than the very weak Robinson Arithmetic Q. Consequently, only a few rudimentary facts (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-26
    Russell: A Guide for the Perplexed.John Ongley & Rosalind Carey - 2013 - Continuum.
    Contents: Introduction / Naïve Logicism / Restricted Logicism / Metaphysics (Early, Middle, Late) / Knowledge (Early, Middle, Late) / Language (Early, Middle, Late) / The Infinite.
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  14. added 2014-03-04
    Ramified Frege Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715-735.
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege’s definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
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  15. added 2013-12-27
    Logicism, Interpretability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):84-119.
    A crucial part of the contemporary interest in logicism in the philosophy of mathematics resides in its idea that arithmetical knowledge may be based on logical knowledge. Here an implementation of this idea is considered that holds that knowledge of arithmetical principles may be based on two things: (i) knowledge of logical principles and (ii) knowledge that the arithmetical principles are representable in the logical principles. The notions of representation considered here are related to theory-based and structure-based notions of representation (...)
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  16. added 2011-05-24
    Wisdom Mathematics.Nicholas Maxwell - 2010 - Friends of Wisdom Newsletter (6):1-6.
    For over thirty years I have argued that all branches of science and scholarship would have both their intellectual and humanitarian value enhanced if pursued in accordance with the edicts of wisdom-inquiry rather than knowledge-inquiry. I argue that this is true of mathematics. Viewed from the perspective of knowledge-inquiry, mathematics confronts us with two fundamental problems. (1) How can mathematics be held to be a branch of knowledge, in view of the difficulties that view engenders? What could mathematics be knowledge (...)
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  17. added 2011-03-06
    A Logic for Frege's Theorem.Richard Heck - 2011 - In Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, say, (...)
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