Rationality in Economics

What to say in response to a campaign for economics based on more realistic assumptions? The usual defence of assumptions that appear unrealistic, given a certain common way of thinking about people, is what does it matter as long as there is predictive accuracy? I outline a different defence: that rarer results are obtained by departing from realistic assumptions.

Mainstream economics, with its rational actor models, appears to be against common sense. For example, it does not take into account how tribal people are. They have a group identity and they are largely concerned with perpetuating that identity. I propose that mainstream economics is not more opposed to common sense than alternative frameworks. The appendix introduces a counterexample to transitivity of preferences, which I assume is where the chief value of the paper is.

In this paper, I present a challenge to Adam Smith’s specialization recommendations, at least according to the “unzany” interpretation suggested by his famous pin factory example. I present it while attempting the style of a notable fiction writer from the Indian sub-continent, as befits the challenge. I have adapted the style slightly for the Western setting.

John Rawls’s difference principle says that we should change our economy if doing so is better for the worst-off group, on the condition that certain basic rights are secured. This paper presents a kind of case that challenges the principle. If we modify the principle to cope with the challenge, we open the way to a Sorites paradox.

The fail-safe makes sure the fee is high enough to meet carbon emission reduction targets. The safeguard keeps the fee from getting any higher than needed. -/- One of the ways that we could account for the unpredictability of the price elasticity of demand for carbon would be to provide a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that we definitely stay on the carbon reduction schedule. If we keep Energy Innovation Act (HR 763) essentially as it is and scale up the annual (...) carbon fee increase by Number-of-Years-Behind-Schedule * 0.15. (shrink)

A decision theory is self-recommending if, when you ask it which decision theory you should use, it considers itself to be among the permissible options. I show that many alternatives to expected utility theory are not self-recommending, and I argue that this tells against them.

This paper aims to address the question of how one ought to choose when one is uncertain about what outcomes will result from one’s choices, but when one can nevertheless assign probabilities to the different possible outcomes. These choices are commonly referred to as choices (or decisions) under risk. I assume in this paper that one ought to make instrumentally rational choices—more precisely, one ought to adopt suitable means to one’s morally permissible ends. Expected utility (EU) theory is generally accepted (...) as a normative theory of rational choice under risk, or, more specifically, as a theory of instrumental rationality. According to EU theory, when faced with a decision under risk, one ought to rank one’s options (from least to most choiceworthy) according to their EU and one ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest EU (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied). The EU of an option is a probability-weighted sum of each of its possible utilities. In this paper, I argue that EU theory is not the correct theory of instrumental rationality. In its place, I argue for a new theory of instrumental rationality, namely expected comparative utility (ECU) theory. I first show that for any choice option, a, and for any state of the world, G, the measure of the choiceworthiness of a in G is the comparative utility of a in G—that is, the difference in utility, in G, between a and whichever alternative to a carries the greatest utility in G. On the basis of this principle, I then argue, roughly speaking, that for any agent, S, faced with any decision under risk, S ought to rank her options (in terms of how choiceworthy they are) according to their ECU and S ought to choose whichever option carries the greatest ECU (or one of them in the event that several alternatives are tied). For any option, a, a’s ECU is a probability‐weighted sum of a’s comparative utilities across the various possible states of the world. In this paper, I show that in some commonplace decisions under risk, ECU theory delivers different verdicts from those of EU theory. (shrink)

Ludwig von Mises’s methodological apriorism is frequently attributed to the broader Austrian School of economics, of which, of course, Mises was a prominent member. However, there is considerable controversy concerning the meaning of Mises’s various attempts to justify his apriorism. There are prima facie inconsistencies within and across Mises’s methodological writings that engender massive confusion in the secondary literature. This confusion is aggravated by the fact that Mises’s apriorism cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as an artifact of his historical milieu. Indeed, (...) the two prevailing families of interpretation both treat Mises’s apriorism as radically anachronistic, albeit in different senses. According to “extreme” interpretations, Mises’s apriorism reflects an epistemology several decades, if not centuries, beyond its expiration date. According to “moderate” interpretations, however, Mises’s apriorism anticipates ideas that would not appear in the epistemological literature for several decades to come. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that Mises’s actual methodological beliefs are not reflected in his writings, that Mises either obfuscated or exaggerated his methodological position, for whatever reasons, making it seem more radical than it was in fact. I conclude that we have no idea what justification Mises actually intended when he asserted the a priori nature of the fundamental propositions of economics. If this is right, then, whatever method(s) they follow, Austrian economists cannot (deliberately) follow Mises’s apriorism. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

The phenomenon of weakness of will – not doing what we perceive as the best action – is not recognized by neoclassical economics due to the axiomatic assumptions of the revealed preference theory (RPT) that people do what is best for them. However, present bias shows that people have different preferences over time. As they cannot be compared by the utility measurements, economists need to normatively decide between selves (short- versus long-term preferences). A problem is that neoclassical economists perceive RPT (...) as value-free and incorporate present bias within the economic framework. The axiomatic assumption that people do what is best for them leads to theoretical and practical dilemmas. This work examines weakness of will to resolve some shortcomings of RPT. The concept of intention is used to provide multiple self conception with the framework to decide between selves, which had not been done before. The paper concludes that individuals should not always follow their revealed preferences (desires) but the intentions (reason) because the latter indicates what people really want. (shrink)

This paper investigates two assumptions of the exponential discounted utility theory (EDU) to which Callender draws our attention: namely that we can cleanly distinguish pure from impure temporal preferences, and that past discounting can be ignored. Drawing on recent empirical work in this area, we argue that in so far as one might have thought that past-directed preferences are more pure than future ones, then there is evidence that people’s pure preferences (in so far as we can make sense of (...) that notion) show more interpersonal variation than has previously been thought. (shrink)

The books’ goal is to answer the question: Do the weaknesses of value-free economics imply the need for a paradigm shift? The author synthesizes criticisms from different perspectives (descriptive and methodological). Special attention is paid to choices over time, because in this area value-free economics has the most problems. In that context, the enriched concept of multiple self is proposed and investigated. However, it is not enough to present the criticisms towards value-free economics. For scientists, a bad paradigm is better (...) than no paradigm. Therefore, the author considers whether value-based economics with normative approaches such as economics of happiness, capability approach, libertarian paternalism, and the concept of multiple self can be the alternative paradigm for value-free economics. This book is essential reading to everyone interested in the current state of economics as a discipline. (shrink)

Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory and the (...) unstable problems that challenge causal decision theory. (shrink)

Da Gintis ein leitender Ökonom ist und ich einige seiner früheren Bücher mit Interesse gelesen habe, erwartete ich einige weitere Einblicke in das Verhalten. Leider, macht er die toten Hände der Gruppenauswahl und Phänomenologie in die Herzstücke seiner Verhaltenstheorien, und das macht die Arbeit weitgehend ungültig. Schlimmer noch, da er hier ein so schlechtes Urteilsvermögen an den Tag stellt, stellt er all seine bisherigen Arbeiten in Frage. Der Versuch, die Gruppenauswahl seiner Freunde in Harvard, Nowak und Wilson wiederzubeleben, vor ein (...) paar Jahren war einer der größten Skandale in der Biologie in den letzten zehn Jahren, und ich habe die traurige Geschichte in meinem Artikel "Altruismus, Jesus und das Ende der Welt – wie die Templeton Foundation kaufte eine Harvard-Professur und angegriffen Evolution, Rationalität und Zivilisation -- Eine Rezension von E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) und Nowak und Highfield 'SuperCooperators' (2012). Im Gegensatz zu Nowak scheint Gintis nicht durch religiösen Fanatismus motiviert zu sein, sondern durch den starken Wunsch, eine Alternative zu den düsteren Realitäten der menschlichen Natur zu schaffen, die durch das (nahezu universelle) Unverständnis der grundlegenden menschlichen Biologie und des leeren Schiefers von Verhaltenswissenschaftlern, anderen Akademikern und der breiten Öffentlichkeit leicht gemacht wird. Gintis greift zu Recht (wie schon oft zuvor) Ökonomen, Soziologen und andere Verhaltensforscher an, weil sie keinen kohärenten Rahmen haben, um Verhalten zu beschreiben. Natürlich ist das Notwendige, um Das Verhalten zu verstehen, evolutionär. Leider bietet er selbst keine selbst (nach seinen vielen Kritikern und ich stimme zu), und der Versuch, die faule Leiche der Gruppenauswahl auf alle wirtschaftlichen und psychologischen Theorien zu transplantieren, die er in seiner jahrzehntelangen Arbeit erzeugt hat, macht nur sein gesamtes Projekt ungültig. Obwohl Gintis sich tapfer bemüht, die Genetik zu verstehen und zu erklären, wie Wilson und Nowak, ist er weit davon entfernt, ein Experte zu sein, und wie sie blendet ihn die Mathematik nur für die biologischen Unmöglichkeiten, und das ist natürlich die Norm in der Wissenschaft. Wie Wittgenstein auf der ersten Seite von Kultur und Wert bekannte: "Es gibt keine religiöse Konfession, in der der Missbrauch metaphysischer Ausdrücke für so viel Sünde verantwortlich war wie in der Mathematik." Es war immer glasklar, dass ein Gen, das Verhalten verursacht, das seine eigene Frequenz verringert, nicht bestehen kann, aber dies ist der Kern des Begriffs der Gruppenauswahl. Darüber hinaus ist bekannt und oft gezeigt, dass Gruppenauswahl nur auf inklusive Fitness reduziert (Verwandtise), die, wie Dawkins festgestellt hat, ist nur ein weiterer Name für evolution durch natürliche Selektion. Wie Wilson arbeitet Gintis seit etwa 50 Jahren in dieser Arena und hat sie immer noch nicht begriffen, aber nach dem Skandal hat es nur 3 Tage gedauert, bis ich die relevanteste professionelle Arbeit gefunden, gelesen und verstanden habe, wie in meinem Artikel beschrieben. Es ist ein Irrsinn zu erkennen, dass Gintis und Wilson nicht in der Lage waren, dies in fast einem halben Jahrhundert zu erreichen. Ich diskusere die Fehler der Gruppenauswahl und Phänomenologie, die in der Wissenschaft die Norm sind, als Sonderfälle des nahezu universellen Versagens, die menschliche Natur zu verstehen, die Amerika und die Welt zerstören. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Wer sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessiert, kann 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) sehen. (shrink)

由于金蒂斯是一位资深经济学家,而且我饶有兴趣地阅读了他的一些以前的书,所以我期待对行为有更多的见解。可悲的是,他把群体选择和现象学的死手变成了他行为理论的核心,这在很大程度上使工作无效。更糟糕的是,由 于他在这里表现出了如此糟糕的判断,这就使他对以前的所有工作都提出了质疑。几年前,他在哈佛、诺瓦克和威尔逊的朋友试图重新选择团体,这是过去十年中生物学领域的重大丑闻之一,我在《利他主义、耶稣和世界末日》 一文中讲述了这个悲惨的故事——邓普顿·福 foundation 买下了哈佛大学教授职位,攻击了进化、理性和文明——对E.O.威尔逊的《地球的社会征服》(2012年)和诺瓦克和高菲尔德"超级合作者"(2012年)的回顾。与诺瓦克不同,金提人似乎并 非出于宗教狂热,而是强烈希望为人性的严峻现实创造一种替代方案,而(几乎普遍)缺乏对人类基本生物学的理解和空白石板主义的使之变得容易。行为科学家、其他学者和一般公众。 Gintis正确地攻击(正如他以前多次)经济学家、社会学家和其他行为科学家没有一个连贯的框架来描述行为。当然,理解行为所需的框架是一个进化的框架。不幸的是,他未能提供一个自己(根据他的许多批评家,我同 意),并试图嫁接腐烂的尸体的群体选择到任何经济和心理理论,他在他的几十年的工作,只是使他的整个项目无效。 虽然金蒂斯勇敢地努力去理解和解释遗传学,比如威尔逊和诺瓦克,但他远非专家,和他们一样,数学只是使他看不到生物学上的不可能性,当然这是科学的常态。正如维特根斯坦在《文化与价值》第一页中著名的指出的那样: "没有宗教派别滥用形而上学的表达方式像在数学中那样造成如此多的辛德。 一直很清楚,导致行为降低其自身频率的基因不能持久,但这是群体选择概念的核心。此外,众所周知,并经常证明,群体选择只是减少到包容性健身(亲属选择),正如道金斯指出,这只是另一个名字进化的自然选择。和威尔 逊一样,金蒂斯在这个舞台上工作了大约50年,但至今还没有掌握,但是丑闻爆发后,我只用了3天时间就找到、阅读和理解了最相关的专业工作,就像我的文章所详述的。想到金蒂斯和威尔逊在近半个世纪里未能实现这一点 ,这令人费解。 我讨论了群体选择和现象学的错误,这是学术界的常态,是几乎普遍不理解正在毁灭美国和世界的人性的特殊情况。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

This paper generalizes rationalizability of a choice function by a single acyclic binary relation to rationalizability by a set of such relations. Rather than selecting those options in a menu that are maximal with respect to a single binary relation, a weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice function selects those options that are maximal with respect to at least one binary relation in a given set. I characterize the class of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions in terms of simple functional properties. This result also (...) generalizes Aizerman and Malishevski's characterization of pseudo-rationalizable choice functions, that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of total orders. (shrink)

I provide a characterization of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions---that is, choice functions rationalizable by a set of acyclic relations---in terms of hyper-relations satisfying certain properties. For those hyper-relations Nehring calls extended preference relations, the central characterizing condition is weaker than (hyper-relation) transitivity but stronger than (hyper-relation) acyclicity. Furthermore, the relevant type of hyper-relation can be represented as the intersection of a certain class of its extensions. These results generalize known, analogous results for path independent choice functions.

Business and Economic textbooks warn against committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy: you, rationally, shouldn't let unrecoverable costs influence your current decisions. In this paper, I argue that this isn't, in general, correct. Sometimes it's perfectly reasonable to wish to carry on with a project because of the resources you've already sunk into it. The reason? Given that we're social creatures, it's not unreasonable to care about wanting to act in such a way so that a plausible story can be told (...) about you according to which your diachronic behavior doesn't reveal that you've suffered, what I will call, diachronic misfortune. Acting so as to hide that you've suffered diachronic misfortune involves striving to make yourself easily understood while disguising any shortcomings that might damage your reputation as a desirable teammate. And making yourself easily understood to others while hiding your flaws will, sometimes, put pressure on you to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to show that instrumental rationality and utility that have been used in economics for many years does not work well. What is presented in the article is how significant the influence of utilitarianism has been on economics and why the economists get rid of humans’ goals and motivations. It is shown in the article that the human who decides in present is absolutely different from the human who decides over time. Many economists neglected this (...) problem because they wanted to have an effective and simple model. Becker’s economic method is presented as a dead end to which economics has been brought to. It is impossible to connect different selves of one human being by using the utility measure. The works of Schelling and J.S. Mill are used to explain this impossibility. The conclusion of this article is that instrumental rationality and utility have affected economics significantly. But, this simplified view on human nature is no longer valid. Hence, economics needs to think not only about the means but also about the human goals. Economics needs to rebuff relativism and show people how to achieve well-being. If we want to help people with their self-governance, we will have to choose reason over emotions. (shrink)

This introduction explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. The difficulty of a genuine dialogue and understanding between economics, law and humanities, seems to be due not only to the fragmentation of reflections on man, but to a real ‘conflict of anthropologies’. What kind of conceptions of man and human values are presupposed by and / or privileged by economics, law, economic approaches to law and social sciences? How and when do these (...) conceptions come into conflict within and between disciplines? How do these conceptions of man and his values influence the conceptions of economics, law and institutions, and vice versa, how do these last conceptions influence the former? What are the normative, regulatory and practical implications of assuming an anthropological and / or axiological perspective instead of another? This Special issue aims at exploring the possibility of finding a common ground for discussion between economics, law and humanities, through the analysis and comparison of both the conceptions of man, human action and values assumed by economics, law and humanities, and their normative implications. The contributions to this Special issue and its organization are outlined at the end of this introduction. (shrink)

Desde Gintis é um economista sênior e eu li alguns de seus livros anteriores com interesse, eu estava esperando um pouco mais insights sobre o comportamento. Infelizmente, ele faz as mãos mortas de seleção de grupo e fenomenologia para as peças centrais de suas teorias de comportamento, e isso em grande parte invalida o trabalho. Pior, uma vez que ele mostra um julgamento tão ruim aqui, ele chama a questão de todo o seu trabalho anterior. A tentativa de ressuscitar a (...) seleção de grupos por seus amigos em Harvard, Nowak e Wilson, há alguns anos foi um dos maiores escândalos em biologia na última década, e eu tenho narrado a triste história no meu artigo ' altruísmo, Jesus e do fim do mundo-como o Templeton Foundation comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização-uma revisão de E.O. Wilson 'A Conquista social da Terra' (The Social Conquest of Earth) (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). Ao contrário de Nowak, Gintis não parece ser motivado pelo fanatismo religioso, mas pelo forte desejo de gerar uma alternativa para as realidades sombrias da natureza humana, facilitada pela (perto Universal) falta de compreensão da biologia humana e Blank Slateism (tábua rasa) de cientistas comportamentais, outros acadêmicos e o público em geral. Gintis justamente ataca (como ele tem muitas vezes antes) economistas, sociólogos e outros cientistas comportamentais por não ter um quadro coerente para descrever o comportamento. Naturalmente, a estrutura necessária para entender o comportamento é um evolucionário. Infelizmente, ele não consegue fornecer um próprio (de acordo com seus muitos críticos e eu concordo), e a tentativa de transplantar o cadáver podre de seleção de grupo para qualquer teorias econômicas e psicológicas que ele gerou em suas décadas de trabalho, meramente invalida todo o seu projeto. Embora Gintis faz um esforço valente para entender e explicar a genética, como Wilson e Nowak, ele está longe de ser um perito, e como eles, a matemática apenas o cega para as impossibilidades biológicas e, claro, esta é a norma na ciência. Como Wittgenstein famosa observou na primeira página de cultura e valor "não há nenhuma denominação religiosa em que o uso indevido de expressões metafísicas tem sido responsável por tanto pecado como tem em matemática." Sempre foi evidente que um gene que provoca comportamento que diminui a sua própria frequência não pode persistir, mas este é o cerne da noção de seleção de grupo. Além disso, tem sido bem conhecido e muitas vezes demonstrado que a seleção de grupo apenas reduz a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), que, como observou Dawkins, é apenas um outro nome para a evolução pela seleção natural. Como Wilson, Gintis tem trabalhado nesta arena por cerca de 50 anos e ainda não entendeu, mas depois que o escândalo quebrou, levei apenas 3 dias para encontrar, ler e entender o trabalho profissional mais relevante, como detalhado no meu artigo. É incompreensível para perceber que Gintis e Wilson foram incapazes de realizar isso em quase meio século. Discuto os erros de seleção de grupo e fenomenologia que são a norma na Academia como casos especiais da falha universal perto de entender a natureza humana que estão destruindo a América e o mundo. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. (shrink)

Como Gintis es economista senior y he leído algunos de sus libros anteriores con interés, esperaba más información sobre el comportamiento. Tristemente, hace las manos muertas de selección de grupos y fenomenología en los centros de sus teorías de comportamiento, y esto invalida en gran medida la obra. Peor aún, ya que muestra tan mal juicio aquí, cuestiona todo su trabajo anterior. El intento de resucitar la selección grupal por sus amigos en Harvard, Nowak y Wilson, hace unos años fue (...) uno de los mayores escándalos en biología en la última década, y he contado la triste historia en mi artículo ' altruismo, Jesús y el fin del mundo-cómo el Templeton Foundation compró una Cátedra de Harvard y atacó la evolución, la racionalidad y la civilización--una revisión de E.O. Wilson ' la conquista social de la tierra ' (2012) y Nowak y Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). ' A diferencia de Nowak, Gintis no parece estar motivada por el fanatismo religioso, sino por el fuerte deseo de generar una alternativa a las realidades sombrías de la naturaleza humana, fácil por la falta de comprensión (casi universal) de la biología humana básica y el pizeísmo en blanco de científicos del comportamiento, otros académicos y el público en general. Gintis ataca con razón (como ha tenido muchas veces antes) a economistas, sociólogos y otros científicos del comportamiento por no tener un marco coherente para describir el comportamiento. Claro, el marco necesario para comprender el comportamiento es un uno evolutivo. Desafortunadamente él no proporciona uno mismo (de acuerdo con sus muchos críticos y Yo coincido), y el intento de injertar el cadáver podrido de selección de grupo en cualquier teoría económica y psicológica que ha generado en sus décadas de trabajo, simplemente invalida todo su proyecto . Aunque Gintis hace un valiente esfuerzo para entender y explicar la genética, como Wilson y Nowak, él está lejos de ser un experto, y como ellos, las matemáticas sólo lo ciega a las imposibilidades biológicas y, por supuesto, esta es la norma en la ciencia. Como señaló Wittgenstein en la primera página de la cultura y el valor "no hay denominación religiosa en la que el mal uso de las expresiones metafísicas ha sido responsable de tanto pecado como lo ha sido en matemáticas." Siempre ha sido cristalino que un gen que causa comportamiento que disminuye su propia frecuencia no puede persistir, pero este es el núcleo de la noción de selección de grupo. Además, ha sido bien sabido y a menudo demostró que la selección de grupos sólo se reduce a la aptitud inclusiva (selección de los parientes), que, como Dawkins ha señalado, es sólo otro nombre para la evolución por la selección natural. Al igual que Wilson, Gintis ha trabajado en esta arena durante unos 50 años y todavía no lo ha entendido, pero después de que el escándalo se rompió, me tomó sólo 3 días para encontrar, leer y entender el trabajo profesional más relevante, como se detalla en mi artículo. Es alucinante darse cuenta de que Gintis y Wilson fueron incapaces de lograr esto en casi medio siglo. Discuto los errores de selección de grupo y fenomenología que son la norma en el mundo académico como casos especiales de la falta casi universal de entender la naturaleza humana que están destruyendo América y el mundo. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Entender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía y Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky y otras. (shrink)

In markets globalization and increasing competition context, governments of the world’s leading countries are forced to use complex organizational and economic instruments to support the countries’ economy. One of such instruments is creation of Free Economic Zones (FEZ) with favorable conditions for doing business. Over the last decade activation process of Free Economic Zones mechanism disposal for the economy of a particular country development has been possible to observe. If in 1995 there were approximately 500 zones in the world, now (...) there are more than 4,300 zones in more than 130 countries which employ more than 68 thousand workers. In addition, global practice has shown that FEZ activities effective organization is efficient not only in giving impetus to the country’s economy development, but in bringing it into the world leaders as well. (shrink)

The monograph reveals challenging issues of small and medium enterprises development in the European Union and East-Partnership countries. Special attention is paid to a new paradigm of financing investments and fostering innovations at all levels of legal entities including SMEs, enhancing innovative entrepreneurship in conditions of global social and technological challenges as well as determining priority sectors for small and medium enterprises as drivers of economic growth. The authors of the monograph emphasize on such European approaches to financing SMEs as (...) crowd-funding and SME-bonds, analyze experience of applying fiscal instruments to support investment and innovations. The researchers underline the role of social investment as an innovative strategy for European SMEs that could be applied in Ukraine and East-partnership countries, suggest new conceptual approach to the evaluation of innovative business development. They also analyse trends of Ukrainian IT enterprises development in the context of modern information services in a global market. Additional attention is paid to the analysis of SMEs’ entrepreneurial potential in conditions of global social and technological changes, estimation effects of applying electronic governance technologies to provide administrative services by public authorities of various levels of governance. Finally, the researchers disclose economic mentality of legal entities as an informal side of financial assets and substantiate the necessity of creation entrepreneurial universities as drivers of innovative development of economy. The materials of the monograph will be useful to scholars, financial managers of companies, financial analysts, representatives of state bodies who implement the state policy in the field of SMEs development in the East-partnership countries, as well as students of economic universities. (shrink)

Economic pressures, mounting environmental, security and health requirements, are all critical factors that shape economic action. With regard to environmental protection, an economic entity acting as homo oeconomicus finds himself in a situation resembling a prisoner’s dilemma. Signposts for a possible resolution of this dilemma include an environmental management system, a system of environmental law based on the principles of environmental ethics, and a new conception of human nature.

We introduce a “reason-based” framework for explaining and predicting individual choices. It captures the idea that a decision-maker focuses on some but not all properties of the options and chooses an option whose motivationally salient properties he/she most prefers. Reason-based explanations allow us to distinguish between two kinds of context-dependent choice: the motivationally salient properties may (i) vary across choice contexts, and (ii) include not only “intrinsic” properties of the options, but also “context-related” properties. Our framework can accommodate boundedly rational (...) and sophisticatedly rational choice. Since properties can be recombined in new ways, it also offers resources for predicting choices in unobserved contexts. (shrink)

This paper discusses the validity of nudges to tackle time-inconsistent behaviours. I show that libertarian paternalism is grounded on a peculiar model of personal identity, and that the argument according to which nudges may improve one’s self-assessed well-being can be seriously questioned. I show that time inconsistencies do not necessarily reveal that the decision maker is irrational: they can also be the result of discounting over the degree of psychological connectedness between our successive selves rather than over time. Time inconsistency (...) can call for paternalism if and only if we accept that an individual is characterised by stable “true” preferences over time-dependent outcomes, and that she is rationally required to make time-consistent choices. This model is descriptively and normatively questionable. I then argue that behavioural findings may still justify paternalistic interventions, but on a non-welfarist basis. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to provide an overview of conceptual approaches to incorporating a decision maker’s non-knowledge into economic theory. We will focus here on the particular kind of non-knowledge which we consider to be one of the most important for economic discussions: non-knowledge of possible consequence-relevant uncertain events which a decision maker would have to take into account when selecting between different strategies.

Mostrando le analogie tra il modello di Homo oeconomicus e quello che chiameremo Animal oeconomicum, nonché la genealogia del ragionamento “economico” applicato al comportamento animale, vengono messi in risalto gli impliciti e le debolezze di alcuni ragionamenti etologici frequenti; revisioni e critiche che hanno ridimensionato il concetto di Homo oeconomicus sono applicabili anche all’interpretazione raziocinante e calcolatrice del comportamento animale.

The impossibility results in judgement aggregation show a clash between fair aggregation procedures and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the notion of rational outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding of collective rationality. In particular, we use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion of group reasoning that allows for studying collective rationality with respect to a number of logics. We analyse the well-known paradoxes in (...) judgement aggregation and we pinpoint the reasoning steps that trigger the inconsistencies. Moreover, we extend the map of possibility and impossibility results in judgement aggregation by discussing the case of substructural logics. In particular, we show that there exist fragments of linear logic for which general possibility results can be obtained. (shrink)

Focusing on the work of Friedrich von Hayek and Vernon Smith, we discuss some conceptual links between Austrian economics and recent work in behavioral game theory and experimental economics. After a brief survey of the main methodological aspects of Austrian and experimental economics, we suggest that common views on subjectivism, individualism, and the role of qualitative explanations and predictions in social science may favour a fruitful interaction between these two research programs.

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.

This paper tries to penetrate Jon Elster’s contribution to ratioanlity in the frame of the problem ofmeans and ends rationality. To treat rationality in Elster, we will study the imperfect rationality and its relation to weakness of will,and the development of precommitment strategies. We will also point out the role of Emotions, false beliefs and cognitive fallacies in the consideration of rationality. We Will show the difference that the author makes between the thin theory and the broad theory of rationality. (...) Taking into account Hamlin’s distinction between means, beliefs, ends and extended rationality, we will explain the relation between his belief rationality and Elster’s broad theory. (shrink)

How does economics understand the human being? In this article, I present the current dominant conception of the human being in neoclassical theory, which is usually labelled as 'homo oeconomicus' (economic man). I describe the traits of this anthropology, and present the historical context in which it emerged. Then I make its critical evaluation. This is followed by a discussion of two recent alternative conceptions of the human being, which try to go beyond the individualist 'homo economicus' paradigm. I highlight (...) the recent contributions of John B. Davis and Luigino Bruni. Finally I reflect on some elements of Christian anthropology which can contribute to enrich the conception of the person in economics. (shrink)

Neuroeconomics illustrates our deepening descent into the details of individual cognition. This descent is guided by the implicit assumption that “individual human” is the important “agent” of neoclassical economics. I argue here that this assumption is neither obviously correct, nor of primary importance to human economies. In particular I suggest that the main genius of the human species lies with its ability to distribute cognition across individuals, and to incrementally accumulate physical and social cognitive artifacts that largely obviate the innate (...) biological limitations of individuals. If this is largely why our economies grow, then we should be much more interested in distributed cognition in human groups, and correspondingly less interested in individual cognition. We should also be much more interested in the cultural accumulation of cognitive artefacts: computational devices and media, social structures and economic institutions. (shrink)

After providing a brief overview of the economic theory of judicial decisions this paper presents an argument for why not only the economic theory of judicial decisions, but also the rational approach in general, most often fails in explaining decision-making. Work done within the research program of New Institutionalism is presented as a possible alternative. Within this research program judicial activity is conceptualized as the activity of "interpreting the rules of the game", i.e. the institutions that frame the economic and (...) political interaction in a society. Such a conceptualization of judicial interpretation and judicial decision-making would have to depart from rational choice modes of reasoning, and should instead focus on how human beings actually reason, learn and choose drawing from research in cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group’s aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group (...) can meet two challenges: the ‘rationality challenge’ and the ‘knowledge challenge’. The rationality challenge arises when a group is required to endorse consistent beliefs or judgments; the knowledge challenge arises when the group’s beliefs or judgments are required to track certain truths. My discussion seeks to identify those properties of an aggregation procedure that affect a group’s success at meeting each of the two challenges. (shrink)

A framing effect occurs when an agent's choices are not invariant under changes in the way a decision problem is presented, e.g. changes in the way options are described (violation of description invariance) or preferences are elicited (violation of procedure invariance). Here we identify those rationality violations that underlie framing effects. We attribute to the agent a sequential decision process in which a “target” proposition and several “background” propositions are considered. We suggest that the agent exhibits a framing effect if (...) and only if two conditions are met. First, different presentations of the decision problem lead the agent to consider the propositions in a different order (the empirical condition). Second, different such “decision paths” lead to different decisions on the target proposition (the logical condition). The second condition holds when the agent's initial dispositions on the propositions are “implicitly inconsistent,” which may be caused by violations of “deductive closure.” Our account is consistent with some observations made by psychologists and provides a unified framework for explaining violations of description and procedure invariance. (shrink)

In this article, we provide a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems, and institutions, and how they affect economic performance. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions’ emergence, their working properties, and their effect on economic and political outcomes should begin from an analysis of cognitive processes. We explore the nature of individual and collective learning, stressing that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or boundedly rational, but rather how human beings actually reason and (...) choose, individually and in collective settings. We then tie the processes of learning to institutional analysis, providing arguments in favor of what can be characterized as “cognitive institutionalism.” Besides, we show that a full treatment of the phenomenon of path dependence should start at the cognitive level, proceed at the institutional level, and culminate at the economic level. (shrink)

No evangelistic erroneous network of ideas can guarantee the satisfaction of these two demands : (1) propagate the network without revision and (2) completely insulate itself against losses in credibility and adherents through criticism. If a network of ideas is false, or inconsistent or fails to solve its intended problem, or unfeasible, or is too costly in terms of necessarily forsaken goals, its acceptability may be undermined given only true assumptions and valid arguments. People prefer to adopt ideologies that (i) (...) are logically consistent, (ii) are more truth-like and of higher information content than their rivals, (iii) are systematically organised, (iv) solve their problems better than their rivals, (v) do not contain unfeasible demands, and (vi) do not contain uneconomic demands. Truth and validity therefore act as Darwinian-like filters on ideologies. Using Popper's notion of situational analysis and with reference to Darwinian evolution, considered as a special case of the former, and Bartley's theory of comprehensively critical rationalism I argue that a propagandist cannot guarantee his message or his movement from sound criticism. All positions are in a methodological sense open to argument. Moreover, the logic of a propagandist's situation constrains him into making his message and himself open to criticism in order to maximize its chances of being propagated through the population. But he then loses control of the message in two respects. Firstly, his audience are disposed to select from the competing ideas they encounter those that satisfy (i) to (vi) because of man's evolutionary history. Secondly, he cannot guarantee protection from criticism even a privileged section of his message because he cannot predict in a systematic way what logical repercussions each protective reformulation of the ideology will have on other sections of the ideology and what criticism the ideology will encounter. He cannot do the latter because of certain logical properties of theories that endow them with unfathomable depths. Marxism and Freudianism serve as case studies, especially for the analysis of Popper's notion of the immunizing stratagem, a methodological/logical device that is supposed to save theories from criticism. "Immunizing stratagems" either abandon the ideology they are meant to protect or seriously lower its chances of being reproduced. (shrink)

We know that technological developments will affect economic development which will have an impact on the level of public consumption. Law Diminishing Marginal Utility cause boredom which will comprehensively reduce one's purchasing power and interest in the commodities on the market. Capitalism and its development always try to encourage people's consumption continuously to the maximum point. Hedonism and consumerism cause financial imbalances which are a real threat to our society today. Law Diminishing Marginal Utility and followed by the application of (...) Economic Materialism Asymmetry to reduce unnecessary or philosophically form a normative framework so as not to get trapped in a destructive hedonistic cycle. These measurements are not carried out quantitatively or in a stricter context, this is intended to make it easier for the public to apply theoretical concepts from analysis to create a balance of consumption which has implications for alleviating poverty. (shrink)