Statehood

In gloomy and despairing times, we who work for liberation generate light and joy. We experience this every time we work together to defend our communities, when we fight to win collective victories, when we build something new. Much of the time these experiences are in marches and meetings – really important spaces for movement work. But here we want to amplify the usefulness of collective study, and share some thoughts about why Harsha Walia’s new book Border and Rule would (...) be a great place to start if you might like to try a political kind of book club. (shrink)

Orson Scott Card and his Ender Series have had a profound impact on the genre of contemporary science fiction, meriting an academic analysis of some of his more theoretical ideas. I have chosen to analyze his concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations found in Xenocide and Children of the Mind through the lens of international relations, sociological, and political theory, in order to bring nuance to an underdeveloped theory that many non-academics may be familiar with. Ultimately, we must conclude that (...) Card’s concept of “Center” and “Edge” nations is too stagnant and does not account for social and hegemonic change, which influences the justifications of why these “nations” may be considered “Center” in the first place. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on what liberal states should tolerate outside their borders. This requires definitions of `liberalism, ́ `toleration, ́ and `state. ́ In the first section of this paper, I briefly indicate how I use those and other terms necessary to the discussion and introduce the normative principle I take liberals to be committed to. In the second section, I continue clearing the path for the rest of my discussion. In the rest of (...) the paper, I draw conclusions about what liberals should tolerate outside their state that I believe follow from the proffered definitions and principles. I limit myself to interference aimed at providing humanitarian aid, but do so in a way that is meant to provide resources for thinking about other sorts of interventions. In the third section, I consider humanitarian interventions done with the permis- sion of the other state and will point toward a toleration-based view; here we are really talking about non-toleration of suffering. In the fourth section, I consider humanitarian interventions done without the permission of the other state; here we are talking about non-toleration of a state that harms its residents. I consider an objection in section five. (shrink)

Methodological nationalism assumes that, to understand a phenomenon, nation- states are the relevant units of analysis. This assumption has been recognized as a source of bias in most of the social sciences. Does it bias Rawls' understanding of justice, too? This paper argues that it does for at least two reasons. Firstly, what Rawls thinks justice requires on a global scale falls short of what states and inter- national organisations actually do. Secondly, framing the difference principle in national terms, as (...) Rawls did, is a way to increase the “citizenship rent”, or the revenue a person receives just by being citizen ofa rich country The paper argues that methodological nationalism biases Rawls’ understanding of justice by affecting both the plausibility and the coherence of his theory. (shrink)

This paper identifies and synthetically demonstrates the most important steps and changes in the evolution of the idea and institution of citizenship in Europe over more than two thousand years. Citizenship is one of the essential categories defining human status. From a historical perspective, the idea of citizenship in Europe is in a state of constant evolution. Therefore, the essence of the institution of citizenship and its acquisition criteria are continually being transformed. Today’s comprehension of citizenship is different from understanding (...) citizenship in Europe in earlier epochs of history. In some of them, the concept of citizenship existed only in the realm of ideas. In others, the idea materialised, and membership in the state (or city) and civic rights and obligations found a formal, legal expression. The formation of the idea and institution of citizenship is a long and multi-phase process. Published in "Studia Europejskie – Studies in European Affairs", Vol. 25, 1/2021, pp. 7-31. (shrink)

Tentazione di Siracusa, "Tentación de Siracusa", es el título que eligió Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) para la breve, aunque magistral, conferencia que pronunció el 18 de enero de 2001 en Ortigia, en el Palacio del Senado siracusano. Allí fue convocado por las autoridades del Collegio Siciliano di Filosofía y por el entonces intendente de la comuna sícula, Giambattista Bufardeci, quien le otorgó en tal ocasión la ciudadanía honoraria de esa antigua y culturalmente variada urbe mediterránea, una ciudad atravesada milenariamente por la (...) tensión entre filosofía y política, que vio partir por mar, reducido a esclavo, a Platón, y que se manchó con la sangre de Arquímedes, derramada por un soldado romano invasor. La lectio derridiana, que propone sin ambages una nueva figura para la relación entre filosofía y política, abordando el fenómeno de la "mundialización" así como la pregunta por el sentido contemporáneo de la ciudadanía, debió esperar casi dos décadas para ver la luz. Recién en 2018 la editorial Mimesis, sello italiano de incuestionable prestigio, la hizo accesible dentro de su colección "eterotopie", dirigida por los profesores Salvo Vaccaro (Università degli Studi di Palermo) y Pierre Dalla Vigna (Università dell'Insubria). El texto fue traducido íntegro para su publicación por Francesco Garritano y Marina Machì (ambos de la Università della Calabria), quienes ofrecieron, como adelanto de su versión, un breve fragmento por primera vez en la edición del 21 de enero de 2001 del periódico italiano Repubblica, bajo el título Il tiranno e il filosofo). (shrink)

The main claim of this chapter is that planetary defense against asteroids cannot be implemented under a decentralized model of democratic global governance, as espoused elsewhere in this book. All relevant indices point to the necessity of establishing a centralized global political authority with legitimate coercive powers. It remains to be seen, however, whether such a political system can be in any recognizable sense democratic. It seems unconvincing that planetary-wide physical-threat, all-comprehensive macrosecuritization, coupled with deep transformations of international law, global (...) centralization of core decision-making powers, de-stigmatization of nuclear weapons and the like can proceed, succeed, and be implemented in a non-hierarchical international system where planetary defense constitutes only one regime among many, and where states basically remain the decisive actors. Although rationally and scientifically robust, the project suffers from oversimplification, as well as naivety with respect to how both international and domestic politics works. Among other topics, this chapter discusses problems associated with the rule of law and constituent powers, political representation and sources of legitimacy, conditions of multilevel collective action, or limits of theoretical idealization. The general message is that the planetary defense community needs to be more aware of the social and political context of its own enterprise. (shrink)

Employing the framework of conflicting goals in democracy promotion as departure point, the paper addresses the issue of arms exports to non-democratic countries as an important research topic which points to a reconsideration of certain fundamental conceptual and normative commitments underpinning democracy promotion. Empirically, we remind of the lingering hypocrisy of Western arms exporters, knowing that exports to non-democratic countries often hinder or block democratisation. This is not easily circumvented, because of the many conflicting objectives both internal and external to (...) democracy promotion itself. Yet democracy and human rights promotion remain, ethically and pragmatically, important policy goals. Noting that the self-evident character of the state-based liberal democratic model is being increasingly questioned in the literature, we then critically explore a radical if surprisingly natural alternative vision: Namely that if the commitment to democracy and human rights is to be genuine, only global democracy remains a viable way of resolving the many dilemmas, as it aspires to deal both with regulating arms exports and building of accountable decision-making structures. Although we ultimately reject the globalist solution and lean towards a less radical constructivist approach, we endorse the underlying rationale, namely that democracy promotion needs to sincerely embrace normative democratic theory. (shrink)

In this article we address the question of individual identity and its place – or rather omission – in contemporary discussions about the cosmopolitan extension of liberalism as the dominant political theory. The article is divided into two parts. In the first part we show that if we consistently emphasise the complementarity of the “inner” and “outer” identity of a person, which is essential to liberalism from its very beginnings, then a fundamental flaw in the liberal cosmopolitan project becomes apparent. (...) This is the underestimation of the indispensability of an unambiguously determined public framework which will fix and enforce liberal principles and values in a comprehensible way. Such a framework for liberalism was always the political community and then, above all, the modern state, in which the liberal identity could then be realised. The discussion in this part of the article prepares the ground for an examination, in the second part, of a dilemma which cosmopolitan liberalism must face. In the second part we argue that the attempt to tackle the given problem presents liberals with the following dilemma: either it is necessary to plead for the institution of a global political authority (a “world state”), or to give up the belief that fundamental liberal principles and values can be realised to a global extent. We show, at the same time, that because of the character and ambitions of the cosmopolitan project, the promise of plural identities and multi­centred law cannot be relied upon. By way of conclusion we then ask what is the price of the realisation of cosmopolitan liberal ideals. -/- NOTE: This is a two-part article (in Czech). For download here is the first part; please see the link below for the second part as well. (shrink)

There are various ways of reducing conflicts and of stabilizing the political situation in states where society is made up of many different ethnic groups and religious communities, and where relations between these segments – or between them and the central government – are tense. A particularly important way is the establishment in those states of a political system based on power-sharing (PS), which allows members of various ethnic and religious segments to take part in the exercise of power. The (...) literature on the subject usually discusses two models of PS: consociationalism and centripetalism. A third model is encountered in practice, however, that of hybrid power-sharing (HPS), which combines the institutions of the first two. The main objective of this article is to explain the nature and origins of HPS. (shrink)

Although many libertarians share similar moral foundations, they disagree about whether the state can be justified. The most famous libertarian attempt to justify the state is that of Robert Nozick. This attempt has been criticized by, among others, the libertarian anarchist Murray Rothbard. In this article, Nozick’s theory and Rothbard’s critique are discussed, as well as some other attempts to justify the state from libertarian premises. Keeping the criticisms of those theories in mind, an alternative theory, which attempts to bypass (...) the criticisms, is put forward. This alternative theory explains how a state—most probably a nonminimal democratic state—can legitimately be formed in a condition of anarchy without violating anyone’s libertarian rights. One result of this is that the rights-based case for minarchism is severely weakened. (shrink)

The principle of national self-determination holds that a national community, simply by virtue of being a national community, has a prima facie right to create its own sovereign state. While many support this principle, not as many agree that it should be formally recognized by political institutions. One of the main concerns is that implementing this principle may lead to certain types of inequalities—between nations with and without their own states, members inside and outside the border, and members and nonmembers (...) inside the same nation state. While these inequalities may arise, I shall argue that they are not unjust. These worries are partly the results of confusing two types of interests that a national group may have—in cultural affairs and in political affairs. While a national community should enjoy rights over their cultural affairs, this does not grant them authority over other non-cultural, political affairs. Once the distinction is drawn, we can see that there are constraints on the implementation of this principle. Consequently, these inequalities justify setting limits to a group’s right of self-government, although they do not conclusively refute the right itself. (shrink)

A number of philosophers argue that the moral value of national identity is sufficient to justify at least a prima facie right of a national community to create its own independent, sovereign state. In the literature, this argument is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully proves that a national group is entitled to a state of its own. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument (...) and then consider whether they lead to the desired conclusion. My examination reveals that the identity argument relies on the Optimal Protection Principle; however, this principle does not apply to the case of a national community. As a result, the identity argument fails to justify even a prima facie right of a national community to establish its own state. (shrink)

Beniński filozof Paulin J. Hountondji jest autorem teorii systemu, która aspiruje do przynajmniej częściowego wytłumaczenia przyczyn złej kondycji afrykańskich społeczeństw i państw. Afrykański społeczno-polityczny stan rzeczy charakteryzuje, zdaniem Hountondjiego, przede wszystkim wadliwa organizacja struktur instytucjonalnych państw oraz codziennego życia Afrykanów. Hountondji krytykuje liczne wady afrykańskiej rzeczywistości - w tym inercję instytucji, działania pełne absurdów, marnowanie czasu, energii i zdrowia - i zarazem poszukuje ich ukrytych, „systemowych” podstaw. W rozumieniu Hountondjiego, system to zbiór wzajemnie ze sobą powiązanych elementów organizacji afrykańskich społeczeństw. (...) Istniejący system jest kontrproduktywny dla rozwoju. Myśl Hountondjiego wydaje się być adresowana przede wszystkim do samych Afrykanów, których filozof zapewne chciałby zachęcić do przemyśleń nad tym, dlaczego nie dążą oni wystarczająco skutecznie do zmiany rzeczywistości, w której żyją. Hountondji dostrzega u Afrykanów brak „woli racjonalnej organizacji, woli wykorzystania niewielu dostępnych zasobów w najlepszy możliwy sposób i dla największego możliwego zadowolenia każdego”. Zarazem wskazuje podstawowe i niezbędne, w jego opinii, działania, które mogą prowadzić do zmiany systemu, który kreuje i utrwala afrykański stan rzeczy. (shrink)

W artykule tym przedstawiam i krytycznie analizuję główne wątki rozważań nigeryjskiego filozofa Ifeanyiego A. Menkitiego o przyszłości afrykańskiego państwa. Menkiti jest w pełni świadomy historycznej, etnicznej i terytorialnej specyfiki typowego pokolonialnego państwa w Afryce. Powstało ono w XX w. jako organizm charakteryzujący się bardzo głębokimi podziałami etnokulturowymi. Przebieg jego granic został jeszcze w czasach kolonialnych arbitralnie ustanowiony przez Europejczyków. W konsekwencji ich decyzji większość afrykańskich granic dzieli dziś członków wielu ludów na nominalnych obywateli różnych państw. Z drugiej strony, w granicach (...) jednego państwa mieszkają ludy o odmiennym pochodzeniu i kulturze. Jak to ujmuje Menkiti, w następstwie działań Europejczyków Afryka jest dziś zatem narzuconym z zewnątrz zbiorem bytów prawnych. Afrykańscy przywódcy oficjalnie uznają granice państwowe w Afryce za nienaruszalne. Tym niemniej Afryka pokolonialna była, jest i zapewne będzie w przyszłości targana konfliktami o rozmaitej proweniencji, w tym granicznymi i separatystycznymi, w których kwestia wieloetniczności będzie odgrywać istotną rolę. O ile wieloetniczność sama w sobie nie jest przyczyną powstawania afrykańskich konfliktów, może stanowić dla nich podłoże, zwłaszcza gdy jest wykorzystywana przez ich głównych aktorów dla osiągnięcia określonych celów. Zdaniem Menkitiego, dalsze istnienie w Afryce granic o kolonialnym pochodzeniu jest kwestią wtórną. Filozof zdaje się bowiem postrzegać przyszłość wspólnej, pomyślnej koegzystencji różnych ludów w ramach afrykańskiego państwa przede wszystkim z perspektywy zaistnienia w nim sprawiedliwości. Odnosząc się do relacji między sprawiedliwością a dalszym trwaniem afrykańskiego państwa w kolonialnych granicach, Menkiti zauważa, że „choć może w końcu zaistnieć potrzeba nowego wytyczenia granic, nie musimy tego czynić natychmiast. Sprawiedliwość społeczna jest nadal silnym, cichym partnerem w zachowaniu granic państwowych. Jeśli państwo afrykańskie zdobywa szacunek swoich obywateli przez osiągnięcie sprawiedliwości w domenie publicznej, wówczas może nie być istotne, czy Afryka pozostanie taką, jaką jest ze swoimi obecnymi granicami czy też zostanie na powrót dopasowana do [jakichś] swoich wcześniejszych rozwiązań. Ważne jest, aby obywatele czuli się bezpieczni i aby wiedzieli, że ich życiowe szanse nie są rozwiewane przez to właśnie państwo, które ma ich wspierać”. (shrink)

It is argued (a) that laws are assurances of protections of rights and (b) that governments are protectors of rights. Lest those assurances be empty and thus not really be assurances at all, laws must be enforced and governments must therefore have the power to coerce. For this reason, the government of a given region tends to have, as Max Weber put it, a "monopoly on power" in that region. And because governments are power-monopolizers, it is tempting to think that (...) the concepts of government and law are to be understood in terms of the concept of power. In actuality, the first two concepts are to be understood primarily in terms of the concept of morality--of rights-protection, to be specific--and only secondarily in terms of the concept of power. Contentions (a) and (b) appear to be inconsistent with obvious facts (e.g. the fact that Pol Pot's regime violated the rights of those over whom it had power). But (a) and (b) are compatible with those facts. This is a consequence of two principles. First, moral requirements have a "dimension of weight," as Dworkin put it, meaning that one moral imperative can be outweighed, without being obliterated, by another moral imperative. Second, sentential operators can have different degrees of scope. "It is hereby assured that" is such an operator. Linguistic surface structure may obfuscate the degree of scope that it has in a given sentence. That fact compatibilizes our analysis with the fact that there are evil laws and evil governments. (shrink)

A compilation of essays and letters written between 2003 and 2009.

In this article, I present and critically analyze the main ideas of the Nigerian thinker, Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, on the future of the multi-ethnic state in Africa. Menkiti appears to consider that the basic condition for the successful coexistence of the various groups occupying the states of Africa is for relations between them to rest on just principles. Justice should involve the fair and equitable division amongst peoples of the burdens and benefits of living in a common state. To realize (...) this ideal, he proposes the creation in Africa of morally neutral, managerial states. He bases his plan in part on the ideas of John Rawls. Close analysis of Menkiti’s views shows that his vision of the minimalist state is only a temporary solution, which is to lead to the peaceful dismemberment of the current post-colonial model of multi-ethnic states functioning within the old colonial borders. The basic value of Menkiti’s thought rests in his reversal of the usual perspective on African states, as he considers that maintaining territorial integrity or achieving unity should no longer be considered a paramount necessity. Published in "Hemispheres", 2010, No. 25. (shrink)

Pogge, O'Neill, Elkins, and others propose the "dispersal" or "unbundling" of state sovereignty, allegedly to disincentivize war, to foster global and regional cooperation on environment, justice, and other issues of naturally supra-state concern, as well as to tailor some functions or jurisdictions to more local, regional, or differently shaped geographical areas. All these proposals are guilty of function-atomism, i.e. they ignore the massive benefits of clustering identically bounded functions or jurisdictions in a single territory. These benefits include the effective enforcement (...) of law; the effective production of public goods and deterrence of free-riding; the coinciding of the tax base, law formation and enforcement and sustaining community of media, schools, universities, and other vital institutions; and the fostering of democratic community and participation in a significant political structure. (shrink)

Książka ta jest zbiorem dwudziestu studiów przygotowanych przez badaczy polskich, którzy reprezentują różne dziedziny nauki: ekonomię, geografię, historię, politologię i stosunki międzynarodowe, prawo, socjologię. Badacze ci podjęli się analizy i opisu problemów, zjawisk oraz procesów, które nie zawsze są sobie bliskie. Autorów studiów łączy jednak wspólne zainteresowanie tym, czym jest i jak w dzisiejszym świecie funkcjonuje maszyna zwana państwem. Odmienność płaszczyzn i podejść badawczych jest o tyle cenna, iż pozwala na postrzeganie współczesnych problemów państwa z różnych perspektyw. Do kluczowych zagadnień (...) poruszanych w tym zbiorze należą: idea państwa; fenomen państwa narodowego; istota władzy i jej prawomocność; państwo we współczesnej myśli politycznej; wpływ charakteru władzy państwowej na rozwój społeczny; wolność jednostki w państwie; suwerenność państwa; wielopłaszczyznowa transformacja państwa; różne aspekty funkcjonowania instytucji państwa; fenomen państwa w stanie upadku. Autorzy studiów korzystają z dorobku filozofów różnych epok, teoretyków państwa, badaczy dziejów najnowszych, uznanych autorytetów naukowych. Część tekstów powstała w oparciu o analizę dokumentów krajowych porządków prawnych oraz prawa międzynarodowego. W zbiorze tym poruszane są problemy Europy, obu Ameryk, Afryki, różnych regionów Azji i Pacyfiku. Takie podejście pozwala zapomnieć o istniejących odmiennościach kulturowych i dostrzec podobieństwa między społeczeństwami i państwami często – wydawałoby się – bardzo od siebie odległymi. Pomocna jest w tym również bogata literatura, do której kierują swych Czytelników autorzy. Zbiór ten nie pretenduje do roli całościowego opracowania traktującego o głównych problemach współczesnego państwa. Często autorzy nie odpowiadają nawet do końca na zadawane przez siebie pytania, a raczej inspirują Czytelników do szukania odpowiedzi. Odważne wnioski prezentowane w niektórych tekstach zachęcają nie tylko do rewidowania czy przewartościowywania wielu utartych poglądów, ale także obalają utrwalone niekiedy mity oraz zmuszają do dalszych intelektualnych poszukiwań. (shrink)

Krzysztof Trzcinski, 'Citizenship in Europe: The History of the Idea and Institution' - this is an interdisciplinary book as the concept of citizenship is one of the key terms of the social sciences and raises questions of a legal, political, historical, philosophical, and sociological nature. The main subjects of this work are the origins and evolution of the idea and institution of citizenship in Western Europe. Doctrinal and institutional models of citizenship presented in this monograph are of different historical origins (...) (beginning with ancient times and ending with the 20th century). This work shows that in different historical periods, the concept of citizenship underwent shifts in semantic substance and that the idea of citizenship is in permanent flux. Hence, the essence of citizenship is continually being enriched with new elements (or, at times, impoverished by the loss of other elements). According to specific conditions of a socio-political, economic, and cultural nature, the concept of citizenship has been redefined in the historical perspective. At various historical periods, the term 'citizen' referred to a broader or narrower spectrum of society. Criteria for membership in the body of citizens also evolved. Over the centuries, many models of citizenship emerged in Europe. Some of them were institutional in form. In contrast, others were the fruit of philosophers' social and political thinking at different times. The basic models emerged in ancient Athens and Rome. Later models of citizenship usually took over many traits, particular to initial models (such as the right to life). However, at the same time, they usually eliminated some of their elements (such as the enslavement of certain members of society) while simultaneously creating and adding new ones (such as electoral rights for women). In this manner, new models emerged, which were an offshoot of classical models. These models contributed to the formation of the contemporary institution of citizenship, which brings together different elements of various historical models. This book contributes to research into the evolution of the state (including research into the formation of the nation-state in Europe), as the institution of citizenship is inherently and functionally tied to the state. This work also contributes to research into the evolution of supranational European Union citizenship. The institutional development of the idea of EU citizenship could - along with the unavoidable transformation of all community structures or even the very idea of integration itself - lead to a fundamental change in the contemporary concept of state citizenship. This work could also prove helpful in research into the phenomenon of immigration in Europe, especially into the interdependence between obtaining the citizenship of the host state and the effective integration of immigrants. (shrink)

Obywatelstwo należy do najistotniejszych kategorii określających pozycję człowieka w państwie. W niektórych okresach dziejów pojęcie obywatelstwa istniało jedynie w sferze idei, w innych idea uległa urzeczywistnieniu, a członkostwo w państwie (lub mieście) oraz status obywatelski znalazły formalny wyraz na niwie prawnoustrojowej. Kształtowanie się obywatelstwa stanowi proces długi i wielofazowy. Obywatelstwo w Europie pozostaje bowiem już od starożytności w stanie permanentnego rozwoju i wciąż wzbogacane jest o nowe treści (lub też czasem zubożane o pewne elementy); tym niemniej jego rdzeń, nakreślony w (...) pierwowzorach antycznych, pozostaje w dużej mierze tożsamy. Sens obywatelstwa, czy też jego ładunek znaczeniowy ulega redefinicji w perspektywie historycznej w zależności od specyficznych warunków natury społeczno-politycznej. Na poszczególnych etapach ewolucji obywatelstwo obejmuje swym zasięgiem węższą lub szerszą część społeczeństw państwowych. (shrink)

Ksiazka Roberta Paula Wolfa Apologia anarchizmu, ktora ukazala sie w roku 1970, stala sie niezwyklym wydarzeniem w rozwoju dwudziestowiecznej filozofii zachodniej: oto bowiem szacowny filozof, reprezentujacy (mniej wiecej) glowny nurt swej dziedziny, przedstawial argumenty zyczliwe wobec anarchizmu.

My objective in this paper is to address a handful of issues that typically get raised in discussions of philosophical anarchism. Some of these issues arise in discussions among partisans of anarchism, and some are more likely to be raised in efforts to defend the state against its opponents. My hope is to focus the argument in such a way as to make clearer the main issues that are at stake from the point of view of at least one version (...) of philosophical anarchism. (shrink)

The “Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine" is one of the most important and innovative chapters in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's book, A Thousand Plateaus. It is a highly original text in political philosophy whose implications have yet to be fully mined—or even partially mined, for that matter. This short text analyzes the "noumenal" status that Deleuze assigns to the nomadic war machine, and analyzes the fundamental role that the nomadology plays in Deleuze and Guattari's political philosophy.