- Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.details
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(Almost) all evidence is higher-order evidence.Brian Hedden & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 82 (3):417-425.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1407-1433.details
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(1 other version)Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2021 - Episteme 1 (Early view):1-18.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):841-866.details
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Epistemic Paradise Lost: Saving What We Can with Stable Support.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Epistemic dilemma and epistemic conflict.Verena Wagner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-76.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain.Nicholas Leonard & Fabrizio Cariani - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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When in Doubt, Withhold: A Defense of Two Rational Grounds for Withholding.A. K. Flowerree - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
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E-Cigarettes and the Multiple Responsibilities of the FDA.Larisa Svirsky, Dana Howard & Micah L. Berman - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (10):5-14.details
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(1 other version)Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality, by Julia Staffel. Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. ix + 217. [REVIEW]Claire Field - 2021 - Mind 130.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Moral disagreement scepticism leveled.Jonathan Dixon - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):203-216.details
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Epistemic Defeaters.Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Pro tem rationality.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):383-403.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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The challenge of heritability: genetic determinants of beliefs and their implications.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):831-874.details
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Being pessimistic about the objective present.Derek Lam - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-16.details
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist.Dominik Balg - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):51-78.details
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A defense of liberalism in the epistemology of perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers Universitydetails
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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(1 other version)The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
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Moral Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Higher-Order Evidence.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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Rational Uniqueness and Religious Disagreement.Christopher Willard-Kyle - manuscriptdetails
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The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox.Jennifer Nagel - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), The Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press.details
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Om betydelsen av evidens av högre ordning.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 39 (1).details
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Polarization in groups of Bayesian agents.Josefine Pallavicini, Bjørn Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):1-55.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
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Imprecise probability in epistemology.Elkin Lee - 2017 - Dissertation, Ludwig–Maximilians–Universitatdetails
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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