- Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Can We Believe for Practical Reasons?Juan Comesaña - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):189-207.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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(1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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(1 other version)Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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Grit.Sarah K. Paul & Jennifer M. Morton - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):175-203.details
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(1 other version)Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.details
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Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Andrew Evan Reisner (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: Themes From the Philosophy of John Broome. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Fitting Attitude Theories of Value.Daniel Jacobsen - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.details
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(2 other versions)Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?Susanna Siegel - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 240.details
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Some Evidence is False.Alexander Arnold - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):165 - 172.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.details
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Instrumental rationality, epistemic rationality, and evidence-gathering.Lara Buchak - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):85-120.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle.Ken Levy - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.details
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Rationalizing beliefs: evidential vs. pragmatic reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):447-462.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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Sunk costs, rationality, and acting for the sake of the past.Thomas Kelly - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):60–85.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Modest deontologism in epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):339 - 355.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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Permissivist Evidentialism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Resolving to Believe: Kierkegaard’s Direct Doxastic Voluntarism.Z. Quanbeck - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Defending a Realist Stance.Christopher Pincock - 2024 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 37 (1):1-15.details
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Norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory.Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 47:237-268.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):457-479.details
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Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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