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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.details
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To give a surprise exam, use game theory.Elliott Sober - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):355-373.details
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Explanation and causation. [REVIEW]Elliott Sober - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):243-257.details
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Are theories of rationality empirically testable?Howard Smokler - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):297 - 306.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
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A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.details
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On the Rationality of Inconsistent Predictions: The March Madness Paradox.Rory Smead - 2016 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 43 (1):163-169.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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The Calendar Paradox.Sam Shpall - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):801-825.details
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The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy.Tomoji Shogenji - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):29-48.details
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Logic of Justified Beliefs Based on Argumentation.Chenwei Shi, Sonja Smets & Fernando R. Velázquez-Quesada - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1207-1243.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without σ-Additivity.G. Schurz & H. Leitgeb - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):257-283.details
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Objectively homogeneous reference classes.Wesley C. Salmon - 1977 - Synthese 36 (4):399 - 414.details
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Epistemology without knowledge?Ruth Weintraub - 1991 - Ratio 4 (2):157-169.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
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When is argumentation deductive?Henry Prakken - 2023 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 33 (3-4):212-223.details
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No Justificatory Closure without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.details
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A Bayesian framework for knowledge attribution: Evidence from semantic integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):92-104.details
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The theory of nomic probability.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.details
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Self-defeating arguments.John L. Pollock - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.details
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Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.details
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How to use probabilities in reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (1):65 - 85.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts.Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2010 - Theoria 76 (2):112-118.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference.Rohit Parikh - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (1):97 - 119.details
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Sceptical Theism and the Paradox of Evil.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):319-333.details
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Acceptance and Certainty, Doxastic Modals, and Indicative Conditionals.Kurt Norlin - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (5):951-971.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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Consciousness, Certainty, and Epistemic Operators.Masaharu Mizumoto - 2005 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 38 (1):1-15.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Modality, expected utility, and hypothesis testing.WooJin Chung & Salvador Mascarenhas - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-40.details
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Logical questions behind the lottery and preface paradoxes: lossy rules for uncertain inference.David Makinson - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):511-529.details
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WEIRD languages have misled us, too.Asifa Majid & Stephen C. Levinson - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):103-103.details
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The irrelevance of belief to rational action.Patrick Maher - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.details
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Vague Credence.Aidan Lyon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):3931-3954.details
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Argument and belief: Where we stand in the Keynesian tradition. [REVIEW]R. P. Loui - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (4):357-365.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
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