- Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Unpossessed Evidence: What’s the Problem?Joe Milburn - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):107-120.details
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Affective Reason.Jason McMartin & Timothy Pickavance - forthcoming - Episteme.details
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Disagreement and alienation.Berislav Marušić & Stephen J. White - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):210-227.details
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Belief: What is it Good for?John MacFarlane - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment.Matt Lutz - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1-24.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment.Dustin Locke - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).details
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Foundations of Everyday Practical Reasoning.Hanti Lin - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (6):831-862.details
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I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View.Matthew Lee - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):143-158.details
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Moral priorities under risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):793-811.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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Knowledge and reasonableness.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - Synthese 199:1435-1451.details
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Coherence as Competence.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):353-376.details
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Diachronic trends in the topic distributions of formal epistemology abstracts.David Kinney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-34.details
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This paper surely contains some errors.Brian Kim - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):1013-1029.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence.Dominik Kauss - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7303-7320.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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Settling the Unsettled: Roles for Belief.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):359-368.details
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Salvaging Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Jackson & Andrew Rogers - 2019 - Philosophia Christi 21 (1):59-84.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Belief‐Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson & Peter Tan - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):717–727.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Belief, Faith, and Hope: On the Rationality of Long-Term Commitment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):35–57.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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A normative comparison of threshold views through computer simulations.Alice C. W. Huang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-23.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Lying and knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):495-513.details
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Promises, obligation, and reliance.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):150-170.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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