- Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
|
|
Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
|
|
Indiscriminability and the sameness of appearance.Katalin Farkas - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (2):39-59.details
|
|
Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge.Katalin Farkas - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200.details
|
|
A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.details
|
|
Radical Knowledge Minimalism.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):223-227.details
|
|
Against cognitive homelessness.J. C. Espejo-Serna - 2019 - Humanitas Hodie 2 (1):h214.details
|
|
What are degrees of belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.details
|
|
Disagreement and inconsistency: a problem for orthodox expressivism.John Eriksson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-17.details
|
|
El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.details
|
|
Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
|
|
Logical reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.details
|
|
The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
|
|
Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1481-1505.details
|
|
Knowledge is closed under analytic content.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353.details
|
|
Exploring Scientific Inquiry via Agent-Based Modelling.Dunja Šešelja - 2021 - Perspectives on Science 29 (4):537-557.details
|
|
Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.details
|
|
No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
|
|
Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1).details
|
|
Perceptual Knowledge, Discrimination, and Closure.Santiago Echeverri - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1361-1378.details
|
|
Transmission of warrant-failure and the notion of epistemic analyticity.Philip A. Ebert - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):505 – 521.details
|
|
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
|
|
Intuitions are inclinations to believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.details
|
|
The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
|
|
Safety’s coordination problems.Julien Dutant & Sven Rosenkranz - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1317-1343.details
|
|
Introduction.Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1427-1431.details
|
|
How to be an Infallibilist.Julien Dutant - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):148-171.details
|
|
Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3755-3772.details
|
|
Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
|
|
Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
|
|
Epistemological motivations for anti-realism.Billy Dunaway - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2763-2789.details
|
|
Evidential externalism.Jeffrey Dunn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):435-455.details
|
|
The Attitudes We Can Have.Daniel Drucker - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (4):591-642.details
|
|
Policy Externalism.Daniel Drucker - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):261-285.details
|
|
Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
|
|
Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd.Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):395-403.details
|
|
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
|
|
Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
|
|
Religious Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):63--86.details
|
|
Resolving Religious Disagreements.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83.details
|
|
Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
|
|
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
|
|
Knowing against the odds.Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):277-287.details
|
|
Good Guesses.Kevin Dorst & Matthew Mandelkern - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):581-618.details
|
|
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
|
|
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
|
|
Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.details
|
|
Margin for error and the transparency of knowledge.Jérôme Dokic & Paul Égré - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):1-20.details
|
|
A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
|
|
Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.details
|
|