- The Knowledge Norm of Belief.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):43-50.details
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Gender and first-person authority.Gus Turyn - 2023 - Synthese 201 (122):1-19.details
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Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.details
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Essentially Intentional Action.Ginger Schultheis & Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.details
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On the Probability of Plenitude.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (5):267-292.details
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Immorality and Irrationality.Alex Worsnip* - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):220-253.details
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Incoherent but Reasonable: A Defense of Truth-Abstinence in Political Liberalism.Wes Siscoe & Alexander Schaefer - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (3):573-603.details
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The Informativeness Norm of Assertion.Grzegorz Gaszczyk - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
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Reasoning Through Narrative.A. K. Flowerree - 2023 - Episteme 20 (4):912-926.details
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Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action.Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne & Bob Beddor - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Perceptual learning and reasons‐responsiveness.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Noûs 57 (2):481-508.details
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Knowledge as a (non-factive) mental state.Adam Michael Bricker - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Early 2012 Dissertation Draft - 'Respect for Truth and the Normativity of Epistemic Rationality'.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:284-308.details
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The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism.Jared Warren - 2024 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol 4. Oxford University Press.details
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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Lessons from the Void: What Boltzmann Brains Teach.Bradford Saad - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Moral Worth, Moral Awareness, and Virtuous Motives.Fabian Lorentzon - unknowndetails
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Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.details
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Perceptual Particularity.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):25-54.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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Aesthetic Testimony and Aesthetic Authenticity.Felix Bräuer - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (3):395–416.details
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Looking beyond reductionism and anti-reductionism.Felix Bräuer - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):230-248.details
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On the Relationship between Reasons and Evidence.Christopher Cloos - manuscriptdetails
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Rethinking Implicatures.Matheus Silva - manuscriptdetails
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Naming and epistemic necessity.Dilip Ninan - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):334-362.details
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Semantics and the objects of assertion.Dilip Ninan - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (5):355-380.details
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Agreement and Equilibrium with Minimal Introspection.Harvey Lederman - 2014 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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Reconciling the Epistemic and the Zetetic.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):93-100.details
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A case for integrative epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):12021-12039.details
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Epistemic Value: The Insufficiency of Truth.Benoit Gaultier - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):303-316.details
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"Moral Disagreement".Folke Tersman - 2021 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Doxastic Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 219-240.details
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Rationally irresolvable disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1277-1304.details
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The Logical and Philosophical Foundations for the Possibility of True Contradictions.Ben Martin - 2014 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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Brains in vats and model theory.Tim Button - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.details
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Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?Anne Meylan & Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (6):1102-1124.details
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Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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