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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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A metaphysics for practical knowledge.Kim Frost - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):314-340.details
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How to stay safe while extending the mind.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4065-4081.details
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Knowledge of things.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3559-3592.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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How Naïve Realism can Explain Both the Particularity and the Generality of Experience.Craig French & Anil Gomes - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):41-63.details
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Assertion and transparent self-knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889.details
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The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.Marco Tiozzo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):917-923.details
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Compartmentalized knowledge.Levi Spectre - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2785-2805.details
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The Explanation Proffering Norm of Moral Assertion.Mona Simion - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):477-488.details
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Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
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Intrinsic properties and relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?Sten Lindström - 2017 - In George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara & Kim Solin (eds.), Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering. pp. 160-171.details
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Inductive Knowledge.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Noûs 54 (2):354-388.details
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Is panpsychism simple?Henry Taylor - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):265-275.details
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Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?Marcello Di Bello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2145-2168.details
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Amodal completion and knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.details
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Knowledge without safety.Haicheng Zhao - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3261-3278.details
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The Domain of the Mental in Williamson’s Philosophy.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1).details
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Implicit Bias: from social structure to representational format.Josefa Toribio - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):41-60.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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Empirical justification and defeasibility.Juan Comesaña - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1771-1786.details
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Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.details
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Interests, evidence and games.Brian Weatherson - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):329-344.details
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Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.details
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Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.details
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Fiabilismo.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2018 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.details
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Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):39-51.details
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Thinking about the body as subject.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.details
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Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.details
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The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.details
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Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1481-1505.details
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It's All in the Brain : A Theory of the Qualities of Perception.Jesper Östman - 2013 - Umeå Studies in Philosophy 11:168.details
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Moral Enhancement Can Kill.Parker Crutchfield - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (5):568-584.details
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Cognition and Content.João Branquinho - 2005 - Lisboa, Portugal: Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa.details
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Force, content and the varieties of unity (old version).Michael Schmitz - manuscriptdetails
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Is probabilistic evidence a source of knowledge?Ori Friedman & John Turri - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (5):1062-1080.details
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
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Higher order ignorance inside the margins.Sam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1789-1806.details
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What Is Bayesian Confirmation for?Darren Bradley - 2017 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3):229-241.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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A Topological Approach to Full Belief.Alexandru Baltag, Nick Bezhanishvili, Aybüke Özgün & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):205-244.details
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God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.details
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