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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification as the appearance of knowledge.Steven L. Reynolds - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):367-383.details
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Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis.Chris Ranalli - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.details
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On two formulations of the safety condition and epistemic risk.Francois-Igor Pris - 2019 - Al-Farabi 3 (67):15-24.details
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When warrant transmits and when it doesn’t: towards a general framework.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2481-2503.details
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‘Boghossian’s Blind Reasoning’, Conditionalization, and Thick Concepts. A Functional Model.Olga Ramírez - 2012 - Ethics in Progress Quarterly 3 (1):31-52.details
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Knowing By Perceiving, by Alan Millar.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Mind 132 (527):852-861.details
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The edenic theory of reference.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):276-308.details
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Contentless basic minds and perceptual knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).details
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Assertibility and Sensitivity.Geoff Pynn - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):99-117.details
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Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.details
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A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.details
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Questions, content and the varieties of force.Michael Schmitz - manuscriptdetails
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Intrinsic properties and relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.details
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Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Avant: Special Issue-Thinking with Images 10 (2).details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The place of reasons in epistemology.Kurt Sylvan & Ernest Sosa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
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Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.details
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Epistemically self-defeating arguments and skepticism about intuition.Paul Silva - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):579-589.details
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On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.details
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Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Disagreement in a Group: Aggregation, Respect for Evidence, and Synergy.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 184-210.details
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Neither/Nor.Clayton Littlejohn - 2019 - In Casey Doyle, Joe Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism. Routledge.details
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Epistemology from a Sanskritic Point of View.Jonardon Ganeri - 2018 - In Masaharu Mizumoto, Stephen P. Stich & Eric S. McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world. Oxford University Press. pp. 12-21.details
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Know How and Acts of Faith.Paulina Sliwa - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 246-263.details
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Religious Diversity and Disagreement.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 185-195.details
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'Ought': OUT OF ORDER.Stephen Finlay - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press.details
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A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press.details
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Who needs intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press. pp. 232-256.details
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Truth, charity and assertion.Carlo Penco - unknowndetails
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Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs.Jennifer Nagel, Valerie San Juan & Raymond A. Mar - 2013 - Cognition 129 (3):652-661.details
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Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.details
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Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume on Propositions, Edited by G. Rattan and D. Hunter 43 (5-6):679-701.details
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The landscape of affective meaning.Víctor Carranza-Pinedo - 2022 - Dissertation, Institut Jean Nicoddetails
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Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
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The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, volume 18. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
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New Lessons From Old Demons: The Case For Reliabilism.Thomas Grundmann - 2015 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-110.details
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The disunity of truth.Josh Dever - 2009 - In Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Compositionality, Context and Semantic Values: Essays in Honour of Ernie Lepore. pp. 174-191.details
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Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.details
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What does it take to "have" a reason?Mark Schroeder - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201--22.details
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Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge.details
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Understanding Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):767-797.details
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Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat.Conrad Bakka - 2023 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Justificação, Probabilidade e Independência.André Neiva & Tatiane Marks - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):207-230.details
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Truth, Modality, and Paradox: Critical Review of Scharp, 'Replacing Truth'.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Fixed Points in the Hyperintensional Epistemic $\mu$-Calculus and the KK Principle.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemicism and Moral Vagueness.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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A Modal Logic and Hyperintensional Semantics for Gödelian Intuition.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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