- How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist.Daniel J. Singer - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):580-602.details
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(1 other version)Intention as Faith.Rae Langton - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:243-258.details
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice. Normore - 1998 - Vivarium 36 (1):23-39.details
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
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(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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(1 other version)No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Choice without Preference.N. Rescher - 1959 - Société Française de Philosophie, Bulletin 51:142.details
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Believing at Will is Possible.Rik Peels - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):1-18.details
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Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2014 - New York: Routledge.details
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Picking and Choosing.Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney Morgenbesser - 1977 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 44 (4):757-785.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Truth as the aim of epistemic justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Choice without preference. A study of the history and of the logic of the problem of “Buridan's ass”.Nicholas Rescher - 1960 - Kant Studien 51 (1-4):142-175.details
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Believing at Will.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (sup1):149-187.details
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``Evidence and Reasons for Belief".Richard Foley - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):98-102.details
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Why Is Belief Involuntary?Jonathan Bennett - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.details
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Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.details
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The Toxin Puzzle.Gregory S. Kavka - 1983 - Analysis 43 (1):33-36.details
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(1 other version)Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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The Internalist Conception of Justification.Alvin Goldman - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):27-51.details
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Intention.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.David Owens - 2002 - The Monist 85 (3):381-397.details
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(1 other version)The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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(1 other version)Believing at Will.Kieran Setiya - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):36-52.details
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The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)Self-deception and the nature of mind.Mark Johnston - 1994 - In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 63--91.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
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On the aim of belief.David Velleman - 1996 - In J. David Velleman (ed.), The Possibility of Practical Reason. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo). pp. 244--81.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
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Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.David Owens - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Tahafut Al-tahafut.Muhammad Averroës, Ghazzali & Uraybi - 1969 - Dar Al-Fikr Al-Lubnani.details
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Some Paradoxes of Counterprivacy.André Gombay - 1988 - Philosophy 63 (244):191 - 210.details
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