- (2 other versions)A causal theory of knowing.Alvin I. Goldman - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):357-372.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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(2 other versions)Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.details
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Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck.Adam Michael Bricker - 2019 - Synthese (8):1-18.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Against global method safety.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5101-5116.details
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Safety in Sosa.John Greco - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5147-5157.details
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Saving safety from counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5161-5185.details
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Knowledge and tracking revisited.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):396-405.details
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Global safety: how to deal with necessary truths.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2019 - Synthese 196 (3):1167-1186.details
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Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.details
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Epistemic Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (11):550-571.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(2 other versions)Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(4 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Research 29:191-220.details
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Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge.Kevin Wallbridge - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.details
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In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.details
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Worries about Pritchard’s safety.John Greco - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):299-302.details
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A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Tracking, closure, and inductive knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.details
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The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck.Kourken Michaelian - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2429-2456.details
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(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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(1 other version)Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.details
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(2 other versions)Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.details
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Skepticism and Contextualism.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s1):1-18.details
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(1 other version)How to defeat opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.details
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(1 other version)The proper role for contextualism in an anti-luck epistemology.Mark Heller - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:115-129.details
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Luminosity and the safety of knowledge.Ram Neta & Guy Rohrbaugh - 2004 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):396–406.details
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Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.details
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An analysis of factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):157-170.details
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Experience and factual knowledge.Peter Unger - 1967 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):152-173.details
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The causal indicator analysis of knowledge.Steven Luper-Foy - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (4):563-587.details
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Epistemic luck and the generality problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.details
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Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.details
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Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2879-2894.details
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(3 other versions)Précis of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.details
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(1 other version)The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.details
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(1 other version)An analysis of empirical knowledge.L. S. Carrier - 1971 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):3-11.details
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(2 other versions)The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck and the Purely Epistemic.Richard Foley - 1984 - American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (2).details
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