For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten (...) project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique» (Id 60/68). Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle (fonnale Anzeige). (shrink)

Mit den "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie" von 1913, von ihm selbst nur als eine "Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie" angezeigt, zog Edmund Husserl die Konsequenz aus seinen Logischen Untersuchungen (PhB 601), die ihn 1900/01 berühmt gemacht hatten: Ausgehend von der dort entwickelten Phänomenologie der intentionalen Erlebnisse sieht er jetzt in der Aufdeckung der Leistungen des "reinen Bewußtseins", dem die uns bekannte natürliche Welt nur als "Bewußtseinskorrelat" gegeben ist, den eigentlichen Gegenstand philosophischer Erkenntnis und in den (...) von ihm eingeführten methodologischen Begriffen der "Reduk tion" und der "Epoché" den Weg, sich über die Beschaffenheit dieses "reinen Bewußtseins", aus dem alle Erkenntnis entspringt, Klarheit zu verschaffen. Die Ausgabe bietet Husserls Schrift text- und seitengleich nach Band III/1 der Husserliana, herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann; beigegeben sind Husserls Nachwort zu den Ideen von 1930 aus Band V der Husserliana, herausgegeben von Marly Biemel, sowie ein umfangreiches Namen- und Sachregister von Elisabeth Ströker. (shrink)

This work is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth.

First published in 1988 as volume 63 of his Collected Works, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity is the text of Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Freiburg during the summer of 1923. In these lectures, Heidegger reviews and makes critical appropriations of the hermeneutic tradition from Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine to Schleiermacher and Dilthey in order to reformulate the question of being on the basis of facticity and the everyday world. Specific themes deal with the history of ontology, the development (...) of phenomenology and its relation to Hegelian dialectic, traditional theological and philosophical concepts of man, the present situation of philosophy, and the influences of Aristotle, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Husserl on Heidegger's thinking. Students of Heidegger will find initial breakthroughs in his unique elaboration of the meaning of human experience and the "question of being," which received mature expression in Being and Time. (shrink)

This work, the text of Martin Heidegger's lecture course of 1929/30, is crucial for an understanding of Heidegger's transition from the major work of his early years, Being and Time, to his later preoccupations with language, truth, and ...

Introduction to Phenomenological Research, volume 17 of Martin Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe, contains his first lectures given at Marburg in the winter semester of 1923–1924. In these lectures, Heidegger introduces the notion of phenomenology by tracing it back to Aristotle’s treatments of phainomenon and logos. This extensive commentary on Aristotle is an important addition to Heidegger’s ongoing interpretations which accompany his thinking during the period leading up to Being and Time. Additionally, these lectures develop critical differences between Heidegger’s phenomenology and that of (...) Descartes and Husserl and elaborate questions of facticity, everydayness, and flight from existence that are central in his later work. Here, Heidegger dismantles the history of ontology and charts a new course for phenomenology by defining and distinguishing his own methods. (shrink)

As an early articulation of Heidegger's thought, this book is an indispensable resource for scholars and students."--BOOK JACKET.

"... a major contribution to Heidegger scholarship..." —Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences "Van Buren’s portrayal of these formative years is striking and vital to all future Heidegger scholarship." —Christian Century "Van Buren presents a clear and cogent argument for the theory that Martin Heidegger’s mature thought, epitomized in Being and Time, actually was a return to his youthful theory and concerns.... Van Buren’s ability to present a rounded discussion while using Heidegger’s own technical vocabulary is highly commendable." —Library (...) Journal "... here at last is a work on the philosopher that is of fundamental philosophical-historical import. Van Buren’s book is both interesting and well written... " —Choice "... a readable, interesting, and first-rate book." —John D. Caputo A startling new reading of Martin Heidegger’s early thought leading up to Being and Time and its subsequent development in his later writings. (shrink)

In 1929, after rejecting the suggestion that contemporary Christians may be expected to feel "threatened" by Kierkegaard's criticisms, the Protestant theologian Gerhardt Kuhlmann remarks.

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic. The continuing publication of Husserl’s manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon (...) both Husserl’s published works and posthumous material, Husserl’s Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl’s thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking. (shrink)

Steven Crowell has been for many years a leading voice in debates on twentieth-century European philosophy. This volume presents thirteen recent essays that together provide a systematic account of the relation between meaningful experience and responsiveness to norms. They argue for a new understanding of the philosophical importance of phenomenology, taking the work of Husserl and Heidegger as exemplary, and introducing a conception of phenomenology broad enough to encompass the practices of both philosophers. Crowell discusses Husserl's analyses of first-person authority, (...) the semantics of conscious experience, the structure of perceptual content, and the embodied subject, and shows how Heidegger's interpretation of the self addresses problems in Husserl's approach to the normative structure of meaning. His volume will be valuable for upper-level students and scholars interested in phenomenological approaches to philosophical questions in both the European and the analytic traditions. (shrink)

Diese Ausgabe enthalt auch die in dem seit langerem vergriffenen Band "Vier Seminare" 1977 erstmals veroffentlichten Seminare, die Heidegger mit sieben franzosischen Gelehrten und dem Dichter Rene Char in Le Thor (1966, 1968 und 1969) und Zahringen (1973) abgehalten hat. Der Band fasst die zu Lebzeiten Martin Heideggers veroffentlichten Protokolle der Seminare zusammen, die er geleitet oder an denen er teilgenommen hat. Die Beschaffenheit der Texte ist verschieden, denn die Protokolle sind auf unterschiedliche Weise entstanden, wozu die Nachworte das Nahere (...) mitteilen. Der einzige Text, der eine eigene Handschrift Heideggers wiedergibt, ist die als "Nachtrag" zum letzten der "Vier Seminare" hier erstmals veroffentlichte Erlauterung zu einem Wort des Parmenides mit kurzer Vorbemerkung "Die Herkunft des Denkens". Eine Besonderheit des Bandes bilden die Textbeitrage, die von Seminarteilnehmern stammen, unter denen Eugen Fink mit der eigenen Heraklit-Interpretation den herausragenden Anteil hat. Die mit Franzosen abgehaltenen "Vier Seminare" vermitteln beilaufig einige Einblicke in Heideggers Beziehungen zum geistigen Frankreich und zu seinen wohl wichtigsten Freunden (und Ubersetzern), von denen Rene Char und Jean Beaufret am bekanntesten sind. Heidegger begegnet dem Leser hier im Dialog, als Leiter und Partner im Gesprach, dessen Wiedergabe oft eine eigene Lebendigkeit aus dem jeweiligen Eingehen auf die Teilnehmer gewinnt. Dieser andere Duktus der Texte unterscheidet die Seminare vom Stil der Vorlesungen und der veroffentlichten Schriften. Die Nachworte geben Aufschluss uber das Zustandekommen der einzelnen Seminare und der fruheren Protokoll-Veroffentlichungen; sie enthalten auch Hinweise auf die Teilnehmerkreise. (shrink)

Klarheit in betreff dieser Sätze anstrebt, d. i. Einsicht in das Wesen der bei dem Vollzug und den ideal-möglichen Anwendungen solcher Sätze ins Spiel tretenden Erkenntnisweisen und der mit diesen sich wesensmäßig konstituierenden Sinngebungen und objektiven Gel- 1 11 S tungen • Sprachliche Erörterungen gehören r nun sicherlich zu den 1 r philosophisch I unerläßlichen Vorbereitungen für den Aufbau der [A 4] reinen Logik, weil nur durch ihre Mithilfe die eigentlichen Objekte der logischen Forschung und, in weiterer Folge, die wesentlichen (...) Arten und Unterschiede dieser Objekte zu unmißverständlicher 10 Klarheit herauszuarbeiten sind. Es handelt sich dabei aber nicht um 12 grammatische Erörterungen im r empirischen, auf irgendeine historisch gegebene Sprache bezogenen Sinn, sondern um Erörterun gen jener allgemeinsten Art, die zur weiteren Sphäre einer objekti ven Theorie der Erkenntnis und, was damit innigst zusammen- 13 15 hängt, einer rreinen Phänomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse gehören. rDicse, wie die sie umspannende reine Phänomenologie der Erlebnisse überhaupt, hat es ausschließlich mit den in der Intuition erlaßbaren und analysierba ren Erlebnissen in reiner Wesensallgemeinheit zu tun, nicht aber mit 20 empirisch apperzipierten Erlebnissen als realen Fakten, als Erlebnis sen erlebender Menschen oder Tiere in der erscheinenden und als Erfahrungsfaktum gesetzten Welt. Die in der Wesensintuition direkt erfaßten Wesen und rein in den Wesen gründenden Zusammenhän ge bringt sie deskriptiv in Wesensbegriffen und gesetzlichen 25 Wesensaussagen zu reinem Ausdruck. Jede solche Aussage ist eine 1 14 apriorische im vorzüglichsten Sinne des Wortes. (shrink)

: This article contributes to the contemporary debate regarding the young Heidegger’s method of formal indication. Theodore Kisiel argues that this method constitutes a radical break with Husserl---a rejection of phenomenological reflection that paves the way to the non-reflective approach of the Beiträge. Against this view, Steven Crowell argues that formal indication is continuous with Husserlian phenomenology---a refinement of phenomenological reflection that reveals its existential sources. I evaluate this debate and adduce further considerations in favor of Crowell’s view. To do (...) so, I analyze the young Heidegger’s account of phenomenological communication and argue that it further reflects the continuity that Crowell identifies: as he does with reflection, Heidegger refines Husserl’s account of phenomenological communication and sheds light on its existential sources. (shrink)

"A magisterial accomplishment that will be the standard in this field for years to come."--John D. Caputo, Villanova University "Outstanding, entirely original, absolutely groundbreaking.... It is quite simply the best account to date--and the best we can expect for decades in the future--of the philosophical development of Heidegger's early thought."--Thomas Sheehan, Loyola University "A magisterial accomplishment that will be the standard in this field for years to come."--John D. Caputo, Villanova University.

The major part of this paper is devoted to the task of showing that Husserl's account of knowledge and truth in terms of a synthesis of fulfilment falls prey neither to a form of “metaphysics of presence” nor to a “myth of interiority” or mentalism. Husserl's presentation of the desire to know, his awareness of irreducible forms of absence at the heart of the intuitive presence of the object of knowledge and his formulation of general rules concerning the possible accomplishment (...) of a synthesis of fulfilment are therefore carefully examined. Special attention is also given to the fact that the determination of knowledge and truth provided by the Sixth Logical Investigation rests on an account of an original interweaving between the thing, consciousness, and language. Unlike in Husserl's earlier and later works, no attempt is thereby made to subordinate any of these three elements involved in all knowledge to one of the others. (shrink)

Publisher's description: The Phenomenology of Religious Life presents the text of Heidegger's important 1920621 lectures on religion. First published in 1995 as volume 60 of the Gesamtausgabe, the work reveals a young Heidegger searching for the striking language that eventually formed the mature expression of his thought. The volume consists of the famous lecture course "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion," a course on "Augustine and Neoplatonism," and notes for a course on "The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism" that was (...) never delivered. Heidegger's engagements with Aristotle, St. Paul, Augustine, and Luther give readers a sense of what phenomenology would come to mean in his later works. Here, Heidegger reveals an impressive display of theological knowledge, protecting Christian life experience from Greek philosophy and defending Paul against Nietzsche. The appearance of this first English translation marks a significant event in Heidegger scholarship and affords a unique look into his phenomenology. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that Heidegger, contrary to the view of many scholars, in fact endorsed a view of truth as a sort of correspondence. I first show how it is a mistake to take Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealment' as a definition of propositional truth. It is thus not only possible but also essential to disambiguate Heidegger's use of the word 'truth', which he occasionally used to refer to both truth as it is ordinarily understood and unconcealment understood as (...) the condition of the possibility of truth. I then show how Heidegger accepted that propositional truth, or 'correctness', as he sometimes called it, consists in our utterances or beliefs corresponding to the way things are. Heidegger's objection to correspondence theories of truth was not directed at the notion of correspondence as such, but rather at the way in which correspondence is typically taken to consist in an agreement between representations and objects. Indeed, Heidegger took his account of unconcealment as explaining how it is possible for propositions to correspond to the world, thus making unconcealment the ground of propositional truth. I conclude by discussing briefly some of the consequences for Heidegger interpretation which follow from a correct understanding of Heidegger's notion of propositional truth. (shrink)

For Heidegger, phenomenological investigation is carried out by formal indication, the name given to the methodical approach he assumes in Being and Time. This paper attempts to draw attention to the nature of formal indication in light of the fact that it has been largely lost upon American scholarship (mainly due to its inconsistent translation). The roots of the concept of formal indication are shown in two ways. First, its thematic treatment in Heidegger's 1921/22 Winter Semester course, Phenomenological Investigations into (...) Aristotle, is examined to make clear what Heidegger silently assumes in Being and Time. Second, Heidegger's adaptation of Husserl's use of the term, indication, is outlined to clarify the concept even more. The enhanced understanding of formal indication granted by these two points leads to a better grasp of Heidegger's concept of truth, for formal indication and truth are mutually implied for Heidegger. Finally, it is suggested that the reader of Being and Time, on the basis of what formal indication demands, approach the work not as a doctrine to be learned but as a task always requiring further completion. (shrink)

For Husserl, the natural attitude - and hence any further explication of it - is put out of play, bracketed by the phenomenological epoché, which, of course, is not to deny its existence, but only to turn our theoretical gaze elsewhere. As Husserl remarks, “the single facts, the facticity of the natural world taken universally, disappear from our theoretical regard” (Id 60/68). The project of the young Heidegger, I will argue, is precisely a concern with facticity, taking up this forgotten (...) project in phenomenology, and thus attempting an explication of the natural attitude, considered so “extraordinarily important” by Husserl. Heidegger thus effects something of a relocation of phenomenology, turning its analysis to a different site: pretheoretical experience. Further, Heidegger also seeks to honor the precognitive nature of this pretheoretical experience, or what he will call faktische Lebenserfahrung. As such, the young Heidegger is very concerned with Husserl’s “theoreticization” of factical life. To avoid the same in his ‘new’phenomenology, Heidegger must develop a new conceptuality: the “formal indication” (formale Anzeige).Selon Husserl, l’attitude naturelle - et toute explication de celle-ci - est mise hors d’usage, mise entre parenthèses par l’epoche, laquelle ne nie pas son existence, mais fait détourner notre regard théorique. Comme le remarque Husserl: «les faits singuliers, la facticité du monde naturel pris dans son universalité, disparaissent de notre regard théorique» (Id 60/68). Je soutiendrai que le projet du jeune Heidegger consiste précisément en une préoccupation de la facticité, reprenant ainsi un projet oublié de la phénoménologie, et tâchant ainsi d’expliquer l’attitude naturelle, si «extraordinairement importante» aux yeux de Husserl. Ainsi, Heidegger institue une sorte de redéfinition de la phénoménologie, fixant son analyse à un lieu différent: l’expérience préthéorique. De plus, Heidegger cherche é reconnaître la nature précognitive de cette experience préthéorique, ou ce qu’il appellera faktische Lebenserfahrung. Ainsi, Heidegger est hautement préoccupé par la «théorisation» husserlienne de la vie factuelle. Pour éviterune telle chose dans sa «nouvelle» phénoménologie, Heidegger doit développer une conceptualisation nouvelle: l’indication formelle (fonnale Anzeige). (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to criticize the reification of language present in Heidegger’s writings after the Kehre . The steps of the argument are as follows. First, it is argued that the specific features of Heidegger’s conception of language after the Kehre can be traced back to Heidegger’s conception of the ontological difference in Being and Time . The common element in both conceptions is the assumption that meaning determines reference (i.e. that the way entities are understood determines which (...) entities we can refer to). In the next step the implications of this assumption are shown through an analysis of Heidegger’s conception of designation in Being and Time and after the Kehre . Finally, this conception of designation is criticized with the help of the analysis of designation offered by the so-called theories of direct reference. Key Words: Donnellan • Heidegger • language • linguistic idealism • meaning • ontological difference • reference • referential/attributive distinction. (shrink)

The first English translation of one of Heidegger's most important early lecture courses, including his most extensive treatment of the topic of destruction.

In der Vorlesung des Sommersemesters 1927 unter dem Titel Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie nimmt Martin Heidegger eine Neue Ausarbeitung des 3. Abschnitts des I. Teiles von 'Sein und Zeit' in Angriff. Der Gesamtbestand der Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie in ihrer Systematik und Begrundung besteht in der Diskussion der Grundfrage nach dem Sinn von Sein uberhaupt und der aus ihr entspringenden Probleme. Die so gekennzeichnete Thematik von Zeit und Sein wird auf dem Umweg einer phanomenologischen Erorterung von vier geschichtlichen Thesen uber das (...) Sein behandelt. Die phanomenologisch-kritische Diskussion dieser Thesen fuhrt zu der Einsicht, dass allem zuvor die Grundfrage nach dem Sinn von Sein uberhaupt beantwortet sein muss, um die aus den vier geschichtlichen Thesen herausgeschalten vier Grundprobleme in zureichender Weise systematisch ausarbeiten zu konnen. Wer Sein und Zeit als einen Weg zur Ausarbeitung der Seinsfrage uberhaupt als dem Ziel studiert, bleibt auf Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie verwiesen. (shrink)

Winner of 2002 Edward Goodwin Ballard Prize In a penetrating and lucid discussion of the enigmatic relationship between the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, Steven Galt Crowell proposes that the distinguishing feature of twentieth-century philosophy is not so much its emphasis on language as its concern with meaning. Arguing that transcendental phenomenology is indispensable to the philosophical explanation of the space of meaning, Crowell shows how a proper understanding of both Husserl and Heidegger reveals the distinctive contributions of (...) each to that ongoing phenomenological project. (shrink)

Heidegger hielt die unter dem Titel Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs angekundigte Vorlesung im Sommer-Semester 1925 in der Marburger Universitat. Er gelangte jedoch nicht mehr zur Ausfuhrung der zentralen Thematik. Der Themenkreis der Vorlesung ist mit der Nennung des Untertitels abgesteckt: Prolegomena zu einer Phanomenologie von Geschichte und Natur. Heideggers thematische Uberlegungen beginnen mit einer Kennzeichnung der Situation von Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der zweiten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts und stellen das seiner Deutung nach entscheidende Ereignis dieser Zeit heraus: den Durchbruch der (...) Phanomenologie als philosophische Forschung. Er untersucht ihre wesentlichen Entdeckungen, verteidigt sie gegen Missverstandnisse, um dann seinerseits Kritik vorzubringen, wo die Phanomenologie ihrer Forderung zu den Sachen selbst nicht gerecht wird. (shrink)

Theodore Kisiel's outstanding translation premits English-speaking readers to appreciate the central importance of this text in the development of Heidegger's thought.

Die im Wintersemester 1929/30 an der Freiburger Universität vierstündig gehaltene Vorlesung ist in zweierlei Hinsicht erregend. Zum einen enthält sie eine breit durchgeführte Analyse der in der Freiburger Antrittsvorlesung 'Was ist Metaphysik?' nur gestreiften Langeweile, zum anderen bietet sie eine ebenso ausführliche Wesensbestimmung des Organismus und des Lebens - eine Thematik, die Heidegger in 'Sein und Zeit', § 12, nur benennt. 'Diese Vorlesung ist wohl die bedeutendste, die Heidegger gehalten hat, und schon fast ein zweites Hauptwerk.' Rüdiger Safranski.