- (2 other versions)A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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(2 other versions)A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.details
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(1 other version)The Nature of Intrinsic Value.N. Lemos - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):587-590.details
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The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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Praise, blame, obligation, and DWE: Toward a framework for classical supererogation and kin.Paul McNamara - 2011 - Journal of Applied Logic 9 (2):153-170.details
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Treatise of Human Nature.L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) - 1739 - Oxford University Press.details
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Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics.R. M. Chisholm - 1963 - Ratio (Misc.) 5 (1):1.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2001 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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Evidentialism, internalism, disjunctivism.Duncan Pritchard - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Justified Inference.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):273-295.details
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Evaluative vs. Deontic Concepts.Christine Tappolet - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 1791-99.details
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Weakness of Will.Christine Tappolet - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 4412-21.details
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``Norms of Assertion".Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)``Chisholm and the Ethics of Belief".Roderick Firth - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):493-506.details
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(1 other version)Strong and Weak Justification.Alvin Goldman - 1987 - In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing. pp. 51-71.details
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Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation.William P. Alston - 2005 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.details
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Why responsible belief is blameless belief.Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.details
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Fittingness: The sole normative primitive.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):684 - 704.details
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Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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Shades of goodness: gradability, demandingness and the structure of moral theories.Rob Lawlor - 2009 - Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Reason and Belief in God.Alvin Plantinga - 1983 - In Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 16-93.details
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Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God.Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.) - 1983 - University of Notre Dame Press.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic value.Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.) - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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There is immediate justification.James Pryor - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 181--202.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.details
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A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue.Matthias Steup (ed.) - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Internalism and epistemically responsible belief.John Greco - 1990 - Synthese 85 (2):245 - 277.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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(1 other version)Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.details
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(1 other version)Chisholm and the ethics of belief.Roderick Firth - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (4):493-506.details
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The suberogatory.Julia Driver - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):286 – 295.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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(1 other version)Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.details
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