- Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
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Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 126-145.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Could've Thought Otherwise.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12).details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.details
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The Fallacy of Calibrationism.Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):247-260.details
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The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.details
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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The Merits of Incoherence.James Pryor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):112-141.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Bayes, Bounds, and Rational Analysis.Thomas F. Icard - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (1):79-101.details
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Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 277-294.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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On the principle of total evidence.Irving John Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):319-321.details
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How to Be A Reliabilist.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):346-374.details
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(1 other version)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.details
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Process reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Reliability Theories of Justified Credence.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):63-94.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?Jonathan Matheson & Brandon Carey - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 131-149.details
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One and Done? Optimal Decisions From Very Few Samples.Edward Vul, Noah Goodman, Thomas L. Griffiths & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (4):599-637.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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(1 other version)Goldman on Evidence and Reliability.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):205-223.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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It Is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, for Anyone, to Believe Anything upon Insufficient Evidence.Peter van Inwagen - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder & Jeff Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 137-154.details
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“Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?Roderick Firth - 1978 - In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Values and Morals. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 215-229.details
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Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):294-312.details
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A Vindication of the Equal Weight View.Tomas Bogardus - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):324-335.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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(1 other version)Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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