La finalidad del presente ensayo consiste en partir de las nociones interrelacionadas de "capitalismo mundial integrado" (Guattari) y de "sociedad de control" (Deleuze) para intentar una deriva que cruce géneros, épocas y nombres propios: de la filosofía al cine y a la poesía (caminos de ida y vuelta), de Benjamin a Serres pasando por Homero, Kavafis, Cioran o Godard, del tardío imperio romano y sus incertidumbres a la imprecisión de nuestro propio tiempo. Posiblemente, pensar hoy la identidad humana sea como (...) nunca antes un asunto de mezcla, de viaje a través de territorios viejos que demandan una nueva cartografía. -/- The purpose of this essay is to depart from the interrelated notions of "whole global capitalism" (Guattari) and the "control society" (Deleuze) to attempt a drift across genders, epochs and proper names: from philosophy to cinema and poetry (roundtrip roads), from Benjamin to Serres, passing through Homer, Kavafis, Cioran or Godard, from the late Roman empire and its uncertainties to our own time. Possibly, thinking today about human identity is as never before, a matter of mixture, of travel through old territories that demand new maps. (shrink)

In 1601 certain Jesuits in Alcalá de Henares defended the following thesis: «It is not by faith that we confess that this man, for example, Clement VIII, is Pope.» During 1602 this fact became known in Rome and the Pope urged that the Spanish Inquisition imprison these Jesuits. To defend themselves, they alleged that the thesis was not unusual among scholars, indicating the names of several authors who defended it, among them, the eminent professor emeritus of Salamanca Domingo Báñez. (...) However, he convened an academic act in Valladolid on July 2, 1602 to show that his position was not such. Shortly thereafter, the Jesuits held another event in the same town to challenge the thesis of their coreligionists, underscoring their opposition even more than Báñez. New, partly unknown material on the subject is copied in these pages: the letters from the nuncio to the head of the Vatican State, with annotations written by the Pope, and a letter from the King of Spain to his ambassador; the complete text of the theses defended by Báñez and by the Jesuits in July 1602, as well as two unpublished letters from Báñez on the occasion of his act, one to the master general of his Order and the other to the Pope. (shrink)

This unpublished manuscript of the Spanish Dominican Domingo Báñez reflects his personal account of the proceedings held during July 1602 in Valladolid in defense of his own doctrine against suspicious theses formulated by some Jesuits from Alcalá de Henares the previous March. The Jesuits denied that the adhesion of faith to the Roman Pontiff included him as a specific man, e.g. Pope Clement VIII. In support of their thesis, they provided the authority of Báñez. The Dominican theologian clarified (...) in Valladolid that the fact that Clement VIII was Pope did belong to the faith indeed but not in a primary and immediate sense, although this was later supported by other Jesuits in a third session held a few days later, again in Valladolid. (shrink)

The “theses of Alcalá” were two controversial statements defended by certain Jesuits at the University of Alcalá de Henares in 1601. One of them was perceived by the Pope as particularly offensive: “It does not belong to Faith that this concrete man, for example, Clement VIII, is the Roman Pontiff”. When Pope Clement learned of this theological act, the Spanish Inquisition intervened, since it attempted to prevent the Supreme Pontiff from reserving the cause for himself. In this (...) article, we delve into these events thanks to several hitherto unpublished manuscripts. Among these documents we highlight several by F. Peña, a Spaniard who interpreted this statement as a subterfuge by the Society of Jesus to avoid the supposedly imminent condemnation of Luis de Molina, a Jesuit whose book on divine predestination and human freedom was being examined in Rome at the time. The documents transcribed here provide us with new details, such as the precise text of the conclusions defended in Alcalá. In addition, it is noteworthy that Peña was the first to understand correctly the position of the Dominican Domingo Báñez, because according to him it does belong to faith that Clement VIII is Pope, even though not in a primary way. (shrink)

Unlike Heidegger who reflects on the relationship between being and time, we are interested in studying the relationship between doing and time. We begin by discovering that the basis of people's doing is the starting point for any reflection on society and culture, and therefore we believe that our conclusions can be important especially for sociologists, ethnologists, political scientists, economists and psychologists. A fundamental difference between "doing" and "acting" could be that only people, not things, "do". We say "Antonio (...) made his house out of bricks to prevent the wind from blowing it down". We never refer to the "action of the wind" as a "doing". Acting, especially in "action," is erroneously associated with causation; we think, "the action of the wind on the house, is the cause of the collapse of the house." But in reality, causation is only a variant of doing. For example, in "Susanna writes a letter to Paul", Susanna is the cause of the text of the letter, but not of the reading of the letter. This is a paradigmatic example, the one that gave rise to our study. We say that the text "attracts its reader", as the poles of a magnet attract each other. From which we concluded that it is impossible to keep secrets. The importance of the study of doing in general becomes very relevant when we understand that "producing" and "consuming" are variants of doing. In Marx's work, the doing that generates social value is productive doing. But our research shows that all variants of doing generate order and all "order" generates organizational value. Note that the order of an act can be measured in "bits", which frees us from subjective measurements of the value of what we do in "money". We anticipate here that, in the following pages, we arrive at the conclusion that doing can be divided into 6 types of acts and their subgroups: the vectorial independent and hodern acts and the pendular complementary, parallel, curative and causa-dor acts. In addition, we discovered the existence of inter-acts, i.e. the "organizational resonance of the poles of a pendular act" and which includes the self-referent, bipolar, tripolar and multipole variants. This book could not have been written, without the background of the works already published and elaborated jointly, with Professor Luis de Marcos Ortega between 2018 and 2021. We refer to The Informational Foundation of the Human Act and Whispers and Shouts. The Informational Measurement of the Human Act both published by the University of Alcalá (Madrid). The texts of this book were published in weekly installments between May 2020 and December 2021, in the GaZeta portal of Guatemala. We have respected the chronological order of publication, as well as the contents of the articles. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is twofold. First, it provides a quick look at the foundations of modern relational mechanics by tracing its development from Julian Barbour and Bruno Bertotti's original ideas until present-day's pure shape dynamics. Secondly, it discusses the most appropriate metaphysics for pure shape dynamics, showing that relationalism is more of a nuanced thesis rather than an elusive one. The chapter ends with a brief assessment of the prospects of pure shape dynamics in light of quantum physics.

This paper analyzes the specific shift in the meaning of “civilization” that took place in texts and documents of early American philosophical naturalism. Particularly, it will focus on the specific role that naturalization plays in the edification of a newly secularized, science-oriented, and democratic society, as well as of a naturalized conception of culture and civilization. Indeed, as the work of many philosophers and intellectuals of the Forties highlights, naturalism represents not only the banner of a new idea of civilization, (...) but at the same time becomes the symbol of a powerful postwar ideology. (shrink)

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual (...) structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation. (shrink)

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA[ 48]) are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [59]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and reasoning are (...) also available [34]. In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a framework developed by Peter G¨ardenfors [24] more than fifteen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by G¨ardenfors [23] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one. In particular we focus on the advantages offered by Conceptual Spaces (w.r.t. symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches) in dealing with the problem of compositionality of representations based on typicality traits. Additionally, we argue that Conceptual Spaces could offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical representations. As a consequence, their adoption could also favor the integration of diagrammatical representation and reasoning in CAs. (shrink)

This paper elaborates on relationalism about space and time as motivated by a minimalist ontology of the physical world: there are only matter points that are individuated by the distance relations among them, with these relations changing. We assess two strategies to combine this ontology with physics, using classical mechanics as example: the Humean strategy adopts the standard, non-relationalist physical theories as they stand and interprets their formal apparatus as the means of bookkeeping of the change of the distance relations (...) instead of committing us to additional elements of the ontology. The alternative theory strategy seeks to combine the relationalist ontology with a relationalist physical theory that reproduces the predictions of the standard theory in the domain where these are empirically tested. We show that, as things stand, this strategy cannot be accomplished without compromising a minimalist relationalist ontology. (shrink)

We defend, from a contractarian perspective, that the fair price of an insurance policy is the amount that the contracting parties agree when they are both equally uncertain about the insured event. Drawing on the approach developed by R. Sugden in _The Community of Advantage_, we answer two standard objections raised against contractarianism in the actuarial sciences: (1) people are not wise enough to assess their actuarial risks; (2) they are not rational enough to decide which insurance policy suits them (...) better. We show under which circumstances people can make fair actuarial agreements, without presupposing any objective risk or rationality benchmarks. (shrink)

Commonsense reasoning is one of the main open problems in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) while, on the other hand, seems to be a very intuitive and default reasoning mode in humans and other animals. In this talk, we discuss the different paradigms that have been developed in AI and Computational Cognitive Science to deal with this problem (ranging from logic-based methods, to diagrammatic-based ones). In particular, we discuss - via two different case studies concerning commonsense categorization and knowledge (...) invention tasks - how cognitively inspired heuristics can help (both in terms of efficiency and efficacy) in the realization of intelligent artificial systems able to reason in a human-like fashion, with results comparable to human-level performances. (shrink)

This paper presents a practical case study showing how, despite the nowadays limited collaboration between AI and Cognitive Science (CogSci), cognitive research can still have an important role in the development of novel AI technologies. After a brief historical introduction about the reasons of the divorce between AI and CogSci research agendas (happened in the mid’80s of the last century), we try to provide evidence of a renewed collaboration by showing a recent case study on a commonsense reasoning system, built (...) by using insights from cognitive semantics. (shrink)

Consider a gas confined to the left half of a container. Then remove the wall separating the two parts. The gas will start spreading and soon be evenly distributed over the entire available space. The gas has approached equilibrium. Why does the gas behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the system has to be ergodic for the approach to equilibrium to take place. This answer has been criticised on different grounds (...) and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that these criticisms have dismissed Boltzmann’s answer too quickly and that something almost like Boltzmann’s answer is true: the approach to equilibrium takes place if the system is epsilon-ergodic, i.e. ergodic on the entire accessible phase space except for a small region of measure epsilon. We introduce epsilon-ergodicity and argue that relevant systems in statistical mechanics are indeed espsilon-ergodic. (shrink)

Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...) Lieto illustrates how the cognitive design approach has an important role to play in the development of intelligent AI technologies and plausible computational models of cognition. Introducing a unique perspective that draws upon Cybernetics and early AI principles, Lieto emphasizes the need for an equivalence between cognitive processes and implemented AI procedures, in order to realise biologically and cognitively inspired artificial minds. He also introduces the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a pragmatic method to rank the different degrees of biologically and cognitive accuracy of artificial systems in order project and predict their explanatory power with respect to the natural systems taken as source of inspiration. -/- Providing a comprehensive overview of cognitive design principles in constructing artificial minds, this text will be essential reading for students and researchers of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build arti cial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the (...) comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the fi nal part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the artificial components of hybrid bionic systems do not play a direct explanatory role, i.e., in simulative terms, in the overall context of the systems in which they are embedded in. More precisely, I claim that the internal procedures determining the output of such artificial devices, replacing biological tissues and connected to other biological tissues, cannot be used to directly explain the corresponding mechanisms of the biological component(s) they substitute (and therefore cannot be used (...) to explain the local mechanisms determining an overall biological or cognitive function replicated by such bionic models). I ground this analysis on the use of the Minimal Cognitive Grid (MCG), a novel framework proposed in Lieto (Cognitive design for artificial minds, 2021) to rank the epistemological and explanatory status of biologically and cognitively inspired artificial systems. Despite the lack of such a direct mechanistic explanation from the artificial component, however, I also argue that the hybrid bionic systems can have an indirect explanatory role similar to the one played by some AI systems built by using an overall structural design approach (but including the partial adoption of functional components). In particular, the artificial replacement of part(s) of a biological system can provide i) a local functional account of that part(s) in the context of the overall functioning of the hybrid biological–artificial system and ii) global insights about the structural mechanisms of the biological elements connected to such artificial devices. (shrink)

In this work we present an explainable system for emotion attribution and recommendation (called DEGARI (Dynamic Emotion Generator And ReclassIfier) relying on a recently introduced probabilistic commonsense reasoning framework (i.e. the TCL logic, see Lieto & Pozzato 2020) which is based on a human-like procedure for the automatic generation of novel concepts in a Description Logics knowledge base (see also Lieto et al. 2019, Chiodino et al. 2020 for other applications). In particular, in order to model human-like forms of concept (...) combinations, the TCL logic combines a probabilistic description logics of typicality with the HEAD-MODIFIER heuristics coming from cognitive semantics. In the context of our application of such framework, our system exploits the logic TCL to automatically generate novel commonsense semantic representations of compound emotions (e.g. Love as derived from the combination of Joy and Trust according to Plutchik’s theory of emotions, see Plutchik 2001). The generated emotions corresponds to prototypes, i.e. commonsense representations of given concepts, and have been used to reclassify emotion-related contents in a variety of artistic domains. We have tested our system in the context of the H2020 EU project SPICE for providing artistic recommendations of museum items in the Galleria di Arte Moderna (GAM) of Turin. The obtained results (reported in Lieto et al, 2021 and Lieto at al., to appear) show promising results for what concerns both the acceptance of the provided affective recommendation and the explainability associated to each suggestion made by the users. Here we discuss, the open problems and the lessons learned. -/- . (shrink)

The paper presents the heterogeneous proxytypes hypothesis as a cognitively-inspired computational framework able to reconcile, in both natural and artificial systems, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning that have been traditionally seen as incompatible. In particular, through the Dual PECCS system and its evolution, it shows how prototypes, exemplars and theory-theory like conceptual representations can be integrated in a cognitive artificial agent (thus extending its categorization capabilities) and, in addition, can provide useful insights in the context of (...) a computationally grounded science of the mind. (shrink)

One of the symbolic images to which Leibniz constantly entrusted the synthesis of his philosophy regards the idea of considering one and the same city from various visual perspectives. Such an image is diffused throughout all Leibniz’s writings and clearly reflects the philosopher’s interest for matters regarding perspective as well as optical phenomena. The point of view of its inhabitants can therefore be compared to a mirror that reflects some different portions of reality. But what do the city-viewers really see? (...) Do they all see exactly the same thing? And assuming the plurality of points of view, how one can be sure that they share the same representative content? The paper presented here tries to offer a plausible interpretation of this topic also by linking different and somehow remote Leibnizian doctrines together. (shrink)

Invited Lecture at the SRM ACM Student Chapter, India, on Cognitive Heuristics for Commonsense Thinking and Reasoning in the next generation Artificial Intelligence. The lecture proposes a historical and technical overview of strategies for commonsense reasoning in AI.

We intoduce a novel extension of Description Logics (DLs) of typicality by means of probabilities able to represent and reason about typical properties and defeasible inheritance in DLs.

We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.

A 3rd person Knowledge Level analysis of cognitive architectures -/- Abstract I provide a knowledge level analysis of the main representational and reasoning problems affecting the cognitive architectures for what concerns this issue. In providing this analysis I will show, by considering some of the main cognitive architectures currently available (e.g. SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION), how one of the main problems of such architectures is represented by the fact that their knowledge representation and processing mechanisms are not sufficiently constrained with “structural (...) insights” (Lieto 2021) coming from cognitive science for dealing with commonsense knowledge and reasoning (Lebiere, Oltramari, 2018). As a possible way out to such knowledge processing issues, I present the main assumptions that have led to the development of the Dual PECCS categorization system (Lieto, Radicioni, Rho 2017) and discuss some of the lessons learned and their possible implications in the design of the knowledge modules and knowledge-processing mechanisms of integrated cognitive architectures. (shrink)

Combining typical knowledge to generate novel concepts is an important creative trait of human cognition. Dealing with such ability requires, from an AI perspective, the harmonization of two conflicting requirements that are hardly accommodated in symbolic systems: the need of a syntactic compositionality (typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typicality effects (see Frixione and Lieto, 2012). In this work we provide a logical framework able to account for this type of human-like concept combination. We propose (...) a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality called TCL (Typicality-based Compositional Logic). (shrink)

O artigo parte do consenso sobre a facto de que a arte tem valor para a exploração dos vários problemas sobre esse valor cujas soluções dividem os filósofos da arte. O enfoque é especialmente sobre a dimensão mais actual do debate em torno do tema, que se debruça não tanto sobre questões como o realismo quanto aos valores estéticos e a objectividade e justificação dos juízos de valor estético, mas acima de tudo sobre a natureza do valor artístico – que (...) tipo de valor é e em que propriedades da arte (se nalguma) reside. (shrink)

Exploramos aquí la conexión entre los conceptos de riesgo e igualdad en el argumento del observador imparcial. La concepción de la justicia que elegiría un observador imparcial se justifica por la pureza del procedimiento de elección. Sin embargo, si modelizamos esta decisión utilizando medidas del riesgo habituales en matemática financiera, veremos cómo el criterio de elección del observador bajo el velo de la ignorancia contiene una preferencia implícita por el grado de desigualdad resultante. Esto nos obliga a reconsiderar la pureza (...) procedimental de la elección. (shrink)

The mental rotation ability is an essential spatial reasoning skill in human cognition and has proven to be an essential predictor of mathematical and STEM skills, critical and computational thinking. Despite its importance, little is known about when and how mental rotation processes are activated in games explicitly targeting spatial reasoning tasks. In particular, the relationship between spatial abilities and TetrisTM has been analysed several times in the literature. However, these analyses have shown contrasting results between the effectiveness of Tetris-based (...) training activities to improve mental rotation skills. In this work, we studied whether, and under what conditions, such ability is used in the TetrisTM game by explicitly modelling mental rotation via an ACT-R based cognitive model controlling a virtual agent. The obtained results show meaningful insights into the activation of mental rotation during game dynamics. The study suggests the necessity to adapt game dynamics in order to force the activation of this process and, therefore, can be of inspiration to design learning activities based on TetrisTM or re-design the game itself to improve its educational effectiveness. (shrink)

I will present the rationale followed for the conceptualization and the following development the Dual PECCS system that relies on the cognitively grounded heterogeneous proxytypes representational hypothesis [Lieto 2014]. Such hypothesis allows integrating exemplars and prototype theories of categorization as well as theory-theory [Lieto 2019] and has provided useful insights in the context of cognitive modelling for what concerns the typicality effects in categorization [Lieto, 2021]. As argued in [Lieto et al., 2018b] a pivotal role in this respect is played (...) by the use of the conceptual spaces framework and by its integration with a symbolic knowledge representation layer. (shrink)

The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it being useful at all. This paper is devoted to bringing a modicum of order to the chaos through the time-honored device of categorization. The chief purpose of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive descriptive taxonomy of the nuanced ways the term attention may be employed. It is presented in table form, followed by elucidations and illustrations of each of its items. But (...) first, I offer reasons why a taxonomy of attention is needed and explore some of its possible benefits. After presenting the taxonomy, I sketch by way of example how it might be applied to two interesting questions: is the umbrella term attention still useful?; and, what is it that ties the subdefinitions of attention together yet distinguishes them from other kinds of cognition? (shrink)

The paper discusses the possible implications of the relational framework of Pure Shape Dynamics for the metaphysics of time. The starting point of the analysis is an interpretation of shapes in ontic structural realist terms, which gives rise to the notion of self-subsisting structure. The relational version of a Newtonian-particle toy model is introduced and discussed as a concrete example.

Авторами розглянуто вплив провідних світових кредитних рейтингових агентств на фінансову безпеку емітентів цінних паперів. Обґрунтовано перформативний характер діяльності кредитних рейтингових агентств з позицій моделі «Les economies de la grandeur» нового соціологічного французького інституціоналізму, що дає змогу розв’язати протиріччя щодо сильної опозиції стосовно їх функціонування з одночасним збереженням діючої системи нормативного використання кредитних рейтингів.

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC + TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the (...) form p :: T(C) v D, whose intuitive meaning is that “we believe with degree p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds”. As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then exploit such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC. (shrink)

Inventing novel knowledge to solve problems is a crucial, creative, mechanism employed by humans, to extend their range of action. In this paper, we present TCL (typicality-based compositional logic): a probabilistic, non monotonic extension of standard Description Logics of typicality, and will show how this framework is able to endow artificial systems of a human-like, commonsense based, concept composition procedure that allows its employment in a number of applications (ranging from computational creativity to goal-based reasoning to recommender systems and affective (...) computing). -/- The framework relies on 3 main ingredients: a non monotonic extension of standard Description Logics (allowing to reason on exceptions to inheritance in standard knowledge bases) a probabilistic extension coming from the field of logic programming (the DISPONTE semantics) a cognitive heuristics known ad HEAD-Modifier determining preference rules for the inheritance mechanisms of the novel concepts to be generated via commonsense rules. -/- We report the obtained results and the lessons learned of this research path in the context of model-based AI applications. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper we present a framework for the dynamic and automatic generation of novel knowledge obtained through a process of commonsense reasoning based on typicality-based concept combination. We exploit a recently introduced extension of a Description Logic of typicality able to combine prototypical descriptions of concepts in order to generate new prototypical concepts and deal with problem like the PET FISH (Osherson and Smith, 1981; Lieto & Pozzato, 2019). Intuitively, in the context of our application of this logic, the (...) overall pipeline of our system works as follows: given a goal expressed as a set of properties, if the knowledge base does not contain a concept able to fulfill all these properties, then our system looks for two concepts to recombine in order to extend the original knowledge based satisfy the goal. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or injecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the (...) automatic and creative re-framing, or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling procedures. (shrink)

The proposal of moral enhancement as a valuable means to face the environmental, technological and social challenges that threaten the future of humanity has been criticized by a number of authors. One of the main criticisms has been that moral enhancement would diminish our freedom. It has been said that moral enhancement would lead enhanced people to lose their ‘freedom to fall’, that is, it would prevent them from being able to decide to carry out some morally bad actions, and (...) the possibility to desire and carry out these bad actions is an essential ingredient of free will, which would thus be limited or destroyed—or so the argument goes. In this paper we offer an answer to this criticism. We contend that a morally enhanced agent could lose the ‘freedom to fall’ without losing her freedom for two reasons. First, because we do not consider that a morally well-educated person, for whom the ‘freedom to fall’ is a remote option, is less free than an evildoer, and there is no reason to suppose that bioenhancement introduces a significant difference here. Second, because richness in the amount of alternative possibilities of action may be restored if the stated loss is compensated with an improvement in sensitivity and lucidity that can lead to seeing new options and nuances in the remaining possible actions. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of combining prototypical concepts, an open problem in the fields of AI and cognitive modelling. Our logic extends the logic of typicality ALC + TR, based on the notion of rational closure, by inclusions p :: T(C) v D (“we have probability p that typical Cs are Ds”), coming from the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics. Additionally, it embeds a set of cognitive heuristics for concept (...) combination. We show that the complexity of reasoning in our logic is EXPTIME-complete as in ALC. (shrink)

Artikel zur Kriegsphilosophie des Militärtheoretikers Carl von Clausewitz.

In questo contributo descriviamo un sistema di creatività computazionale in grado di generare automaticamente nuovi concetti utilizzando una logica descrittiva non monotòna che integra tre ingredienti principali: una logica descrittiva della tipicalità, una estensione probabilistica basata sulla semantica distribuita nota come DISPONTE, e una euristica di ispirazione cognitiva per la combinazione di più concetti. Una delle applicazioni principali del sistema riguarda il campo della creatività computazionale e, più specificatamente, il suo utilizzo come sistema di supporto alla creatività in ambito mediale. (...) In particolare, tale sistema è in grado di: generare nuove storie (a partire da una rappresentazione narrativa di storie pre-esistenti), generare nuovi personaggi (ad es. il nuovo “cattivo” di una serie tv o di un cartone animato) e, in generale, può essere utilizzato per proporre nuove soluzioni e format narrativi da esplorare nell’ambito dell’industria creativa. (shrink)

One of the most interesting aspects of Leibniz's philosophy is the distinction between "art" and "nature"; the core of this matter is the possibility (or even the impossibility) of distinguishing as clearly as possible between two ontological domains: on one hand the products of technique (such as "artificial machines"), on the other hand all the beings that can be defined as natural ("natural machines"). The question raised in this paper is if it is possibile to build ontological criteria which can (...) be clear enough to distinguish between the products of nature and those of technique in the field of the "res" that they are. (shrink)

Character and the will are rarely discussed together. At most, philosophers working on the one mention the other in an eliminativist vein—if character is represented as something chosen, for example, it can be chalked up to the work of the will; if the will consists merely of a certain arrangement of mental states, it can be seen as little more than a manifestation of character. This mutual neglect appears perfectly justified. If both character and will are determinants of action, to (...) treat them separately would be to overdetermine agency at best, and at worst to fragment it. While defending this reasoning, I argue that things are not so simple, because character and will serve distinct explanatory and normative functions, respectively. The difference in function, however, does not prove that character and will must be ontologically distinct sources of agency; only that our discourse about them must keep them apart. (shrink)

Potere, conflitto, globalizzazione. Poteri globali contro conflitti globali.

El presente articuLo pretende encuadrar y definir las implicaciones éticas reLativas a La aplicación biomédica de las nanotecnologías, a través de La vaLoración deL estado del arte.Las nanotecnologías, expresiÓn de La habilidad humana de manipuLar la materia a escala atómico/molecular se presentan como un instrumento capaz de modificar la investigaciÓn científica y la medicina de manera radicaL.Debates a todo nivel han subrayado las dificultades de darles una definición clara y unívoca, a causa de la convergencia de diversos ámbitos del saber (...) comprendidos en ellas.No obstante que Las nanotecnoLogías estén ya presentes en las ciencias computacionaLes y en La eLectrÓnica, es en eL ámbito médico-sanitario que se proyectan Las aplicaciones más entusiastas: instrumentos de diagnóstico y suministración de fármacos menos invasivos y más eficaces. Estas tecnoLogías se presentan al mismo tiempo como terapias pero también como instrumentos de prevención únicos, Las mismas características que hacen peculiar eL empLeo de las nano tecnologías en medicina, sugieren también precauciones: por una parte la dimensión mínima de las nanopartículasfacilita su ingreso en el organismo humano, traspasando las defensas naturales del organismo, agilizando una distribuciÓn de los fármacos altamente precisa. Por otra parte, estas mismas características pueden revelarse dañinas para el organismo humano .Dado que se trata de tecnología en rápida progresiÓn cuyos adelantos no son fáciles de predecir. los riesgos, aunque sÓlo aquellos potenciales, deben ser cuidadosamente valorados ya sea para las aplicaciones presentes como para aquellas futuras.Por tanto, encuadrar las implicaciones bioéticas de las nanotecnologías significa comprender y valorar su impacto sobre la salud humana. (shrink)

The research in Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has nowadays extended its attention to the study of persuasive technologies. Following this line of research, in this paper we focus on websites and mobile applications in the e-commerce domain. In particular, we take them as an evident example of persuasive technologies. Starting from the hypothesis that there is a strong connection between logical fallacies, i.e., forms of reasoning which are logically invalid but psychologically persuasive, and some common persuasion strategies adopted within these (...) technological artifacts, we carried out a survey on a sample of 175 websites and 101 mobile applications. This survey was aimed at empirically evaluating the significance of this connection by detecting the use of persuasion techniques, based on logical fallacies, in existing websites and mobile apps. In addition, with the goal of assessing the effectiveness of different fallacy-based persuasion techniques, we performed an empirical evaluation where participants interacted with a persuasive (fallacy-based) and with a non-persuasive version of an e-commerce website. Our results show that fallacy-based persuasion strategies are extensively used in existing digital artifacts, and that they are actually effective in influencing users’ behavior, with strategies based on visual salience manipulation (accent fallacy) being both the most popular and the most effective ones. (shrink)

The paper introduces an extension of the proposal according to which conceptual representations in cognitive agents should be intended as heterogeneous proxytypes. The main contribution of this paper is in that it details how to reconcile, under a heterogeneous representational perspective, different theories of typicality about conceptual representation and reasoning. In particular, it provides a novel theoretical hypothesis - as well as a novel categorization algorithm called DELTA - showing how to integrate the representational and reasoning assumptions of the theory-theory (...) of concepts with the those ascribed to the prototype and exemplars-based theories. (shrink)

This paper compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the relation between knowing subjects and known objects. Kant discusses Leibniz’s philosophy in the ‘Amphiboly’ section of the first Critique. According to Kant, Leibniz’s main error is mistaking objects in space and time for mind-independent things in themselves, that is, for monads. The paper argues that, pace Kant, Leibniz regards objects in space and time as mind-dependent. A deeper divergence between the two philosophers concerns knowing subjects. For Leibniz, they are substances. For (...) Kant, we cannot know whether they are substances. Kant conceives of knowing subjects as complex systems of cognitive capacities. (shrink)