In this paper I explore humility as a paradigm, with reference to recent debates over the morality and rationality of emotions, and to the relation between religion and emotion. In Ancient Greek ethics, humility did not yet play a role; with the rise of Christianity, however, it becomes one of the cardinal virtues -- only to disappear again with the onset of modernity. Against a culture-pessimistic interpretation of this development, this article begins by characterising the relation between virtue and emotion, (...) before reconstructing the inner rationality of humility and showing how it can be traced through several transformations to a modern ethics of responsibility. Against this background, possible manifestations of the humble attitude in the present are made plausible. (shrink)

Abordagens pós-cognitivistas mais recentes têm lançado duras críticas à noção de representação mental, procurando ao invés disso pensar a mente e a cognição em termos de ações corporificadas do organismo em seu meio. Embora concordemos com essa concepção, não está claro que ela implique necessariamente a rejeição de qualquer tipo de vocabulário representacional. O objetivo deste artigo é argumentar que representações podem nos comprar uma dimensão explicativa adicional não disponível por outros meios e sugerir que, ao menos em alguns casos, (...) elas podem participar da explicação de performances ou capacidades cognitivas. A noção de representação apresentada, como deixaremos claro ao longo do artigo, não viola os preceitos metodológicos mais caros à cognição 4E em geral e ao enativismo em particular, podendo, portanto, ser utilizada como uma ferramenta teórica útil em investigações sobre a natureza corporificada e situada da mente. (shrink)

This essay is a critical assessment of Sellars' interpretation and criticism of Descartes. It argues that Sellars made several mistakes in his view of Descartes, although the general thrust of his critique is sound.

Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are used to model human activities and predict behavior. Such systems have shown race, gender and other kinds of bias, which are typically understood as technical problems. Here we try to show that: 1) to get rid of such biases, we need a system that can understand the structure of human activities and;2) to create such a system, we need to solve foundational problems of AI, such as the common-sense problem. Additionally, when informational platforms uses these (...) models to mediate interactions with their users, which is a commonplace nowadays, there is an illusion of progress, for what is an increasingly higher influence over our own behavior is took for an increasingly higher predictive accuracy. Given this, we argue that the bias problem is deeply connected to non-technical issues that must be discussed in public spaces. -/- Técnicas de inteligência artificial (IA) são utilizadas para modelar as atividades humanas e gerar predições comportamentais. Estes sistemas têm apresentado vieses diversos, inclusive de raça e gênero, tipicamente tomados como problemas de engenharia. Realiza-se aqui um esforço argumentativo para mostrar que: 1) escapar dos vieses demanda um sistema que compreenda a estrutura das atividades humanas e; 2) criar um sistema que apresente tal compreensão, demanda a solução de problemas fundacionais da IA, em particular, o problema de como modelar o senso comum. No caso de plataformas informacionais que usam desses modelos para mediar interações com seus usuários, algo cada vez mais comum, o não reconhecimento disso dá margem a uma ilusão de progresso, em que uma crescente influência sobre nosso comportamento é tomada como uma crescente acurácia preditiva. Nesse cenário, argumenta-se que o problema dos vieses está associado a questões não técnicas que devem ser discutidas em espaços públicos. (shrink)

Context sensitivity is one of the distinctive marks of human intelligence. Understanding the flexible way in which humans think and act in a potentially infinite number of circumstances, even though they’re only finite and limited beings, is a central challenge for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, particularly in the case of those using representational theories. In this work, the frame problem, that is, the challenge of explaining how human cognition efficiently acknowledges what is relevant from what is not (...) in each context, has been adopted as a guide. By using it, we’ve been able to describe a fundamental tension between context sensitivity and the mental representations used in cognition theories. The first chapter discusses the nature of the frame problem,as well as the reasons for its persistence. In the second and third chapters, the problem is used as a measure tool in order to inquiry a few representational approaches and check how well suited they are to deal with context dependencies. The problems found are then correlated with the frame problem. Throughout the discussion, we try to show that 1) none of the evaluated approaches is capable of dealing with context sensitivity in a proper manner, but 2) that’s not a reason to think that the frame problem constitutes an argument against representational approaches in general, and 3) that it constitutes a fundamental conceptual tool in contemporary research -/- A sensibilidade ao contexto é uma das marcas distintivas da inteligência humana. Compreender o modo flexível como o ser humano pensa e age em função de um número potencialmente infinito de circunstâncias, ainda que munido de recursos finitos e limitados, é um desafio central para a filosofia da mente e para a ciência cognitiva, em particular aos que fazem uso de teorias representacionalistas. Nesse trabalho, adotou-se como fio condutor o modo como isso se manifesta no "frame problem": a dificuldade em explicar como a cognição humana reconhece, de maneira eficiente, o que é ou não relevante em cada contexto. A partir dele, buscou-se caracterizar uma tensão fundamental entre a sensibilidade ao contexto e o uso de representações mentais em teorias da cognição. O primeiro capítulo discute a natureza do frame problem, bem como as razões de sua resiliência. No segundo e terceiro capítulos, faz-se uso do problema como métrica para investigar o quão adequado é o tratamento das dependências contextuais no âmbito de várias abordagens representacionais. No decorrer da discussão, realiza-se um esforço argumentativo para mostrar que 1) nenhuma das estratégias abordadas é capaz tratar adequadamente da sensibilidade ao contexto, mas que 2) apesar disso, o frame problem não constitui argumento fatal para teorias representacionalistas em geral, e que 3) ele constitui uma ferramenta conceitual fundamental para pesquisas contemporâneas. (shrink)

Psychopathic individuals are characterized by impaired affective processing, impulsivity, sensation-seeking, poor planning skills and heightened aggressiveness with poor self-regulation. Based on brain self-regulation studies using neurofeedback of Slow Cortical Potentials (SCPs) in disorders associated with a dysregulation of cortical activity thresholds and evidence of deficient cortical functioning in psychopathy, a neurobiological approach seems to be promising in the treatment of psychopathy. The results of our intensive brain regulation intervention demonstrate, that psychopathic offenders are able to gain control of their brain (...) excitability over fronto-central brain areas. After SCP self-regulation training, we observed reduced aggression, impulsivity and behavioral approach tendencies, as well as improvements in behavioral-inhibition and increased cortical sensitivity for error-processing. This study demonstrates improvements on the neurophysiological, behavioral and subjective level in severe psychopathic offenders after SCP-neurofeedback training and could constitute a novel neurobiologically-based treatment for a seemingly change-resistant group of criminal psychopaths. (shrink)

This paper explores the “cultural-linguistic” dimensions of Hans Frei’s theology. I make the case that several of the pragmatic and sociological concerns usually identified as distinctive marks of Frei’s later theology of the 1980s are, in fact, central to his work as far back as the early 1960s. Moreover, I demonstrate that such “cultural-linguistic” insights present important continuous threads in the development of his theology from early to late. Attending to this dimension illuminates the trajectory of Frei’s thinking as consistently (...) Wittgensteinian in sensibility, and deeply indebted to his career-long conversation with Karl Barth’s theology. If successful, this reading should clarify the ways in which Frei’s early work is more innovative, and his later work less derivative, than is often recognized. (shrink)

The essay reflects on how Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Barth view interpretation of the Christian Bible. It proceeds in three main sections. The first contends that Gadamer secularizes Christian theology, and that this has drawbacks for the sort of reading his hermeneutic can give to Christian Scripture. The second part turns to Barth, arguing that the whole structure of his approach to the Bible factors in theological commitment, with benefits for the readings he can deliver. The final part makes a (...) case that contemporary reflection on interpretation can nonetheless glean important insights from Gadamer, especially regarding the readerly reception of texts, because his perspective has a certain sort of richness that Barth’s cannot match. The overall suggestion emerging from the interrogation of these two thinkers is that phenomenology and theology might learn from one another, that they each contribute something valuable to discussions of biblical interpretation. (shrink)

Barth consistently comments on Kant's importance for his early thought in his autobiographical sketches, letters, and even more explicitly in his 1930 lectures on Kant in his Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. Interestingly, however, little attention has been paid to these latter lectures in the secondary literature. In part, this oversight is due to the manner in which Barth's theology has been thought to overcome Kant's influence much earlier on in his intellectual development. Hence, although commentators such as Merold (...) Westphal, Simon Fisher and Bruce McCormack have developed keen interest in Kant's influence upon Barth's early work, even engaging Barth's Neo-Kantian context in great detail, my contention is that Barth's later interpretation of Kant is crucial and gives further insight into Barth's legacy for contemporary thought today. After Kant, Barth did not abandonment or disregard the metaphysical question of being, but rather, faced it all the more rigorously. (shrink)

This article focuses on Barth's explication of Anselm's Proslogion 2-4 in his book on Anselm and attempts to show how Anselm helped clarify for Barth the ontological nature of his own early theology, in particular what he meant by the “is” in his affirmation “God is God.” My contention is that Barth's continual pointing to Anselm's Fides Quaerens Intellectum as a vital key to his own theology should not be overlooked. In fact, I argue that only by returning Barth to (...) Anselm in this way is it possible to understand more thoroughly Barth's relevance to contemporary onto-theological debates. (shrink)

What is reality? It is postmodern or poststructuralist philosophers like Roland Barthes, who realized that it only seems that the media present reality in the form of facts, because they actually spread myths. Accordingly, Jacques Derrida made it clear that communication via media is not based on logic, but is characterized by a significant “différance” between a “marque” (trace) of the past and the expectations of the future. Both agreed, that the initial misunderstanding of the concept of reality must (...) be uncovered or "deconstructed". This is more than necessary for them, because media, be it pictures or language, in truth convey values that are culturally and socially significant. They ‘iterate’ these values subliminally, because what shows up are only placeholders and thus mere forms (“structures of graphematic”) that are superficially realised as facts (“stereotypes”). In this way, according to Barthes, we all accept without question the values hidden behind them, so that they can gain a normative power that unconsciously guides our thinking, our decisions and our actions. Afterwards, it is Judith Butler who critically asked: How can we ever escape from this? Given the power of the subliminal dominant discourses, she saw the only effective solution “im Umdeuten” (in reinterpretation) of their subliminal values. In order to finally escape this “parasitic existence at the ritual”, the media philosopher Walter Benjamin already suggested to trigger "Chockwirkungen” (shock effects) in the viewer. It is the German painter Karin Kneffel, so it shall be shown, who has realized this with her series Fruits and Interiors in the most beautiful photorealistic strategy. (shrink)

The article is an attempt of the analysis and the interpretation of the categories ‘pleasure’ (Fr. plaisir) and ‘delight’ (Fr. jouissance), in the context of philosophically oriented theoretical‑literary considerations of Roland Barthes, sacrificed to the mystery of experiencing of the love. The part first, referring mainly to Barthes’ works, Revognises the range of the semantic field plaisir and jouissance, as categories basic for the textual language of the outstanding theoretician. The second part introduces three examples of western cultural (...) practices which illustrate the manner of use plaisir and jouissance as the factors of textual structures. (shrink)

The sensory dimension of writing, which is never fully neutralised in the process of semiosis, remains aporetic in Derrida’s philosophy. I show how Barthes’ observations on pseudo-writing lead to his understanding of writing as a gesture, opening up post-structuralism to the body as absolutely non-repeatable, as the opposite of semiosis. The examination of Barthes’ account of the relationship between writing and the body leads to an aesthetic of physical responsiveness, which challenges the distinction between work, creator and viewer. (...) In this regard ‘seeing’ can neither be reduced to the infinite decoding of signs nor to an immediate perception, but rather can be understood as the playful contact with signs. Barthes’ notion of writing contributes to overcoming the limits of Derrida’s account of the sensory quality of writing without jeopardiz- ing the philosophical gain of deconstruction. (shrink)

The task of the congress of the German Society for Semiotics in Passau / Germany in September 2017 was to explore and describe "boundaries". A total of 12 sections of the society wrote a call for paper for this purpose. With the present anthology it has to be made evident, how concretely also the boundaries of the own, the other and the foreign can be negotiated via pictures. -/- Papers: -/- - Martina Sauer: Ikonische Grenzverläufe. Szenarien des Eigenen, Anderen und (...) Fremden im Bild. Eine Einführung, 4 - Barbara Margarethe Eggert: Das andere Geschlecht im Altarraum – exklusive Textilien als inklusive Medien. Studien zum Gösser Ornat, 7 - Birke Sturm: Politik der Schönheit: Zur Konstruktion einer ›wissenschaftlichen‹ Bildästhetik schöner weiblicher Körper um 1900 am Beispiel des Gynäkologen Carl Heinrich Stratz, 22 - Melis Avkiran: Das rassifizierte Fremde im Bild. Zur Genese differenzbildender Konzepte in der Kunst des 15. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel des Malers Hans Memling, 40 - Leonie Licht: weiß zwischen schwarz zwischen weiß – Geschichten von Identität im Bild, 75 - Julia Austermann: Queere Interventionen im kommunistischen Polen – Krzysztof Jung und sein ›plastisches Theater‹, 91 - Sabine Engel: Tizians Porträt der Laura Dianti. Aneignung und Transformation zwischen Orient und Okzident, 111 - Anna Christina Schütz: Osman Hamdi Beys Türkische Straßenszene. Der Teppich als Verhandlungsort kultureller Identitäten im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, 146 - Benjamin Häger, Claudia Jürgens: Ikonische Stadtstrategien. Das Fassadenplakat und die Musterfassade als Instrumente machtpolitischer Repräsentation, 175 - Irene Schütze: Fehlende Verweise, rudimentäre ›Markierungen‹: aufgeweichte Grenzverläufe zwischen Kunst und Alltag, 204 - Stefan Römer: Interesse an und in einem Bildarchiv für Migrant/innen und Flüchtlinge, 221 - Viola Nordsieck: Von der Fähigkeit, einen Stuhl zu ignorieren. A. N. Whiteheads Konzept der Wahrnehmung als symbolisierender Tätigkeit und die Art, wie wir Bilder als Bilder sehen, 239 - David Jöckel: Mythos und Bild. Roland Barthes’ Semiologie bildlicher Stereotypisierung, 255 -/- - Kurzbiographien der Autorinnen und Autoren, 274 - Impressum, 278. (shrink)

Origen of Alexandria can be credited as the founder of a Christian speculative angelology, in which Christ the Logos is both the creator and the interpreter of the angels. He introduces the angels as the first created rational beings who, in contemplating the divine Word (Logos), freely choose to direct their will as holy angels in service to or wicked demons in antagonism against the love of God. The first created rational beings are divided into three orders: the angels, the (...) demons, and the neutral spirits of human souls. The angels remain closest in contemplation of the Logos, yet, due to their negligence, descend to unfold in the angelic hierarchy. The angels and demons thereafter guide the movements of all spirits, substances, and signs in the created world. The neutral spirits of human souls can choose to follow either the guidance of guardian angels or demons. And yet after the Incarnation, the angels are distinguished from the demons by their choice to follow Christ. Origen’s angelology has often been regarded as an early Christian alternative to Middle Platonic daemonologies. And after Karl Barth, his angelology has come to be dispensed from Christian theology. However, as Jean Daniélou has observed, Origen had previously departed from Platonic daemonology in affirming that angelic mediacy must pass away like the light of the stars before the brilliance of the Logos of Christ. He had, in this way, already assimilated the mediacy of the angels to the absolute mediation of Christ. And, in assimilating angelic to christic mediacy, Origen also attributes the reason with which the world is moved to the divine reason of the divine Word (Logos) of Christ in God. Origen’s angelology can thus be read both before and after Barth as a science of the angels. (shrink)

In this essay I take issue with the ease which the work of Sade has been, since Roland Barthes, integrated into academic discourse and try to reawaken a sense for what is unacceptable in Sade, but without lapsing into moralism. I try to give a reinvigorated account of the materialism of Sade's writing (as opposed to formalist appropriations of Sade like Barthes') which I then apply to the two characteristic Sadian devices: first, the encyclopedic enumeration and the (quite (...) separate) philosophical discourse. The encyclopedic enumeration is not only a kind of anti-literature but also comprises an irreducibly counter-conceptual geometry of affect whose structure I explore. I evaluate Bataille's claim that at the philosophical and discursive level Sade is primarily a thinker of transgression and defend, using the special case of blasphemy, the notion against critics who view it is puerile or self-defeating. In so doing, I unearth a profound pragmatism in Sade aimed at 'deprogramming' him from Western, Christian values, a move that anticipates Nietzsche in crucial and interesting ways. (shrink)

Hans Frei, one of the most influential American theologians of the twentieth century, is generally considered a founder of postliberal theology. Frei never set forth his thinking systematically, and he has been criticized for being inconsistent, contradictory, and insufficiently rigorous. Jason Springs seeks here to offer a re-evaluation of Frei's work. Arguing that Hans Frei's theology cannot be understood without a meticulous consideration of the complex equilibrium of his theological and philosophical interests and influences, Springs vindicates Frei's christologically motivated engagement (...) with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Clifford Geertz, and Erich Auerbach, as well as his use of ordinary language philosophy and non-foundational philosophical insights, while illuminating his indebtedness to Karl Barth's theology. Moreover, by placing Frei's work in critical conversation with developments in pragmatist thought and cultural theory since his death, this re-reading aims to resolve many of the misunderstandings that vex his theological legacy. What emerges from Toward a Generous Orthodoxy is a sharpened account of the christologically anchored, interdisciplinary, and conversational character of Frei's theology, one he came to describe as a "generous orthodoxy"--modeling a way for academic theological voices to take seriously both their vocation to the Christian church and their roles as interlocutors in academic discourse. (shrink)

Roland Barthes' famous essay "The Death of the Author" packs an astonishing number of logical howlers into its blessedly few pages. How did it become so firmly entrenched in the canon of literary theory?

Adopting modal logic the doctrine of the primacy of Christ is defined and defended in relation to the Thomistic – Scotistic debates over the primary and efficient causes of the incarnation. This leads to a defence of the Scotistic thesis and a reserved affirmation for the Scotistic hypothesis that there would have been an incarnation irrespective of the fall. This hypothesis is tested by reference to the work of four recent theologians, Thomas Weinandy O.F.M. cap., Karl Barth, J¨urgen Moltmann, and (...) Thomas Torrance. Finally, a sketch describ-ng another possible-world incarnation that builds upon the Scotistic hypothesis is provided. (shrink)

The shortest stories are zero words long. There is no maximum length.

Η μοντέρνα φιλοσοφία στράφηκε απευθείας στη φύση (Francis Bacon), στράφηκε απευθείας στο νου (René Descartes), στράφηκε απευθείας στην εμπειρία (Thomas Hobbes). Από αυτή τη βασική διαφωνία ως προς τις πηγές της φιλοσοφικής γνώσης προέκυψε η «διαμάχη των αρχαίων με τους σύγχρονους». -/- Η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία αποστασιοποιήθηκε από το παγιωμένο γνωσιολογικό παρελθόν και ενστερνίστηκε την αρχή ότι η γνώση προοδεύει ιστορικά και κατατείνει στη διεύρυνση της ανθρώπινης κατανόησης μέσω της λογικής μεθόδου ή μέσω της εμπειρίας. Στη διαμάχη μεταξύ των ηπειρωτικών ορθολογιστών (...) φιλοσόφων (Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz και Benedict de Spinoza) και των Βρετανών εμπειριστών (Hobbes, John Locke και David Hume) στο τέλος του Διαφωτισμού του δέκατου όγδοου αιώνα, ο Immanuel Kant επιχείρησε να συμφιλιώσει τις αντιθέσεις και να διατυπώσει μια νέα κριτική φιλοσοφία. Ο Immanuel Kant συγκέντρωσε στην «κριτική» του φιλοσοφία τις δεσμεύσεις για την αναλυτική άσκηση του νου, από τη μια, και την εμπειρική πρόσληψη μέσω των αισθήσεων, από την άλλη. Με τον Καντ, η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία συνδύασε την «υπερβατική ενότητα της αντίληψης» με την «πολλαπλότητα της εμπειρίας». Η σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία δεν βασιζόταν πλέον σε μια θεωρία αναπαράστασης -αναπαράσταση του νου μέσω της λογικής ή αναπαράσταση του νου μέσω της εμπειρίας- αλλά στη σύνδεση της υπερβατικής υποκειμενικότητας και της εμπειρικής αντικειμενικότητας. Αυτό το «διπλό», όπως το ονόμασε ο Michel Foucault, αντιπροσώπευε έναν εντελώς νέο τρόπο φιλοσοφίας. Ο μοντερνισμός διακρίνεται από τη σύγχρονη φιλοσοφία στο ότι συνδέεται με ορισμένα κινήματα στην τέχνη και τη λογοτεχνία που ξεκίνησαν κάπου γύρω στα τέλη του δέκατου ένατου αιώνα. Ενώ βασιζόταν σε κάποια παρόμοια χαρακτηριστικά της «μοντέρνας φιλοσοφίας», ο μοντερνισμός στην τέχνη, τη λογοτεχνία και τη φιλοσοφία περιλάμβανε καινοτομία, ρήξη με την παράδοση, πρόοδο, συνεχή ανάπτυξη, γνώση που προέρχεται είτε από τη θέση του υποκειμένου είτε από αξιώσεις για αντικειμενικότητα, και ταυτόχρονα κρίση στη γνώση που παράγεται από αυτήν ακριβώς τη διχοτόμηση. Ως εκ τούτου, στον μοντερνισμό, την ίδια στιγμή που ορισμένες θεωρίες βασίζονταν στη γνώση σε μια επικεντρωμένη, υπερβατική, ερμηνευτική υποκειμενικότητα και άλλες βασίζονταν στη γνώση σε βέβαιη, ατομικιστική, αναλυτική, εμπειρική αντικειμενικότητα, η κρίση στη γνώση δημιούργησε μια αίσθηση αβεβαιότητας, παραδοξότητας, ατέλειας, ανεπάρκειας, κενό. Ο μοντερνισμός στην τέχνη και τη λογοτεχνία περιλάμβανε μια μετατόπιση από τις διχοτομίες του ρομαντισμού και του ρεαλισμού στο ρεύμα της συνείδησης, της βιωμένης και εσωτερικής συνείδησης του χρόνου, της υπερβατικής υποκειμενικότητας, της αφηγηματικής ανάμνησης και επίγνωσης, της απεικονιζόμενης ταχύτητας, των μηχανισμών, των αντικειμένων και των αφαιρέσεων. Το λανθάνον περιεχόμενο αφέθηκε να διεισδύσει μέσα από τις επιφάνειες εμφανούς περιεχομένου. Η κατανόηση θα έπρεπε να εμβαθύνει περισσότερο από τις επιφάνειες και τις απλές εμφανίσεις. Θα χρειαζόταν μια φαινομενολογία για την απογραφή του περιεχομένου της συνείδησης (Edmund Husserl) ή μια ψυχανάλυση για να διερευνήσει τα βάθη του τι σκεφτόταν πραγματικά ο νους (Sigmund Freud), ή ένας λογικός θετικισμός θα έπαιρνε την εναλλακτική οδό, αποκλείοντας κάθε γνώση που δεν μπορεί να επαληθευτεί λογικά και εμπειρικά (Bertrand Russell, πρώιμος Ludwig Wittgenstein, A. J. Ayer). Ο μοντερνισμός στη φιλοσοφία περιλάμβανε σε κάθε στάδιο τον καντιανό συνδυασμό του εμπειρικού και του υπερβατικού, του αντικειμενικού και του υποκειμενικού, του υλικού και του διανοητικού—αλλά κάθε φορά στη διπλή αυτή θεωρητική σύλληψη υπερίσχυε αξιακά και γνωσιολογικά ένας πόλος. -/- Η αποσύνθεση του μοντερνισμού στη φιλοσοφία ήταν εσωτερική. Οι ριζοσπαστικοί ισχυρισμοί του λογικού θετικισμού απέκλειαν ό,τι είχε αξία: τη μεταφυσική, την αισθητική, την αξιολογία. Η αυστηρή επιστήμη της υπερβατικής φαινομενολογίας απέκλεισε την ίδια την ύπαρξη αυτού που ερευνούσε. Ο δυϊσμός του δημιουργικού εξελικτισμού άφησε μια ανεπανόρθωτη διχοτόμηση μεταξύ βιωμένης εμπειρίας και αντικειμενικής γνώσης. Ο πραγματισμός του ριζοσπαστικού εμπειρισμού απέτυχε να προσφέρει έναν τρόπο ερμηνείας των νοημάτων της εμπειρίας. Το κέντρο του μοντερνισμού στη φιλοσοφία δεν μπορούσε να κρατήσει γιατί τα ίδια τα θεμέλιά του ήταν υπό αμφισβήτηση. Αλλά οι προσπάθειες να το ανακτήσει κανείς από τον εαυτό του με τη στροφή προς τη γλώσσα - καθημερινή γλώσσα, αναλυτικές φιλοσοφίες της γλώσσας, ερμηνευτική της γλώσσας, σημειολογίες της γλώσσαςδεν μπόρεσαν να λύσουν τα διλήμματα της ανθρώπινης ύπαρξης. Ο μοντερνισμός στη φιλοσοφία αντιμετώπισε το παράλογο, το διφορούμενο και το διαλεκτικό και εξώθησε αυτές τις θεωρίες στα όριά τους. Στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 1960, η φιλοσοφία άρχισε να εξετάζει τους γνωσιολογικούς της, οι ανακρίσεις του Maurice Merleau-Ponty αναδιατυπώθηκαν στην αρχαιολογία της γνώσης του Foucault. Οι ανθρωπιστικές επιστήμες έθεσαν υπό αμφισβήτηση τις αισιοδοξίες της σύγχρονης φιλοσοφίας παρακάμπτοντας τη θεωρία του «ανθρώπου». Οι σχηματισμοί γνώσης αρθρώθηκαν με όρους πολλαπλών χώρων παραγωγής γνώσης και όχι πλέον σύμφωνα με μια κεντρική πηγή ή θέση, ή εγώ, ή εαυτός, ή υποκείμενο, ούτε σύμφωνα με μια πληθώρα αισθητηριακών δεδομένων, αντικειμενικών κριτηρίων, υλικών στοιχείων ή συμπεριφορών . Οι σχηματισμοί γνώσης διέσχιζαν τους κλάδους και λειτούργησαν σε πολλαπλούς χώρους όπου τα ερωτήματα της δομής, του πλαισίου, του περιθωρίου, του ορίου, της άκρης, του ορίου κ.λπ. θα σημάδευαν οποιαδήποτε πρακτική λόγου. Με άλλα λόγια, η γνώση δεν παράγεται πλέον από ένα κέντρο, θεμέλιο, έδαφος, βάση, ταυτότητα, εξουσία ή υπερβατική ικανότητα. Η γνώση ήταν διάσπαρτη, πολλαπλή, κατακερματισμένη και θεωρητικά ποικίλη. Η γνώση δεν βασιζόταν πλέον στη συνέχεια, την ενότητα, την ολότητα, την πληρότητα και τη συνέπεια. Η γνώση άρχισε να γίνεται κατανοητή με όρους ασυνέχειας, διαφοράς, διάδοσης και διαφορετικών. Στις αρχές της δεκαετίας του 1970, ο μεταμοντερνισμός - ένας όρος που χρησιμοποίησε ο Daniel Bell σε σχέση με τη μεταβιομηχανική κοινωνία τη δεκαετία του 1950, τον οποίο έκαναν έκκληση οι αρχιτέκτονες στη δεκαετία του 1960 και που οι ιστορικοί της τέχνης και της λογοτεχνίας επικαλέστηκαν τη δεκαετία του 1970 - δεν είχε ακόμη επικαλεστεί σε σχέση με τη φιλοσοφία. -/- Η γραμματολογία και η θεωρία της «διαφοράς» του Ζακ Ντεριντά το 1967 (με βάση την αφήγηση του Μάρτιν Χάιντεγκερ για το «τέλος της φιλοσοφίας και το έργο της σκέψης») μετατράπηκαν σε πλήρη αποδόμηση τη δεκαετία του 1970. Η έννοια του Gilles Deleuze και του Felix Guattari για τη ριζωματική σκέψη (σε αντίθεση με την ιεραρχική, εξουσιοδοτημένη δενδρώδη σκέψη) σηματοδότησε μια κίνηση ενάντια στις ψυχαναλυτικές θεωρίες που βασίζονται στην Οιδιπόδεια αυθεντία και την πατρική επιμονή. Η ιδέα τους για τον νομαδισμό έδωσε έμφαση στη γνώση, την εμπειρία και τις σχέσεις που δεν ήταν οργανωμένες γύρω από μια κεντρική έννοια. Η αφήγηση του J. Kristeva για την επανάσταση στην ποιητική γλώσσα σηματοδότησε τη διάκριση μεταξύ του σημειωτικού και του συμβολικού. Όπου η συμβολική —επιστημονική, θεωρητική, φαλλική, πατρική— σκέψη είχε διαποτίσει τη φιλοσοφία και την επιστήμη, η Kristeva επικαλέστηκε τη σημειωτική ως την ποιητική, ρευστή, σαν υποδοχέα, μητρική σκέψη που έχει κρυφτεί στη σύγχρονη σκέψη. Ωστόσο, το μεταμοντέρνο δεν ήταν σχεδόν ο όρος που χρησιμοποιήθηκε για να περιγράψει αυτό το είδος φιλοσοφίας. Αντίστοιχα, η πιο περιορισμένη μελέτη της φαινομενολογίας και του υπαρξισμού στη φιλοσοφία έδωσε τη θέση της στις πιο πολλαπλές και ποικιλόμορφες θεωρίες που υπονοούνται στην ηπειρωτική φιλοσοφία: αποδόμηση, αρχαιολογία της γνώσης, σημασιολογική ανάλυση, σχιζανάλυση, φεμινιστική θεωρία κ.λπ. Ωστόσο, ενώ ο μεταστρουκτουραλισμός (σε σχέση με τους Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Kristeva, et al.) χαιρετίστηκε ως ο διάδοχος του στρουκτουραλισμού (Claude Lévi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser) και της υπαρξιακής φαινομενολογίας (Heidegger, Jean -Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir), ο μεταμοντερνισμός δεν ήταν ακόμα μια σχετική κατηγορία στη φιλοσοφία μέχρι και τη δεκαετία του 1980. Καθώς περνούσε ο καιρός, ο μεταμοντερνισμός και η μεταμοντέρνα σκέψη άρχισαν να υπερισχύουν του μεταστρουκτουραλισμού ως η κυρίαρχη θεωρητική διατύπωση. -/- . (shrink)

This article aims to provide a theory of atonement, termed the "Agápēic Theory," which is formulated within a philosophical framework that has the aim of humans flourishing to the maximum level through partaking in an everlasting relationship of love with God. The Agápēic Theory will be formulated by using a certain conception of love, introduced by Alexander Pruss, into the field of applied ethics, and also various elements from other existing theories of the Atonement found within the fields of analytic (...) theology, in the work of Richard Swinburne, Eleonore Stump and Robin Collins, and systematic/biblical theology, in the work of Karl Barth and N.T Wright, which will both help to ground the Agápēic Theory on firm philosophical and theological grounds and ultimately provide a robust theory of the Atonement. (shrink)

One might naturally suppose that philosophers of art would take a strong interest in the idea of creation in the context of art. In fact, this has often not been the case. In analytic aesthetics, the issue tends to dwell on the sidelines and in continental aesthetics a shadow has sometimes been cast over the topic by the notion of the “death of the author” and by the claim, as Roland Barthes put it, that the author is only ever (...) able to “imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original”. This paper explains the understanding of artistic creation developed by the French art theorist André Malraux in his well-known book The Voices of Silence. Malraux argues that the true artist is involved in a creative act in the full sense of the term – creation ex nihilo – despite the debt he or she often owes to other artists. The paper also comments briefly on possible reasons why traditional post-Enlightenment aesthetics has said so little about the topic in question. (shrink)

This Guide is designed to restore the theological background that informs Kant’s treatment of grace in Religion to its rightful place. This background is essential not only to understand the nature of Kant’s overall project in this book, namely, to determine the “association” or “union” between Christianity (as a historical faith) and rational religion, but also to dispel the impression of “internal contradictions” and conundrums” that contemporary interpreters associate with Kant’s treatment of grace and moral regeneration. That impression, we argue, (...) is the result of entrenched interpretative habits that can be traced back to Karl Barth’s reading of the text. Once we realize that such a reading rests on a mistake, much of the anxiety and confusion that plague current discussions on these issues can be put to rest. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta uma discussão que tem como objetivo principal propor um novo risco ao contorno da noção de intericonicidade que aparece em Courtine, precisamente, em 2003. Aí encontramos uma abertura que nos permite traçar outras curvaturas em sua noção. É justamente por este interstício que vamos propor a inclusão de dois elementos que, a nosso ver, estão na ordem da constituição das imagens: as utopias e heterotopias, conforme discussões iniciadas anteriormente por Araújo (2014a, 2014b). Para tanto, tomamos como pano (...) de fundo as imagens em movimento de duas produções francesas de horror e as imagens fotográficas da prisão de Abou Ghraib que serão analisadas à luz da discussão realizada por Foucault em Le corps utopique, les heterotopies e em Outros Espaços, juntamente com as discussões de Courtine e de Milanez acerca da intericonicidade (cf. COURTINE, 2005; 2011; 2013; MILANEZ, 2011a; 2011b; 2013a, 2013b). Os Elementos de Semiologia e A escrita do acontecimento de Barthes também fazem parte da discussão, já que este autor aparece desde cedo no trabalho de Courtine, precisamente, quando buscava apresentar a noção de intericonicidade. (shrink)

This paper is about the relevance of the ineffable and the singular to hermeneutics. I respond to standard criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher by Karl Barth and Hans-Georg Gadamer in order to clarify his understanding of language, interpretation, and religion. Schleiermacher’s “indicative hermeneutics” is developed in the context of the ethical significance of communication and the ineffable. The notion of trace is employed in order to interpret the paradox of speaking about that which cannot be spoken. The trace is not a (...) brute singularity but bears a fundamental relationship to the word—and ultimately the word of God—for Schleiermacher. (shrink)

This chapter sharpens the book’s criticism of exclusivist responsible to religious multiplicity, firstly through close critical attention to arguments which religious exclusivists provide, and secondly through the introduction of several new, formal arguments / dilemmas. Self-described ‘post-liberals’ like Paul Griffiths bid philosophers to accept exclusivist attitudes and beliefs as just one among other aspects of religious identity. They bid us to normalize the discourse Griffiths refers to as “polemical apologetics,” and to view its acceptance as the only viable form of (...) pluralism. This reasoning may seem initially plausible, but on closer examination his and other’s defence of the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity fall apart. Informed by our study of luck-leaning theological explanations of religious difference and the counter-inductive thinking they exemplify, I argue that exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are best explained by personal and group bias, and that a discourse between exclusivist authors or sects is beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. Our study of descriptive (psychological) and prescriptive (religious) fideism in the first sections of Chapter Five suggests that we turn back to formal features of doxastic methods (i.e., of how people process), features that may be straightforwardly tested for in studies utilizing scales of religious orientation. These formal features allow us to better recognize not only the multiplicity of models of faith that religious adherents adhere to, but also that the relationship between forms of fideism is scalar: there is a spectrum of views running from rationalism to fideism, and at the fideistic end from moderate to strong forms of religious fideism. I further explain why developing tests and markers for a high degree of fideistic orientation is important to all those who study religion. The second half of the chapter turns to criticism or censure of exclusivist attitudes to religious multiplicity, in contrast to apologetic defenses of exclusivism. While we have examined the close connections between fideism and fundamentalism, and again between fundamentalism and exclusivism in earlier chapters, a sharper focus reveals an important but little-recognized distinction reflected in the literature: the distinction between religion-specific (or particularist) and mutualist exclusivism. The mutualist doesn’t talk just about the right of adherents of one specific religion to assert exclusivism, but the adherents of any and all “home” religions. I argue that some previously unrecognized problems for the reasonableness of exclusivist responses to religious multiplicity are brought to light when we make the distinction between the two basic ways to understand the claim that exclusivists are making. I put particularist (Barth, Lindbeck, Plantinga) and mutualist (Griffiths, Gellman, Margalit, D’Costa) defenses of exclusivism on the horns of a dilemma, and argue that despite the popularity it presently enjoys among post-liberal theologians, a close examination reveals that the very conceptual coherence of mutualist exclusivism is in serious doubt. (shrink)

Berkeley's immaterialism has more in common with views developed by Henry More, the mathematician Joseph Raphson, John Toland, and Jonathan Edwards than those of thinkers with whom he is commonly associated (e.g., Malebranche and Locke). The key for recognizing their similarities lies in appreciating how they understand St. Paul's remark that in God "we live and move and have our being" as an invitation to think to God as the space of discourse in which minds and ideas are identified. This (...) way of speaking about God, adapted by Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, opens up new ways to think about the relation between God and finite minds. (shrink)

Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there'‚ written on one side and 'was a story that began'‚ on the other. Twisting the paper and joining the ends produces John Barth’s story Frame-Tale, which prefixes 'once upon a time there was a story that began'‚ to itself. I argue that the ability to understand this sentence cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth in English.

The present article aims to make good on Roland Barthe’s unfulfilled promise to provide an eidetic phenomenology for the photograph. Though the matter deserves consideration simply because no relevant account has yet been provided, the consequences of adumbrating eight eidetic features, we hope to show, bear directly on the phenomenology of time, the possibility of technological events, and the status of truth as what Heidegger called alētheia . Finally, and most importantly for the enterprise of phenomenological reflection, if we are (...) successful in this endeavor, we shall have established a new way to use eidetic phenomenologies: not for Husserl’s original aim of executing a rigorous science, but in a more Derridian spirit as a way to destabilize consensus. (shrink)

TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHICS. AFTER NIETZSCHE -/- Preface This book tells the story of twentieth-century ethics or, in more detail, it reconstructs the history of a discussion on the foundations of ethics which had a start with Nietzsche and Sidgwick, the leading proponents of late-nineteenth-century moral scepticism. During the first half of the century, the prevailing trends tended to exclude the possibility of normative ethics. On the Continent, the trend was to transform ethics into a philosophy of existence whose self-appointed task was (...) that of describing the human condition as consisting of choices, as unavoidable as arbitrary, without any attempt at providing criteria for making such choices. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the heir of ethics was a philosophy of morality, that is, an analysis of the language of morality that intended to clarify valuations without trying to justify them. 1958 was the year of the normative turn that led to the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, a turn followed by decades of controversies between distinct kinds of normative ethics: utilitarian, Kantian, virtue ethics. While the controversy was raging, a quiet revolution took place, that of applied ethics which surprisingly dissolved the controversy's very subject matter by providing methods for making convergence possible on intermediate principles even when no agreement was available about first principles. The normative turn and the revolution of applied ethics have led us, at the turn of the century, to a goal that was quite far from the starting point. Instead of scepticism and relativism that was the fashion at the beginning of the century, at the beginning of the third millennium impartial and universal moral arguments seem to hold the spot being supported, if not by a final rational foundation, at least by reasonableness, the most precious legacy of the Enlightenment. -/- ● TABLE OF CONTENTS -/- ● I Anglo-Saxon philosophy: naturalism 1. Dewey beyond evolutionism and utilitarianism 2. Dewey and anti-essentialist moral epistemology 3. Dewey and naturalist moral ontology 4. Dewey and normative ethics of conduct and function 5. Perry and semantic naturalism -/- ● II Anglo-Saxon philosophy: ideal utilitarianism and neo-intuitionism 1. Moore's critique of utilitarian empiricism 2. Moore on the naturalistic fallacy 3. Moore on the nature of intrinsic value 4. Moore on ideal utilitarianism 5. Prichard on the priority of the right over the good 6. Ross's coherentist moral epistemology 7. Ross's moral ontology: realism, pluralism, and non-naturalism 8. Ross's normative ethics of prima facie duties -/- The chapter reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore's early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. It stresses the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. It argues that PE is more a patchwork of somewhat diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. -/- ●III Anglo-Saxon philosophy: non-cognitivism 1. The Scandinavian School, the Vienna circle and proto-emotivism 2. Wittgenstein and the ineffability of ethics 3. Russell's and Ayer's radical emotivism 4. Stevenson and moderate emotivism 5. Stevenson and the pragmatics of moral language 6. Stevenson and the methods for solving ethical disagreement 7. Hare and prescriptivism The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of 'good', its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with 'emotive' meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell's ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson's theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. A section reconstructs the discussion from the Forties about Hume's law, mentioning Karl Popper's argument and Richard Hare's early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- ●IV Anglo-Saxon philosophy: critics of non-cognitivism 1. Neo-naturalism and its objections to the naturalistic fallacy argument 2. Objections to Hume's law 3. Clarence Lewis and the pragmatic contradiction 4. Toulmin and the good reasons approach 5. Baier and moral reasons 5. Baier, social moralities and the absolute morality 6. Baier and the moral point of view 7. Baier and the contents of absolute ethics -/- ● V Continental philosophy: the philosophy of values 1. Max Weber and the polytheism of values 2. Phenomenology against psychologism and rationalism 3. Reinach and the theory of social acts 4. Scheler and the material ethics of values 5. Hartmann and the ontology of values 6. Plessner, Gehlen and the Philosophische Anthropologie -/- The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl's project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the apriori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy conducted in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach's theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that sketches the ideas 'discovered' later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section discusses Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of 'values' – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler, who claimed to be Husserl's legitimate heirs. -/- ● VI Continental philosophy: the critics of the philosophy of values 1. Freud, the Superego and Civilization 2. Heidegger on original ethos against ethics 3. Sartre and de Beauvoir on authenticity and ambiguity 4. Adorno and Horkheimer on emancipation and immoralism -/- ●VII Post-liberal theologians and religious thinkers 1. Barth on the autonomy of faith from ethics 2. Developments of Reformed moral theology after Barth 3. Bonhoeffer on the concrete divine command and ethics of penultimate realities 4. Developments of Reformed and Catholic moral theology after world war II 5. Baeck and the transformation of liberal Judaism 6. Rosenzweig against liberal Judaism 7. Buber and religion as the vital lymph of morality 8. Heschel and Judaism as a science of actions -/- The chapter examines the main protagonists of Christian theology and Jewish religious thinking in the twentieth century. It stresses how the main dilemmas of contemporary philosophical ethics lie at the root of the various path of inquiry taken by these thinkers. -/- ● VIII Normative ethics: neo-Utilitarianism 1. The discussion on act and rule utilitarianism 2. Hare on two-tiered preference utilitarianism 3. Harsanyi, Gauthier and rational choice ethics 4. Parfit, utilitarianism and the idea of a person 5. Brandt and indirect conscience utilitarianism -/- The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick's and Moore's fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine refuted. Two examples give the reader a glimpse at this uproarious process. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This transformation results in preference utilitarianism combined with a 'Kantian' version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare's two-level preference utilitarianism, where act utilitarianism plays the function of the eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of an action-guiding practical device. -/- ● IX Normative ethics: neo-Aristotelianism and virtue ethics 1. Hannah Arendt, action and judgement 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer and phronesis 3. Alasdair MacIntyre on practices, virtues, and traditions 5. Stuart Hampshire on deliberation 6. Bernard Williams and moral complexity 7. Feminist ethics -/- Sect 1 reconstructs the post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named 'Rehabilitation of practical philosophy' is described. Heidegger's most brilliant disciples were the promoters of this Rehabilitation. Hans-Georg Gadamer is a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle's lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger's lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the significant role of the notion of phronesis. Sect 3 discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. It argues that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. The chapter gives a short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot's and Peter Geach's critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre's grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly inevitable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- ● X Normative ethics: Kantian and rights-based ethics 1. Dialogical constructivism 2. Apel, Habermas and discourse ethics 3. Gewirth and rights-based ethics 4. Nagel on agent-relative reasons 5. Donagan and persons as ends in themselves Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This current started with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. The chapter offers an examination of his argument in some detail, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas's elaboration on Apel's theory. -/- ● XI The applied ethics renaissance 1. Elisabeth Anscombe on the atom bomb 2. From medical ethics to bioethics 3. Rawls and public ethics 3. Nozick, Dworkin and further developments of public ethics 5. Sen and the revival of economic ethics -/- The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin's new casuistry. The chapter argues that Rawls's distinction between a "political" and a "metaphysical" approach to the theory of justice, one central part of ethical theory, is a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and the new casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter. The idea is that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls' view never will be close – on the essential criteria for judgment. -/- ● XII Fin-de-siècle metaethics 1. Deontic logics 2. Anti-realism 3. External realism 4. Internal realism 5. Kantian constructivism -/- The chapter illustrates the fresh start of meta-ethical discussion in the Eighties and Nineties and the resulting new alignments: metaphysical naturalism, internal realism, anti-realism, and constructivism. (shrink)

Building on the theory of humor advanced by Yves Cusset in his recent book Rire: Tractatus philo-comicus, I argue that we can understand the phenomenon in terms of what Jean-Luc Nancy, following Roland Barthes, has called the exemption from sense. I attempt to show how the humorous sensibility, understood in this way, is entirely incompatible with the experience of others as contemptible. I conclude by developing some of the normative implications of this, focusing specifically on the question whether it (...) is ever morally permissible to treat others with contempt. (shrink)

Positivist medical historians, guided by the savoir of modern western biomedicine, have long depicted medieval medicine as an aberration along the continuum of scientific and medical progress. Historical epistemology, founded in the ideas of Cavailles, Foucault, Davidson, and Hacking, however, allows the historian to disrupt this false continuum and to unchain medieval medicine from modern medicine. Postmodernist approaches, such as those sourced in Lyotard, Barthes, and Derrida, allow the historian to further deconstruct medieval and modern medical discourse, revealing a (...) multitude of narrative lenses spinning around biomedical and biocultural strands. In liberating these two medical systems and setting them within the distinct historical and epistemological contexts that both shaped and were shaped by them, the historian can revision the theories, practices, and culture of medieval medicine without having to anachronistically justify them according to modern medical discourse. (shrink)

This article presents and argues for love as part of philosophy of education, more specifically the pedagogical relationship. In light of the concept of an ethics of rhythm, inspired by Roland Barthes, it is argued that the concept of rhythms sheds critical light on the asymmetrical and oppressive potential of the pedagogical relationship, but also on the liberating one. Furthermore, this argument is put into a broader debate about the role of academia as hospitable, inviting and inclusive, which in (...) turn accentuate counter-forces originating from the pedagogical relationship. (shrink)

Music, as sung and listened to, has been described in many a tale as powerful and transformative. Yet, the important question is not so much if that claim is true or whether it may be verified, but what kind of power and transformation are alluded to in those mythical and literary sources? Taking these symbolic claims and elaborating on their possible meaning, alongside thinkers such as Carolyne Abbate or Roland Barthes, proceeds to find ways in which these claims may (...) suggest different roles that music and singing play in human lives. As much as current musicological and anthropological academic narratives point to the power and its negotiation in society, there is more to singing voices’ charms than this. The author points to an important transformation that happens when the human existential qualities found in the voice’s imperfections (its materiality) are matched with the music’s aesthetic qualities (its beauty, sublimity, its symmetry, its impression) to transform the listener and make her listen. (shrink)

Ancient Greek philosophers were the first to postulate the possibility of explaining nature in theoretical terms and to initiate attempts at this. With the rise of monotheistic religions of revelation claiming supremacy over human reason and envisaging a new world to come, studies of the natural order of the transient world were widely considered undesirable. Later, in the Middle Ages, the desire for human understanding of nature in terms of reason was revived. This article is concerned with the fundamental reversal (...) of attitudes, from “undesirable” to “desirable”, that eventually led into the foundations of modern science. One of the earliest, most ingenious and most interesting personalities involved was Eriugena, a theologian at the Court of Charles the Bald in the 9th century. Though understanding what we call nature is only one of the several aspects of his theological work, his line of thought implies a turn into a pro-scientific direction: the natural order is to be understood in abstract terms of ‘primordial causes’; understanding nature is considered to be the will of God; man encompasses the whole of creation in a physical as well as a mental sense. Basically similar ideas on the reconciliation of scientific rationality and monotheistic religions of revelation were conceived, independently and nearly simultaneously, by the Arab philosopher al-Kindi in Bagdad. Eriugena was more outspoken in his claim that reason is superior to authority. This claim is implicit in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa with his emphasis on human mental creativity as the image of God’s creativity; and it is the keynote of Galileo’s ‘Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina’ some 800 years later, the manifesto expressing basic attitudes of modern science. -/- This article in English is based on the monography (in German): A. Gierer “Eriugena, al-Kindi, Nikolaus von Kues - Protagonisten einer wissenschaftsfreundlichen Wende im philosophischen und theologischen Denken”, Acta Historica Leopoldina 29 (1999), Barth Verlag in MVH Verlage Heidelberg, ISBN: 3-335-00652-6, which is also available online on this server. -/- -/- . (shrink)

Appropriation art has often been thought to support the view that authorship in art is an outmoded or misguided notion. Through a thought experiment comparing appropriation art to a unique case of artistic forgery, I examine and reject a number of candidates for the distinction that makes artists the authors of their work while forgers are not. The crucial difference is seen to lie in the fact that artists bear ultimate responsibility for whatever objectives they choose to pursue through their (...) work, whereas the forger's central objectives are determined by the nature of the activity of forgery. Appropriation artists, by revealing that no aspect of the objectives an artist pursues are in fact built in to the concept of art, demonstrate artists' responsibility for all aspects of their objectives and, hence, of their products. This responsibility is constitutive of authorship and accounts for the interpretability of artworks. Far from undermining the concept of authorship in art, then, the appropriation artists in fact reaffirm and strengthen it. (shrink)

In a chapter that hones in on certain Renaissance portraits by Hans Holbein, Giorgione, and Jan van Scorel, Hans Maes examines how it is that we can be deeply moved by such portraits, despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that we don’t know anything about their sitters. Standard explanations in terms of the revelation of an inner self or the recreation of a physical presence prove to be insuffi cient. Instead, Maes provides a more rounded account of what makes (...) said portraits moving and memorable, thereby relying on Barthes’ notion of ‘punctum,’ James Elkins’ account of why people cry in front of paintings, and a phenomenological exploration of the parallel between portraiture and the tradition of the Vanitas painting. (shrink)

We live in the age of postmodernism. What does that mean? With a call for essays, we asked for proposals for a better understanding. At the same time, we were looking for posts that show how the arts have processed and are still processing the change from the modern to the postmodern selfconception of man, which has been described by philosophy since the 1950s to today. This special issue thus demonstrates how architects, designers and artists have reacted to the new (...) socio-politically relevant concepts of postmodernism. -/- With contributions of Simone Kraft on architecture, Arianna Fantuzzi on self-portraits, Stephan Schmidt-Wulffen on visual arts in the 1980s, Anna Kristensson on design, Iris Laner on postmodern theory and the work of Jeff Wall, Christiane Wagner on postmodern avatars and finally, I contributed with a text on the deconstruction of the familiar in postmodern theory and the work of Karin Kneffel. (shrink)

This paper presents a close analysis of Steve Pyke’s famous series of portraits of philosophers. By comparing his photographs to other well-known series of portraits and to other portraits of philosophers we will seek a better understanding of the distinctiveness and fittingness of Pyke’s project. With brief nods to Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, G.W.F. Hegel, and Arthur Schopenhauer and an extensive critical investigation of Cynthia Freeland’s ideas on portraiture in general and her reading of Steve Pyke’s portraits in particular, (...) this paper will also aim to make a contribution to the philosophical debate on portraiture. (shrink)

You ask if metaphysics is possible after modernity, or after Barth and Wittgenstein and Derrida and the critique of foundationalism? May I invite you, by way of response, to listen in on a conversation? It is a dialogue between what I will call a postcritical philosopher ("P") and a postcritical scriptural theologian —— I'll label the latter a "textualist" ("T"). What I mean by "postcritical" would be displayed as the pattern of inquiry traced by this dialogue. I take the term (...) "postcritical" from George Lindbeck, whose theological work is described by his commentators as more properly "textualist" rather than "philosophic." I believe my usage is, however, true to Lindbeck's discourse. This means that one of the arguments of this essay is that there is a mode of philosophic inquiry proper to the postcritical orientation in theology that we may associate with such Christian theologians as Hans Frei, etc., as well as Lindbeck. A second argument, offered indirectly, is that there is a family of Jewish thinkers whose work may also be labeled "postcritical" on the model of these Christian thinkers, and that this Jewish postcritical theology would also be displayed in dialogues between philosophic and textualist tendencies. A third argument is that, if we listen in on the philosophic side of any of these dialogues, we will hear a postcritical philosophy. By philosophy, I mean primarily logic, defined as an inquiry that examines problematic rules of reasoning and recommends testable ways of correcting them. Secondarily, philosophy includes metaphysics, defined as an inquiry that, for the sake of assuring people about the reliability of a given logic, constructs pictures of the world whose existence would warrant this logic. We need not assume either that logic and metaphysics can be conducted only in the manner of modern and scholastic foundationalism, or that non-foundationalist theology must be "textualist" in a manner that excludes any philosophic generalization. I will argue that there are, indeed, non-foundationalist ways of conceiving of both logical and metaphysical inquiry and that these ways contribute to the dialogic activity of postcritical inquiry. (shrink)

Gapura Perahu Sebagai Ikon Media Promosi ISI Surakarta, Surya Afandy, 2014. Tesis Program Pascasarjana penciptaan dan pengkajian Seni Institut Seni Indonesia (ISI) Surakarta, pengkajian seni rupa. Tesis ini membahas tentang keberadaan gapura perahu ISI Surakarta, latar belakang pemakaian ikon gapura Perahu ISI Surakarta dan bentuk media promosi ISI Surakarta yang terdapat ikon gapura perahu ISI Surakarta didalamnya. Permasalahan penelitian ini terletak pada keberadaan gapura perahu ISI Surakarta, latar belakang pemakaian ikon gapura Perahu ISI Surakarta dan bentuk media promosi ISI Surakarta (...) yang terdapat ikon gapura perahu ISI Surakarta didalamnya. Metode penelitian menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif. Sumber data penelitian diperoleh dari karya, observasi, wawancara, dan dokumentasi. Data dikumpulkan melalui observasi, wawancara, dan dokumen (arsip). Proses analisis data menggunakan interaksi analisis data melalui beberapa tahapan, yaitu pengumpulan data, reduksi, sajian data, serta kesimpulan dan interpretasi analisis dengan dasar teori semiotika Bhartes. Berdasarkan hasil penelitian, diperoleh simpulan keberadaan gapura Perahu ISI Surakarta sebuah karya dari seorang seniman yang secara tidak langsung mempengaruhi dinamika kehidupan masyarakat dan orang-orang kreatif yang bekerja di ISI Surakarta juga memanfaatkan ikon gapura perahu ISI Surakarta menjadi identitas ISI Surakarta, ini terbukti dengan sering munculnya ikon gapura perahu pada media promo-media promo ISI Surakarta. Pemilihan ikon gapura perahu ISI Surakarta sebagai inspirasi untuk media promosi ISI Surakarta dikarenakan gapura tersebut selain memiliki bentuk yang artistik, lebih familiar di mata masyarakat, juga memiliki konsep filosofis yang dapat mewakili ISI Surakarta secara keseluruhan. Cerminan visual gapura Perahu STSI atau ISI Surakarta sendiri secara tidak langsung mengungkap mitos pada ISI Surakarta, yaitu ideologi dewa ruci yang muncul melalui pendekatan semiotika Barthes karena Penggunaan teks, bahasa, maupun tanda pada umumnya didasarkan atas ideologi tertentu secara sadar atau tidak sadar oleh pemakai tanda, dengan demikian kegiatan membaca tanda pada media promosi cetak dapat diartikan sebagai membongkar suatu ideologi yang secara manipulatif bekerja dalam sebuah kondisi sosial tertentu. -/- . (shrink)

Joseph Butler was an Anglican priest and later a bishop who wrote about ethics, religion, and other philosophical themes. He is not well known today. During his lifetime and into the early part of the twentieth century he was better known especially for his major work the Analogy of Religion (1736). Today he is known mostly for his sermons which are interpreted as essays on ethics and for his essay on identity. Butler had a profound effect on J. H. Newman, (...) Matthew Arnold, and W. E. Gladstone and some effect on many other popular, academic, and professional readers. This book is as much about Butler’s sources and his reception as it is about the way he arranged and presented the evidence in the first half of the 18th century. He was a good man and is recognized by the Anglican church as a divine. We have no interest in taking a nostalgic look at a quaint figure in English church history. To those who claim Butler is unknown, that he was “blown out of the water” by John Wesley or Karl Barth, or Cornelius van Til, we can only say Butler is not as well known in the 20th and 21st centuries as in the 19th, but he is certainly not unknown to those who have taken any interest in philosophy, religion, or ethics. Today there has been a revival of interest in Bishop Butler. Our concern is to build and maintain a bridge that will help to keep this momentum. He offers an ethic that is universal and clearly Christian, yet it is based on the nature of man. Kant had a similar project, but in our opinion, Butler makes more compelling arguments. What is of interest to the Christian apologist is Butler’s work in this area. The purpose of this book is to present Butler’s ideas. We believe that his ethics have a universality that is applicable to people of all religious faiths and those that have none. It is common sense way of looking at ethics for everyday interaction. This book is a narrative argument presenting in detail how Butler’s creative arrangement of the evidence served as a bridge between the ancients as known in the Greek, Latin, and Hebrew originals, and the moderns, mostly Anglophone, who constituted Butler’s work environment and his reception in the latter day down to the present. We can hardly expect everyone to agree with Butler on all points, we certainly do not. The point at issue is rather whether he merits a seat at the present-day round table of deliberation on matters pertaining to philosophy, religion, and ethics. (shrink)

Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in which (...) a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

First of all, I would like to thank to the Philosophy of Law Department for this encounter with Professor Solum. It is really a pleasure meeting you Professor, and having the possibility to discuss this profoundly interesting and courageaus text with my colegues and specially with its author. The adjetive I have just used is not simply politeness, I really think we are in front of a very interesting work not only because of its persuasive humorous rhetoric but mainly because (...) it is a text that interrogates its own tradition even if it is with the intention to oxygenate, give air to it. And from a critical position that is something always to be welcomed. Nevertheless what I want to argue in this brief words is that what it is surprising (for my humble point of view) is that originalism, even in this new textual linguistic outfit or clothing, doesnt still address the question of the concept of origin itself. A question and a signifier that has a long inscription not only in western philosophical and interpretative traditions (meaning Nietzsche, Freud, Philosophical Hermeneutics as Gadamer, Ricoeur or in Derrida s deconstruction and so on) but also in non western interpretative tradition such as the Talmudic, for example. In these lines of thought the origin is unreachable, either lost or doesnt exist at all as far as there is no absolute ground that soustain an unique pure original meaning. In short, it is an empty signifier, obviously in dispute. So at last what it is called “original public meaning” it is no more than the result of the force relations between discourses. In other terms, there is an internal intimate relationship between power, language and interpretation. As Bajtin puts it (a russian linguist from the early XX century): the sign is the arena of social struggle. Or as Roland Barthes use to write: power parasitizes the language itself. (shrink)

Social Media is a new media of information flow gateway that can be accessed by the public, easily and freely. Social Media is an interactive information technology which not only can netizens access information, but they can also make news (information, comments, etc.) and share it on the internet. Easy access to information has caused ideological effects on society. This research aims to examine the ideological effects of the myths about COVID-19 on social media. The data collection was done through (...) observation and distributing questionnaires online on social media. The data sources were from WhatsApp and Coronavirus cases reported online Indonesia. Researchers used Barthes' mythological theory to answer the research objectives. The results of this research indicated that the spread of myths related to COVID-19 by netizens on social media had caused ideological effects on society, for example, the public refused the coronavirus victims to be buried in public burial because of the corpse considered to infect the residents. This research contributes to the media effects theory development, which can be a policy for the government in fighting against Coronavirus, and netizens who use parrhesia on social media which can contain untrue myths. (shrink)

La pubblicazione del libro Beta Writer. 2019. Lithium-Ion Batteries. A Machine-Generated Summary of Current Research. New York, NY: Springer, prodotto con software di Intelligenza Artificiale sollecita analisi e riflessioni in vari ambiti. Prima di tutto su che cosa i sistemi di Intelligenza Artificiale siano in grado di fare nell’ambito della produzione di testi di tipo informativo. Di qui si pone la questione se e come un sistema software di Intelligenza Artificiale possa essere trattato come autore di un testo che ha (...) prodotto. Valutare se ciò sia corretto e possibile porta a riprendere in esame la concezione attuale per la quale è scontato che l’autore sia una persona. Ciò, a sua volta, di fronte a testi prodotti da sistemi di Intelligenza Artificiale sollecita necessariamente la domanda se essi, come l’autore-persona, siano dotati di agency. L’articolo conclude che i sistemi di Intelligenza Artificiale si caratterizzano per un’agency distribuita, condivisa con chi li ha progettati e li fa funzionare e che sulla scorta delle riflessioni di 50 anni fa di Barthes e Foucault occorre definire e riconoscere un nuovo tipo di autore. (shrink)

The publication of the book Beta Writer. 2019. Lithium-Ion Batteries. A Machine-Generated Summary of Current Research. New York, NY: Springer, produced with Artificial Intelligence software prompts analysis and reflections in several areas. First of all, on what Artificial Intelligence systems are able to do in the production of informative texts. This raises the question if and how an Artificial Intelligence software system can be treated as the author of a text it has produced. Evaluating whether this is correct and possible (...) leads to re-examine the current conception for which it is taken for granted that the author is a person. This, in turn, when faced with texts produced by Artificial Intelligence systems necessarily raises the question of whether they, like the author-person, are endowed with agency. The article concludes that Artificial Intelligence systems are characterized by a distributed agency, shared with those who designed them and make them work, and that in the wake of the reflections of 50 years ago by Barthes and Foucault, it is necessary to define and recognize a new type of author. (shrink)

In § 35 of Sein und Zeit Heidegger’s denunciation of Gerede, idle talk, is confident and scathing. It sounds so sinister and threatening. What could Heidegger be talking about? One could cite numerous fictional characters (e.g., Pecksniff, Mrs. Gamp, Skimpole, Podsnap – all in Dickens), characters whose speech is very nearly an idiolect of bad faith. And yet there is something so fascinating and creative in their speech, an exuberance in their dissimulation, that one wouldn’t want to miss them. Could (...) idle talk in Heidegger’s sense contribute to the theoretization of Bakhtin's idea of the dialogic and heteroglossia and to the notion of discours as it has been developed by Benveniste, Barthes, and Genette? In prose fiction language is valorized (often implicitly) in terms of meaning/nonsense, serious/non-serious, full/empty. When in fiction language that is deemed low, formulaic, or “empty”-- gossip, chatter, prattle, idiotismes – comes to the fore the narrative elements falters, “nothing much” is said. But a kind of speech as act and process is foregrounded. It is this kind of inadvertence in language, its “idling” state, that Gerede points to. (shrink)