El presente artículo está dedicado al trabajo de Hans-Georg Gadamer titulado “Prometeo y Pandora”, publicado originalmente en español en 1949 en el volumen Goethe. 1749 - 28 de agosto – 1949, editado por la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Cuyo, Argentina. En primer lugar, se ofrece una introducción en la que se presenta el contexto original histórico-intelectual de su edición, traducción y publicación, los antecedentes filosóficos del texto dentro de la obra de Gadamer (conferencias y artículos (...) previos sobre el tema), una presentación breve de las fuentes y de los temas que trata el texto, así como una serie de aclaraciones sobre las correcciones que se realizaron para esta edición crítica. En segundo lugar, se ofrece una nueva edición de “Prometeo y Pandora”. Este ensayo es uno de los dos primeros trabajos de Gadamer que fueron traducidos al castellano y, a su vez, una de las primeras traducciones de las producciones de Gadamer a una lengua extranjera. //--// The following investigation focuses on the article of Hans-Georg Gadamer entitled “Prometheus and Pandora”, originally published in Spanish in 1949, in the book: "Goethe. 1749 – 28th August – 1949", edited by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Cuyo, Argentina. Firstly, an introduction is offered in which is presented the original historical-intellectual context of its edition, translation and publication, the philosophical background of the text within Gadamer’s work (conferences and previous articles on the subject), a brief description of the sources and topics encompassed in the text, as well as a series of clarifications on the corrections made for the current critical edition. This essay is one of the first two works by Gadamer that were translated into Spanish and, in turn, one of the first translations of Gadamer's productions into a foreign language. (shrink)

Resumen: Este texto introduce la primera traducción al español de los textos Schönheit [Belleza] de Hans-Georg Gadamer (trabajo escrito en los años ’70 y que vio la luz en alemán póstumamente en 2007) y Schönheit und Bürgerlichkeit [Belleza y burguesía] de Odo Marquard, publicado también en 2007 como respuesta demorada al trabajo del filósofo de Marburgo. Gadamer explora el desarrollo histórico del concepto de belleza en los siglos XIX y XX, poniendo énfasis en que la belleza siguió y seguirá siendo (...) no sólo un concepto estético sino un concepto normativo. Por su lado, Marquard contextualiza las ideas de Gadamer en su marco de producción original y realiza un análisis crítico de las mismas a partir de sus propias tempranas contribuciones a una teoría de las “ya no bellas artes”.// Abstract: This text introduces the first Spanish translation of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Schönheit [Beauty] (work written in the 1970s and posthumously published in German in 2007) and Odo Marquard’s Schönheit und Bürgerlichkeit [Beauty and Bourgeoisie], published also in 2007 as a delayed response to Gadamer’s views. Gadamer explores the historical development of the concept of beauty in the 19th and 20th centuries, emphasizing that beauty continued and will continue to be not only an aesthetic concept but also a normative concept. For his part, Marquard contextualizes Gadamer’s ideas in their original production framework and performs a critical analysis of them based on his own early contributions to a theory of the “no longer beautiful arts”. (shrink)

Any adequate semantics of generic sentences (e.g., “Philosophers evaluate arguments”) must accommodate both what we call the positive data and the negative data. The positive data consists of observations about what felicitous interpretations of generic sentences are available. Conversely, the negative data consists of observations about which interpretations of generic sentences are unavailable. Nguyen argues that only his pragmatic neo-Gricean account and Sterken’s indexical account can accommodate the positive data. Lee and Nguyen have advanced the debate by arguing that the (...) negative data is a problem for both Nguyen’s and Sterken’s accounts; these two accounts seem to incorrectly predict that generics have felicitous interpretations that they, in fact, fail to have. In this paper, we advance this debate—and, more generally, the task of developing an adequate formal semantics of generics—by arguing that a neglected class of theories are compatible with both the positive data and the negative data. Specifically, we argue that treating the generic operator GEN as a relative gradable expression with a positive, upper- and lower- bounded scale helps accommodate the positive data and the negative data. While developing this view, we show how several previously developed semantics of generics may systematically accommodate both sets of data. One broad contribution of this paper is to show that, while they generate important desiderata, the positive and negative data cannot determine a unique semantics for generics. A further contribution of this paper is to highlight previously unnoted ways in which degree semantics may inform semantic theories of generic meaning. (shrink)

Tentazione di Siracusa, "Tentación de Siracusa", es el título que eligió Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) para la breve, aunque magistral, conferencia que pronunció el 18 de enero de 2001 en Ortigia, en el Palacio del Senado siracusano. Allí fue convocado por las autoridades del Collegio Siciliano di Filosofía y por el entonces intendente de la comuna sícula, Giambattista Bufardeci, quien le otorgó en tal ocasión la ciudadanía honoraria de esa antigua y culturalmente variada urbe mediterránea, una ciudad atravesada milenariamente por la (...) tensión entre filosofía y política, que vio partir por mar, reducido a esclavo, a Platón, y que se manchó con la sangre de Arquímedes, derramada por un soldado romano invasor. La lectio derridiana, que propone sin ambages una nueva figura para la relación entre filosofía y política, abordando el fenómeno de la "mundialización" así como la pregunta por el sentido contemporáneo de la ciudadanía, debió esperar casi dos décadas para ver la luz. Recién en 2018 la editorial Mimesis, sello italiano de incuestionable prestigio, la hizo accesible dentro de su colección "eterotopie", dirigida por los profesores Salvo Vaccaro (Università degli Studi di Palermo) y Pierre Dalla Vigna (Università dell'Insubria). El texto fue traducido íntegro para su publicación por Francesco Garritano y Marina Machì (ambos de la Università della Calabria), quienes ofrecieron, como adelanto de su versión, un breve fragmento por primera vez en la edición del 21 de enero de 2001 del periódico italiano Repubblica, bajo el título Il tiranno e il filosofo). (shrink)

The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists se centra en la relación mutua entre las capacidades humanas de sentir placer y dolor y el carácter afectivo que las une con las facultades cognitivas de aprender, comprender, recordar, evocar, planificar y anticiparse. Para esto, Warren consagra toda su agudeza analítica a eminentes obras del pensamiento antiguo: particularmente nos referimos a los diálogos platónicos República, Protágoras y Filebo. Otro tanto hace con De Anima, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, Ética (...) a Nicómaco, Retórica y Poética de Aristóteles. Finalmente, hacia la mitad y sobre el final del libro, se dedica a poner en diálogo sus análisis sobre Platón y Aristóteles con las escuelas hedonistas clásicas del helenismo: epicúreos y cirenaicos. (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el análisis de la lectura de la filosofía política platónica que Hans-Georg Gadamer realiza en su conferencia Plato und die Dichter (1934). Se planteará como hipótesis propia que, en los diálogos platónicos, tanto el filosofar como el poetizar habilitan el acceso a la comprensión del carácter sagrado de la justicia, la dimensión política de la legalidad de la musa poética y la percepción de lo sagrado como necesidad humana que permanece encubierta al modo de (...) lo innecesario. Por otro lado, sobre el final se prestará atención al concepto de phrónēsis en relación a la facultad humana del juicio y como instrumento necesario para la realización práctica del devenir del ser político del hombre en el Estado. (shrink)

Marranos. El otro del otro es el cuarto libro de la filósofa italiana Donatella Di Cesare, Catedrática de la Sapienza-Università di Roma, publicado en la colección «Clásicos del mañana» de la Editorial Gedisa, después de la aparición de Heidegger y los judíos. Los Cuadernos negros (2017), Terrorismo (2017) y Tortura (2018) de la misma autora. Este texto de Di Cesare es una exploración inquieta e inquietante. Su indagación no promete al lector dar, al final del recorrido, con una terra incognita (...) que se revelará reconfortantemente segura o con un tesoro hundido en las profundidades abisales del pasado, sino que se mueve en prodigiosos meandros que aguardan aun, en cada una de sus discontinuidades, una chispa de redención metafísico-política. (shrink)

English title: Gadamer's interpretation of the Aristotelian Protrepticus. -/- Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present and analyse the main hypotheses of Hans-Georg Gadamer in his 1928 essay Der aristotelische Protreptikos und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik, emphasizing the Gadamerian reception of the notions of phrónēsis, hēdonḗ and, to a lesser extent, phýsis. It will be attempted to show that in this early work of Gadamer there is more than a methodological and interpretative debate regarding the Protrepticus (...) and the Aristotelian ethics. Lastly, the paper argues that it is possible to read in the main arguments of this early essay the first intellectual maturation of relevance of Gadamer, expressed in the form of a critical dialogue with his great masters (Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Paul Friedländer), departing from the new interpretative possibilities that philology and phenomenology opened to his studies on the ethical-political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The theoretical consequences of this early article would have both paved the way of Gadamer’s next theoretical interventions regarding Platonic political philosophy as well as for the future developments of philosophical hermeneutics. /// -/- Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es presentar y analizar las principales hipótesis de Hans-Georg Gadamer en su ensayo de 1928 Der aristotelische Protreptikos und die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtung der aristotelischen Ethik, poniendo énfasis en la recuperación gadameriana de las nociones de phrónēsis, hēdonḗ y, en menor medida, phýsis. Se intenta demostrar que en este trabajo temprano de Gadamer hay, en términos metodológicos e interpretativos, más que una discusión con Werner Jaeger con relación al Protréptico y a la ética aristotélica. Finalmente, este artículo sostiene que es posible leer en las principales argumentaciones del ensayo la primera maduración intelectual de relevancia de Gadamer, expresada en forma de diálogo crítico con sus grandes maestros (Paul Natorp, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Paul Friedländer), a partir de las nuevas posibilidades interpretativas que la filología y fenomenología le abrieron para el estudio de la filosofía ético-política de Platón y Aristóteles. Las consecuencias teóricas de este temprano artículo habrían signado tanto el camino de sus siguientes intervenciones teóricas en tono a la filosofía política platónica como también los futuros desarrollos de la hermenéutica filosófica. (shrink)

El objetivo general de este artículo es interrogar el lugar de la crítica a la idea de progreso en la filosofía de Walter Benjamin, argumentando que las raíces de su pensamiento político podrían encontrarse en el misticismo cabalista. La intención principal es determinar, siguiendo a Benjamin, algunas de las principales características de la creencia en el progreso como problema y su relación con una determinada normatividad histórica. Este recorrido permitirá elucidar la relación que, según el autor, mantendría una comprensión procesualista (...) y lineal de la historia con una actitud político-intelectual apoyada en el conformismo y la indiferencia. Por último, se propone considerar la original interpretación sobre la temporalidad que aparece en una vertiente del misticismo judío, el cabalismo de Isaac Luria de Safed, actualizada en forma heterodoxa por Benjamin, que permitiría comprender desde un nuevo punto de vista, conforme a la argumentación presentada, el vínculo temporal que supone la idea de tradición y rememoración en el materialismo histórico benjaminiano. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn’t matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following (...) asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism resistant to the standard argument against speciesism. (shrink)

A 25 años de su muerte, los escritos de Louis Althusser continúan siendo tan polémicos y controvertidos como lo fueron en el momento de su publicación. La siguiente investigación se propone analizar uno de los temas que más controversias y críticas suscitó en la década de los sesenta, momento por demás polémico dentro de su producción intelectual: la relación entre la ciencia e ideología. ¿Se trata de una llana oposición?, ¿son la ciencia y la ideología dos estructuras claramente diferenciadas?, ¿es (...) acaso la ciencia la salida de la ideología?, ¿es la ciencia la verdad y la ideología el error? A través de un estudio pormenorizado de los textos publicados en la década señalada, este trabajo buscará dar cuenta del pensamiento de Althusser en relación con esta temática en el marco de sus valiosos aportes al pensamiento marxista. -/- . (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es interrogar la obra ensayística, literaria y periodística del escritor inglés Gilbert Keith Chesterton desde una perspectiva teórico-política y poner en tensión aquellos elementos conceptuales que se encuentran enfrentados con algunos de los principales supuestos de la modernidad. La propuesta de este trabajo es organizar estos elementos dispersos y postular la posibilidad de estructurar una filosofía política a partir de una lectura que los integre. Se hará hincapié en su crítica a la idea moderna de (...) progreso, para luego explorar la posibilidad de derivar de las reflexiones del autor un cuerpo conceptual coherente que pueda ser considerado relevante para la teoría política. Para esta tarea, se toman como punto de partida conceptos centrales para la ciencia política presentes en sus obras que se encuentran alumbrados por doctrinas teológicas clave dentro del pensamiento cristiano, vector fundamental de sus escritos. Particularmente, se insiste en profundizar en las reflexiones del autor en torno a la democracia, estableciendo una relación específica con sus consideraciones teológicas y políticas. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore Gadamer’s early reflections on Plato’s utopian thought and its potential topicality. In the following section, I will show how areté, understood as a hermeneutical and existential virtue, is dialectically related to ethics and politics in Gadamer’s phenomenological reception of Plato’s philosophy. I argue that, in Gadamer’s eyes, Socratic-Platonic self-understanding enables human beings to be aware of their political responsibilities, to recognize how they are existentially and mutually related to the other, and to (...) clarify dialectically their own existential possibilities in order to transcend their inherited world of values. In the third section, I aim to show how these are the grounds on which Gadamer’s initial thoughts on the utopian dimension of Platonic political philosophy developed, mainly through his further critical account of the works on the German “political Plato” published in Germany between 1927 and 1933, i.e., Kurt Singer’s Platon, der Gründer (1927), Julius Stenzel’s Platon. Der Erzieher (1928), and Kurt von Hildendrandt‘s Platon, Der Kampf des Geistes um die Macht (1933). Then, in the fourth section, I will express my own views on the relevance of reconsidering how the notions of areté, phrónesis, and andreía are already related in Plato’s dialogues, complementing the insights on Gadamer’s interpretation of areté in section two. My purpose is to go beyond Gadamer’s reading and provide us with a more solid ground to address his late reflections on political courage and its relations with his dialectical understanding of Platonic utopia as a myth. Therefore, I will explore the problem of civil disobedience, a topic that was actually not at the centre of Gadamer’s concerns, as a genuine mode of utopian political action which can enact a true deviation from the sophistic pólis and its understanding of power. Finally, in the conclusion, I will characterize Gadamer’s portrait of Platonic utopia as a dialectical myth which enables human beings to recognize when politics are being reduced to mere power abuse by the State and also suggest why Gadamer’s approach to utopias is still relevant today. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer, en su conferencia Plato und die Dichter (1934), desarrolló una investigación fenomenológica excepcional de filosofía ético-política de Platón y del lugar que el arte ocupa en ella. En mediados de la década de 1990, la escritora mexicana Teresa Orozco publicó una serie de escritos en los cuales acusa a Gadamer de haberse colocado, a través de la exhibición y publicación de este trabajo, a servicio del nacional-socialismo. Este artículo busca discutir los argumentos presentados por Orozco y otros autores, (...) en primer lugar, investigando la heterogeneidad de la recepción del texto en cuestión entre 1934 y 1944, dentro y fuera de Alemania; en segundo lugar, recuperando datos biográficos relevantes que fueron omitidos por sus detractores; y, finalmente, ofreciendo pruebas documentales que refuten los fundamentos de la acusación mencionada anteriormente. Al final, haré una propuesta de lectura metodológica para analizar el trabajo de referencia en relación a su contexto histórico, lo que puede contribuir para verificar en qué sentido esta conferencia expresaría la disidencia de Gadamer con la hegemonía Nacional-Socialista. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar el modo en que se presenta la virtud política en los principales textos de Montesquieu y su resonancia en la obra de Rousseau. La hipótesis general que se propone es que, a pesar de sus enormes divergencias, los dos elaboraron una lectura eminentemente moderna que los separa de la filosofía política clásica. Ambos habrían compartido la idea de que la virtud es una pasión ―o que es intercambiable por una pasión―, apartándose de (...) las jerarquías del pensamiento antiguo. Se sostiene en este artículo que Montesquieu declarará, ante la muerte de la virtud clásica, su sucedáneo en el placer de la seguridad que es capaz de garantizar la libertad por medio del gobierno mixto. Por su lado, Rousseau hará una reivindicación de la virtud antigua, pero identificándola con la compasión, dislocando el status de la virtud civil. Estas lecturas darán lugar a dos maneras muy distintas de comprender la relación existente entre derecho natural y derecho positivo. // Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze the way in which political virtue appears in the main texts of Montesquieu and and its repercussions in Rousseau’s work. The hypothesis proposed is that, despite their enormous divergences, both of them developed an eminently modern reading that separates them from Classical Political Philosophy. Both authors would have shared the idea that virtue is a passion ―or that it is interchangeable with a passion―, moving away from the hierarchies of ancient thought. This paper argues that Montesquieu will declare after the death of classical virtue the pleasure of security as a substitute capable of guaranteeing modern liberty by means of States organized as mixed constitutions. For his part, Rousseau will make a vindication of ancient virtue, but identifying it with compassion, dislocating the status of civil virtue. These readings will give rise to two very different ways of understanding the relationship between natural law and positive law. -/- Palabras clave: virtud – pasión – modernidad – seguridad – compasión. Key-words: virtue – passion – modernity – security – compassion. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo busca presentar sumariamente las principales críticas elaboradas por Karl Löwith y Leo Strauss en su recepción del clásico trabajo de Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [El concepto de lo político]. Se intentará explorar, en un primer apartado, la acusación löwithiana de “ocasionalismo ateológico”, formulada, aunque bajo pseudónimo, en un texto crítico de 1935 cuyo título original fue luego reemplazado por aquel con el que se lo conoce actualmente: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [El decisionismo (...) ocasional de Carl Schmitt]. En la segunda sección, siguiendo principalmente la lectura propuesta de Heinrich Meier, se buscará dar cuenta de la interpretación que aparece en los Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comentarios sobre El concepto de lo político de Carl Schmitt], las notas de Leo Strauss, publicadas en 1932, que sugieren entender la afirmación de lo político en la obra de Schmitt como constitutiva de la posterior crítica schmittiana de la filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes. Palabras clave: político, ocasionalismo, decisión, teología política, liberalismo. Abstract: This article seeks to briefly present the main criticisms elaborated by Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss in their reception of the classic work of Carl Schmitt Der Begriff des Politischen [The Concept of the Political]. It will be explored, in a f irst section, the Löwithian accusation of “atheological occasionalism”, offered, although under a pseudonym, in a text of 1935 whose original title was later replaced by that with which it is currently known: Der okkasionelle Dezisionismus von Carl Schmitt [The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt]. In the second section, following mainly the reading of Heinrich Meier, I will seek to give an account of the interpretation present in the Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen [Comments on Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political], the critical notes by Leo Strauss, published in 1932, which suggest understanding the assertion of politics in Schmitt’s work as constitutive for the later Schmittian critique of Thomas Hobbes’ political philosophy. Keywords: political, occasionalism, decision, politcal theoology, liberalism. (shrink)

In memoriam: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (2007-2017). Filosofía, poesía y política en Martin Heidegger,.

This paper explores the liar paradox and its implications for logic and philosophical reasoning. It analyzes the paradox using classical logic principles and paraphrases it as "affirmation of the falsity of the very affirmation." The study draws connections between the liar paradox and Hegel's speculative sentence and suggests it functions as a "quasi-speculative sentence." Additionally, it examines parallels with the logocentric predicament and the determinist's assertion, highlighting their paradoxical nature. Through these analyses, the paper aims to illuminate the fundamental paradoxes (...) in our reasoning and logic. (shrink)

The emphasis on evidence based medicine (EBM) has placed increased focus on finding timely answers to clinical questions in presence of patients. Using a combination of natural language processing for the generation of clinical excerpts and information theoretic distance based clustering, we evaluated multiple approaches for the efficient presentation of context-sensitive EBM excerpts.

The aim of this article is to provide a philosophical conceptual framework to understand the theoretical roots and political implications of the interpretations of Plato’s work in Jaeger’s Third Humanism and Krieck’s völkisch-racist pedagogy and anthropology. This article will seek to characterize, as figures of localitas, their conceptions of the individual, community, corporeality, identity, and the State that both authors developed departing from Platonic political philosophy. My main hypothesis is that Jaeger’s and Krieck’s interpretations of Platonic paideía shared several core-elements (...) based on a modern conception of State sovereignty and human will, whose fundamental ground is the subjectivist-technical metaphysics. The “production” of a human type (spiritual and/or racial) and a unitary State political community appears in both authors mediated by a theory of political education, that I define as «State typohumanism», that sought its sustenance in Plato’s political philosophy, mainly by means of a distorted understanding of the notions of týpos and ē̂thos, and that, I argue, played a key role in the intellectual legitimization of völkisch-racism. This would be broadly translated into a programmatic and literal understanding of the Platonic Republic which assumes that the inherent function of any State is to produce subjectivities based on national identities grounded on homogeneous characteristics. In these varied characterizations similar appropriations of humanitas have been expressed both in Jaeger and in Krieck. (shrink)

Este nuevo libro colectivo recoge los trabajos del grupo de investigación de Filosofía de la PUCE, elaborados entre 2019 y 2020. El tema elegido, Tecnología y política, define una de las problemáticas contemporáneas más relevantes dentro del trabajo académico. Como en ocasiones anteriores, cada autor plantea contextos de lectura diversos; los aportes recorren un escenario complejo, resultado de los caminos que cada uno ha elegido para consolidar su propia reflexión a partir de los proyectos de escritura de tesis de posgrado (...) y de investigaciones desarrolladas tanto en universidades europeas como americanas. Sin embargo, el punto de encuentro está dado en la perspectiva y en las condiciones que determinan la posibilidad de proponer un pensamiento crítico y propositivo desde América Latina. (shrink)

Pocos otros temas despiertan más polémicas que el de los vínculos entre filosofía y política: que quienes se dedican a la filosofía no deben verse influenciados por la política, que si a la política le corresponde ser auxiliada por la filosofía, que si el saber filosófico tiene que desligarse de las posiciones políticas, que si a las instituciones académicas de las humanidades les conviene independizarse del poder de turno, etc. Todas estas son discusiones que heredamos (no sin reformularlas y, por (...) lo tanto, retransformarlas) desde la Antigüedad, en la que ya aparecería, de la mano de Platón, la figura del rey filósofo. Este libro reúne una variedad de abordajes que atraviesan debates sobre juicios de hecho y de valor, sobre la democra-cia como forma de gobierno y sobre la intervención de la historia en el vínculo de la filosofía y la política. Recuperando el pensamiento antiguo y moderno, pero concentrándose en la obra de intelectuales contemporáneos, los autores ponen en movimiento dilucidaciones de grandes como Max Weber, Jacques Rancière, Louis Althusser, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe y Leo Strauss, entre otros. Así, ofrecen aquí un vívido panorama de las controversias que habitan los entrecruzamientos entre filosofía y política, coronando el volumen con la traducción de un texto de Claude Lefort, hasta el momento inédito en español. (shrink)

I discuss whether "sentience" (i.e., phenomenal consciousness) comes in degrees.

This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I develop a variety of motivations for this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.

We propose an approach to the question of how qualia fit into the physical world, in the context of a relational and realist completion of quantum theory, called the causal theory of views\cite{views}. This is a combination of an approach to a dynamics of discrete causal structures, called energetic causal sets, developed with M. Cortes, with a realist approach to quantum foundations, called the real ensemble formulation. In this theory, the beables are the information available at each event from its (...) causal past, such as its causal predessesors and the energy and momentum they transfer to the event. We call this the view of an event. That is, we describe a causal universe that is composed of a set of partial views of itself. We propose that conscious perceptions are aspects of some views. This addresses the problem of why consciousness always involves awareness of a bundled grouping of qualia that define a momentary self. This gives a restricted form of panpsychism defined by a physically based selection principle which selects which views have experiential aspects. We further propose that only those views which are novel, in the sense that they are not duplicates of the view of any event in the event's own causal past, are the physical correlates of conscious experience. (shrink)

This paper examines the idea of "objective phenomenology," or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn’t require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are (...) objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. (shrink)

This paper gives significance to the concept of continuity in addressing the contemporary mind-body problem. Building upon philosophical definitions and insights from empirical brain science, the paper argues for "ontology of continuity" as a way to bridge between the mental and physical. To overcome the challenge of Kim’s causal overdetermination, the paper introduces a dual-neural process model, where subjective experiences and neural activities co-depend and influence each other in a quasi-parallel manner. This model seeks to reconcile idealism and physicalism, proposing (...) that continuity serves as a fundamental ontological construct connecting the mental and physical realms. (shrink)

I develop and defend a sense-datum theory of perception. My theory follows the spirit of classic sense-datum theories: I argue that what it is to have a perceptual experience is to be acquainted with some sense-data, where sense-data are private particulars that have all the properties they appear to have, that are common to both perception and hallucination, that constitute the phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences, and that are analogous to pictures inside one’s head. But my theory also diverges from (...) conventional sense-datum theories in some key respects: on my view, (1) sense-data are first-person presentations of neural states, (2) the sensational qualities of sense-data differ in kind from the sensible qualities of external objects, and (3) sense-data are the vehicles in virtue of which we perceive, rather than the objects that we perceive. I argue that this package of claims is appropriately labeled ‘sense-datum theory’, and that the resultant view ought to be a live contender in contemporary philosophy of perception. (shrink)

In the science of consciousness, it’s oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, (...) and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees. (shrink)

Martin y Fritz Heidegger, Correspondencia. 1930-1949. Edición de Bruno Pieger. Traducción de Raúl Gabás. Barcelona: Herder, 2018, 172 pp.

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system’s interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems are those that use interpretive rules to map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which (...) a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically. (shrink)

I sketch here an intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types, which are individuated in part by historical paths (re)production. Although attractive, this view has been rejected by a number of authors on the basis of general claims about abstract objects. On consideration, however, these general claims are overgeneralizations, which whilst true of some abstracta, are not true of all abstract objects, and in particular, are not true of created types. The intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types (...) is, then, left in place. (shrink)

Exploring the intimate tie between body movement and space and time, Lee begins with the position that body movement generates space and time and explores the ethical implications of this responsibility for the situations one’s body movements generate. Whiteness theory has come to recognize the ethical responsibility for situations not of one’s own making and hence accountability for the results of more than one’s immediate personal conscious decisions. Because of our specific history, whites have developed a particular embodiment and body (...) movement that generates places that can only be characterized as more comfortable and more enabling to whites. (shrink)

This article aims to readdress Hans-Georg Gadamer's first encounter with Plato's philosophy through his earlier academic journey, the direct and indirect influence exerted by his celebrated mentors at the University of Marburg, and his early publications. For this, I will resort not only to his intellectual biography, but also to neglected texts of Gadamer, such as his 1922 doctoral thesis, reviews and articles published between 1924 and 1928, correspondence, both edited and unpublished, philosophical interviews, as well as archive footage. I (...) will seek to determine the role of his early mentors around Plato’s interpretation through the analysis of the evolution of Gadamer's theoretical positions in order to elucidate his critical reassessments. In the conclusions, I will make an attempt to deepen on Gadamer's process of reception, rupture and emancipation around the then-dominant interpretations of Marburg neo-Kantianism, especially on the link between the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, as well as the transformative character of Gadamer’s approach to the phenomenology of Scheler and Heidegger, and his incursion into classical philology. (shrink)

Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Autor: Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, Translated by Jeff Fort, Foreword by Jean-Luc Nancy, Editorial: Fordham University Press, Fecha de Publicación: 2016, Formato: Hardback $85.00, Páginas: 116, Reviewed by: Facundo Bey (Universidad Nacional de General San Martín / CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires).

En 1942 Gadamer publicó su ensayo Platos Staat der Erziehung. En este artículo interrogará la mutua relación entre pólis y psyché, así como entre política y filosofía en el diálogo República de Platón. El presente texto se propone exponer de modo crítico el análisis que el autor realizó, en el ensayo mencionado, de la dikaiosýne entendida como “hacer propio” en los diálogos platónicos, así como el rango político de la educación filosófica. Para ello se pondrá énfasis en el papel que (...) desempeñan en su elaboración las nociones de andreía y sophrosýne. Finalmente, en las conclusiones se mostrará cómo en la lectura de Gadamer la educación filosófica de los guardianes y de los líderes se inscribe en una interpretación inescindible de una caracterización utópica de la kallípolis, que problematiza la cuestión del poder en el pensamiento platónico. (shrink)

Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.

It is often suggested that when opinions differ among individuals in a group, the opinions should be aggregated to form a compromise. This paper compares two approaches to aggregating opinions, linear pooling and what I call opinion agglomeration. In evaluating both strategies, I propose a pragmatic criterion, No Regrets, entailing that an aggregation strategy should prevent groups from buying and selling bets on events at prices regretted by their members. I show that only opinion agglomeration is able to satisfy the (...) demand. I then proceed to give normative and empirical arguments in support of the pragmatic criterion for opinion aggregation, and that ultimately favor opinion agglomeration. (shrink)

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires (...) rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals, or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals. (shrink)

Conscious experiences are characterized by mental qualities, such as those involved in seeing red, feeling pain, or smelling cinnamon. The standard framework for modeling mental qualities represents them via points in geometrical spaces, where distances between points inversely correspond to degrees of phenomenal similarity. This paper argues that the standard framework is structurally inadequate and develops a new framework that is more powerful and flexible. The core problem for the standard framework is that it cannot capture precision structure: for example, (...) consider the phenomenal contrast between seeing an object as crimson in foveal vision versus merely as red in peripheral vision. The solution I favor is to model mental qualities using regions, rather than points. I explain how this seemingly simple formal innovation not only provides a natural way of modeling precision, but also yields a variety of further theoretical fruits: it enables us to formulate novel hypotheses about the space and structures of mental qualities, formally differentiate two dimensions of phenomenal similarity, generate a quantitative model of the phenomenal sorites, and define a measure of discriminatory grain. A noteworthy consequence is that the structure of the mental qualities of conscious experiences is fundamentally different from the structure of the perceptible qualities of external objects. (shrink)

This paper argues that in Eudemian Ethics 8.3, virtue’s mean between excess and deficiency is defined by the standard of promoting the most contemplation. Promotion is indirect and constrained by virtue’s other essential features. The chapter’s apparent restriction of the standard to actions concerning natural goods actually serves a dialectical, not a restrictive, purpose. This paper proposes to unify the chapter’s argumentative arc.

There is growing concern that decision-making informed by machine learning (ML) algorithms may unfairly discriminate based on personal demographic attributes, such as race and gender. Scholars have responded by introducing numerous mathematical definitions of fairness to test the algorithm, many of which are in conflict with one another. However, these reductionist representations of fairness often bear little resemblance to real-life fairness considerations, which in practice are highly contextual. Moreover, fairness metrics tend to be implemented in narrow and targeted toolkits that (...) are difficult to integrate into an algorithm’s broader ethical assessment. In this paper, we derive lessons from ethical philosophy and welfare economics as they relate to the contextual factors relevant for fairness. In particular we highlight the debate around acceptability of particular inequalities and the inextricable links between fairness, welfare and autonomy. We propose Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs) as a way towards providing a more holistic understanding of whether or not an algorithm is aligned to the decision-maker’s ethical values. (shrink)

Some philosophers think that life is worth living not merely because of the goods and the bads within it, but also because life itself is good. I explain how this idea can be formalized by associating each version of such of a view with a function from length of life to the value generated by life itself. Then I argue that every version of the view that life itself is good faces some version of the following dilemma: either (1) good (...) human lives are worse than very long lives wholly devoid of pleasure, desire-satisfaction, knowledge, or any other goods, or (2) very short lives containing nothing but suffering are worth living. Since neither result is plausible, we ought to reject the view that life itself is good. On the view I favor, any given life may be worth living because of the goods that it contains, but life itself is neutral. (shrink)

Social psychologists typically explain human behavior as a result of the relationship between mental states and social situations, studying the social conditions under which thoughts, feelings, and behaviors occur, and how these variables influence social interactions.

The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be (...) a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals. (shrink)

Researchers have recognized that interpersonal trust consists of different dimensions. These dimensions suggest that trust can be rational, cognitive, or affective. Affect, which includes moods and emotions, is likely to have a direct impact on the affective dimension. On the other hand, there are also studies showing that affect indirectly influence cognitive judgments. Nonetheless, in this chapter we argue that the impact of affect on judgment will not be the same on all individuals. In effect, the impact varies, depending on (...) the individual's attention to affect, motivation to use or guard against affect, or regulation of affect. All this may suggest that an individual's abilities or tendencies to manage affect will have implication on his or her trust relationships with others. (shrink)

Han Feizi’s criticisms of Confucian and Mohist political recommendations are often thought to involve materialist or historicist arguments, independently of their epistemological features. Drawing largely on Amia Srinivasan’s recent taxonomy of genealogical arguments, this paper proposes a genealogical reading of passages in “The Five Vermin [五蠹 wudu]” and “Eminence in Learning [顯學 xianxue].” This reveals Han Feizi’s arguments to be more comprehensively appreciated as problematizing Confucian and Mohist political judgments as arising from undermining contingencies, rendering them irrelevant, if not detrimental, (...) to any lasting excellence of a state. In doing this, it is also suggested that there is a ‘master argument’ underlying Han Feizi’s criticisms, according to which the epistemology of the Confucians and Mohists are fundamentally unreliable. (shrink)

Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to (...) the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. (shrink)

I develop and defend "metaethical experientialism," the thesis that phenomenal facts explain certain kinds of value facts. I argue, for example, that anyone who knows what it’s like to feel extreme pain is in a position to know that that kind of experience is bad. I argue that metaethical experientialism yields genuine counterexamples to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical theories hold (...) for different classes of ethical facts. (shrink)