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Cathy Legg
Deakin University
  1. Perceiving Necessity.Catherine Legg & James Franklin - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3).
    In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive or (...)
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  2. The Hardness of the Iconic Must: Can Peirce’s Existential Graphs Assist Modal Epistemology.Catherine Legg - 2012 - Philosophia Mathematica 20 (1):1-24.
    Charles Peirce's diagrammatic logic — the Existential Graphs — is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf's famous challenge that most ‘semantics for mathematics’ do not ‘fit an acceptable epistemology’. It is suggested that necessary reasoning is in essence a recognition that a certain structure has the particular structure that it has. This means that, contra Hume and his contemporary heirs, necessity is observable. One just needs to pay attention, not merely to individual (...)
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  3. Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
    This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.
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  4.  43
    Metaphysics — Low in Price, High in Value: A Critique of Global Expressivism.Catherine Legg & Paul Giladi - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (1):64.
    Pragmatism’s heartening recent revival (spearheaded by Richard Rorty’s bold intervention into analytic philosophy Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) has coalesced into a distinctive philosophical movement frequently referred to as ‘neopragmatism’. This movement interprets the very meaning of pragmatism as rejection of metaphysical commitments: our words do not primarily serve to represent non-linguistic entities, but are tools to achieve a range of human purposes. A particularly thorough and consistent version of this position is Huw Price’s global expressivism. We here critically (...)
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  5. What is a Logical Diagram?Catherine Legg - 2013 - In Sun-Joo Shin & Amirouche Moktefi (eds.), Visual Reasoning with Diagrams. Springer. pp. 1-18.
    Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does (...)
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  6. The Problem of the Essential Icon.Catherine Legg - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):207-232.
    Charles Peirce famously divided all signs into icons, indices and symbols. The past few decades have seen mainstream analytic philosophy broaden its traditional focus on symbols to recognise the so-called essential indexical. Can the moral now be extended to icons? Is there an “essential icon”? And if so, what exactly would be essential about it? It is argued that there is and it consists in logical form. Danielle Macbeth’s radical new “expressivist” interpretation of Frege’s logic and Charles Peirce’s existential graphs (...)
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  7. Diagrammatic Teaching: The Role of Iconic Signs in Meaningful Pedagogy.Catherine Legg - 2017 - In Inna Semetsky (ed.), Edusemiotics: A Handbook. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 29-45.
    Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics uniquely divides signs into: i) symbols, which pick out their objects by arbitrary convention or habit, ii) indices, which pick out their objects by unmediated ‘pointing’, and iii) icons, which pick out their objects by resembling them (as Peirce put it: an icon’s parts are related in the same way that the objects represented by those parts are themselves related). Thus representing structure is one of the icon’s greatest strengths. It is argued that the implications of (...)
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  8.  39
    What is Intelligence For? A Peircean Pragmatist Response to the Knowing-How, Knowing-That Debate.Catherine Legg & Joshua Black - 2020 - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Mainstream philosophy has seen a recent flowering in discussions of intellectualism which revisits Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’, and challenges his argument that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. These debates so far appear not to have engaged with pragmatist philosophy in any substantial way, which is curious as the relation between theory and practice is one of pragmatism’s main themes. Accordingly, this paper examines the contemporary debate in the light of Charles Peirce’s (...)
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  9.  49
    Is Truth Made, and If So, What Do We Mean by That? Redefining Truthmaker Realism.Catherine Legg - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):587-606.
    Philosophical discussion of truthmaking has flourished in recent times, but what exactly does it mean to ‘make’ a truth-bearer true? I argue that ‘making’ is a concept with modal force, and this renders it a problematic deployment for truthmaker theorists with nominalist sympathies, which characterises most current theories. I sketch the outlines of what I argue is a more genuinely realist truthmaker theory, which is capable of answering the explanatory question: In virtue of what does each particular truthmaker make its (...)
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  10. “Things Unreasonably Compulsory”: A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Cognitio 15 (1):89-112.
    Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.
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  11. The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, Tina Besley & Mats Hyvonen (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: Viral Modernity & Higher Education. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 43-58.
    Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...)
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  12. The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism.Catherine Legg - 2005 - Axiomathes 15 (2):293-318.
    Much discussion of meaning by philosophers over the last 300 years has been predicated on a Cartesian first-person authority (i.e. “infallibilism”) with respect to what one’s terms mean. However this has problems making sense of the way the meanings of scientific terms develop, an increase in scientific knowledge over and above scientists’ ability to quantify over new entities. Although a recent conspicuous embrace of rigid designation has broken up traditional meaning-infallibilism to some extent, this new dimension to the meaning of (...)
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  13. Idealism Operationalized: How Peirce’s Pragmatism Can Help Explicate and Motivate the Possibly Surprising Idea of Reality as Representational.Catherine Legg - 2017 - In Kathleen Hull & Richard Kenneth Atkins (eds.), Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 40-53.
    Neopragmatism has been accused of having ‘an experience problem’. This paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions thought to constitute a direct confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgments which do not copy but index the percept (just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind). Percept and perceptual judgment thereby mutually inform and correct one another, (...)
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  14.  14
    “Logic, Ethics and the Ethics of Logic”.Catherine Legg - 2014 - In T. Thellefsen B. Sorensen (ed.), Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 271-278.
    This piece explores the meaning of the following quote from Charles Peirce (1902), ". . . the main reason logic is unsettled is that thirteen different opinions are current as to the true aim of the science. Now this is not a logical difficulty, but an ethical difficulty; for ethics is the science of aims. Secondly, it is true that ethics has been, and always must be, a theatre of discussion for the reason that its study consists in the gradual (...)
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  15.  65
    Predication and the Problem of Universals.Catherine Legg - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (2):117-143.
    This paper contrasts the scholastic realisms of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it. Rather, it pertains to which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced (...)
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  16.  51
    This is Simply What I Do.Catherine Legg - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):58–80.
    Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive "scientific hierarchy". Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication. Rule-following scepticism, the (...)
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  17. Bill Gates is Not a Parking Meter: Philosophical Quality Control in Automated Ontology Building.Catherine Legg & Samuel Sarjant - 2012 - Proceedings of the Symposium on Computational Philosophy, AISB/IACAP World Congress 2012 (Birmingham, England, July 2-6).
    The somewhat old-fashioned concept of philosophical categories is revived and put to work in automated ontology building. We describe a project harvesting knowledge from Wikipedia’s category network in which the principled ontological structure of Cyc was leveraged to furnish an extra layer of accuracy-checking over and above more usual corrections which draw on automated measures of semantic relatedness.
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  18.  54
    Argument-Forms Which Turn Invalid Over Infinite Domains: Physicalism as Supertask?Catherine Legg - 2008 - Contemporary Pragmatism 5 (1):1-11.
    Argument-forms exist which are valid over finite but not infinite domains. Despite understanding of this by formal logicians, philosophers can be observed treating as valid arguments which are in fact invalid over infinite domains. In support of this claim I will first present an argument against the classical pragmatist theory of truth by Mark Johnston. Then, more ambitiously, I will suggest the fallacy lurks in certain arguments for physicalism taken for granted by many philosophers today.
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  19.  92
    Naturalism and Wonder: Peirce on the Logic of Hume's Argument Against Miracles.Catherine Legg - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):297-318.
    Peirce wrote that Hume’s argument against miracles (which is generally liked by twentieth century philosophers for its antireligious conclusion) "completely misunderstood the true nature of" ’abduction’. This paper argues that if Hume’s argumentative strategy were seriously used in all situations (not just those in which we seek to "banish superstition"), it would deliver a choking epistemological conservatism. It suggests that some morals for contemporary naturalistic philosophy may be drawn from Peirce’s argument against Hume.
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  20. Higher-Order One–Many Problems in Plato's Philebus and Recent Australian Metaphysics.S. Gibbons & C. Legg - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):119 - 138.
    We discuss the one?many problem as it appears in the Philebus and find that it is not restricted to the usually understood problem about the identity of universals across particulars that instantiate them (the Hylomorphic Dispersal Problem). In fact some of the most interesting aspects of the problem occur purely with respect to the relationship between Forms. We argue that contemporary metaphysicians may draw from the Philebus at least three different one?many relationships between universals themselves: instantiation, subkind and part, and (...)
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  21.  63
    Semi-Platonist Aristotelianism: Review of James Franklin, "An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):837-837.
    This rich book differs from much contemporary philosophy of mathematics in the author’s witty, down to earth style, and his extensive experience as a working mathematician. It accords with the field in focusing on whether mathematical entities are real. Franklin holds that recent discussion of this has oscillated between various forms of Platonism, and various forms of nominalism. He denies nominalism by holding that universals exist and denies Platonism by holding that they are concrete, not abstract - looking to Aristotle (...)
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  22.  24
    A Properly Pragmatist Pragmatics: Peircean Reflections on the Distinction Between Semantics and Pragmatics.Cathy Legg - 2020 - Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (27):387-407.
    Although most contemporary philosophers of language hold that semantics and pragmatics require separate study, there is surprisingly little agreement on where exactly the line should be drawn between these two areas, and why. In this paper I suggest that this lack of clarity is at least partly caused by a certain historical obfuscation of the roots of the founding three-way distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics in Charles Peirce’s pragmatist philosophy of language. I then argue for recovering and revisiting these (...)
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  23. Catnesses.Catherine Legg - 2008 - In Stephen D. Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell You about Your Cat. Carus.
    An introduction to cat metaphysics..........
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  24.  5
    Comments on Diana B. Heney: "Toward a Pragmatist Metaethics". [REVIEW]Cathy Legg - 2018 - Syndicate.
    This poised and articulate volume addresses an area of pragmatist philosophy as yet relatively unexplored in pragmatism's welcome revival. Neopragmatism's preoccupation with changing philosophers' view of the relation between language (or as Rorty puts it: "vocabularies") and reality, has largely focussed their discussions on the 'metaphysics & epistemology', rather than the 'value' side of philosophy, apart from Rorty's brief flirtations with edifying Western political discourse. Yet the nature of truth in ethics has been a topic of keen discussion in recent (...)
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  25. Charles Sanders Peirce on Necessity.Catherine Legg & Cheryl Misak - 2016 - In Adriane Rini, Edwin Mares & Max Cresswell (eds.), Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 256-278.
    Necessity is a touchstone issue in the thought of Charles Peirce, not least because his pragmatist account of meaning relies upon modal terms. We here offer an overview of Peirce’s highly original and multi-faceted take on the matter. We begin by considering how a self-avowed pragmatist and fallibilist can even talk about necessary truth. We then outline the source of Peirce’s theory of representation in his three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, (monadic, dyadic and triadic relations). These have modal (...)
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  26.  13
    Discursive Habits: A Representationalist Re-Reading of Teleosemiotics.Catherine Legg - 2021 - Synthese.
    Enactivism has influentially argued that the traditional intellectualist ‘act-content’ model of intentionality is insufficient both phenomenologically and naturalistically, and minds are built from world-involving bodily habits – thus, knowledge should be regarded as more of a skilled performance than an informational encoding. Radical enactivists have assumed that this insight must entail non-representationalism concerning at least basic minds. But what if it could be shown that representation is itself a form of skilled performance? I sketch the outline of such an account (...)
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  27. Extension, Intension and Dormitive Virtue.Catherine Legg - 1999 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (4):654 - 677.
    Would be fairer to call Peirce’s philosophy of language “extensionalist” or “intensionalist”? The extensionalisms of Carnap and Quine are examined, and Peirce’s view is found to be prima facie similar, except for his commitment to the importance of “hypostatic abstraction”. Rather than dismissing this form of abstraction (famously derided by Molière) as useless scholasticism, Peirce argues that it represents a crucial (though largely unnoticed) step in much working inference. This, it is argued, allows Peirce to transcend the extensionalist-intensionalist dichotomy itself, (...)
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  28.  8
    Grasping Mathematical Reality.Catherine Legg - 2015 - CUADERNOS DE SISTEMÁTICA PEIRCEANA 7.
    This paper presents a Peircean take on Wittgenstein's famous rule-following problem as it pertains to 'knowing how to go on in mathematics'. I argue that McDowell's advice that the philosophical picture of 'rules as rails' must be abandoned is not sufficient on its own to fully appreciate mathematics' unique blend of creativity and rigor. Rather, we need to understand how Peirce counterposes to the brute compulsion of 'Secondness', both the spontaneity of 'Firstness' and also the rational intelligibility of 'Thirdness'. This (...)
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  29. Huw Price.Catherine Legg - 2010 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Monash University ePress.
    A review of the life and work of the Australian philosopher Huw Price.
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  30. Hacking: The Performance of Technology? Review of Douglas Thomas, "Hacker Culture". [REVIEW]Cathy Legg - 2005 - Techne 9 (2):151-154.
    The word “hacker” has an interesting double meaning: one vastly more widespread connotation of technological mischief, even criminality, and an original meaning amongst the tech savvy as a term of highest approbation. Both meanings, however, share the idea that hackers possess a superior ability to manipulate technology according to their will (and, as with God, this superior ability to exercise will is a source of both mystifying admiration and fear). This book mainly concerns itself with the former meaning. To Thomas (...)
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  31. Peirce and Education - an Overview.Catherine Legg & Torill Strand - 2019 - Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory.
    The philosophy of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) enhances our understanding of educational processes.
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  32.  25
    Gabriele Gava, "Peirce’s Account of Purposefulness: A Kantian Perspective". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):267-270.
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  33. Peirce and Sellars on Nonconceptual Content.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Luca Corti & Antonio Nunziante (eds.), Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 125-143.
    Whereas Charles Peirce’s pragmatist account of truth has been much discussed, his theory of perception still offers a rich mine of insights. Peirce presented a ‘two-ply’ view of perception, which combines an entirely precognitive ‘percept’ with a ‘perceptual judgment’ that is located in the space of reasons. Having previously argued that Peirce outdoes Robert Brandom in achieving a hyper-inferentialism (“Making it Explicit and Clear”, APQ, 2008), I now wish to examine his philosophy in the light of inferentialism’s ‘original fount’ – (...)
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  34.  30
    Peter Olen: Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity. [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (3).
    Commentary on Peter Olen's book "Wilfrid Sellars and the Foundations of Normativity", originally prepared for an 'Author Meets Critics' session organized by Carl Sachs for the Eastern Division Meeting of the APA in Savannah, Georgia, on 5th January, 2018.
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  35.  7
    Peirce’s Reception in Australia and New Zealand.Catherine Legg - 2014 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 6 (1).
    "Although I think it is far to say that in what natives of this part of the world call 'downunder,' Peirce is still a minority interest, appreciation of his work appears to be growing slowly but surely...".
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  36. Anne Freadman, "The Machinery of Talk: Charles Peirce and the Sign Hypothesis". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):642-645.
    This book, officially a contribution to the subject area of Charles Peirce’s semiotics, deserves a wider readership, including philosophers. Its subject matter is what might be termed the great question of how signification is brought about (what Peirce called the ‘riddle of the Sphinx’, who in Emerson’s poem famously asked, ‘Who taught thee me to name?’), and also Peirce’s answer to the question (what Peirce himself called his ‘guess at the riddle’, and Freadman calls his ‘sign hypothesis’).
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  37. J. Brunning and P. Forster (Eds), "The Rule of Reason". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):170-174.
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  38.  62
    Danielle Macbeth, "Realizing Reason: A Narrative of Truth and Knowing". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2015 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:online.
    This substantial book is a highly original and thorough work of synthetic first philosophy. Although it has some recognizable roots in the Kantian/Sellarsian tradition of the Pittsburgh school, it adds a wealth of precise discussion of examples from science and mathematics, made possible by Macbeth's dual training in arts and sciences. It presents a developmental story of human reason bootstrapping itself towards greater power and clarity through the Western tradition (which is the sole purview of the discussion). This development is (...)
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  39.  36
    Paul Forster, "Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (1):137-8.
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  40.  9
    Owen Holland, "Machine Consciousness". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2004 - Metapsychology Reviews Online 2004 (Sep):1-5.
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  41. J.J. Liszka, "An Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles Sanders Peirce". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):122-124.
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  42.  19
    W.V.O. Quine,“From Stimulus to Science”. [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 1996 - Metascience 5 (1):209-213.
    "From Stimulus to Science" crystallises one of America's most celebrated philosophers' thinking of a lifetime on naturalised epistemology. This slim volume grew out of Quine's Ferrarer Mora Lectures of 1990 at the Universitat de Girona in Catalonia. Its overarching theme can fairly be described as rational reconstruction of the passage to mature, predictive scientific theory from “...the mere impacts of rays and particles on our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain of walking uphill” (p. 16).
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  43. Richard Smyth, "Reading Peirce Reading". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):388 – 390.
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  44. Mark Eli Kalderon, "Sympathy in Perception". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg & Jack Alan Reynolds - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2018 (0809).
    Mark Eli Kalderon's book boldly positions itself as a work in speculative metaphysics. Its point of departure is the familiar distinction between presentational and representational philosophies of perception. Kalderon notes that the latter has been more popular of late, as it is more amenable to "an account" explicating causal or counterfactual conditions on perception; but he wishes to rehabilitate the former, at least in part. One widely perceived disadvantage of presentationalism has been the way that understanding perception merely as registering (...)
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  45. The Epistemology of Mathematical Necessity.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Peter Chapman, Gem Stapleton, Amirouche Moktefi, Sarah Perez-Kriz & Francesco Bellucci (eds.), Diagrammatic Representation and Inference10th International Conference, Diagrams 2018, Edinburgh, UK, June 18-22, 2018, Proceedings. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 810-813.
    It seems possible to know that a mathematical claim is necessarily true by inspecting a diagrammatic proof. Yet how does this work, given that human perception seems to just (as Hume assumed) ‘show us particular objects in front of us’? I draw on Peirce’s account of perception to answer this question. Peirce considered mathematics as experimental a science as physics. Drawing on an example, I highlight the existence of a primitive constraint or blocking function in our thinking which we might (...)
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  46.  14
    Giovanni Maddalena, "The Philosophy of Gesture: Completing Pragmatists' Incomplete Revolution". [REVIEW]Catherine Legg - 2018 - Review of Metaphysics 72 (1).
    Western Philosophy’s modern period has been very much shaped by a representationalism according to which “concepts” (earlier: “ideas”) assembled into “propositions” constitute the fundamental unit of meaning, thought, belief— and even, in the hands of 20th century philosophers such as G.E.M. Anscombe and Jaegwon Kim— action, conceived as performed under a description. What exactly a proposition consists in ontologically is not easy to explain in a manner consonant with prevailing scientific naturalism. But it is clearly a disembodied entity, some kind (...)
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  47. What Achilles Did and the Tortoise Wouldn't.Catherine Legg - manuscript
    This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and the Tortoise doesn’t, in Carroll’s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce’s distinction between symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is then argued that logical form is represented by (...)
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  48. Mining Meaning From Wikipedia.David Milne, Catherine Legg, Medelyan Olena & Witten Ian - 2009 - International Journal of Human-Computer Interactions 67 (9):716-754.
    Wikipedia is a goldmine of information; not just for its many readers, but also for the growing community of researchers who recognize it as a resource of exceptional scale and utility. It represents a vast investment of manual effort and judgment: a huge, constantly evolving tapestry of concepts and relations that is being applied to a host of tasks. This article provides a comprehensive description of this work. It focuses on research that extracts and makes use of the concepts, relations, (...)
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