This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics, to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, rendering a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections (...) on conjunction and disjunction in the weak Kleene logics accompany this paper, particularly concerning their relation with containment logics. These considerations motivate a special approach to defining sound and complete Gentzen-style sequent calculi for some of their four-valued generalizations. (shrink)

We provide a logical matrix semantics and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the first-degree entailments valid in W. T. Parry's logic of Analytic Implication. We achieve the former by introducing a logical matrix closely related to that inducing paracomplete weak Kleene logic, and the latter by presenting a calculus where the initial sequents and the left and right rules for negation are subject to linguistic constraints.

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...) paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively. (shrink)

In a recent work, Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues present an epistemically motivated interpretation of paraconsistent logic. In their view, when there is conflicting evidence with regard to a proposition A (i.e. when there is both evidence in favor of A and evidence in favor of ￢A) both A and ￢A should be accepted without thereby accepting any proposition B whatsoever. Hence, reasoning within their system intends to mirror, and thus, should be constrained by, the way in which we reason (...) about evidence. In this article we will thoroughly discuss their position and suggest some ways in which this project can be further developed. The aim of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, we will present some philosophical critiques to the specific epistemic interpretation of paraconsistent logic proposed by Carnielli & Rodrigues. First, we will contend that Carnielli & Rodrigues’s interpretation implies a thesis about what evidence rationally justifies to accept or believe, called Extreme Permissivism, which is controversial among epistemologists. Second, we will argue that what agents should do, from an epistemic point of view, when faced with conflicting evidence, is to suspend judgment. On the other hand, despite these criticisms we do not believe that the epistemological motivation put forward by Carnielli & Rodrigues is entirely wrong. In the last section, we offer an alternative way in which one might account for the epistemic rationality of accepting contradictions and, thus, for an epistemic understanding of paraconsistency, which leads us to discuss the notion of diachronic epistemic rationality. (shrink)

In this article we revisit a number of disputes regarding significance logics---i.e., inferential frameworks capable of handling meaningless, although grammatical, sentences---that took place in a series of articles most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy between 1966 and 1978. These debates concern (i) the way in which logical consequence ought to be approached in the context of a significance logic, and (ii) the way in which the logical vocabulary has to be modified (either by restricting some notions, (...) or by adding some vocabulary) to keep as much of Classical Logic as possible. Our aim is to show that the divisions arising from these disputes can be dissolved in the context of a novel and intuitive proposal that we put forward. (shrink)

Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology suffered by at least (...) some of these sentences as infectious. This leads us to consider four distinct four-valued logics: one where truth-value gaps are infectious, but gluts are not; one where truth-value gluts are infectious, but gaps are not; and two logics where both gluts and gaps are infectious, in some sense. Additionally, we focus on the proof theory of these systems, by offering a discussion of two related topics. On the one hand, we prove some limitations regarding the possibility of providing standard Gentzen sequent calculi for these systems, by dualizing and extending some recent results for infectious logics. On the other hand, we provide sound and complete four-sided sequent calculi, arguing that the most important technical and philosophical features taken into account to usually prefer standard calculi are, indeed, enjoyed by the four-sided systems. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the peculiar case of infectious logics, a group of systems obtained generalizing the semantic behavior characteristic of the -fragment of the logics of nonsense, such as the ones due to Bochvar and Halldén, among others. Here, we extend these logics with classical negations, and we furthermore show that some of these extended systems can be properly regarded as logics of formal inconsistency and logics of formal undeterminedness.

This paper discusses a dualization of Fitting's notion of a "cut-down" operation on a bilattice, rendering a "track-down" operation, later used to represent the idea that a consistent opinion cannot arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. The logic of track-down operations on bilattices is proved equivalent to the logic d_Sfde, dual to Deutsch's system S_fde. Furthermore, track-down operations are employed to provide an epistemic interpretation for paraconsistent weak Kleene logic. Finally, two logics of sequential combinations of cut-and track-down (...) operations allow settling positively the question of whether bilattice-based semantics are available for subsystems of S_fde. (shrink)

In Kripke’s classic paper on truth it is argued that by adding a new semantic category different from truth and falsity it is possible to have a language with its own truth predicate. A substantial problem with this approach is that it lacks the expressive resources to characterize those sentences which fall under the new category. The main goal of this paper is to offer a refinement of Kripke’s approach in which this difficulty does not arise. We tackle this characterization (...) problem by letting certain sentences belong to more than one semantic category. We also consider the prospect of generalizing this framework to deal with languages containing vague predicates. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the extent to which conjunction and disjunction can be rightfully regarded as such, in the context of infectious logics. Infectious logics are peculiar many-valued logics whose underlying algebra has an absorbing or infectious element, which is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. To discuss these matters, we review the philosophical motivations for infectious logics due to Bochvar, Halldén, Fitting, Ferguson and Beall, noticing that none of them discusses (...) our main question. This is why we finally turn to the analysis of the truth-conditions for conjunction and disjunction in infectious logics, employing the framework of plurivalent logics, as discussed by Priest. In doing so, we arrive at the interesting conclusion that —in the context of infectious logics— conjunction is conjunction, whereas disjunction is not disjunction. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi (...) for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...) be identified with an infinite sequence of consequence relations holding between increasingly complex relata: formulae, inferences, metainferences, and so on. As a result, the present proposal allows not only to differentiate Classical Logic from ST, but also from other systems sharing with it their valid metainferences. Finally, we show how these results have interesting consequences for some topics in the philosophical logic literature, among them for the debate around Logical Pluralism. The reason being that the discussion concerning this topic is usually carried out employing a rivalry criterion for logics that will need to be modified in light of the present investigation, according to which two logics can be non-identical even if they share the same valid inferences. (shrink)

In some recent articles, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley, & van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a nontransitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut (...) involving semantic notions. In this article we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have nontrivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this article is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this article, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be nontrivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and (...) complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory. (shrink)

Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That (...) is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition. (shrink)

When discussing Logical Pluralism several critics argue that such an open-minded position is untenable. The key to this conclusion is that, given a number of widely accepted assumptions, the pluralist view collapses into Logical Monism. In this paper we show that the arguments usually employed to arrive at this conclusion do not work. The main reason for this is the existence of certain substructural logics which have the same set of valid inferences as Classical Logic—although they are, in a clear (...) sense, non-identical to it. We argue that this phenomenon can be generalized, given the existence of logics which coincide with Classical Logic regarding a number of metainferential levels—although they are, again, clearly different systems. We claim this highlights the need to arrive at a more refined version of the Collapse Argument, which we discuss at the end of the paper. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to discuss the extent to which certain substructural logics are related through the phenomenon of duality. Roughly speaking, metainferences are inferences between collect...

In this paper we discuss the extent to which the very existence of substructural logics puts the Tarskian conception of logical systems in jeopardy. In order to do this, we highlight the importance of the presence of different levels of entailment in a given logic, looking not only at inferences between collections of formulae but also at inferences between collections of inferences—and more. We discuss appropriate refinements or modifications of the usual Tarskian identity criterion for logical systems, and propose an (...) alternative of our own. After that, we consider a number of objections to our account and evaluate a substantially different approach to the same problem. (shrink)

En este texto analizo los principales argumentos y contraargumentos realistas y anti-realistas que se han construido a favor y en contra de la capacidad científica para producir conocimiento objetivo y verdadero del mundo social y natural. Argumento que el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional con el que los científicos sociales y naturales se refieren a las diversas entidades, fenómenos, propiedades y procesos científicos observables e inobservables están determinados, en la práctica, por sus tradiciones teóricas de investigación; lo que muestra (...) que la metodología científica depende en tal medida de las teorías que es, a lo sumo, un proceder constructivo y no un proceder de descubrimiento. (shrink)

While we typically think of culture as defined by geography or ethnicity (e.g., American culture, Mayan culture), the term also applies to the practices and expectations of smaller groups of people. Though embedded in the larger culture surrounding them, such subcultures have their own sets of rules like those that scientists do. Philosophy of science has as its main object of studio the scientific activity. A way in which we have tried to explain these scientific practices is from the actual (...) ontological commitments that scientists do through their scientific theories. Certainly, we know scientific theories through some specific scientific language, which is, in its turn, a subset of the natural language developed by a particular culture. This study is conducted to explore and evaluate some of the most important epistemological consequences of these ontological commitments, specially the so-called ‘truth-commitment’ and its relation with a linguistic-cultural framework. There is an interesting debate between advocates and opponents of scientific realistic view of the natural world. Some lines of scientific realism argumentation assure that: (i) Mature scientific theories are approximately true. (ii) There are entities and organisms in the world that correspond with the ontology presupposed by the best scientific theories within a specific domain of scientific research and (iii) The new acceptable scientific theories should explain why past theories were successful predecessors (Colyvan 2008, Cocchiarella 2007 & Laudan 1981). Contrary, anti- realist positions ensure against the realist’s true - claim that is a semantic commitment - that the purpose of scientific theories to found the truth it is simple an unattainable goal, especially if the kind of truth they are looking for is a corresponding relation between scientific theories and the ontology of the world. Anti-realist positions held that this relation could be circular and unknowable. I do believe that there is a deep confusion between the way in which we accede to the knowledge of the constitutive structures, entities and organisms of the world (which is an epistemological matter) and the way these structures, entities and organisms are (which is an ontological matter). It seems that there is a bridge between the epistemological and ontological aspect in need for conceptual clarification. I do propose that the type of link between the two extremes have to be linguistic in nature. (shrink)

Para desarrollar este trabajo, en el primer capítulo caracterizaré con cierta extensión dos de las principales posturas funcionalistas del progreso científico, a saber, la defendida por Thomas S. Kuhn y Larry Laudan, respectivamente. Posteriormente, haré un análisis crítico de estas posturas. En particular, mostraré que un modelo de progreso científico basado en la resolución de problemas no puede pasar por alto explicar cómo es que se genera un problema científico y cómo puede ser medida no sólo la importancia cognitiva de (...) los problemas científicos a resolver; sino la importancia cognitiva que tienen las soluciones a los problemas que enfrenta la ciencia. En el segundo capítulo caracterizaré y analizaré la postura realista metafísica sobre el progreso científico desarrollada por Philip Kitcher. El análisis del modelo de Kitcher es pertinente para el presente estudio debido a que este autor integró muchas de las críticas que se le hicieron a las posturas funcionalistas anteriores a su propuesta. Sin embargo, como sugeriré en la conclusión de ese capítulo, la postura defendida por Kitcher en torno al progreso cognitivo de la ciencia fluctúa entre la defensa de un realismo de corte metafísico (Kitcher 1993 y 1995) y un realismo de corte semántico (Kitcher 2001a, 2001b, 2002 y 2007) que hace difícil entender con precisión y a cabalidad su postura. Con los anteriores elementos, en el tercer capítulo revisaré el debate entre las posturas funcionalistas y las posturas realistas sobre el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia en el marco del llamado Realismo Epistemológico Convergente, con el objetivo de evaluar si otras posturas realistas pueden explicar de mejor manera el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia. Como mostraré, el realismo epistemológico convergente requiere para su defensa de una definición conceptual precisa en relación a lo que debe entenderse por “verdad” – o “aproximación a la verdad” – y su conexión con el éxito científico; así como la relación de referencia entre las entidades y organismos teóricos observables e inobservables que la ciencia postula y el mundo natural. Para analizar estas conexiones, en este capítulo revisaré varios argumentos anti-realistas en contra de la relación cognitiva que los defensores del realismo epistemológico convergente pretenden establecer entre el éxito empírico y la verdad, por un lado, y el éxito empírico y la referencia, por el otro. Posteriormente, analizaré los contra-argumentos realistas más importantes que a mi juicio se han elaborado para defender el realismo epistemológico convergente. Finalmente, mostraré que los contra-argumentos realistas no logran ser lo suficientemente sólidos para evadir con éxito los ataques anti-realistas en torno al progreso cognitivo de la ciencia. El cuarto capítulo de este trabajo lo dedicaré a caracterizar y analizar la postura fundacionista defendida por Alexander Bird. Este autor sostuvo que la ciencia progresa cuando muestra “acumulación de conocimiento justificado”. Para validar su postura, este autor contrastó sus ideas con los conceptos sobre el progreso científico construidos precisamente por Kuhn y Laudan, respectivamente. El objetivo de Bird fue mostrar que el criterio de “resolución de problemas” defendido por estos autores es regresivo y, por ello, anti-intuitivo. En este capítulo analizo los argumentos de Bird, muestro en qué fallan para, finalmente, evaluar su postura a partir de sus propios fundamentos epistemológicos. En el quinto y último capítulo del libro ofreceré algunas conclusiones que pueden ser inferidas del presente estudio. (shrink)

Where does the impetus towards ethical theory come from? What drives humans to make values explicit, consistent, and discursively justifiable? This paper situates the demand for ethical theory in human life by identifying the practical needs that give rise to it. Such a practical derivation puts the demand in its place: while finding a home for it in the public decision-making of modern societies, it also imposes limitations on the demand by presenting it as scalable and context-sensitive. This differentiates strong (...) forms of the demand calling for theory from weaker forms calling for less, and contexts where it has a place from contexts where it is out of place. In light of this, subjecting personal deliberation to the demand turns out to involve a trade-off. (shrink)

Los estudiantes de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración de la Universidad de la República deben realizar, como trabajo final de carrera, una investigación o ensayo monográfico en un área de su interés, tutorados por un docente universitario o un investigador de reconocida trayectoria. Un gran número de estos trabajos monográficos han hecho un aporte valioso al conocimiento pero, lamentablemente, la poca difusión de éstos hace que ese conocimiento termine olvidado en los fondos de la biblioteca de la (...) Facultad, entre cientos de producciones monográficas. Se pretende en este libro, mostrar los aportes que se han generado en el área tanto de Economía de la Cultura como de Gestión de Organizaciones Culturales. Varias de las monografías fueron realizadas en la línea de investigación Costos y Gestión de Organizaciones Culturales, la cual coordino. Otros fueron realizados con antelación, como los trabajos tutorados por el referente de la Economía de la Cultura en Uruguay, el hoy fallecido Luis Stolovich. También se incluyen dos trabajos monográficos tutorados por el Dr Gustavo Buquet, quien siempre está presente a la hora de crear investigación de calidad en Economía de la Cultura. Como cada trabajo supera el centenar de páginas, no es posible publicarlos completamente, por lo que para este libro se hicieron resúmenes de esos trabajos, intentando adecuar la terminología y quitándoles el formato estrictamente científico –poco amigable para un no especialista-, de forma tal que su lectura sea accesible al público en general. Se resumieron ocho, clasificados en tres capítulos: Patrimonio, Artes Escénicas e Industria Cultural. El capítulo de Patrimonio comienza con un trabajo realizado por las Economistas Fernanda Arezo y Verónica Pereyra, titulado “Museos y Ciudadanos, el comportamiento del consumidor”, tutorado por Raúl Ramírez y por mí. Este estudio tuvo como centro explicar la modalidad de conducta de consumo del visitante montevideano hacia tres importantes instituciones museísticas como lo son el Museo del Cabildo, el Museo del Carnaval y el Museo de Historia del Arte. El objetivo del trabajo es estimar la demanda y obtener un indicador de la propensión a pagar por el consumo de dichos museos. El segundo trabajo, titulado “Disposición a pagar por la restauración de la Puerta de la Ciudadela”, fue realizado por las Contadoras Beatriz Torres, María Elena Olarán y María Carolina Duarte, y tutorado en forma conjunta por el Phd. Juan José Goyeneche y quien les escribe. En este trabajo se realiza una valoración contingente para medir la disposición a pagar por la restauración de la “Puerta de la Ciudadela”, un monumento fundamental de identidad montevideana. El capítulo de Patrimonio finaliza con un trabajo realizado por las Economistas Malena Rodríguez y María de la Paz Besada y tutorado por el Ec. Luis Stolovich. El mismo se denomina “El arte uruguayo: un estudio sobre el mercado y la pintura como alternativa de inversión” y explora el mercado de arte uruguayo, analizando la rentabilidad de la inversión en pintura uruguaya. Tratan la rentabilidad de la inversión para tres casos específicos: las obras vendidas por el Banco Comercial en su proceso de recuperación de activos, un portafolio de obras de Pedro Figari y otro de Joaquín Torres García. En cuanto al segundo capítulo, Artes Escénicas, comienza con un trabajo realizado para la obtención del título de Contador Público realizado por Pamela Cambeiro, Martín Cami e Ignacio Mouradián. Se denomina “La gestión de teatros. Caso de estudio: Aplicación del Cuadro de Mando Integral al Teatro Solís” y trata sobre la identificación de indicadores que faciliten las tareas de gestión para la dirección del Teatro. Luego se presenta un trabajo realizado por las Economistas Tania Cruz y Natalia Nollenberger titulado “Análisis económico del teatro independiente en Montevideo: una aproximación al problema de la fatalidad de los costos”. Este trabajo, también tutorado por el Ec. Luis Stolovich, muestra un exhaustivo análisis del teatro independiente montevideano identificando los problemas económicos que afectan al sector. El capítulo de Industria Cultural incluye tres trabajos. El primero, fue realizado por el Economista Diego Traverso y tutorado por el Dr. Gustavo Buquet, y su título es “Análisis de competitividad del sector exportador de Productoras Audiovisuales Publicitarias en Uruguay”. El sector audiovisual publicitario es un sector dinámico que se ha internacionalizado tempranamente y que generó divisas para el país del orden de los US$ 24 millones durante el año 2005 por concepto de exportaciones. En este trabajo se caracteriza al sector audiovisual publicitario en Uruguay y se analiza las ventajas competitivas que posee frente a sus principales competidores extranjeros. El segundo trabajo fue realizado por las Contadoras Natalia Rivera, Antonella Triay y María Eugenia Triay y se denomina “Gestión aplicada a las empresas radiales”. En este se identifican el sector radial, su proceso productivo y la complejidad al definir al “cliente”. Se proponen una serie de indicadores con el doble objetivo de medir el desempeño de la empresa y proveer incentivos a su organización. Finalmente, el último trabajo monográfico, fue una investigación interdisciplinaria, que sirvió simultáneamente para obtener el título de Licenciado en Economía a Ernesto Pienika y el de Licenciado en Administración a Nicolás Cohnheim y a Damián Geinsinger. Este trabajo, tutorado por el Dr. Gustavo Buquet y el Cr. Cecilio García de título “Impactos de las nuevas tecnologías en la .industria musical”, muestra cuáles son los principales impactos en esa industria que las nuevas tecnologías han provocado y cuáles son las posibles estrategias para adaptarse a estos cambios, así como los nuevos modelos de negocio. Espero que este libro sea el primero de una larga lista. Las áreas de Economía de la Cultura y Gestión de Organizaciones Culturales son disciplinas jóvenes que necesitan seguir creciendo. La investigación realizada por trabajos monográficos de fin de carrera en estas áreas, será siempre bienvenida. (shrink)

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a critic of just the kind of genealogical debunking he is popularly associated with. We begin by showing that interpretations of Nietzsche which see him as engaging in genealogical debunking turn him into an advocate of nihilism, for on his own premises, any truthful genealogical inquiry into our values is going to uncover what most of his contemporaries deem objectionable origins and thus license global genealogical debunking. To escape nihilism and make room for naturalism (...) without indiscriminate subversion, we then argue, Nietzsche targets the way of thinking about values that permits genealogical debunking: far from trying to subvert values simply by uncovering their origins, Nietzsche is actively criticising genealogical debunking thus understood. Finally, we draw out the consequences of our reading for Nietzsche’s positive vision. (shrink)

Se explora la naturaleza de los problemas lacunae a partir del análisis de los conceptos elaborados, respectivamente, por Larry Laudan, Theo Kuipers y Atocha Aliseda. Sugeriré que los problemas lacunae pueden surgir del debilitamiento de la noción de ‘falsación empírica’ y repercutir en la noción de ‘implicación lógica’.

Composta attorno al 1065-1067, la lettera "Sull’onnipotenza divina" di Pier Damiani si apre con una questione posta da Desiderio, abate di Montecassino: «Sebbene Dio possa ogni cosa, non può restituire la verginità a colei che l’ha perduta. Egli ha certamente il potere di liberarla dalla pena, ma non può ridarle la corona della verginità che ha perduto». Il problema, che Pier Damiani riprendeva dalla lettera XXII di san Gerolamo, è solo in apparenza ozioso: il monaco ravennate ne fa un’autentica questione (...) filosofica, un “esperimento mentale” che solleva domande cruciali sulla natura del tempo e sul rapporto tra necessità e contingenza, leggi divine e princìpi logici, natura divina e natura umana. Il volume, a cura di Roberto Limonta, presenta la traduzione del De divina omnipotentia con note e testo latino a fronte. La prefazione di Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri e il saggio introduttivo di Roberto Limonta ricostruiscono la lunga durata della questione posta da Pier Damiani, dai dibattiti teologici dei secoli medievali sino alle sue fortune nella filosofia, teologia e letteratura contemporanea. (shrink)

En los últimas décadas se han elaborado diferentes teorías al interior de la filosofía de la ciencia que pretenden explicar cuál es la mejor manera de entender el progreso científico cognitivo. De entre ellas sobresalen por su extensión, especificidad y alcance las propuestas de Larry Laudan y de Philip Kitcher. Laudan, siguiendo a Karl Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn y retomando varias ideas de Imre Lakatos, defendió una perspectiva funcionalista a partir de la cual propuso la resolución de problemas como el (...) mejor criterio cognitivo para evaluar el progreso científico. Por su parte, Kitcher propuso como criterio del progreso científico la producción de enunciados significativos y verdaderos, defendiendo - no sin ambigüedad - un tipo de realismo científico. En este trabajo pretendo mostrar que los criterios epistémicos, a diferencia de los criterios no epistémicos, complican innecesariamente el análisis de la progresividad científica. (shrink)

Recientemente, Alexander Bird (2007) sugirió que la ciencia progresa cuando muestra “acumulación de conocimiento justificado”. Para validar su postura, Bird contrastó sus ideas con los conceptos sobre el progreso científico construidos por Thomas S. Kuhn y Larry Laudan, respectivamente. El objetivo de Bird fue mostrar que el criterio de “resolución de problemas” defendido por estos autores, es regresivo y, por ello, anti-intuitivo. En este texto analizo los argumentos de Bird en contra de estos autores y muestro en qué fallan. Posteriormente (...) se evalúa su postura a partir de sus propios fundamentos epistemológicos. Al final, presento algunas conclusiones que pueden inferirse del presente estudio. (shrink)

El libro de Lorraine Daston Breve Historia de la Atención Científica, publicado en español por editorial La Cifra en el 2012, consta de seis apartados a través de los cuales Daston formula una interesante pregunta desde las perspectivas de la psicología de la investigación científica y la epistemología de la historia natural: por qué, cuándo y cómo ocurre que los científicos dirigen su atención sobre determinados objetos de estudio y no sobre otros. O visto desde otro punto de vista, cómo (...) emergen los objetos científicos y cómo, en determinado momento, se desvanecen. (shrink)

Analizo los alcances y los límites de las teorías sobre el progreso científico elaboradas por Larry Laudan y Philip Kitcher, respectivamente. Comienzo por caracterizar sus teorías, después hago una comparación entre éstas y finalmente reviso cuáles son sus principales problemas. Al final muestro algunas razones por las cuales sus criterios propuestos para evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia no son exitosos. Termino sugiriendo una manera de evaluar el progreso cognitivo de la ciencia.

Analizo los principales argumentos en torno a la dependencia teórica de los enunciados y conceptos observacionales tomando como eje de discusión la postura de Gerhard Schurz. Después discuto los principales argumentos sobre la dependencia teórica de la percepción. Finalmente analizo la dependencia teórica de la experimentación científica teniendo como eje de discusión la postura de Allan Franklin. Muestro que un rasgo positivo de la dependencia teórica de la observación y la experimentación es que una teoría científica puede establecer los mecanismos (...) para evaluar la importancia de los fenómenos observados inesperados. Estos mecanismos sin duda constituyen un instrumento esencial para el progreso científico. (shrink)

In his 2016 book, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Paul Bloom argues that “if we want to be good caring people, if we want to make the world a better place, then we are better off without empathy.” I’ve specifically chosen this formulation of Bloom’s position because it gets at the issue I will most directly challenge him on - that we would, or even could, be better off without empathy. The position I will defend is that our (...) empathy plays an indispensable role in the development of our moral conscience, and an ongoing role in the cultivation of our moral concepts, that would be compromised by suppressing our empathy. On this understanding, I argue that we would generally be better served by cultivating our empathy to mitigate and overcome its shortcomings, rather than suppressing our empathy as Bloom recommends. (shrink)

This thesis articulates a novel interpretation of Heidegger’s explication of the being (Seins) of gear (Zeugs) in §15 of his masterwork Being and Time (1927/2006) and develops and applies the position attributed to Heidegger to explain three phenomena of unreflective action discussed in recent literature and articulate a partial Heideggerian ecological metaphysics. Since §15 of BT explicates the being of gear, Part 1 expounds Heidegger’s concept of the ‘being’ (Seins) of beings (Seienden) and two issues raised in the ‘preliminary methodological (...) remark’ in §15 of BT regarding explicating being. §1.1 interprets the being (Sein) or synonymously constitution of being (Seinsverfassung) of a being (Seienden) as a regional essence: a property unifying a region (Region), district (Bezirk), or subject-area (Sachgebiet) – a highly general (‘regional’) class of entities. Although Heidegger posits two components of the being of a being, viz. material-content (Sachhaltigkeit, Sachgehalt) and mode-of-being (Seinsart) or way-of-being (Seinsweise, Weise des Seins, Weise zu sein) (1927/1975, 321), the unclarity of this distinction means that it does not figure prominently herein. §1.2 addresses Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and ontic investigations and his notion of ‘modes of access’ (Zugangsarten, Zugangsweisen). Part 2 expounds §15 of BT’s explication of the being of gear. §2.1 analyses Heidegger’s two necessary and sufficient conditions for being gear and three core basic concepts (Grundbegriffe) enabling comprehension of these conditions and therewith a foundational comprehension of gear. Heidegger explicates the being of gear through content of unreflectively purposeful, non-intersubjective intentional states. I term such states ‘mundane concern’, which is almost synonymous with Hubert Dreyfus’s term ‘absorbed coping’ (1991, 69). Heidegger’s explication highlights around-for references (Um-zu-Verweisungen) as the peculiar species of property figuring in mundanely concernful intentional content. §2.2 clarifies Heidegger’s position on the relationship between to-hand-ness (Zuhandenheit) and extantness (Vorhandenheit) in the narrow sense: two of Heidegger’s most widely discussed concepts. I reject Kris McDaniel’s recent reading of Heidegger as affirming that nothing could be both to-hand and extant simultaneously (McDaniel 2012). Part 3 develops and applies Heidegger’s phenomenology of mundane concern. §3.1 explains the phenomena of situational holism, situated normativity, and mundanely concernful prospective control. §3.2 undertakes the metaphysical accommodation of around-for references, which §3.1 posited as featuring prominently within mundanely concernful intentional content. This thesis thus contributes not only to Heidegger scholarship, but also to contemporary debates within the philosophy of action and cognitive science. (shrink)

Social and political concepts are indispensable yet historically and culturally variable in a way that poses a challenge: how can we reconcile confident commitment to them with awareness of their contingency? In this article, we argue that available responses to this problem—Foundationalism, Ironism, and Right Wittgensteinianism—are unsatisfactory. Instead, we draw on the work of Bernard Williams to tease out and develop a Left Wittgensteinian response. In present-day pluralistic and historically self-conscious societies, mere confidence in our concepts is not enough. For (...) modern individuals who are ineluctably aware of conceptual change, engaged concept-use requires reasonable confidence, and in the absence of rational foundations, the possibility of reasonable confidence is tied to the possibility of critically discriminating between conceptual practices worth endorsing and those worth rejecting. We show that Left Wittgensteinianism offers such a basis for critical discrimination through point-based explanations of conceptual practices which relate them to the needs of concept-users. We end by considering how Left Wittgensteinianism guides our understanding of how conceptual practices can be revised in the face of new needs. (shrink)

How do we form concepts like those of three, bicycle and red? According to Kant, we form them by carrying out acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction on information provided by the senses. Kant's answer raised numerous objections from philosophers and psychologists alike. "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" argues that Kant is able to rebut those objections. The book shows that, for Kant, it is possible to perceive objects without employing concepts; it explains how, given those perceptions, we can (...) form categories and empirical concepts; and it argues that theories like Kant's - abstractionist theories of concept formation - are more plausible than is often assumed. (shrink)

Book review of 'More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms'. By E. J. LOWE.

Resumo: A crise na União Europeia e os programas de austeridade subsequentes fizeram emergir uma miríade de movimentos sociais, diversos na sua natureza e nos seus propósitos. O que se pretende aferir neste artigo é a relação e a conexão existentes entre o Estado, o poder económico, a sociedade civil e os movimentos sociais neste contexto específico de crise. Procuraremos, nesta breve abordagem, explanar alguns elementos de originalidade intrínsecos aos movimentos sociais hodiernos, patentes na sua forma de participação e organização, (...) assim como aplicar estas questões teóricas relevantes ao contexto português. A parte empírica, dada a escassez de estudos de caso existentes, será apoiada no último inquérito do European Social Survey, de 2012. Analisando um conjunto de perguntas aí explícitas, podemos compreender, de forma indirecta, algumas das dinâmicas que caracterizam estes movimentos. Abstract: The crisis in the European Union and the subsequent austerity programs have unleashed a myriad of social movements, diverse in its nature and purpose. The purpose of this paper is to assess the relationship and connection between the State, economic power, civil society and social movements in this specific context of crisis. We will try, in this brief approach, to explain some elements of originality intrinsic to modern social movements, evident in their form of participation and organization, as well as to apply these theoretical questions relevant to the Portuguese context. The empirical part, given the paucity of existing case studies, will be supported in the last survey of the European Social Survey of 2012. By analyzing a set of questions explicit there, we can, indirectly, understand some of the dynamics that characterize these movements. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

When I say that my conception of metaphysics is Aristotelian, or neo-Aristotelian, this may have more to do with Aristotle’s philosophical methodology than his metaphysics, but, as I see it, the core of this Aristotelian conception of metaphysics is the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy . In what follows I will attempt to clarify what this conception of metaphysics amounts to in the context of some recent discussion on the methodology of metaphysics (e.g. Chalmers et al . (2009), (...) Ladyman and Ross (2007)). There is a lot of hostility towards the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics in this literature: for instance, the majority of the contributors to the Metametaphysics volume assume a rather more deflationary, Quinean approach towards metaphysics. In the process of replying to the criticisms towards Aristotelian metaphysics put forward in recent literature I will also identify some methodological points which deserve more attention and ought to be addressed in future research. (shrink)

How do we come to know metaphysical truths? How does metaphysical inquiry work? Are metaphysical debates substantial? These are the questions which characterize metametaphysics. This book, the first systematic student introduction dedicated to metametaphysics, discusses the nature of metaphysics - its methodology, epistemology, ontology and our access to metaphysical knowledge. It provides students with a firm grounding in the basics of metametaphysics, covering a broad range of topics in metaontology such as existence, quantification, ontological commitment and ontological realism. Contemporary views (...) are discussed along with those of Quine, Carnap and Meinong. Going beyond the metaontological debate, thorough treatment is given to novel topics in metametaphysics, including grounding, ontological dependence, fundamentality, modal epistemology, intuitions, thought experiments and the relationship between metaphysics and science. The book will be an essential resource for those studying advanced metaphysics, philosophical methodology, metametaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Are there any bona fide boundaries, i.e., boundaries that carve at the joints? Or is any boundary—hence any object—the result of a fiat articulation reflecting our cognitive biases and our social practices and conventions? Does the choice between these two options amount to a choice between realism and wholesome relativism?

This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...) Condorcet's paradox) are in large electorates. (shrink)

Recent work on Natural Kind Essentialism has taken a deflationary turn. The assumptions about the grounds of essentialist truths concerning natural kinds familiar from the Kripke-Putnam framework are now considered questionable. The source of the problem, however, has not been sufficiently explicated. The paper focuses on the Twin Earth scenario, and it will be demonstrated that the essentialist principle at its core (which I call IDENT)—that necessarily, a sample of a chemical substance, A, is of the same kind as another (...) sample, B, if and only if A and B have the same microstructure—must be re-evaluated. The Twin Earth scenario also assumes the falsity of another essentialist principle (which I call INST): necessarily, there is a 1:1 correlation between (all of ) the chemical properties of a chemical substance and the microstructure of that substance. This assumption will be questioned, and it will be argued that, in fact, the best strategy for defending IDENT is to establish INST. The prospects for Natural Kind Essentialism and microstructural essentialism regarding chemical substances will be assessed with reference to recent work in the philosophy of chemistry. Finally, a weakened form of INST will be presented. (shrink)

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

In formal ontology, infinite regresses are generally considered a bad sign. One debate where such regresses come into play is the debate about fundamentality. Arguments in favour of some type of fundamentalism are many, but they generally share the idea that infinite chains of ontological dependence must be ruled out. Some motivations for this view are assessed in this article, with the conclusion that such infinite chains may not always be vicious. Indeed, there may even be room for a type (...) of fundamentalism combined with infinite descent as long as this descent is “boring,” that is, the same structure repeats ad infinitum. A start is made in the article towards a systematic account of this type of infinite descent. The philosophical prospects and scientific tenability of the account are briefly evaluated using an example from physics. (shrink)