What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem”, I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because it (...) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use. (shrink)

Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.

This paper sets out to carry out an analysis of the concept of love in the Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit, published anonymously by Feuerbach in 1830. Afer examining the scale of different types of love, conceived by Feuerbach as a hierarchy of the erotic, the paper will focus its attention on the question of the other and the fundamental role it plays in the very constitution of the individual: starting from the famous Feuerbachian defnition “Sein ist Gemeinschaf„, a number (...) of key notions that fnd their basis in love will be addressed, such as self-knowledge, the distinction of the individual, life as a continuous process of communication and as remembrance (of and by) the other, as well as the signifcation of one’s own life in relation to others. -/- -------- -/- El presente trabajo se propone realizar un análisis del concepto de amor en los Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit, publicado anónimamente por Feuerbach en 1830. Luego de examinar la escala de diferentes tipos de amor, concebida por Feuerbach como jerarquía de lo erótico, el trabajo centrará su atención en la cuestión del otro y del papel fundamental que desempeña en la propia constitución del individuo: partiendo de la célebre defnición feuerbachiana “Sein ist Gemeinschaf„, se abordará una serie de nociones clave que encuentran su base en el amor, tales como el saber de sí, la distinción del individuo, la vida como proceso continuo de comunicación y como recuerdo (de y por) otro, así como la signifcación de la propia vida a partir de los demás. (shrink)

In this paper I first present Dan Korman’s (2015) recent defence of a conservative view as regards the existence and composition of material objects, and then go on to criticize some of his arguments. I will focus on two related issues: on the one hand, I argue that his defense of that kind of view by making use of what he calls “arguments from counterexamples” has some metaontological presuppositions that are indeed unacceptable for someone defending the revisionist views he opposes; (...) on the other hand, I also claim that his defence of the epistemic authority of the singular intuitions allegedly backing some key premisses in those arguments is also flawed, as it seems to be in tension with his realist commitments. (shrink)

El artículo que sigue fue publicado originalmente con el título "Causation" en el Journal of Philosophy 70.17 : 556-567, y luego reimpreso en Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers. Vol. II. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986. 159-172. Esta traducción se publica conla autorización del Journal of Philosophy y de Oxford University Press.Querría agradecer aquí a Santiago Erpen, María José García Encinas,Diego Morales y Carolina Sartorio por diversos comentarios y sugerencias que me han permitido, espero, mejorar la traducción.

In this paper I present and critically discuss Simon Evnine’s account of hylomorphically complex objects (as presented in his 2016 book Making Objects and Events). On the one hand, I object to the account he gives of how artifacts (which are for him the paradigmatic cases of hylomorphically complex objects) allegedly acquire their existence and identity conditions. I elaborate on two problems I see for this account: first, that it seems unable to explain our knowledge of the kinds to which (...) artifacts belong; second, that it cannot offer a plausible solution to the grounding problem for coincident objects. I also object to the way in which he tries to adapt the sort of account he gave for artifacts to the case of organisms (in my view this fails because both cases are dissimilar at crucial points), and finally I also object to his attempt to extend that account, in a fictional way, to the case of natural non-organic objects (as I try to show, both his arguments to the effect that there are no such objects, and his positive fictionalist proposal to account for our talk about them, are flawed). (shrink)

Organization figures centrally in the understanding of biological systems advanced by both new mechanists and proponents of the autonomy framework. The new mechanists focus on how components of mechanisms are organized to produce a phenomenon and emphasize productive continuity between these components. The autonomy framework focuses on how the components of a biological system are organized in such a way that they contribute to the maintenance of the organisms that produce them. In this paper we analyze and compare these two (...) accounts of organization and argue that understanding biological organisms as cohesively integrated systems benefits from insights from both. To bring together the two accounts, we focus on the notions of control and regulation as bridge concepts. We start from a characterization of biological mechanisms in terms of constraints and focus on a specific type of mechanism, control mechanisms, that operate on other mechanisms on the basis of measurements of variables in the system and its environment. Control mechanisms are characterized by their own set of constraints that enable them to sense conditions, convey signals, and effect changes on constraints in the controlled mechanism. They thereby allow living organisms to adapt to internal and external variations and to coordinate their parts in such a manner as to maintain viability. Because living organisms contain a vast number of control mechanisms, a central challenge is to understand how they are themselves organized. With the support of examples from both unicellular and multicellular systems we argue that control mechanisms are organized heterarchically, and we discuss how this type of control architecture can, without invoking top-down and centralized forms of organizations, succeed in coordinating internal activities of organisms. (shrink)

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible (...) contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research. (shrink)

Living organisms act as integrated wholes to maintain themselves. Individual actions can each be explained by characterizing the mechanisms that perform the activity. But these alone do not explain how various activities are coordinated and performed versatilely. We argue that this depends on a specific type of mechanism, a control mechanism. We develop an account of control by examining several extensively studied control mechanisms operative in the bacterium E. coli. On our analysis, what distinguishes a control mechanism from other mechanisms (...) is that it relies on measuring one or more variables, which results in setting constraints in the control mechanism that determine its action on flexible constraints in other mechanisms. In the most basic arrangement, the measurement process directly determines the action of the control mechanism, but in more complex arrangements signals mediate between measurements and effectors. This opens the possibility of multiple responses to the same measurement and responses based on multiple measurements. It also allows crosstalk, resulting in networks of control mechanisms. Such networks integrate the behaviors of the organism but also present a challenge in tailoring responses to particular measurements. We discuss how integrated activity can still result in differential, versatile, responses. (shrink)

If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?

This paper focuses on elucidating the manner in which, funded upon Feuerbach’s peculiar sen- sualist philosophical anthropology found in his early work Gedanken über Tod und Übsterlichkeit (1830), a notion of history is raised which tends towards an immanence and anti-theological ap- proach, where memory takes on a fundamental role as a becoming-communicable of the subject. History, according to a young Feuerbach, is to be understood as an uninterrupted process of commu- nal remembrance, in which individual man finds his transcendence. (...) -/- El presente trabajo se concentrará en elucidar de qué manera, sobre la peculiar antropología filosó- fica sensualista feuerbachiana que encontramos en su obra temprana Gedanken über Tod und Übsterlichkeit (1830), se erige una noción de la historia que abona por un enfoque inmanentista y anti-teológico, en donde el recuerdo asume un rol fundamental en tanto un hacerse-comunicable del sujeto. La historia, para el joven Feuerbach, se entendería ella misma como un ininterrumpido proceso de recordación comunitaria, en la que el hombre individual encontraría su trascendencia. (shrink)

In the present paper I defend an interpretation of the Cartesian notion of material falsity that it would be adequate to describe as ‘epistemic’, as opposed to most other views in the literature, which could be described as ‘metaphysical’. Whereas metaphysical conceptions of material falsity consider an idea to be such because of some kind of failure in their representative properties, that is, in the relation between what they exhibit and their objects, an epistemic view considers that what makes an (...) idea materially false is some kind of opacity that precludes their representational properties to be known in the first place. In the paper the evidence for these two kinds of reading is assessed, and it is shown that epistemic views are clearly more adequate. (shrink)

In this article we analyse the problem of emergence in its diachronic dimension. In other words, we intend to deal with the generation of novelties in natural processes. Our approach aims at integrating some insights coming from Whitehead’s Philosophy of the Process with the epistemological framework developed by the “autopoietic” tradition. Our thesis is that the emergence of new entities and rules of interaction (new “fields of relatedness”) requires the development of discontinuous models of change. From this standpoint natural evolution (...) can be conceived as a succession of emergences — each one realizing a novel “extended” present, described by distinct models — rather than as a single and continuous dynamics. This theoretical and epistemological framework is particularly suitable to the investigation of the origin of life, an emblematic example of this kind of processes. (shrink)

examine Nathan Salmon’s solution to the problem of trivialization, as it arises for conceptions of general term rigidity that construe it as identity of designation across possible worlds. I argue that he does not succeed in showing that some alleged general terms, such as “the colour of the sky” are non-rigid, but also that a small class of different examples that he presents, which can be construed as second order descriptions, are indeed non-rigid general terms, although for reasons different from (...) those he thought. (shrink)

The new mechanists and the autonomy approach both aim to account for how biological phenomena are explained. One identifies appeals to how components of a mechanism are organized so that their activities produce a phenomenon. The other directs attention towards the whole organism and focuses on how it achieves self-maintenance. This paper discusses challenges each confronts and how each could benefit from collaboration with the other: the new mechanistic framework can gain by taking into account what happens outside individual mechanisms, (...) while the autonomy approach can ground itself in biological research into how the actual components constituting an autonomous system interact and contribute in different ways to realize and maintain the system. To press the case that these two traditions should be constructively integrated we describe how three recent developments in the autonomy tradition together provide a bridge between the two traditions: (1) a framework of work and constraints, (2) a conception of function grounded in the organization of an autonomous system, and (3) a focus on control. (shrink)

Endocrinologists apply the idea of feedback loops to explain how hormones regulate certain bodily functions such as glucose metabolism. In particular, feedback loops focus on the maintenance of the plasma concentrations of glucose within a narrow range. Here, we put forward a different, organicist perspective on the endocrine regulation of glycaemia, by relying on the pivotal concept of closure of constraints. From this perspective, biological systems are understood as organized ones, which means that they are constituted of a set of (...) mutually dependent functional structures acting as constraints, whose maintenance depends on their reciprocal interactions. Closure refers specifically to the mutual dependence among functional constraints in an organism. We show that, when compared to feedback loops, organizational closure can generate much richer descriptions of the processes and constraints at play in the metabolism and regulation of glycaemia, by making explicit the different hierarchical orders involved. We expect that the proposed theoretical framework will open the way to the construction of original mathematical models, which would provide a better understanding of endocrine regulation from an organicist perspective. (shrink)

Spinoza is often described as an ethical perfectionist—one who accepts an account of the good centered on the development of our natural capacities. Perfectionists typically accept a perfectionist theory of value, in which the properties of good and evil are grounded in a normative property of perfection. Yet I argue that Spinoza rejects a perfectionist theory of value because he believes it conflicts with the doctrine of necessitarianism. This leads him to conclude that attributions of perfection in ethical contexts must (...) be regarded as fictions. If Spinoza is indeed an ethical perfectionist, his perfectionism must be grounded in a theory of value that is not itself perfectionist. (shrink)

L'articolo ha come obiettivo quello di dimostrare come il paradigma russelliano risulti più proficuo non soltanto per rendere coerente una teoria semantica per gli atteggiamenti proposizionali ma anche per predire il comportamento di un agente razionale cosa, del tutto innovativa, viste le continue ciritiche nella letteratura contemporanea. Sul finire dell'articolo viene abbozzata una proposta inedita volta alla costruzione di un modello - inquadrato nelle scienze cognitive - coerente per prevedere il comportamento di un agente razionale sulla base di una teoria (...) referenzialista degli atteggiamenti proposizionali. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework to understand how multicellular systems realize functionally integrated physiological entities by organizing their intercellular space. From a perspective centered on physiology and integration, biological systems are often characterized as organized in such a way that they realize metabolic self-production and self-maintenance. The existence and activity of their components rely on the network they realize and on the continuous management of the exchange of matter and energy with their environment. One (...) of the virtues of the organismic approach focused on organization is that it can provide an understanding of how biological systems are functionally integrated into coherent wholes. Organismic frameworks have been primarily developed by focusing on unicellular life. Multicellularity, however, presents additional challenges to our understanding of biological systems, related to how cells are capable to live together in higher-order entities, in such a way that some of their features and behaviors are constrained and controlled by the system they realize. Whereas most accounts of multicellularity focus on cell differentiation and increase in size as the main elements to understand biological systems at this level of organization, we argue that these factors are insufficient to provide an understanding of how cells are physically and functionally integrated in a coherent system. In this paper, we provide a new theoretical framework to understand multicellularity, capable to overcome these issues. Our thesis is that one of the fundamental theoretical principles to understand multicellularity, which is missing or underdeveloped in current accounts, is the functional organization of the intercellular space. In our view, the capability to be organized in space plays a central role in this context, as it enables (and allows to exploit all the implications of) cell differentiation and increase in size, and even specialized functions such as immunity. We argue that the extracellular matrix plays a crucial active role in this respect, as an evolutionary ancient and specific (non-cellular) control subsystem that contributes as a key actor to the functional specification of the multicellular space and to modulate cell fate and behavior. We also analyze how multicellular systems exert control upon internal movement and communication. Finally, we show how the organization of space is involved in some of the failures of multicellular organization, such as aging and cancer. (shrink)

Theoretical accounts of development exhibit several internal tensions and face multiple challenges. They span from the problem of the identification of the temporal boundaries of development (beginning and end) to the characterization of the distinctive type of change involved compared to other biological processes. They include questions such as the role to ascribe to the environment or what types of biological systems can undergo development and whether they should include colonies or even ecosystems. In this chapter we discuss these conceptual (...) issues, and we argue that adopting an organizational approach may help solve or clarify them. -/- While development is usually identified with the achievement of an adult form with the capability to reproduce and therefore maintain a lineage, adopting the organizational approach may provide a different strategy, which focuses also on the maintenance of the current organization of the organism. By doing so an organizational approach favors a switch in perspective which consists in analyzing how organisms maintain their viability at each moment of development rather than considering them as going through intermediate stages of a process directed toward a specific goal state. This developmental dimension of biological organization has yet to be given a general and detailed analysis within the organizational theoretical perspective, apart from some preliminary attempts. How a biological organization is maintained through a series of radical organizational changes and what these changes are issues that still require clarification. In this chapter we offer the beginnings of such an analysis of developmental transitions, understood as changes in functionality brought forth by regulatory mechanisms in the context of the continued maintenance of organizational viability at every step. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Circularity and the Micro-Macro-Difference” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: The target article defends the fundamental role of circularity for systems sciences and the necessity to develop a conceptual and methodological approach to it. The concept of circularity, however, is multifarious, and two of the main challenges in this respect are to provide distinctions between different forms of circularities and explore in detail the roles they play in organizations. This commentary provides some suggestions in this direction (...) with the aim to supplement the perspective presented in the target article with some insights from theoretical biology. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja refletir sobre os pressupostos educacionais presentes na obra Sobre a Pedagogia, de Kant e A destinação do erudito, de Fichte. Quanto a Kant, buscar-se-á demonstrar a importância que o pensador confere a uma sólida formação na infância, que será refletida no adulto do futuro. No que se refere a Fichte, o pensador, partindo de pressupostos kantianos, reafirma a importância da construção de uma sociedade moral, na qual cada indivíduo tem uma vocação a ser exercida livremente e (...) que beneficiará a todos os demais. Em ambos os pensadores, pode-se perceber uma ênfase no estabelecimento da educação moral, com o objetivo de promover uma boa convivência em sociedade. A finalidade dessa educação é fazer com que os instintos se submetam à lei moral, que, em última instância, serve para permitir que o indivíduo conviva em harmonia com seus semelhantes. (shrink)

Definition The authors’ definition of the autopoietic system has evolved through the years. One of them states that an autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (1) through their interactions and transformations regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the (...) topological domain of its realization as such a network (Varela 1979, p. 13). Nearly the same formula was earlier used to define an autopoietic machine (Maturana and Varela 1973/1980, 1984/1987, p. 135). (shrink)

The following aesthetic discussion examines in a philosophical-scientific way the relationship between computation and artistic creativity. Currently, there is a criticism about the possible artistic creativity that an algorithm could have. Supporting the above, the term computer-generated art (CG-Art) defined by Margaret Boden would seem to have no exponents yet. Moreover, it has been pointed out that, rather than a matter of primitive technological development, CG-Art would have in its very foundations the inability to exist. This, because art is considered (...) as one of the most unique and exclusive human manifestations of our species. On the contrary, I propose that the denial of CG-Art has an anthropocentric bias. For this, I use the recent studies that, from the cognitive sciences, have been carried out on artistic creativity. In this way, I intend to convince the reader that behind the denial of the creative artistic capacity to the machines, a negationist mysticism of the current scientific advances necessarily lies. (shrink)

It is a widespread idea that suspended judgement implies a state of doxastic neutrality. Jane Friedman has recently claimed that while inquiring into a given question, one suspends one’s judgement on it. Jointly considered, the previous claims imply that one is in a state of doxastic neutrality about a given question while inquiring into it. In this article, I explore the leading cases against Friedman’s perspective, arguing that it is debatable whether they exhibit inquiries into questions without doxastic neutrality. However, (...) I will propose the possibility of “explorative disconfirmation inquiries” to show that doxastically non-neutral inquiries do exist. (shrink)

Jane Friedman claims that when we inquire, there is a tension between the instrumental normativity of our inquiries and some basic epistemic norms: The former forbids what the latter permit. Moreover, she argues that since the instrumental normativity of inquiry is epistemic, the previous tension shows that our current conception of epistemic normativity is incoherent and needs to be revised. To solve the problem, she suggests that all our epistemic norms should be considered “zetetic”, namely, norms of inquiry. In this (...) paper, I will argue that the instrumental normativity of inquiry Friedman depicts is inaccurate. I will propose the following alternative picture: All our reasons to inquire and take means to answer our questions are instrumental and can be derivative from the epistemic, the practical, or both. However, developing this alternative view, I will argue that our duties to inquire and take means to answer our questions are just practical in nature. Based on this, I will show that the tension between the epistemic and the zetetic Friedman depicts is just a conflict between the practical and the epistemic: A conflict that does not show per se that the current conception of epistemic normativity is incoherent and needs to be revised. (shrink)

This paper critically revises the organisational account of teleology, which argues that living systems are first and foremost oriented towards a goal: maintaining their own conditions of existence. It points out some limitations of this account, mainly in the capability to account for the richness and complexity of biological systems and their purposeful behaviours. It identifies the reason of these limitations in the theoretical grounding of this account, specifically in the too narrow notion of closure of constraints, focused on self-production. (...) It proposes to ground an organisational account of biological teleology in the capability of living system not just to produce and replace their parts, but to control their own internal dynamics and behaviours in such a way as to maintain themselves. This theoretical framework has two advantages. It better captures the distinctive features of biological organisations and consequently the richness and active nature of their purposeful behaviours. By doing so, it makes it possible to apply this framework beyond minimal theoretical models to real biological cases. (shrink)

In the Ethics, Spinoza famously rejects freedom of the will. He also offers an error theory for why many believe, falsely, that the will is free. Standard accounts of his arguments for these claims focus on their efficacy against incompatibilist views of free will. For Spinoza, the will cannot be free since it is determined by an infinite chain of external causes. And the pervasive belief in free will arises from a structural limitation of our self-knowledge: because we are aware (...) of our actions but unaware of their causes, we suppose that we alone must be responsible for them. Yet I argue that the standard accounts miss a further element of Spinoza’s arguments that also targets compatibilist views on which free will is consistent with a specific kind of determination—namely, self-determination in accordance with our value judgments. For Spinoza, we are misled not only in supposing that our actions lack external determination but also in thinking that they are determined by our representations of value. In fact, our actions are determined by our appetites, which are blind to our value judgments. And the pervasive belief that our actions are determined by such judgments arises from the projection of value onto the objects we seek. As he denies us free will, then, Spinoza also denies us a capacity central to agency—the capacity to determine our actions in accordance with our ideas of the good. This makes his arguments against free will more consequential, and more radical, than commonly assumed. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present some system-theoretical notions ─ such as constraint, closure, integration, coordination, etc. ─ which have recently raised a renovated interest and have undergone a deep development, especially in those branches of philosophy of biology characterized by a systemic approach. The im- plications of these notions for the analysis and characterization of self-maintaining organizations will be discussed with the aid of examples taken from models of minimal living systems, and some conceptual distinctions will be (...) provided. In the last part of the paper the epistemic implications of these ideas will be presented. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to investigate the relevance and implications of synthetic models for the study of the interactive dimension of minimal life and cognition, by taking into consideration how the use of artificial systems may contribute to an understanding of the way in which interactions may affect or even contribute to shape biological identities. To do so, this article analyzes experimental work in synthetic biology on different types of interactions between artificial and natural systems, more specifically: between (...) protocells and between biological living cells and protocells. It discusses how concepts such as control, cognition, communication can be used to characterize these interactions from a theoretical point of view, which criteria of relevance and evaluation of synthetic models can be applied to these cases, and what are their limits. (shrink)

This paper discusses the epistemic status of biology from the standpoint of the systemic approach to living systems based on the notion of biological autonomy. This approach aims to provide an understanding of the distinctive character of biological systems and this paper analyses its theoretical and epistemological dimensions. The paper argues that, considered from this perspective, biological systems are examples of emergent phenomena, that the biological domain exhibits special features with respect to other domains, and that biology as a discipline (...) employs some core concepts, such as teleology, function, regulation among others, that are irreducible to those employed in physics and chemistry. It addresses the claim made by Jacques Monod that biology as a science is marginal. It argues that biology is general insofar as it constitutes a paradigmatic example of complexity science, both in terms of how it defines the theoretical object of study and of the epistemology and heuristics employed. As such, biology may provide lessons that can be applied more widely to develop an epistemology of complex systems. (shrink)

Since it was inspired by Bernard and developed and named by Cannon, the conceptof homeostasis has been invoked by many as the central theoretical framework for physiology. Ithas also been the target of numerous criticisms that have elicited the introduction of a plethoraof alternative concepts. We argue that many of the criticisms actually target the more restrictiveaccount of homeostasis advanced by the cyberneticists. What was crucial to Bernard and Cannonwas a focus on the maintenance of the organism as the goal (...) of physiological regulation. We analysehow Bernard’s and Cannon’s broad conception of what was required to maintain the organismwas narrowed to negative feedback, characterized in terms of setpoints, by the cyberneticistsand demonstrate how many of the alternative concepts challenge the role of setpoints – treatingthem as variable in light of circumstances or in anticipation of future circumstances, or asdispensable altogether. To support our analysis, we draw on the experimental and theoreticalwork on thermoregulation, a phenomenon that has been considered as a paradigmatic example ofhomeostasis and has been a common focus of those advancing alternative concepts. To integratethe insights advanced by the original proponents of homeostasis and the theorists proposingreplacement notions we advance a framework in which regulation is viewed from the perspectiveof maintaining the organism. (shrink)

In Pensare l’infosfera La filosofia come design concettuale, Luciano Floridi states the value of a correct analysis and philosophical responses within the information age we are living in. The aim of this paper is to suggest several ideas for reflecting on some of Floridi’s topics such as the analysis of presence, relationship and semantization. In the second paragraph, after a brief introduction about the author, I will analyse philosophical insights on the relationship between being and determination. In the third paragraph, (...) I am going to suggest the importance of a correct analysis of presence. In the fourth paragraph, a possible analogy between the philosophy of information and a certain form of neo-idealism will be shown. At last, I try to show how the philosophy of information can play a key role in the way we think about reality, but also its possible conceptual risks. (shrink)

The article examines education in the information age, proposing an informational perspective. By analyzing the epistemology of informational learning, I offer a framework for understanding how individuals acquire knowledge, highlighting the role of design and models in active and constructive learning. Following this, the paper presents the UDL and ODDE educational models, outlining their key features and potential contributions. I then showcase the practical application of these models through case studies focusing on the use of AI to develop personalized learning (...) tools and inclusive environments. I propose EIML as a competence to address the abundance of information in learning and the need for the concept of reciprocity. (shrink)

This paper focuses on physiological integration in multicellular systems, a notion often associated with biological individuality, but which has not received enough attention and needs a thorough theoretical treatment. Broadly speaking, physiological integration consists in how different components come together into a cohesive unit in which they are dependent on one another for their existence and activity. This paper argues that physiological integration can be understood by considering how the components of a biological multicellular system are controlled and coordinated in (...) such a way that their activities can contribute to the maintenance of the system. The main implication of this perspective is that different ways of controlling their parts may give rise to multicellular organizations with different degrees of integration. After defining control, this paper analyses how control is realized in two examples of multicellular systems located at different ends of the spectrum of multicellularity: biofilms and animals. It focuses on differences in control ranges, and it argues that a high degree of integration implies control exerted at both medium and long ranges, and that insofar as biofilms lack long-range control (relative to their size) they can be considered as less integrated than other multicellular systems. It then discusses the implication of this account for the debate on physiological individuality and the idea that degrees of physiological integration imply degrees of individuality. (shrink)

El cine de Jim Jarmusch es reconocible por captar momentos de quietud en los que la acción y el drama son secundarios. Es por ello que su film Only Lovers Left Alive ha sido tan destacado por críticos y académicos. Esta película ha llevado a la pantalla la estética ruinosa de Detroit. Este artículo amplía esas recientes investigaciones, para postular que la Detroit de Jarmusch es una ciudad estéticamente inorgánica. Siguiendo a grandes rasgos los lineamientos de Wilhelm Worringer, se analiza (...) el estilo postindustrial de la arquitectura de Detroit y la figura del vampiro. Esto permite concluir que lo inorgánico —Detroit— tiene capacidades estéticas propias, las cuales son exaltadas por el particular estilo de Jarmusch. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende mostrar que, a través de la obra de Lovecraft, es posible ilustrar una forma de realismo estructural óntico (REO). Se postula que la literatura de Lovecraft permite ejemplificar una ontología orientada hacia las relaciones (entre entidades), y no a las entidades mismas. Además, puesto que en esta forma de REO las entidades se definirían por sus relaciones, se concluye que estas deberían ser abstractas, habilitadas para contar con todas las características que extrínsecamente les sean asignadas en una (...) actualización determinada de la estructura que las alberga. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to examine the path of the philosopher of religion Italo Mancini related to his early speculative period on meontology and to show a theoretical consonance with his later period of “double thoughts”. The first part of the contribution argues: it is possible to explain the meontological path as prolegomena to the non-being of being through an in-depth analysis of the notions in his youthful essay “e La struttura dell’essere" e "Il trascendentale come fondamento”, understood (...) as status quaestionis on ontology in general (§1, §2); it presents also why for Mancini transcendence and functionality ground his scheme of possibilities (§3, §4); we define why the fundamental reason why Mancini’s strategy works is entirely based on a theology of oxymorons: starting with double thoughts (§5), as an open and structured path, insofar as thought and revelation appear as a hermeneutic circle (§6); in the last part, we delve into the logic of fragmentariness as an integral principle of religious hermeneutics and, finally, a summary relation between Mancini’s first speculation and the last of his posthumous work “Frammento su Dio” is assessed (§7). (shrink)

The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...) believe that the object that stands before me is a pen, I am in relation to "believe" with the propositional content: that in front of me is a pen. Philosophers of the proposition, from Frege onwards, have dedicated their studies to the analysis of what kinds of entities are the propositional attitudes. Jerry Fodor says that now, the proper prediction of the psychology of common sense, can not be questioned and that the propositional attitudes represent the most effective way to describe our behavior. What Fodor says, however, is that propositional attitudes function, but not how they work. Most philosophers interested in the issue, we are dedicated to the search for a theory that can account consistently both a semantics for propositional attitudes, both of these entities that seem to cause the behavior of a rational subject. There are two main paradigms in the theory of the proposition that contributed to the discussion of the propositional attitudes. One is the one that begins with Gottlob Frege, the other with Bertrand Russell. Defenders of Frege argue that the paradigm scrub objects and properties can not be constituents of the propositional content which have a purely conceptual. In other words, the philosophers belonging to the paradigm of Frege, but not all, mean that you can test in a rigorous way the truth conditions of propositional attitudes. Who defends the russellian’s paradigm argues that the propositional content are made by the objects and properties on which propositional attitudes relate. The purpose of this article is not to rebuild - in detail - both paradigms, nor to reconstruct one but, in a sense, my work will be a completely partial objective is to demonstrate how the paradigm is more profitable russell not only to make a coherent semantic theory for propositional attitudes2 but also to predict the behavior of a rational subject thing, completely innovative, given the repeated objections in contemporary literature3. At the end of this paper will be drafted a proposal to build a consistent model to predict the behavior,of a rational agent, based on a referential theory of propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Sfruttando alcune considerazioni, presenti in Richard (1997), riguardo questioni pragmatiche e psicologiche connesse alla semantica russelliana per i verbi psicologici si propone un modello teorico in cui, attraverso l’introduzione di alcuni enunciati strategici, ad es. “Lois non realizza che Superman è Clark Kent”, alcuni problemi connessi al diverso comportamento di Lois con gli individui Superman e Clark Kent, sembrerebbero risolti fornendoci corrette predizioni riguardo il comportamento di un agente razionale. Scopo di questo lavoro è estendere il modello ad alcuni casi (...) riguardanti l’etica delle credenze e mostrare, attraverso un caso paradigmatico nella letteratura specialistica, alcune potenziali conferme empiriche del modello stesso. (shrink)

Basandomi su (Harvey 2012) argomenterò che la struttura architettonica della città deve seguire un determinato modello morale: gli edifici devono adattarsi alla persone e alle loro esigenze, e non il contrario. Definita la città come un particolare tipo di oggetto sociale, difenderò la tesi della possibilità di cambiamento “qui e ora” delle strutture architettoniche delle città sulla base del modello che, come mostra (Sudjic 2011), è attualmente ribaltato in una situazione in cui gli agglomerati urbani seguono sostanzialmente una struttura che (...) sposa le sole esigenze dei costruttori. Una volta argomentato che la città deve tenere conto degli interessi di tutti, modificando di continuo le proprie strutture, mi baserò su (Frau 2009) per sostenere che la città deve anche trasformarsi in un luogo in cui anche i “ diversi” (malati mentali, ecc.) trovano un loro spazio non dissimile da chi è definito “normale”. (shrink)

BASTARD TONGUES: A Trailblazing Linguist Finds Clues to Our Common Humanity in the World’s Lowliest Languages. Author: Derek Bickerton (270 pp. Hill & Wang. New York - 2008. $ 26.) Review by Leonardo Caffo.

La introducción de las redes generativas antagónicas en el mundo del arte ha revitalizado la clásica pregunta: ¿puede una máquina crear arte? Estos algoritmos requieren una mínima intervención humana para funcionar, por lo que sus creaciones se consideran CG-art. En esta clase particular de arte los computadores no son una herramienta al servicio humano, sino un agente creativo autónomo. Por otro lado, estudios cognitivos recientes han demostrado que las personas son escépticas ante la idea de que una máquina pueda crear (...) arte. Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que el CG-art no puede excluirse arbitrariamente del dominio artístico. Para ello se utiliza la distinción hecha por Dickie entre teorías del arte de tipo natural y cultural. Luego, utilizando el concepto función de estatus de Searle, se propone considerar al arte como un fenómeno independiente del lenguaje. Complementando ambos enfoques sostengo que, la teoría idónea para explicar el fenómeno del CG-art es del tipo natural. Esto implica que la sociedad no puede negar el carácter de arte a estas creaciones algorítmicas. Así, la idea de que las máquinas pueden crear arte es fortalecida. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Ethical new realism is presented as particularly promising and important to the future of philosophy.

From 1950 onwards, the study of creativity has not stopped. Today, AI has revitalised debates on the subject. That is especially controversial in the artworld, as the 21st century already features AI-generated artworks. Without discussing issues about AI agency, this article argues for AI’s creativity. For this, we first present a new functionalist understanding of Margaret Boden’s definition of creativity. This is followed by an analysis of empirical evidence on anthropocentric barriers in the perception of AI’s creative capabilities, which is (...) later criticised for considering insights from media theory. Finally, benefits derived from including AI as an artistic creative producer and supportive tool are discussed. It is then argued that AI can contribute to democratising the artworld. Therefore its creative role must be recognised. (shrink)