Results for 'Frege-Russell Tradition'

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  1. The Principles of Mathematics.Bertrand Russell - 1903 - Allen & Unwin.
    Published in 1903, this book was the first comprehensive treatise on the logical foundations of mathematics written in English. It sets forth, as far as possible without mathematical and logical symbolism, the grounds in favour of the view that mathematics and logic are identical. It proposes simply that what is commonly called mathematics are merely later deductions from logical premises. It provided the thesis for which _Principia Mathematica_ provided the detailed proof, and introduced the work of Frege to a wider (...)
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  2. The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2019 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show (...)
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  3. Corcoran Recommends Hambourger on the Frege-Russell Number Definition.John Corcoran - 1978 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 56.
    It is widely agreed by philosophers that the so-called “Frege-Russell definition of natural number” is actually an assertion concerning the nature of the numbers and that it cannot be regarded as a definition in the ordinary mathematical sense. On the basis of the reasoning in this paper it is clear that the Frege-Russell definition contradicts the following three principles (taken together): (1) each number is the same entity in each possible world, (2) each number exists in each possible (...)
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  4. Revisiting the Notion of “Analysis” on the Bedrock of Analytic Philosophy.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2015 - Philosophy and Progress, University of Dhaka:119-131.
    In recent years, there has been a huge resurrection of interest in the idea of ‘analysis,’ encompassing on analytic philosophy. As with any major philosophical movement, it is futile to define or classify any precision of what makes someone an analytic thinker. However, drawing on the startling works by Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Dummett and Putnam I clear up some strands, portended by the observation that language is the sole medium of analytic philosophy, so the main focus of analytic philosophy is (...)
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  5. The Quasi-Verbal Dispute Between Kripke and 'Frege-Russell'.J. P. Smit - manuscript
    Traditional descriptivism and Kripkean causalism are standardly interpreted as rival theories on a single topic. I argue that there is no such shared topic, i.e. that there is no question that they can be interpreted as giving rival answers to. The only way to make sense of the commitment to epistemic transparency that characterizes traditional descriptivism is to interpret Russell and Frege as proposing rival accounts of how to characterize a subject’s beliefs about what names refer to. My argument relies (...)
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  6. Termos Singulares Indefinidos: Frege, Russell e a tradição matemática.Daniel Durante Pereira Alves - 2016 - Saberes: Filosofia E Educação (Filosofia Lógica e Metafísica An):33-53.
    É bem conhecida a divergência entre as posições de Gottlob Frege e Bertrand Russell com relação ao tratamento semântico dado a sentenças contendo termos singulares indefinidos, ou seja, termos singulares sem referência ou com referência ambígua, tais como ‘Papai Noel’ ou ‘o atual rei da França’ ou ‘1/0 ’ ou ‘√4’ ou ‘o autor de Principia Mathematica’. Para Frege, as sentenças da linguagem natural que contêm termos indefinidos não formam declarações e portanto não são nem verdadeiras nem falsas. Já para (...)
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  7. Frege and German Philosophical Idealism.Nikolay Milkov - 2015 - In Dieter Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e): Proceedings of the International Conference 2013. Logos. pp. 88-104.
    The received view has it that analytic philosophy emerged as a rebellion against the German Idealists (above all Hegel) and their British epigones (the British neo-Hegelians). This at least was Russell’s story: the German Idealism failed to achieve solid results in philosophy. Of course, Frege too sought after solid results. He, however, had a different story to tell. Frege never spoke against Hegel, or Fichte. Similarly to the German Idealists, his sworn enemy was the empiricism (in his case, John Stuart (...)
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  8. Three Unpublished Manuscripts From 1903: "Functions", "Proof That No Function Takes All Values", "Meaning and Denotation".Bertrand Russell & Kevin C. Klement - 2016 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 36 (1):5-44.
    I present and discuss three previously unpublished manuscripts written by Bertrand Russell in 1903, not included with similar manuscripts in Volume 4 of his Collected Papers. One is a one-page list of basic principles for his “functional theory” of May 1903, in which Russell partly anticipated the later Lambda Calculus. The next, catalogued under the title “Proof That No Function Takes All Values”, largely explores the status of Cantor’s proof that there is no greatest cardinal number in the variation of (...)
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  9. Getting Straight on How Russell Underestimated Frege.Adam P. Kubiak & Piotr Lipski - 2014 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 62 (4):121-134.
    Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...)
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  10. Definite Descriptions: What Frege Got Right and Russell Didn’T.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 1997 - Aporia Undergraduate Philosophy Journal:1-16.
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  11.  68
    Conciliare Meinong, Frege e Russell. Commento a Francesco Orilia.Mario Alai - 2005 - Rivista di Estetica 45 (3).
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  12. PEIRCE, FREGE, RUSSELL E O SURGIMENTO DA PREDICAÇÃO LÓGICA CONTEMPORÂNEA.Rafael dos Reis Ferreira - 2016 - Kinesis 8 (17):115-135.
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  13. Neo-Logicism and Russell’s Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2012 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 32 (2):159.
    Most advocates of the so-called “neologicist” movement in the philosophy of mathematics identify themselves as “Neo-Fregeans” (e.g., Hale and Wright): presenting an updated and revised version of Frege’s form of logicism. Russell’s form of logicism is scarcely discussed in this literature, and when it is, often dismissed as not really logicism at all (in lights of its assumption of axioms of infinity, reducibiity and so on). In this paper I have three aims: firstly, to identify more clearly the primary metaontological (...)
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  14. The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein and Its Demise.Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2 (1):81-105.
    Between April and November 1912, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein were engaged in a joint philosophical program. Wittgenstein‘s meeting with Gottlob Frege in December 1912 led, however, to its dissolution – the joint program was abandoned. Section 2 of this paper outlines the key points of that program, identifying what Russell and Wittgenstein each contributed to it. The third section determines precisely those features of their collaborative work that Frege criticized. Finally, building upon the evidence developed in the preceding two (...)
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  15.  32
    A Semantic Analysis of Russellian Simple Type Theory.Sten Lindström - 1986 - In Paul Needham & Jan Odelstad (eds.), Changing Positions, Essays Dedicated to Lars Lindahl on the Occassion of His Fiftieth Birthday. Uppsala:
    As emphasized by Alonzo Church and David Kaplan (Church 1974, Kaplan 1975), the philosophies of language of Frege and Russell incorporate quite different methods of semantic analysis with different basic concepts and different ontologies. Accordingly we distinguish between a Fregean and a Russellian tradition in intensional semantics. The purpose of this paper is to pursue the Russellian alternative and to provide a language of intensional logic with a model-theoretic semantics. We also discuss the so-called Russell-Myhill paradox that threatens simple (...)
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  16. Kantian Neuroscience and Radical Interpretation.Jim Hopkins - forthcoming - In Festschfrift for Mark Platts.
    This is an unedited version of a paper written in 2012 accepted for publication in a forthcoming Festschrift for Mark Platts. In it I argue that the Helmholtz/Bayes tradition of free energy neuroscience begun by Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues, and now being carried forward by Karl Friston and his, can be seen as a fulfilment of the Quine/Davidson program of radical interpretation, and also of Quine’s conception of a naturalized epistemology. -/- This program, in turn, is rooted in (...)
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  17. The Tractatus on Inference and Entailment.Ian Proops - 2002 - In Erich Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Essays on Early Analytic Philosophy, 283–307. Oxford University Press.
    In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes Frege and Russell's view that laws of inference (Schlussgesetze) "justify" logical inferences. What lies behind this criticism, I argue, is an attack on Frege and Russell's conceptions of logical entailment. In passing, I examine Russell's dispute with Bradley on the question whether all relations are "internal".
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  18. Critical Study: Jon Barwise & John Perry, Situations and Attitudes. [REVIEW]Sten Lindström - 1991 - Noûs (5):743-770.
    The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”). I try to show that the argument appears inconclusive, not only from a situation-theoretic perspective, but also from such alternative perspectives as orthodox Fregean semantics (...)
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  19. Context for Meaning and Analysis: A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language.H. G. Callaway - 1993 - Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam (...)
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  20.  58
    De Dicto and De Re: A Brandomian Experiment on Kierkegaard.Gabriel Ferreira - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 2 (7):221-238.
    During the last few decades, the historical turn within the tradition of the analytic tradition has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the frontrunners of this movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing interest in, as well as (...)
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  21. Framework for Formal Ontology.Barry Smith & Kevin Mulligan - 1983 - Topoi 2 (1):73-85.
    The discussions which follow rest on a distinction, first expounded by Husserl, between formal logic and formal ontology. The former concerns itself with (formal) meaning-structures; the latter with formal structures amongst objects and their parts. The paper attempts to show how, when formal ontological considerations are brought into play, contemporary extensionalist theories of part and whole, and above all the mereology of Leniewski, can be generalised to embrace not only relations between concrete objects and object-pieces, but also relations between what (...)
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  22. Surprises in Logic.John Corcoran & William Frank - 2013 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 19 (3):253.
    JOHN CORCORAN AND WILIAM FRANK. Surprises in logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 19 253. Some people, not just beginning students, are at first surprised to learn that the proposition “If zero is odd, then zero is not odd” is not self-contradictory. Some people are surprised to find out that there are logically equivalent false universal propositions that have no counterexamples in common, i. e., that no counterexample for one is a counterexample for the other. Some people would be surprised to (...)
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  23. Russell's Revenge: A Problem for Bivalent Fregean Theories of Descriptions.Jan8 Heylen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):636-652.
    Fregean theories of descriptions as terms have to deal with improper descriptions. To save bivalence various proposals have been made that involve assigning referents to improper descriptions. While bivalence is indeed saved, there is a price to be paid. Instantiations of the same general scheme, viz. the one and only individual that is F and G is G, are not only allowed but even required to have different truth values.
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  24. Existência.João Branquinho - 2015 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Neste ensaio, discutem-se cinco questões acerca da existência: 1. É a existência representável em termos de quantificação? 2. É a existência um predicado" real", de primeira ordem? 3. É existir o mesmo que ser? 4. Existe tudo? 5. Qual é a forma lógica de afirmações de existência? São introduzidas e examinadas algumas das mais salientes posições acerca destas questões, em especial a concepção Frege-Russell da existência e diversas concepções recentes neo-Meinongianas. Defendemos as seguintes três teses acerca daquilo que deve (...)
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  25. The Self-Consciousness Argument: Why Tooley's Criticisms Fail.George Bealer - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307.
    Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can be defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction of ontologically prior realizations. Ideological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only be defined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interaction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argument establishes: ontological functionalism is mistaken because its proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations into the contents of self-consciousness; ideological functionalism is the only viable alternative for functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique (...)
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  26.  49
    Zelfpredicatie: Middeleeuwse En Hedendaagse Perspectieven.Jan Heylen & Can Laurens Löwe - 2017 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 79 (2):239-258.
    The focus of the article is the self-predication principle, according to which the/a such-and-such is such-and-such. We consider contemporary approaches (Frege, Russell, Meinong) to the self-predication principle, as well as fourteenth-century approaches (Burley, Ockham, Buridan). In crucial ways, the Ockham-Buridan view prefigures Russell’s view, and Burley’s view shows a striking resemblance to Meinong’s view. In short the Russell-Ockham-Buridan view holds: no existence, no truth. The Burley-Meinong view holds, in short: intelligibility suffices for truth. Both views approach self-predication in a uniform (...)
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  27. Russell and Husserl (1905–1918): The Not-So-Odd Couple.Nikolay Milkov - 2017 - In Peter Stone (ed.), Bertrand Russell’s Life and Legacy. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 73-96.
    Historians of philosophy commonly regard as antipodal Bertrand Russell and Edmund Husserl, the founding fathers of analytic philosophy and phenomenology. This paper, however, establishes that during a formative phase in both of their careers Russell and Husserl shared a range of seminal ideas. In particular, the essay adduces clear cases of family resemblance between Husserl’s and Russell’s philosophy during their middle period, which spanned the years 1905 through 1918. The paper thus challenges the received view of Husserl’s relation to early (...)
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  28. An Idea of Donnellan.David Kaplan - 2011 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan. Oxford, but (c) David Kaplan. pp. 122-175.
    This is a story about three of my favorite philosophers—Donnellan, Russell, and Frege—about how Donnellan’s concept of having in mind relates to ideas of the others, and especially about an aspect of Donnellan’s concept that has been insufficiently discussed: how this epistemic state can be transmitted from one person to another.
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  29. Wholistic Reference, Truth-Values, Universes of Discourse, and Formal Ontology: Tréplica to Oswaldo Chateaubriand.John Corcoran - 2005 - Manuscrito 28 (1):143-167.
    ABSTRACT: In its strongest unqualified form, the principle of wholistic reference is that in any given discourse, each proposition refers to the whole universe of that discourse, regardless of how limited the referents of its non-logical or content terms. According to this principle every proposition of number theory, even an equation such as "5 + 7 = 12", refers not only to the individual numbers that it happens to mention but to the whole universe of numbers. This principle, its history, (...)
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  30. An Analysis of Two Accounts on the Sense of Singular Terms.Alan Schwerin - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (3):221-231.
    This paper is a critical investigation of Gottlob Frege's and Bertrand Russell's views on the sense or meaning of singular terms. In his famous "On denoting" Russell erects his case on objections that he raises against Frege. I suggest that Russell's criticisms of Frege are seriously misguided, due in large measure to the uneven applications of his terminology when addressing Frege's views.
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  31. The History or Russell's Concepts 'Sense-Data' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance'.Nikolay Milkov - 2001 - Archiv Fuer Begriffsgeschichte 43:221-231.
    Two concepts of utmost importance for the analytic philosophy of the twentieth century, “sense-data” and “knowledge by acquaintance”, were introduced by Bertrand Russell under the influence of two idealist philosophers: F. H. Bradley and Alexius Meinong. This paper traces the exact history of their introduction. We shall see that between 1896 and 1898, Russell had a fully-elaborated theory of “sense-data”, which he abandoned after his analytic turn of the summer of 1898. Furthermore, following a subsequent turn of August 1900—-after he (...)
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  32. What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein simply accepts (...)
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  33. Desiring to Desire: Russell, Lewis and G.E.Moore.Charles Pigden - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes from G.E.Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 244-260.
    I have two aims in this paper. In §§2-4 I contend that Moore has two arguments (not one) for the view that that ‘good’ denotes a non-natural property not to be identified with the naturalistic properties of science and common sense (or, for that matter, the more exotic properties posited by metaphysicians and theologians). The first argument, the Barren Tautology Argument (or the BTA), is derived, via Sidgwick, from a long tradition of anti-naturalist polemic. But the second argument, the (...)
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  34. Sobre o significado da função proposicional no Tractatus de Wittgenstein.Rafael dos Reis Ferreira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Campinas
    The analysis of logical predication has long philosophical tradition in which one of the central subjects of study is the analysis of the logical form of the proposition. We contemporaneously can say that the way more well-finished of logic predication is propositional function. Historically, the propositional function arises as a logical analysis of the proposition scheme resulting from the convergence of mathematics and logic between the XIX and XX centuries. Two of the main responsible for this convergence were Gottlob (...)
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  35. Frege's Basic Law V and Cantor's Theorem.Manuel Bremer - manuscript
    The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). These ontological (...)
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  36.  69
    Thoughts About Russell's Thoughts. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1998 - Times Higher Education.
    This collection of essays by acclaimed philosophers explores Bertrand Russell's influence on one of the dominant philosophical approaches of this century. Michael Dummett argues that analytical philosophy began with Gottlob Frege's analysis of numbers. Frege had begun by inquiring about the nature of number, but found it more fruitful to ask instead about the meanings of sentences containing number words. Russell was to exploit this method systematically. I reflect on the essays of Charles R. Pigden, David Lewis as an exponent (...)
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  37. Phenomenological Reduction in Heidegger's Sein Und Zeit: A New Proposal.Matheson Russell - 2008 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 39 (3):229-248.
    In Phenomenological Reduction in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit: a New Proposal, Matheson Russell investigates the indebtedness of the Heidegger of Being and Time to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology by way of distinguishing in it differing types of transcendental reduction. He supplies an overview of recent attempts to identify such reductions in order then to propose a new interpretation locating two levels of reduction in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. These concern, first, an enquiry going back to the horizon of 'existence', and, second, one (...)
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  38. Indefinite Divisibility.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):239-263.
    Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic interest of (...)
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  39. Parts of Propositions.Cody Gilmore - 2014 - In Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location. Oxford University Press. pp. 156-208.
    Do Russellian propositions have their constituents as parts? One reason for thinking not is that if they did, they would generate apparent counterexamples to plausible mereological principles. As Frege noted, they would be in tension with the transitivity of parthood. A certain small rock is a part of Etna but not of the proposition that Etna is higher than Vesuvius. So, if Etna were a part of the given proposition, parthood would fail to be transitive. As William Bynoe has noted (...)
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  40. Présuppositions linguistiques et enjeux philosophiques des paralogismes liés à la forme de l’expression dans les Réfutations sophistiques d’Aristote.Leone Gazziero - 2016 - In Béatrice Godart-Wendling & Layla Raïd (eds.), B. Godart-Wendling et L. Raïd (éd.), A la recherche de la présupposition, London, Iste Editions, 2016. London: Iste. pp. 33-52.
    Pour des raisons essentiellement liées à la vocation des textes où la notion de présupposition a fait son apparition, c’est la présupposition d’existence qui s’est imposée la première à l’attention des philosophes du langage. Elle a également déterminé l’orientation des débats en les focalisant sur quelques problèmes traditionnels, au premier chef desquels le problème de l’absence de référence de certaines expressions et celui des imperfections du langage naturel. Contrairement aux noms propres et aux descriptions définies, les termes qui signifient des (...)
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  41.  12
    Reference and Descriptions.Andrea Bianchi - 2011 - In Marina Sbisà, Jan-Ola Ostman & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics. Amsterdam: pp. 253-279.
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  42. The Development of Mathematical Logic From Russell to Tarski, 1900-1935.Paolo Mancosu, Richard Zach & Calixto Badesa - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, (...)
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  43.  66
    Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2019 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this (...)
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  44. ""Lambda Theory: Introduction of a Constant for" Nothing" Into Set Theory, a Model of Consistency and Most Noticeable Conclusions.Laurent Dubois - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (222):165-181.
    The purpose of this article is to present several immediate consequences of the introduction of a new constant called Lambda in order to represent the object ``nothing" or ``void" into a standard set theory. The use of Lambda will appear natural thanks to its role of condition of possibility of sets. On a conceptual level, the use of Lambda leads to a legitimation of the empty set and to a redefinition of the notion of set. It lets also clearly appear (...)
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  45. Frege's Paradise and the Paradoxes.Sten Lindström - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski (eds.), A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland. Uppsala Philosophical Studies 52.
    The main objective of this paper is to examine how theories of truth and reference that are in a broad sense Fregean in character are threatened by antinomies; in particular by the Epimenides paradox and versions of the so-called Russell-Myhill antinomy, an intensional analogue of Russell’s more well-known paradox for extensions. Frege’s ontology of propositions and senses has recently received renewed interest in connection with minimalist theories that take propositions (thoughts) and senses (concepts) as the primary bearers of truth and (...)
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  46. Aristotle on Being.George Couvalis - forthcoming - Modern Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand).
    Aristotle explains existence through postulating essences that are intrinsic and percep- tion independent. I argue that his theory is more plausible than Hume’s and Russell’s theories of existence. Russell modifies Hume’s theory because he wants to allow for the existence of mathematical objects. However, Russell’s theory facilitates a problematic collapse of ontology into epistemology, which has become a feature of much analytic philosophy. This collapse obscures the nature of truth. Aristotle is to be praised for starting with a clear account (...)
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  47.  54
    Assertion, Saying, and Propositional Complexity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Colin Johnston - 2011 - In Marie McGinn & Oskari Kuusela (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press.
    Wittgenstein responds in his Notes on Logic to a discussion of Russell's Principles of Mathematics concerning assertion. Russell writes: "It is plain that, if I may be allowed to use the word assertion in a non-psychological sense, the proposition "p implies q" asserts an implication, though it does not assert p or q. The p and the q which enter into this proposition are not strictly the same as the p or the q which are separate propositions." (PoM p35) Wittgenstein (...)
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  48. Logic in the Tractatus.Max Weiss - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (1):1-50.
    I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...)
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  49. Objects, Concepts, Unity.Ulrich Reichard - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophy of Language and Linguistics: The Legacy of Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. De Gruyter. pp. 213-224.
    The paradox of the concept horse has often been taken to be devastating for Frege’s ontological distinction between objects and concepts. I argue that if we consider how the concept-object distinction is supposed to account for the unity of linguistic meaning, it transpires that the paradox is in fact not paradoxical.
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  50. Gödel's Slingshot Revisited: Does Russell's Theory of Descriptions Really Evade the Slingshot.João Daniel Dantas - 2016 - Dissertation, UFRN
    “Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This dissertation treats of the slingshot dubbed “Gödel’s slingshot”. Gödel argued that there (...)
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