There is a strong appetite in ‘the wild’ (i.e., beyond the academy) for public philosophy. There are myriad forums available, from magazines and online publications to podcasts and YouTube videos, for those who wish to engage in philosophy in a non-academic context. For academic philosophers, this has raised methodological and metaphilosophical questions like: ‘what is the best way to engage in public philosophy?’ and ‘what are our aims when we engage in public philosophy?’ But what do ‘the public’ want? If (...) public philosophy is philosophy written for a public audience, what is it, exactly, that it can or might do for them? Several answers have been proposed by philosophers, but less attention has been paid to how the public themselves might answer that question. The aim of this essay is to try and put together at least the beginning of an answer. In June 2022 we put out a survey in the hope of eliciting views from ‘the public’ on issues relating to the nature and aims of both philosophy (more generally) and public philosophy. In doing so, our aim was to take a ‘democratic’ approach to answering the question: What is public philosophy? (shrink)

Relationalism is the view that perception is partly constituted by external objects (McDowell 1994; Campbell 2002; Martin 2004). Faced with the hallucination argument, and unsatisfied with the standard disjunctivist reply, some ‘new wave’ relationalists explain away the possibility of hallucinations as mere illusions (Alston 1999; Watzl 2010; Ali 2018; Masrour 2020). In this paper, I argue that some of these illusions (as in Chalmers 2005; Ali 2018) are perceptions of internal objects which appear as external ones. Then, in response to (...) the obvious screening-off objection, I argue for a novel reply called ‘intrameralism’: roughly, external objects are ordinarily perceived because they gain internal parts—they ‘grow into the head’. The preceding hallucinations are thus ultimately explained away as a kind of perceptual synecdoche, in which internal parts appear as their (ordinarily perceived) external wholes. The paper concludes by addressing some objections. (shrink)

Using his two-dimensional semantics, I demonstrate that David Chalmers’s 2010 ‘two-dimensional argument against materialism’ is sound only if a wide swath of reductive physicalist theses – crucially, those involving identity and other intrinsic reductive relations – are inconceivable. 2DA therefore begs the question against its opponents and undermines its argumentative relevance. Comparisons are drawn to similar arguments in Marton and Sturgeon; the present account differs in its formal and philosophical simplicity, as well as its specific application to reductivist doctrines beyond (...) the ineffective and merely supervenient. (shrink)

Conceivability arguments constitute a serious threat against reductive physicalism. Recently, a number of authors have proven and characterized a devastating logical truth, centered on these arguments: namely, that their soundness entails the inconceivability of reductive physicalism. In this paper, I demonstrate that is only a logical truth when reductive physicalism is interpreted in its stronger, intrinsic sense, as opposed to its weaker—yet considerably more popular—extrinsic sense. The basic idea generalizes: perhaps surprisingly, stronger forms of reduction are uniquely resistant to the (...) conceivability arguments opposing them. So far as the modal epistemology of reduction is concerned, therefore, it pays to go intrinsic. (shrink)

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, (...) which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation. (shrink)

In this article I explore various facets of Nozick’s famous thought experiment involving the experience machine. Nozick’s original target is hedonism—the view that the only intrinsic prudential value is pleasure. But the argument, if successful, undermines any experientialist theory, i.e. any theory that limits intrinsic prudential value to mental states. I first highlight problems arising from the way Nozick sets up the thought experiment. He asks us to imagine choosing whether or not to enter the machine and uses our choice (...) (or rather the choice he assumes most people will have) as evidence against experientialist theories. But for this strategy to succeed it must be possible to distinguish between self-interested and non-self-interested reasons for declining to enter the machine, and there is no obvious way to do this without begging the question against the hedonist. In successive sections I then (a) consider a common misconception of Nozick’s conclusion (that he thinks machine life is the worst life), (b) consider different intuitions about what is important to well-being but missing from machine life, and finally (c) explain what “the experience requirement” is, and describe its relationship to debates about experientialist theories. (shrink)

Philosophers concerned with what would be good for a person sometimes consider a person’s past desires. Indeed, some theorists have argued by appeal to past desires that it is in the best interests of certain dementia patients to die. I reject this conclusion. I consider three different ways one might appeal to a person’s past desires in arguing for conclusions about the good of such patients, finding flaws with each. Of the views I reject, the most interesting one is the (...) view that prudential value is, at least partly, concerned with the shape of a life as a whole. (shrink)

Desire is commonly spoken of as a state in which the desired object seems good, which apparently ascribes an evaluative element to desire. I offer a new defence of this old idea. As traditionally conceived, this view faces serious objections related to its way of characterizing desire's evaluative content. I develop an alternative conception of evaluative mental content which is plausible in its own right, allows the evaluative desire theorist to avoid the standard objections, and sheds interesting new light on (...) the idea of evaluative experience. (shrink)

Medical ethics would be better if people were taught to think more clearly about well-being or the concept of what is good for a person. Yet for a variety of reasons, bioethicists have generally paid little attention to this concept. Here, I argue, first, that focusing on general theories of welfare is not useful for practical medical ethics. I argue, second, for what I call the “theory-without-theories approach” to welfare in practical contexts. The first element of this approach is a (...) focus on examining important and relatively uncontroversial constituents of welfare as opposed to general theories. The second key element is a framework for thinking about choice in relation to welfare, a framework I refer to as “the mild objectivity framework.” I conclude with illustrations of the way in which the “theory without theories approach” can improve thinking in medicine. (shrink)

In her impressive book, looking at the philosophy and science of well-being, Anna Alexandrova argues for the strong claim that we possess no stable, unified concept of well-being. Instead, she thinks the word “well-being” only comes to have a specific meaning in particular contexts, and has a quite different meaning in different contexts. I take issue with (1) her claim that we do not possess a unified, all-things-considered concept of well-being as well as with (2) her failure to consider why (...) we might want a unified concept. I grant that Alexandrova is probably correct that the word “well-being” is used differently in different contexts. But this only shows that one word can come to be used to express different concepts. Moreover, noting that several concepts exist that are picked out by “well-being” doesn’t establish that we lack altogether a notion of all-things-considered well-being. I believe we have such a concept, even though it is not always the concept in play. Moreover, I think we need such a concept. The conceptual muddles Alexandrova highlights—muddles that result from a single word being used to express multiple ideas—remind us how important it is to be able to distinguish different concepts from one another, as well as how important it is to periodically remind ourselves of how various forms of specialist dialogue relate back to the broader, more general notion of “well-being.”. (shrink)

Existence internalism claims that facts about human psychological responsiveness constrain the metaphysics of value in particular ways. Chapter 5 examines whether some form of existence internalism holds for prudential value. It emphasizes the importance of a modal distinction that has been traditionally overlooked. Some facts about personal good are facts about realized good. For example, right now it may be true that X is good for me. Other facts about goodness are facts about what would be good for me in (...) certain possible futures. These are facts about merely possible good. Philosophers should be internalists about realized good. The chapter defends a qualified version of the idea that a necessary constraint on something’s being good for a person at a time is that the thing in question elicits some kind of positive psychological response from the person at that time. However, philosophers should be motivational externalists about merely possible good. Facts about the superior future goodness of an option may ground reasons now to choose it. But we should not expect individuals to always recognize such facts, and so there is no reason to think such facts are always motivating. (shrink)

Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision that dooms subjective theories to failure. (...) I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists. (shrink)

Most philosophers these days assume that more matters for well-being than simply mental states. However, there is an important distinction that is routinely overlooked. When it is said that more matters than mental states, this could mean either that certain mind-independent events count when it comes to assessing the prudential value of a life (the mind-independent events thesis or MIE), or it could mean that it is prudentially important for individuals to have the right kind of epistemic relation to life (...) events (the positive value of knowledge thesis or PVK). This chapter first aims to convince theorists of the importance of the distinction between MIE and PVK, or, more precisely, the importance of distinguishing questions about which non-mental objects (or events or facts) have intrinsic welfare value (if any do) and questions about which epistemic relations (knowledge, justified true belief, true belief) have intrinsic welfare value (if any do). This chapter also raises serious doubts about the way in which contemporary desire theories handle the extra-mental components of welfare, and offers some tentative answers to the question: what should a theorist of welfare say about these matters? (shrink)

Desire satisfaction theorists and attitudinal-happiness theorists of well-being are committed to correcting the psychological attitudes upon which their theories are built. However, it is not often recognized that some of the attitudes in need of correction are evaluative attitudes. Moreover, it is hard to know how to correct for poor evaluative attitudes in ways that respect the traditional commitment to the authority of the individual subject's evaluative perspective. L. W. Sumner has proposed an autonomy-as-authenticity requirement to perform this task, but (...) this article argues that it cannot do the job. Sumner's proposal focuses on the social origins of our values and overlooks the deep psychological roots of other evaluative attitudes that are just as problematic for welfare. If subjective theories of welfare are to be at all plausible they may need to abandon or modify their traditional commitment to the authority of the individual subject. (shrink)

This chapter explores radical personal change and its relationship to well-being, welfare, or prudential value. Many theorists of welfare are committed to what is here called the future-based reasons view (FBR), which holds (1) that the best prudential choice in a situation is determined by which possible future has the greatest net welfare value for the subject and (2) what determines facts about future welfare are facts about the subject and the world at that future time. Although some cases of (...) radical change are intuitively prudentially good, many cases of really radical change are not. Yet FBR has trouble explaining this. Many people instinctively reach for the notion of identity to solve this problem—arguing that really radical change cannot be good because it alters who someone is. Yet, as the chapter argues, there are reasons to doubt that appeals to identity are appropriate. The chapter ends with the suggestion that prudential facts may explain why and when retaining identity matters, rather than the other way around, and points to a possible way forward for a theorist of welfare committed to FBR. (shrink)

Most adult persons with anorexia satisfy the existing criteria widely used to assess decision-making capacity, meaning that incapacity typically cannot be used to justify coercive intervention. After rejecting two other approaches to justification, Professor Radden concludes that it is most likely not possible to justify coercive medical intervention for persons with anorexia in liberal terms, though she leaves it open whether some other framework might succeed. I shall assume here that the standard approach to assessing decisionmaking capacity is adequate.1 The (...) question then is whether we can justify—within a liberal framework—coercive intervention with the decision of a competent... (shrink)

I consider the current best interests of patients who were once thought to be either completely unaware (to be in PVS) or only minimally aware (MCS), but who, because of advanced fMRI studies, we now suspect have much more “going on” inside their minds, despite no ability to communicate with the world. My goal in this chapter is twofold: (1) to set out and defend a framework that I think should always guide thinking about the best interests of highly cognitively (...) compromised patients, and then (2) to defend a particular conclusion that applies to this specific patient population. The framework requires us to ask two questions: Is the individual suffering? Is the individual gaining any benefit from life? There must be benefit of some sort for life to be worth preserving, and the benefit must outweigh any suffering (if there is suffering present). I then argue it would be best overall to allow these patients to die. Either these patients are not really very aware at all, in which case they are most likely not suffering, but not benefiting from life either, or they are mentally intact enough to make benefit a theoretical possibility, but in fact they are not benefiting because they cannot communicate with anyone. Such patients would most likely suffer. As there is no way currently to address their suffering, we should allow them to die. No matter the truth about their cognitive lives, death would either be a neutral event, or a blessing. (shrink)

What is the relationship between negative experience, artistic production, and prudential value? If it were true that (for some people) artistic creativity must be purchased at the price of negative experience (to be clear: currently no one knows whether this is true), what should we conclude about the value of such experiences? Are they worth it for the sake of art? The first part of this essay considers general questions about how to establish the positive extrinsic value of something intrinsically (...) negative. The second part emphasizes the importance of various distinctions within the realm of the negative. We must distinguish between adversity (which is non-mental) and negative mental states, and between negative thoughts (or attitudes) and negative affect. Within the realm of negative affect, we must distinguish between negative emotions and moods, on the one hand, and negative affective perspectives on the other, and then between mildly negative affective perspectives and severely negative ones (for which I reserve the term ‘suffering’). These distinctions matter greatly, since different types of negative experience have very different degrees of prudential disvalue. Although many types of negative experience may be “worth it”—because their positive extrinsic value outweighs their negative value—this is rarely true of severe suffering. (shrink)

The dominant approach to assessing decision-making capacity in medicine focuses on determining the extent to which individuals possess certain core cognitive abilities. Critics have argued that this model delivers the wrong verdict in certain cases where patient values that are the product of mental disorder or disordered affective states undermine decision-making without undermining cognition. I argue for a re-conceptualization of what it is to possess the capacity to make medical treatment decisions. It is, I argue, the ability to track one’s (...) own personal interests at least as well as most people can. Using this idea, I demonstrate that it is possible to craft a solution for the problem cases—one that neither alters existing criteria in dangerous ways (e.g. does not open the door to various kinds of abuse) nor violates widely accepted ethical constraints on decision-making assessment. (shrink)

Frege believes that the content of declarative sentences divides into a thought and its ‘colouring’, perhaps combined with assertoric force. He further thinks it is important to separate the thought from its colouring. To do this, a criterion which determines sameness of sense between sentences must be deployed. But Frege provides three criteria for this task, each of which adjudicate on different grounds. In this article, rather than expand on criticisms levelled at two of the criteria offered, the author focuses (...) on the most promising candidate. As it stands, this criterion has problems, but not insuperable ones. He suggests an adjusted criterion that relies on the epistemic notion of triviality. He recommends this criterion as both harmonious with Frege’s broader thought and preferable to alternatives offered. The moral is that Frege individuates thoughts by deploying an epistemic concept, and this is the only suitable way for him to do so. (shrink)

What is the best way to account for the badness of pain and what sort of theory of welfare is best suited to accommodate this view? I argue that unpleasant sensory experiences are prudentially bad in the absence of contrary attitudes, but good when the object of positive attitudes. Pain is bad unless it is liked, enjoyed, valued etc. Interestingly, this view is incompatible with either pure objectivist or pure subjectivist understandings of welfare. However, there is a kind of welfare (...) theory that can incorporate this view of the badness of pain and which is very, very close to being a form of subjectivism. Moreover, this hybrid account of welfare is entirely compatible with the deep motivations of subjectivism. I therefore argue that those who lean towards welfare subjectivism should adopt this account of pain, and that we should revise our understanding of subjectivism to count such theories as subjective. (shrink)

Frege claims that sentences of the form ‘A’ are equivalent to sentences of the form ‘it is true that A’ (The Equivalence Thesis). Frege also says that there are fictional names that fail to refer, and that sentences featuring fictional names fail to refer as a result. The thoughts such sentences express, Frege says, are also fictional, and neither true nor false. Michael Dummett argues that these claims are inconsistent. But his argument requires clarification, since there are two ways The (...) Equivalence Thesis has been formulated, according as the thesis equates the senses or the referents of the relevant sentences. -/- I have two aims in this paper. The first is to demonstrate that a sameness of sense thesis is inconsistent with Frege’s other theses. The second is to argue that a sameness of reference thesis is consistent with them. Thus, all else being equal, Frege ought to endorse a sameness of reference, rather than a sameness of sense thesis. (shrink)

Mackenzie Graham has made an important contribution to the literature on decisionmaking for patients with disorders of consciousness. He argues, and I agree, that decisions for unresponsive patients who are known to retain some degree of covert awareness ought to focus on current interests, since such patients likely retain the kinds of mental capacities that in ordinary life command our current respect and attention. If he is right, then it is not appropriate to make decisions for such patients by appealing (...) to the values they had in the past, either the values expressed in an advance directive or the values recalled by a surrogate. There are two things I wish to add to the discussion. My first point is somewhat critical, for although I agree with his general conclusion about how, ideally, such decisions should be approached, I remain skeptical about whether his conclusion offers decisionmakers real practical help. The problem with these cases is that the evidence we have about the nature of the patient’s current interests is minimal or nonexistent. However—and this is important—Graham’s conclusion will be extremely relevant if in the future, our ability to communicate with such patients improves, as I hope it will. This leads to my second point. Graham’s conclusion illustrates a more general problem with our standard framework for decisionmaking for previously competent patients, a problem that has not been adequately recognized. So, in what follows, I explain the problem I see and offer some brief thoughts about solutions. (shrink)

Abstract: In this article we introduce an input-oriented democratic innovation – that we term ‘TaxTrack’ – which offers individual taxpayers the means to engage with their political economies in three ways. After joining the TaxTrack program, an individual can: (1) see and understand how much, and what types, of taxes they have contributed, (2) see and understand how their tax contributions are, or have been, used, and (3) control what their tax contributions can, or cannot, be spent on. We explain (...) this democratic innovation in two ways. The first is through evocation to prefigure what the innovation could look like in future practise which raises the prospects for both good and problematic outcomes. The second is through formal theory to produce a detailed model of the innovation to assist theory building. We conclude by discussing three interactive outcomes of ‘TaxTrack’ through the democratic innovations literature to establish the beginnings of a theory for the model. This theory tells us that ‘TaxTrack’ can return benefits to its users and the democratic regimes in which they are located but it may also place restrictions on output-oriented innovations like Participatory Budgeting. (shrink)

मैं बहुत अजीब किताबें और विशेष लोगों के लिए इस्तेमाल कर रहा हूँ, लेकिन Hawkins बाहर बयान के किसी भी प्रकार के "सत्य" के लिए एक कुंजी के रूप में मांसपेशियों के तनाव के परीक्षण के लिए एक सरल तकनीक के अपने उपयोग के कारण बाहर खड़ा है, यानी, न सिर्फ करने के लिए कि क्या व्यक्ति का परीक्षण किया जा रहा है का मानना है यह है, लेकिन क्या यह वास्तव में सच है! क्या अच्छी तरह से जाना (...) जाता है कि लोगों को स्वत:, बेहोश शारीरिक और मनोवैज्ञानिक प्रतिक्रियाओं के बारे में बस कुछ भी वे छवियों, लगता है, स्पर्श, odors, विचारों, लोगों को उजागर कर रहे हैं दिखाएगा. तो, मांसपेशियों को पढ़ने के लिए उनकी सच्ची भावनाओं को खोजने के लिए बिल्कुल कट्टरपंथी नहीं है, यह एक dousing छड़ी के रूप में उपयोग करने के विपरीत (अधिक मांसपेशी पढ़ने) करने के लिए "सामान्य विज्ञान". Hawkins संज्ञानात्मक लोड में वृद्धि के जवाब में एक हाथ की मांसपेशियों में कम तनाव के उपयोग का वर्णन इस प्रकार किसी की उंगलियों के निरंतर दबाव के जवाब में हाथ ड्रॉप करने के लिए कारण. वह अनजान लगता है कि सामाजिक मनोविज्ञान में एक लंबे समय से स्थापित और विशाल चल रहे अनुसंधान प्रयास 'आदर्श अनुभूति', 'स्वचालितता' आदि के रूप में इस तरह के वाक्यांशों द्वारा संदर्भित है, और है कि 'kinesiology' के अपने प्रयोग एक छोटे से खंड है. मांसपेशी टोन के अलावा (समय-समय पर इस्तेमाल किया) सामाजिक मनोवैज्ञानिक ईईजी, गैल्वेनिक त्वचा प्रतिक्रिया और शब्दों, वाक्यों, छवियों या स्थितियों के लिए सबसे अक्सर मौखिक प्रतिक्रियाओं को मापने के लिए कई सेकंड से महीनों के बाद सेकंड के लिए अलग. ऐसे Bargh और Wegner के रूप में कई, परिणाम लेने के लिए मतलब है कि हम automatons जो जानने के लिए और S1 के माध्यम से जागरूकता के बिना काफी हद तक कार्य कर रहे हैं (स्वत: प्रणाली 1) और ऐसे Kihlstrom और Shanks के रूप में कई अन्य लोगों का कहना है कि इन अध्ययनों त्रुटिपूर्ण हैं और हम S2 के जीव हैं (deliberative प्रणाली 2). हालांकि Hawkins के लिए पता नहीं है लगता है, के रूप में उच्च आदेश सोचा के वर्णनात्मक मनोविज्ञान के अन्य क्षेत्रों में, "स्वचालितता" के बारे में स्थिति अभी भी अराजक के रूप में यह था जब Wittgenstein बाँझपन और मनोविज्ञान की बंजरता के लिए कारणों का वर्णन किया गया है में 30 है. फिर भी, इस किताब को एक आसान पढ़ा है और कुछ चिकित्सक और आध्यात्मिक शिक्षकों के उपयोग के मिल सकता है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

I am very used to strange books and special people but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, (...) ideas, people. So muscle reading to find out their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) to do “paranormal science”. Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in response to increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in response to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware that there is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle tone (infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 and many others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2. Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was when Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. Nevertheless, this book is an easy read and some therapists and spiritual teachers may find it of use. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

나는 이상한 책과 특별한 사람들에, 매우 익숙하지만, 호킨스는 어떤 종류의 진술의 "진실"의 열쇠로 근육 긴장을 테스트하기위한 간단한 기술의 그의 사용으로 인해 눈에 띄는 - 즉, 테스트되는 사람이 그것을 믿는지 여부, 하지만 정말 사실 여부! 잘 알려진 것은 사람들이 이미지, 소리, 터치, 냄새, 아이디어, 사람 등 노출되는 모든 것에 대해 자동적이고 무의식적인 생리학적, 심리적 반응을 보일 것이라는 것입니다. 그래서,, 그들의 진정한 감정을 알아 내기 위해 근육 독서는 전혀 급진적이지 않다, 막대기로 물을 찾는 중 스틱으로 사용하는 달리 (더 많은 근육 독서) "초자연적 (...) 인 과학"을 할 수 있습니다. 호킨스는 인지 부하의 증가에 대한 응답으로 팔의 근육에 있는 긴장 감소의 사용을 이렇게 누군가의 핑거의 일정한 압력에 응하여 팔이 떨어지는 원인이 되는 것을 기술합니다. 그는 '암시적 인식', '자동성' 등의 문구로 언급된 사회 심리학분야에서 오랫동안 확립되고 방대한 연구 노력이 있고, '운동학'을 사용하는 것이 하나의 작은 부분이라는 것을 알지 못하는 것 같다. 근육 톤 (자주 사용) 사회 심리학자 측정 EEG, 갈바닉 피부 응답 및 단어에 가장 자주 구두 응답, 문장, 이미지 또는 시간에 상황에 따라 시간에 변화 초에서 개월 자극 후 개월. Bargh와 Wegner와 같은 많은 사람들은 S1 (자동화 된 시스템 1)을 통해 인식없이 크게 배우고 행동하는 오토마톤이며 Kihlstrom 및 Shanks와 같은 많은 다른 사람들이 이러한 연구가 결함이 있으며 우리는 S2 (심의 시스템 2)의 생물이라고 말합니다. 호킨스는 더 높은 계급의 생각의 설명 심리학의 다른 영역에서와 같이, 아무 생각이 없는 것 같지만, "자동성"에 관한 상황은 Wittgenstein이 30 년대에 심리학의 불임과 불모의 이유를 설명 할 때와 마찬가지로 여전히 혼란스럽습니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 이 책은 쉽게 읽을 수 있으며 일부 치료사와 영적 교사는 그것을 사용할 수 있습니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

Je suis très habitué à des livres étranges et des gens spéciaux, mais Hawkins se distingue par son utilisation d’une technique simple pour tester la tension musculaire comme une clé de la «vérité» de tout type de déclaration que ce soit, c’est-à-dire pas seulement à savoir si la personne testée croit, mais si c’est vraiment vrai! Ce que l’on sait bien, c’est que les gens montreront des réponses physiologiques et psychologiques automatiques, inconscientes à peu près tout ce à quoi (...) ils sont exposés : images, sons, toucher, odeurs, idées, personnes. Donc, la lecture musculaire pour découvrir leurs vrais sentiments n’est pas radicale du tout, contrairement à l’utiliser comme un bâton dousing (plus de lecture musculaire) pour faire "science paranormale". Hawkins décrit l’utilisation de la tension décroissante dans les muscles d’un bras en réponse à l’augmentation de la charge cognitive provoquant ainsi le bras à baisser en réponse à la pression constante des doigts de quelqu’un. Il semble ignorer qu’il existe un vaste effort de recherche en psychologie sociale, longtemps établi et vaste, appelé par des expressions telles que la « cognition implicite », l'« automaticité », etc., et que son utilisation de la « kinésiologie » est une petite section. En plus du tonus musculaire (rarement utilisé), les psychologues sociaux mesurent l’EEG, la réponse cutanée galvanique et le plus souvent les réponses verbales aux mots, aux phrases, aux images ou à des situations qui varient parfois de quelques secondes à des mois après le stimulus. Beaucoup, tels que Bargh et Wegner, prennent les résultats pour signifier que nous sommes des automates qui apprennent et agissent en grande partie sans sensibilisation via S1 (système automatisé 1) et beaucoup d’autres tels que Kihlstrom et Shanks disent que ces études sont imparfaites et nous sommes des créatures de S2 (système délibératif 2). Bien que Hawkins ne semble pas avoir d’idée, comme dans d’autres domaines de la psychologie descriptive de la pensée de l’ordre supérieur, la situation concernant «l’automaticité» est toujours aussi chaotique qu’elle l’était quand Wittgenstein décrit les raisons de la stérilité et la stérilité de la psychologie dans les années 30. Néanmoins, ce livre est une lecture facile et certains thérapeutes et les enseignants spirituels peuvent le trouver utile. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux systeme peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Eu estou muito acostumado com livros estranhos e pessoas especiais, mas Hawkins se destaca devido ao seu uso de uma técnica simples para testar a tensão muscular como uma chave para a "verdade" de qualquer tipo de declaração qualquer-i. e., não apenas para se a pessoa que está sendo testada acredita , mas se é realmente verdade! O que é sabido é que os povos mostrarão respostas fisiológicas e psicológicas automáticas, inconscientes a apenas sobre qualquer coisa que são expor (...) a — imagens, sons, toque, odores, idéias, povos. Assim, a leitura muscular para descobrir seus verdadeiros sentimentos não é radical em tudo, ao contrário de usá-lo como uma vara radiestesia (mais leitura muscular) para fazer "ciência paranormal". Hawkins descreve o uso de diminuir a tensão nos músculos de um braço em resposta a aumentos na carga cognitiva, causando assim o braço a cair em resposta à pressão constante dos dedos de alguém. Ele parece não saber que há um longo e vasto esforço de pesquisa em curso em psicologia social referido por frases como ' cognição implícita ', ' automaticidade ' etc., e que seu uso de ' cinesiologia ' é uma pequena seção. Além do tônus muscular (pouco utilizado), os psicólogos sociais medem o EEG, a resposta da pele Galvanica e, mais freqüentemente, as respostas verbais a palavras, frases, imagens ou situações, às vezes, variando de segundos a meses após o estímulo. Muitos, como Bargh e Wegner, levam os resultados para significar que somos autômatos que aprendem e agem em grande parte sem a consciência via S1 (sistema automatizado 1) e muitos outros, como Kihlstrom e Shanks dizem que estes estudos são faladas e somos criaturas de S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Embora Hawkins parece não ter idéia, como em outras áreas da psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior, a situação sobre "automaticidade" ainda é tão caótica como era quando Wittgenstein descreveu as razões para a esterilidade e esterilidade de psicologia nos anos 30. No entanto, este livro é uma leitura fácil e alguns terapeutas e professores espirituais podem encontrá-lo de uso. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3ª Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. (shrink)

Sono molto abituato a libri strani e persone speciali, ma Hawkins si distingue per il suo uso di una semplice tecnica per testare la tensione muscolare come chiave per la "verità" di qualsiasi tipo di affermazione di sorta, cioè, non solo per se la persona che viene testata ci crede, ma se è davvero vero! Ciò che è ben noto è che le persone mostreranno risposte fisiologiche e psicologiche automatiche, inconscie, a qualsiasi cosa siano esposte: immagini, suoni, tatto, odori, (...) idee, persone. Quindi, la lettura muscolare per scoprire i loro veri sentimenti non è affatto radicale, a differenza di usarlo come un bastone dousing (più lettura muscolare) per fare "scienza paranormale". Hawkins descrive l'uso di diminuire la tensione nei muscoli di un braccio in risposta ad aumenti del carico cognitivo causando così il braccio a cadere in risposta alla pressione costante delle dita di qualcuno. Sembra inconsapevole che c'è un vasto e vasto sforzo di ricerca in psicologia sociale a cui si fa riferimento come "cognizione implicita", "automaticità" ecc., e che il suo uso della "cinesiologia" è una piccola sezione. Oltre al tono muscolare (usato raramente) gli psicologi sociali misurano l'EEG, la risposta galvanica della pelle e più frequentemente le risposte verbali a parole, frasi, immagini o situazioni che variano da secondi a mesi dopo lo stimolo. Molti, come Bargh e Wegner, prendono i risultati per significare che siamo automi che imparano e agiscono in gran parte senza consapevolezza tramite S1 (sistema automatizzato 1) e molti altri come Kihlstrom e Shanks dicono che questi studi sono imperfetti e siamo creature di S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Anche se Hawkins sembra non avere idea, come in altre aree della psicologia descrittiva del pensiero di ordine superiore, la situazione per quanto riguarda l'"automaticità" è ancora caotica come lo era quando Wittgenstein descrisse le ragioni della sterilità e della sterilità della psicologia negli anni '30. Tuttavia, questo libro è di facile lettura e alcuni terapisti e insegnanti spirituali possono trovarlo utile. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Ich bin sehr an fremde Bücher und besondere Menschengewöhnt, aber Hawkins zeichnet sich durch seine Verwendung einer einfachen Technik zum Testen von Muskelspannung als Schlüssel zur "Wahrheit" jeglicher Art von Aussage überhaupt aus – d.h. nicht nur, ob die getestete Person es glaubt, sondern ob es wirklich wahr ist! Was allgemein bekannt ist, ist, dass Menschen automatische, unbewusste physiologische und psychologische Reaktionen auf fast alles zeigen, was ihnen ausgesetzt ist – Bilder, Geräusche, Berührungen, Gerüche, Ideen, Menschen. Also,, Muskellesen, um (...) herauszufinden, ihre wahren Gefühle ist überhaupt nicht radikal, im Gegensatz zur Verwendung es als Dousing Stick (mehr Muskellesen) zu tun "paranormale Wissenschaft". Hawkins beschreibt die Verwendung abnehmender Spannung in den Muskeln eines Arms als Reaktion auf die Erhöhung der kognitiven Belastung, wodurch der Arm als Reaktion auf den konstanten Druck der Finger eines Menschen abnimmt. Er scheint sich nicht bewusst zu sein, dass es in der Sozialpsychologie seit langem etablierte und umfangreiche Forschungsanstrengungen gibt, die mit solchen Phrasen wie "implizite Kognition", "Automatik" usw. bezeichnet werden, und dass seine Verwendung der "Kinesiologie" ein winziger Abschnitt ist. Neben dem Muskeltonus (selten verwendet) messen Sozialpsychologen EEG, galvanische Hautreaktionen und am häufigsten verbale Reaktionen auf Wörter, Sätze, Bilder oder Situationen manchmal von Sekunden bis Monate nach dem Stimulus. Viele, wie Bargh und Wegner, nehmen die Ergebnisse zu bedeuten, dass wir Automaten sind, die weitgehend ohne Bewusstsein über S1 (automatisiertes System 1) lernen und handeln, und viele andere wie Kihlstrom und Shanks sagen, dass diese Studien fehlerhaft sind und wir Kreaturen von S2 sind (deliberatives System 2). Obwohl Hawkins keine Ahnung zu haben scheint, wie in anderen Bereichen der beschreibenden Psychologie des Denkens höherer Ordnung, ist die Situation in Bezug auf "Automatik" immer noch so chaotisch wie damals, als Wittgenstein die Gründe für die Sterilität und Unfruchtbarkeit der Psychologie in den 30er Jahren beschrieb. Dennoch ist dieses Buch eine einfache Lektüre und einige Therapeuten und spirituelle Lehrer können es von Nutzen finden. Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Die jenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

I am very used to strange books and special people, but Hawkins stands out due to his use of a simple technique for testing muscle tension as a key to the “truth” of any kind of statement whatsoever—i.e., not just to whether the person being tested believes it, but whether it is really true! What is well known is that people will show automatic, unconscious physiological and psychological responses to just about anything they are exposed to—images, sounds, touch, odors, (...) ideas, people. So, muscle reading to find out their true feelings is not radical at all, unlike using it as a dousing stick (more muscle reading) to do “paranormal science”. -/- Hawkins describes the use of decreasing tension in the muscles of an arm in response to increases in cognitive load thus causing the arm to drop in response to the constant pressure of someone’s fingers. He seems unaware that there is a long established and vast ongoing research effort in social psychology referred to by such phrases as ‘implicit cognition’, ‘automaticity’ etc., and that his use of ‘kinesiology’ is one tiny section. In addition to muscle tone (infrequently used) social psychologists measure EEG, galvanic skin response and most frequently verbal responses to words, sentences, images or situations at times varying from seconds to months after the stimulus. Many, such as Bargh and Wegner, take the results to mean we are automatons who learn and act largely without awareness via S1 (automated System 1) and many others such as Kihlstrom and Shanks say these studies are flawed and we are creatures of S2 (deliberative System 2). Though Hawkins seems to have no idea, as in other areas of the descriptive psychology of higher order thought, the situation regarding “automaticity” is still as chaotic as it was when Wittgenstein described the reasons for the sterility and barrenness of psychology in the 30’s. Nevertheless, this book is an easy read and some therapists and spiritual teachers may find it of use. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Estoy muy acostumbrado a libros extraños y gente especial, pero Hawkins se destaca debido a su uso de una técnica simple para probar la tensión muscular como una clave para la "verdad" de cualquier tipo de afirmación-es., no sólo para si la persona que está siendo probada lo cree, sino si es realmente cierto! Lo que es bien sabido es que las personas mostrarán respuestas fisiológicas y psicológicas automáticas e inconscientes a cualquier cosa a la que estén expuestos: imágenes, (...) sonidos, toques, olores, ideas, personas. así que, lectura muscular para descubrir sus verdaderos sentimientos no es radical en absoluto, a diferencia de usarlo como un palo doble (más lectura muscular) para hacer "ciencia Paranormal". Hawkins describe el uso de la tensión decreciente en los músculos de un brazo en respuesta a aumentos en la carga cognitiva causando así que el brazo caiga en respuesta a la presión constante de los dedos de alguien. No parece consciente de que existe un largo y vasto esfuerzo de investigación en psicología social que se hace referencia por frases como ' cognición implícita ', ' automaticidad ', etc., y que su uso de la ' Kinesiología ' es una sección diminuta. Además del tono muscular (utilizado con poca frecuencia) los psicólogos sociales miden el EEG, la respuesta galvánica de la piel y las respuestas verbales más frecuentes a las palabras, oraciones, imágenes o situaciones en momentos que varían de segundos a meses después del estímulo. Muchos, como Bargh y Wegner, toman los resultados para significar que somos autómatas que aprenden y actúan en gran medida sin conciencia a través de S1 (sistema automatizado 1) y muchos otros como Kihlstrom y Shanks dicen que estos estudios son defectuosos y somos criaturas de S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Aunque Hawkins parece no tener idea, como en otras áreas de la psicología descriptiva del pensamiento de mayor orden, la situación con respecto a "automaticidad" sigue siendo tan caótica como lo fue cuando Wittgenstein describió las razones de la esterilidad y la barrendez de la psicología en los años 30. Sin embargo, este libro es una lectura fácil y algunos terapeutas y maestros espirituales pueden encontrarlo de uso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna Dos Sistemas Punto de Vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2Nd Ed (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2017' 3a Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

我已经习惯了奇怪的书和特殊的人,但霍金斯脱颖而出,因为他使用一个简单的技术来测试肌肉张力作为关键,任何种类的陈述的"真相"-即,不只是被测试的人是否相信它,但它是否真的是真的!众所 周知,人们会表现出自动的、无意识的生理和心理反应,就像他们接触到的任何东西——图像、声音、触觉、气味、想法、人。所以,肌肉阅读,找出他们的真实感受是一点也不激进,不像用它作为一个沉思的棍子(更多的肌肉 阅读)做"超自然科学"。 霍金斯描述了在认知负荷增加时使用降低手臂肌肉的张力,从而导致手臂在手指持续压力下下降。他似乎没有意识到,在社会心理学方面,有一个长期而庞大的持续研究,被诸如"隐性认知"、" ;自动性"等短语所指,而他使用"运动学"只是一小部分。除了肌肉张力(不常使用)外,社会心理学家还测量脑电图、电光皮肤反应,以及最常见的言语反应、句子、图像或情况,有时从刺 激后几秒钟到几个月不等。许多,如巴格和韦格纳,认为结果意味着我们是自动机,学习和行动在很大程度上没有意识通过S1(自动化系统1)和许多其他,如基尔斯特罗姆和尚克斯说,这些研究是有缺陷的,我们是S2的生 物(审议系统2)。虽然霍金斯似乎并不知道,就像在高阶思维的描述性心理学的其他领域一样,"自动性"的情况仍然像维特根斯坦描述心理学无菌和贫瘠的原因时一样混乱。在30年代。然而,这本书 是一个容易阅读,一些治疗师和精神教师可能会发现它使用。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

私は奇妙な本や特別な人々に非常に慣れているが、ホーキンスは、あらゆる種類の声明の「真実」の鍵として筋肉の緊張をテストするための簡単な技術を使用して際立っています。よく知られているのは、画像、音、タッチ 、匂い、アイデア、人など、自分がさらしているものに対して、無意識の生理学的反応や心理的反応を示すことです。だから、彼らの本当の感情を見つけるための筋肉の読書は、それを「超常現象科学」を行うための使用棒 (より多くの筋肉の読書)として使用するのとは異なり、まったく過激ではありません。 ホーキンスは、認知負荷の増加に応じて腕の筋肉の緊張を低下させ、誰かの指の一定の圧力に応じて腕が低下する原因となると説明しています。「暗黙の認知」、「自動性」などのフレーズで言及されている社会心理学には 、長い間確立された広大な研究努力があり、「キネシオロジー」の使用が1つの小さなセクションであることを知らないようです。筋肉の緊張(あまり使用されない)社会心理学者に加えて、EEG、ガルバニック皮膚応答 、および刺激の数秒から数ヶ月後に時々変化する単語、文章、画像または状況に対する最も頻繁な言葉による反応を測定する。BarghやWegnerなどの多くは、S1(自動システム1)を介して意識を持たずに学び 、行動するオートマトンであることを意味する結果を取り、キールストロームやシャンクスのような他の多くの人は、これらの研究に欠陥があり、私たちはS2(審議システム2)の生き物であると言います。ホーキンスは 、高次思考の記述心理学の他の分野と同様に、見当がつかないようですが、ウィトゲンシュタインが30年代の心理学の無菌性と不毛さの理由を述べた時と同じくらい、「オートマチック」に関する状況はまだ混沌としてい ます。それにもかかわらず、この本は読みやすいもので、セラピストや精神的な教師の中には、それを使っている人もいるかもしれません。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Я очень привык к странным книгам и специальныхлюдей, но Хокинс выделяется из-за его использования простой техники для тестирования мышечного напряжения в качестве ключа к "истине" любого заявления бы то ни было, т.е., не только ли человек проходит тестирование верит, но действительно ли это так! Что хорошо известно, что люди будут показывать автоматические, бессознательные физиологические и психологические реакции на все, что они подвергаются-изображения, звуки, прикосновения, запахи, идеи, люди. Таким образом,, мышечное чтение, чтобы узнать их истинные чувства не является радикальным на всех, (...) в отличие от использования его в качестве обливания палкой (больше мышечного чтения), чтобы сделать "паранормальные науки". Хокинс описывает использование снижения напряжения в мышцах руки в ответ на увеличение когнитивной нагрузки, в результате чего рука падает в ответ на постоянное давление пальцев человека. Он, кажется, не знают, что есть давно установленных и обширных текущих исследований в социальной психологии называют такие фразы, как "неявное познание", "автоматизм" и т.д., и что его использование "кинезиологии" является одним крошечным разделом. В дополнение к мышечному тонусу (нечасто используемым) социальные психологи измеряют ЭЭГ, гальваническую реакцию кожи и наиболее часто вербальные ответы на слова, предложения, изображения или ситуации, иногда меняющиеся от секунд до нескольких месяцев после стимула. Многие, такие как Барг и Вегнер, принимают результаты означает, что мы автоматы, которые учатся и действуют в значительной степени без осведомленности через S1 (автоматизированная система 1) и многие другие, такие как Kihlstrom и Шанкс говорят, что эти исследования являются ошибочными, и мы существа S2 (совещательная система 2). Хотя Хокинс, кажется, понятия не имеет, как и в других областях описательной психологии высшего порядка мысли, ситуация в отношении "автоматики" по-прежнему, как хаотично, как это было, когда Витгенштейн описал причины бесплодия и бесплодия психологии в 30-х годов. Тем не менее, эта книга легко читать, и некоторые терапевты и духовные учителя могут найти его в использовании. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Saya sangat terbiasa dengan buku aneh dan khusus orang, tapi Hawkins berdiri keluar karena penggunaan teknik sederhana untuk menguji ketegangan otot sebagai kunci untuk "kebenaran" dari segala jenis pernyataan apa pun-i. e., bukan hanya untuk Apakah orang yang diuji percaya, tapi apakah itu benar-benar benar! Apa yang terkenal adalah bahwa orang akan menunjukkan otomatis, gangguan fisiologis dan psikologis pingsan untuk apa saja mereka terpapar-gambar, suara, sentuhan, bau, ide, orang. Jadi, membaca otot untuk mengetahui perasaan mereka yang sebenarnya tidak radikal (...) sama sekali, tidak seperti menggunakannya sebagai tongkat menyiram (lebih otot membaca) untuk melakukan "ilmu paranormal". Hawkins menjelaskan penggunaan penurunan ketegangan pada otot lengan dalam menanggapi peningkatan beban kognitif sehingga menyebabkan lengan turun dalam menanggapi tekanan konstan jari seseorang. Dia tampaknya tidak menyadari bahwa ada yang lama didirikan dan luas upaya penelitian yang berkelanjutan dalam psikologi sosial disebut dengan frase seperti ' implisit kognisi ', ' automatisitas ' dll, dan bahwa penggunaan ' Kinesiology ' adalah salah satu bagian kecil. Selain nada otot (jarang digunakan) psikolog sosial mengukur EEG, respon kulit galvanik dan respon yang paling sering verbal kata, kalimat, gambar atau situasi pada waktu yang bervariasi dari detik ke bulan setelah stimulus. Banyak, seperti bargh dan Wegner, mengambil hasilnya berarti kita automaton yang belajar dan bertindak sebagian besar tanpa kesadaran melalui S1 (sistem otomatis 1) dan banyak orang lain seperti kihlstrom dan Shanks mengatakan studi ini cacat dan kami adalah makhluk S2 (sistem musyawatif 2). Meskipun Hawkins tampaknya tidak tahu, seperti di bidang lain dari psikologi deskriptif pemikiran yang lebih tinggi, situasi mengenai "automatisitas" masih sebagai kacau seperti itu ketika Wittgenstein menggambarkan alasan untuk sterilitas dan kemandulan psikologi di 30 ' s. Namun demikian, buku ini adalah mudah dibaca dan beberapa terapis dan guru spiritual mungkin menemukan penggunaan. Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019). (shrink)

The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if (...) there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal with the idea that the motivation for the premise may be the thesis that an action is intentional if and only if it is done under the guise of perceived reasons. This offers us a way of defending the premise: by showing that actions prompted by affective desires are not intentional. I, however, argue that this strategy is unworkable. This brings me to the second strategy. Here I consider the idea that the premise does not require a conscious normative thought on the part of the agent; in fact, it may not require any such thought, conscious or unconscious. I claim that this strategy too is a failure. Finally, the third approach builds normative judgment in the desire. This is the approach that I think works; in particular, recent work by Jennifer Hawkins may help us accommodate affective desires. The challenge of affective desires, I conclude, can be tackled. (shrink)

To emphasize what we have outlined in a preceding paper, we consider the following: that human consciousness model should take into consideration “spirit” role, i.e. the mind-body-spirit as integral aspect, which view is neglected in the so-called Freudian mental model. In this paper, we consider two approaches to cancer treatment derived from such an integral triune view of human consciousness, including (a) healing frequency approach as advised by Royal Rife and David Hawkins, and also (b) relational therapy, based on (...) recent research on the healing role of love and compassion. (shrink)

The use of different response modes has been found to influence how subjects evaluate pairs of alternatives described by two attributes. It has been suggested that judgments and choices evoke different kinds of cognitive processes, leading to an overweighing of the prominent attribute in choice (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993). Four experiments were conducted to compare alternative cognitive explanations of this so-called prominence effect in judgment and choice. The explanations investigated were the structure compatibility hypothesis (...) and the restructuring hypothesis. According to the structure compatibility hypothesis, it was assumed that the prominence effect is due to a lack of compatibility between the required output from subjects and the structure of information in input. The restructuring hypothesis stated that the decision maker uses mental restructuring operations on a representation of decision options to make the options more clearly differentiated. In Experiment 1, a matching procedure was used to provide pairs of equally attractive options (medical treatments) for the following experiments. In Experiments 2, 3, and 4, preferences were elicited with two different response modes, choice and preference rating. Value ranges on the prominent and nonprominent attributes were manipulated to test the structure compatibility hypothesis. Accountability was also subject to manipulation as it was assumed to stimulate restructuring. Since the prominence effect was not restricted to choices, and effects of value ranges were obtained but not of accountability, the results were interpreted in line with the structure compatibility hypothesis. (shrink)

This paper is a response to William Lane Craig's criticisms of my previous paper "Uncaused Beginnings". I argue that Craig's criticisms do not inflict any damage on the arguments of that earlier paper.

Reflecting on group theory within clinical supervision offers useful vantage points from which to engage nursing and the helping professions in the task of supervisory practice. This paper presents reflective experiences of group clinical supervision training and practice through a critique of Hawkins and Shohet’s process centred model. The underlying premise of transference hypothesis is that experiences and memories from the past inform present behaviours. Little has been written about the hypothesis in relation to clinical supervision in nursing and (...) the helping professions. However, the hypothesis was criticised by John M. Shlien in the 1980s and remains pertinent today due to expansion into social and healthcare practice. Reflective autobiographical diary entries focus on the model’s two latter stages which propose the use of Sigmund Freud’s transference hypothesis. The work of Freud, Foulkes, Heidegger and Hawkins and Shohet are synthesised and conclude with a phenomenological suggestion that immediacy and openness are necessary ontological conditions for group clinical supervision. Valuing empathic attunement to better understand group clinical supervision may be more important than theoretical distractions for non-therapeutic clinical supervision practice. (shrink)

Time travel is a recognized concept in philosophy and science, but whose scope is highly disputed, giving rise to numerous paradoxes in both philosophy and science. Time travel is considered by some accepted both in general relativity and quantum mechanics, but there is a unanimous consensus that it is not feasible with current technology. (Hawkins 2010) The raised issues are different for the time travel in the past compared to the time travel in the future.

A review of Sorgner's "On Trans-humanism." What to do with transhumanism? And – before we figure out how to categorize it, think about it and make actionable policy decisions with it – how should we define transhumanism? Stefan Lorenz Sorgner asks these questions in "On Trans-humanism" when he examines the idea’s provenance and the pedigree of related ideas. This approach turns out to be, on balance, a productive and useful way into a field that does not yet examine its own (...) roots and relationships often enough. I go on to critique some aspects of his approach, pointing out his lack of attention to posthuman and ecosystemic sensibilities, etc. Evans, Woody. Review of On Transhumanism, by Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, trans. Spencer Hawkins (2020). Prometheus: Critical Studies in Innovation, vol. 38, no. 2, June 2022, pp. 271-274. ScienceOpen. [This line at the bottom of page 272 was misprinted: "Imagine, instead, that we designate the after-transhuman posthuman as something like ‘post-transhuman’ or ‘posthuman’." It should read: "...as something like ‘post-transhuman’ or ‘posthuman-T’" with a superscript "T" after the second posthuman.]. (shrink)