Results for 'L. Sebastian Purcell'

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Lynn Sebastian Purcell
State University of New York College at Cortland
  1. After Hermeneutics?L. Sebastian Purcell - 2010 - Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale 14 (2):160-179.
    Recently Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux have attacked the core of the phenomenological hermeneutic tradition: its commitment to the finitude of human understanding. If accurate, this critique threatens to render the whole tradition a topic of merely historical interest. Given the depth of the criticism, this essay aims to establish a provisional defense of hermeneutics. After briefly reviewing each critique, it is argued that Badiou and Meillassoux themselves face rather intractable difficulties. These difficulties, then, open the space for a hermeneutic (...)
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  2. Phenomenology of a Photograph, or: How to use an Eidetic Phenomenology.L. Sebastian Purcell - 2010 - PhaenEx 5 (1):12-40.
    The present article aims to make good on Roland Barthe’s unfulfilled promise to provide an eidetic phenomenology for the photograph. Though the matter deserves consideration simply because no relevant account has yet been provided, the consequences of adumbrating eight eidetic features, we hope to show, bear directly on the phenomenology of time, the possibility of technological events, and the status of truth as what Heidegger called alētheia . Finally, and most importantly for the enterprise of phenomenological reflection, if we are (...)
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  3. Eudaimonia and Neltiliztli: Aristotle and the Aztecs on the Good Life.Lynn Sebastian Purcell - 2017 - APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 16 (2):10-21.
    This essay takes a first step in comparative ethics by looking to Aristotle and the Aztec's conceptions of the good life. It argues that the Aztec conception of a rooted life, neltiliztli, functions for ethical purposes in a way that is like Aristotle's eudaimonia. To develop this claim, it not only shows just in what their conceptions of the good consist, but also in what way the Aztecs conceived of the virtues (in qualli, in yectli).
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  4. On What There 'Is': Aristotle and the Aztecs on Being and Existence.Lynn Sebastian Purcell - 2018 - APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 18 (1):11-23.
    A curious feature of Aztec philosophy is that the basic metaphysical question of the “Western” tradition cannot be formulated in their language, in Nahuatl. This did not, however, prevent the Aztecs from developing an account of 'reality', or whatever it is that might exist. The article is the first of its kind to compare the work of Aristotle on ousia (being) and the Aztecs on teotl and ometeotl. Through this analysis, it suggests that both of the Nahuatl terms are fundamental (...)
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  5. Per una ripresa dell'essere aristotelico alla luce dell'espressione TO TI HN EINAI. Un'interpretazione alternativa a quella formalista.Pablo Sebastian Aparicio - 2012 - Dissertation, Pontificia Università Gregoriana
    Il lavoro consiste in un'analisi del concetto di essere in Aristotele considerandolo dal punto di vista dell'espressione "to ti en einai". L'essere in quanto tale non è tematizzato in quanto tale, ma visto come sinonimo di ente, e questo nel suo significato principale di "ousia". Siccome l'ousia aristotelica venne successivamente interpretata e tradotta in ambiente latino come "substantia" ed "essentia" l'espressione "to ti en einai" aiuta a comprendere la ragione di questi termini e a determinare realmente la portata concettuale di (...)
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  6. Analytische Moralphilosophie: Grundlagentexte.Philipp Schwind & Sebastian Muders (eds.) - 2021 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Suhrkamp.
    Die Moralphilosophie des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts hat mit Konsequentialismus, Deontologie, Kontraktualismus und Tugendethik nicht nur höchst einflussreiche Theorieparadigmen produktiv weiterentwickelt, sondern auch eine Reihe wichtiger neuer Probleme aufgeworfen. Der vorliegende Band versammelt zentrale Beiträge der analytischen Moralphilosophie, u. a. von David Gauthier, Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, Thomas Nagel, Michael Slote, Christine Swanton und Susan Wolf, die für ein Verständnis gegenwärtiger Diskussionen in der normativen Ethik unabdingbar sind. -/- Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort Einleitung: Analytische Moralphilosophie der Gegenwart -/- 1. Konsequentialismus Shelly Kagan: (...)
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  7. On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.
    It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...)
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  8. Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.
    The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first (...)
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  9. The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
    ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, (...)
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  10. Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can (...)
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  11. The Ethics of Attention: an argument and a framework.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In Sophie Alice Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge.
    This paper argues for the normative significance of attention. Attention plays an important role when describing an individual’s mind and agency, and in explaining many central facts about that individual. In addition, many in the public want answers and guidance with regard to normative questions about attention. Given that attention is both descriptively central and the public cares about normative guidance with regard to it, attention should be central also in normative philosophy. We need an ethics of attention: a field (...)
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  12.  68
    Mystical ineffability: a nonconceptual theory.Sebastian Gäb - 2024 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-16.
    This paper discusses the nonconceptual theory of mystical ineffability which claims that mystical experiences can’t be expressed linguistically because they can’t be conceptualized. I discuss and refute two objections against it: (a) that unconceptualized experiences are impossible, and (b) that the theory is ad hoc because it provides no reason for why mystical experiences should be unconceptualizable. I argue against (a) that distinguishing different meanings of ‘object of experience’ leaves open the possibility of non-empty but objectless nonconceptual experiences. I show (...)
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  13.  66
    Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.
    What should we believe when epistemic and practical reasons pull in opposite directions? The traditional view states that there is something that we ought epistemically to believe and something that we ought practically to (cause ourselves to) believe, period. More recent accounts challenge this view, either by arguing that there is something that we ought simpliciter to believe, all epistemic and practical reasons considered (the weighing view), or by denying the normativity of epistemic reasons altogether (epistemic anti-normativism). I argue against (...)
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  14. Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In M. Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-300.
    It has been argued that the explanation of self-control requires positing special motivational powers. Some think that we need will-power as an irreducible mental faculty; others that we need to think of the active self as a dedicated and depletable pool of psychic energy or – in today more respectable terminology – mental resources; finally, there is the idea that self-control requires postulating a deep division between reason and passion – a deliberative and an emotional motivational system. This essay argues (...)
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  15. Why We Should Promote Irrationality.Sebastian Schmidt - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):605-615.
    The author defends the claim that there are cases in which we should promote irrationality by arguing (1) that it is sometimes better to be in an irrational state of mind, and (2) that we can often influence our state of mind via our actions. The first claim is supported by presenting cases of irrational _belief_ and by countering a common line of argument associated with William K. Clifford, who defended the idea that having an irrational belief is always worse (...)
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  16. Responsibility for Rationality: Foundations of an Ethics of Mind.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.
    How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and in ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. Responsibility for Rationality is the first book that connects recent debates on responsibility and on rationality in a unifying dialectic. It achieves four main goals: first, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility (...)
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  17. Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker? Corona und intellektuelles Vertrauen.Sebastian Schmidt - 2021 - In Romy Jaster & Geert Keil (eds.), Nachdenken über Corona: philosophische Essay über die Pandemie und ihre Folgen. Stuttgart: Reclam. pp. 98-109.
    Sebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften (...)
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  18. Vitalism and the scientific image: an introduction.Sebastian Normandin & Charles T. Wolfe - 2013 - In Sebastian Normandin & Charles T. Wolfe (eds.), Vitalism and the scientific image, 1800-2010. Springer.
    Introduction to edited volume on vitalism and/in the life sciences, 1800-2010.
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  19. Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer “It” to “Me”?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2012 - Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177.
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...)
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  20. Is attention a non-propositional attitude?Sebastian Watzl - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 272-302.
    I argue first that attention is a (maybe the) paradigmatic case of an object-directed, non-propositional intentional mental episode. In addition attention cannot be reduced to any other (propositional or non-propositional) mental episodes. Yet, second, attention is not a non-propositional mental attitude. It might appear puzzling how one could hold both of these claims. I show how to combine them, and how that combination shows how propositionality and non-propositionality can co-exist in a mental life. The crucial move is one away from (...)
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  21. Carnap on Quantum Mechanics.Sebastian Horvat & Iulian D. Toader - forthcoming - In Rudolf Carnap Handbuch. J. B. Metzler.
    This entry reviews Rudolf Carnap's philosophical views on the quantum mechanics of his time. It also offers some thoughts on how Carnap might have reacted to some recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
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  22. Expressivism, Belief, and All That.Sebastian Köhler - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (4):189-207.
    Meta-ethical expressivism was traditionally seen as the view that normative judgements are not beliefs. Recently, quasi-realists have argued, via a minimalist conception of “belief”, that expressivism is fully compatible with normative judgements being beliefs. This maneuver is successful, however, only if quasi-realists have really offered an expressivist-friendly account of belief that captures all platitudes characterizing belief. But, quasi-realists’ account has a crucial gap, namely how to account for the propositional contents of normative beliefs in an expressivist-friendly manner. In particular, quasi-realists (...)
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  23. Can Representationism Explain how Attention Affects Appearances?Sebastian Watzl - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. Boston, USA: The MIT Press. pp. 481-607.
    Recent psychological research shows that attention affects appearances. An “attended item looks bigger, faster, earlier, more saturated, stripier.” (Block 2010, p. 41). What is the significance of these findings? Ned Block has argued that they undermine representationism, roughly the view that the phenomenal character of perception is determined by its representational content. My first goal in this paper is to show that Block’s argument has the structure of a Problem of Arbitrary Phenomenal Variation and that it improves on other instances (...)
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  24. The paradox of ineffability.Gäb Sebastian - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (3):1-12.
    Saying that x is ineffable seems to be paradoxical – either I cannot say anything about x, not even that it is ineffable – or I can say that it is ineffable, but then I can say something and it is not ineffable. In this article, I discuss Alston’s version of the paradox and a solution proposed by Hick which employs the concept of formal and substantial predicates. I reject Hick’s proposal and develop a different account based on some passages (...)
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  25. Ineffability: The very concept.Sebastian Gäb - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1-12.
    In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot be said truly or without contradiction, this is not an instance of ineffability. Next, I distinguish two different meanings of ‘saying something’ which result from a fundamental ambiguity in the term ‘language’, viz. language as a system of symbols and language as a medium of communication. Accordingly, ‘ineffability’ is ambiguous, too, (...)
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  26. Cayetano Betancur, filósofo conservador.Sebastián Pineda & Ana María Granados - 2021 - Ideas Y Valores 70 (Suplemento 7):13-40.
    Este artículo examina de qué forma se refleja el conservatismo de Cayetano Betancur en su filosofía política. El primer capítulo recoge dos acepciones del término conser- vador que abarcan, a grandes rasgos, las dos principales tendencias del conservatismo político. El segundo capítulo está dedicado a examinar cómo cada una de estas dos acepciones (que llamamos negativa y positiva) se reflejan en la obra de Betancur. Como conclusión, se hace referencia a los posibles rumbos hacia los que una investi- gación más (...)
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  27. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Gerhard Ernst & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. (...)
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  28. Rationality and Responsibility.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):379-385.
    Broome takes the debate on rationality to be concerned with the ordinary use of 'rational'. I argue that this is at best misleading. For the object of current theories of rationality is determined by a specific use of 'rational' that is intimately connected to blame and praise. I call the property it refers to 'rationalityRESP'. This focus on rationalityRESP, I argue, has two significant implications for Broome's critique of theories of rationality as reasons-responsiveness. First, rationalityRESP is plausibly conceived of as (...)
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  29. Cross-National Associations Among Cyberbullying Victimization, Self-Esteem, and Internet Addiction: Direct and Indirect Effects of Alexithymia.Sebastian Wachs, Alexander T. Vazsonyi, Michelle F. Wright & Gabriela Ksinan Jiskrova - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  30. Digitale Transformationen der Gesellschaft. Sozialethische Perspektiven auf den technologischen Wandel.Sebastian Kistler, Anna Puzio, Anna-Maria Riedl & Werner Veith (eds.) - 2023
    Kistler, Sebastian/Puzio, Anna/Riedl, Anna-Maria/Veith (Hrsg.) Digitale Transformationen der Gesellschaft Sozialethische Perspektiven auf den technologischen Wandel -/- Die Digitalisierung bewirkt Transformationsprozesse, die die Formen unseres Zusammenlebens grundlegend verändern. Dies betrifft nicht nur die Art, wie wir leben, Partner suchen, arbeiten, wohnen, konsumieren oder uns selbst präsentieren – auch die gesellschaftlichen Lebensbereiche wie Politik, Bildung, Wirtschaft und Gesundheit befinden sich in einem digitalen Wandel. Mit diesen Veränderungsprozessen sind nicht nur Hoffnungen, sondern auch Ängste verbunden, die die Ambivalenzen der Digitalisierung zum Ausdruck (...)
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  31. Ordinary Language Philosophy and Ideal Language Philosophy.Sebastian Lutz - forthcoming - In The Cambridge Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may (...)
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  32. Dreams: an empirical way to settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):263-285.
    Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...)
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  33. Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.
    Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...)
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  34. Introduction: Towards an Ethics of Mind.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 1-20.
    This chapter locates our overall approach within the dialectic of contemporary philosophical debates and provides an overall framework for discussion. First, I introduce the problem of mental normativity. I show how this problem poses a prima facie threat to the common assumption in epistemology and metaethics that beliefs and other attitudes are governed by robust normative requirements. Secondly, I motivate philosophical inquiry about an ethics of mind by tracing this field back to recent debates in the ethics of belief. I (...)
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  35. Informational Theories of Content and Mental Representation.Marc Artiga & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3):613-627.
    Informational theories of semantic content have been recently gaining prominence in the debate on the notion of mental representation. In this paper we examine new-wave informational theories which have a special focus on cognitive science. In particular, we argue that these theories face four important difficulties: they do not fully solve the problem of error, fall prey to the wrong distality attribution problem, have serious difficulties accounting for ambiguous and redundant representations and fail to deliver a metasemantic theory of representation. (...)
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  36. Können wir uns entscheiden, etwas zu glauben? Zur Möglichkeit und Unmöglichkeit eines doxastischen Willens.Sebastian Schmidt - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):571-582.
    I argue that believing at will – i.e. believing for practical reasons – is in some sense possible and in some sense impossible. It is impossible insofar as we think of belief formation as a re-sult of our exercise of certain capacities (perception, memory, agency). But insofar as we think of belief formation as an action that might lead to such a result (i.e. a deliberation or an in-quiry), believing at will is possible. First I present and clarify the problem (...)
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  37. Functions and mental representation: the theoretical role of representations and its real nature.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):317-336.
    Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...)
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  38. Gradualism, Bifurcation, and Fading Qualia.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Manolo Martínez - forthcoming - Analysis.
    When reasoning about dependence relations, philosophers often rely on gradualist assumptions, according to which abrupt changes in a phenomenon of interest can only result from abrupt changes in the low-level phenomena on which it depends. These assumptions, while strictly correct if the dependence relation in question can be expressed by continuous dynamical equations, should be handled with care: very often the descriptively relevant property of a dynamical system connecting high- and low-level phenomena is not its instantaneous behavior, but its stable (...)
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  39.  92
    Conceptual Engineering: For What Matters.Sebastian Köhler & Herman Veluwenkamp - forthcoming - Mind:fzad064.
    Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...)
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  40. Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality: Reply to Baker.Sebastian Hengst - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2503-2516.
    In a recent paper in this journal, Derek Baker (Erkenntnis 83(4):829–852, 2018) raises an objection to expressivism as it has been developed by Mark Schroeder (Being for, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Baker argues that Schroeder’s expressivist (1) is committed to certain sentences expressing rationally incoherent states of mind, and he objects (2) that the expressivist cannot explain why these states would be rationally incoherent. The aim of this paper is to show that Baker’s argument for (1) is unsound, and (...)
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  41. Embodied appearance properties and subjectivity.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2018 - Adaptive Behavior 26 (Special Issue: Spotlight on 4E C):1-12.
    The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...)
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  42. The Ethics of Attention: a framework.Sebastian Watzl - manuscript
    Discussions regarding which norms, if any, govern our practices of forming, maintaining and relinquishing beliefs have come to be collected under the label “The ethics of belief”. Included in the ethics of belief are debates about how those normative issues relate to the nature of belief, whether belief formation is, for example, ever voluntary. The present talk concerns an analogous set of questions regarding our practices of attention. “The ethics of attention” thus concerns the discussion of which norms, if any, (...)
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  43. Mysticism without concepts.Sebastian Gäb - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (3):233-246.
    It has often been claimed, e.g. by William James or Aldous Huxley, that mystical experiences across times and cultures exhibit a striking similarity. Even though the words and images we use to describe them are different, underneath the surface we find a common experiential core. Others have rejected this claim and argued that all experiences are intrinsically shaped by the mystics’ pre-existing religious concepts. Against these constructivist objections, I defend the idea of a common core by arguing that even if (...)
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  44. Incoherence and the balance of evidential reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-10.
    Eva Schmidt argues that facts about incoherent beliefs can be non-evidential epistemic reasons to suspend judgment. In this commentary, I argue that incoherence-based reasons to suspend are epistemically superfluous: if the subjects in Schmidt’s cases ought to suspend judgment, then they should do so merely on the basis of their evidential reasons. This suggests a more general strategy to reduce the apparent normativity of coherence to the normativity of evidence. I conclude with some remarks on the independent interest that reasons-first (...)
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  45. El regreso de Bradley y el problema de la unidad-compleja: ¿tropos al rescate?Sebastián Briceño - 2016 - Critica 48 (143):47-75.
    It is commonly held that Bradley’s regress has a solution within a trope ontology. This seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by non-transferable tropes. It also seems to happen when a bundle is understood as constituted by transferable tropes related by a relational trope of compresence whose existence specifically depends on those relata. In this article I demonstrate that these proposals fail in addressing the essential question that underlies the regress, incurring in a question-begging response already (...)
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  46. Divine Minds. Idealism as Panentheism in Berkeley and Vasubandhu.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - In Swami Medhananda & Benedikt Paul Göcke (eds.), Panentheism in Indian and Western Thought. Cosmopolitan interventions. pp. 118-137.
    This chapter argues that both Berkeley and Vasubandhu accept a kind of metaphysical idealism: while Berkeley’s theistic idealism claims that all of reality exists only in the mind of God, Vasubandhu teaches that external objects have no intrinsic existence and exist only as objects of perception; mind is the ultimate reality. This chapter explores the possibility of reading both these doctrines as a kind of idealist panentheism. Specifically, it will address two questions: (1) in what sense are Berkeley’s and Vasubandhu’s (...)
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  47. Why you should be a religious skeptic.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Philosophical Forum (4):303-314.
    Most philosophers of religion subscribe to some variety of religious realism: they believe that religious statements aim at capturing a mind-independent reality and are true precisely if they successfully do so. Curiously, most religious realists also believe that at least some of our religious beliefs are rationally justified. In this paper, I argue that these positions are actually at odds with each other. Religious realists should rather be religious skeptics. I first argue that realism always implies the possibility of our (...)
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  48. Culture or Biology? If this sounds interesting, you might be confused.Sebastian Watzl - 2019 - In Jaan Valsinger (ed.), Social Philosophy of Science for the Social Sciences. Cham: Springer. pp. 45-71.
    Culture or Biology? The question can seem deep and important. Yet, I argue in this chapter, if you are enthralled by questions about our biological differences, then you are probably confused. My goal is to diagnose the confusion. In debates about the role of biology in the social world it is easy to ask the wrong questions, and it is easy to misinterpret the scientific research. We are intuitively attracted to what is called psychological essentialism, and therefore interpret what is (...)
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  49. Not a HOT Dream.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2013 - In Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...)
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  50. Non-personal immortality.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Religious Studies.
    This article explores the concept of non-personal immortality. Non-personal theories of immortality claim that even though there is no personal or individual survival of death, it is still possible to continue to exist in a non-personal state. The most important challenge for non-personal conceptions of immortality is solving the apparent contradiction between on the one hand accepting that individual existence ends with death and on the other hand maintaining that death nevertheless is not equal to total annihilation. I present two (...)
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