Results for 'Logical Revisionism'

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  1. Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism.J. R. G. Williams - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (4):192-212.
    In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson (1994) and Keefe (2000), I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to (...)
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  2. How to Adopt a Logic.Daniel Cohnitz & Carlo Nicolai - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of logic (...)
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  3. (What) Is Feminist Logic? (What) Do We Want It to Be?Catharine Saint-Croix & Roy T. Cook - 2024 - History and Philosophy of Logic 45 (1):20-45.
    ‘Feminist logic’ may sound like an impossible, incoherent, or irrelevant project, but it is none of these. We begin by delineating three categories into which projects in feminist logic might fall: philosophical logic, philosophy of logic, and pedagogy. We then defuse two distinct objections to the very idea of feminist logic: the irrelevance argument and the independence argument. Having done so, we turn to a particular kind of project in feminist philosophy of logic: Valerie Plumwood's feminist argument for a relevance (...)
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  4. Anti-Realism and Anti-Revisionism in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics.Anderson Nakano - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):451-474.
    Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given by the (...)
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  5. The philosophy of alternative logics.Andrew Aberdein & Stephen Read - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta, The development of modern logic. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 613-723.
    This chapter focuses on alternative logics. It discusses a hierarchy of logical reform. It presents case studies that illustrate particular aspects of the logical revisionism discussed in the chapter. The first case study is of intuitionistic logic. The second case study turns to quantum logic, a system proposed on empirical grounds as a resolution of the antinomies of quantum mechanics. The third case study is concerned with systems of relevance logic, which have been the subject of an (...)
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  6. Logical Omniscience and Acknowledged vs. Consequential Commitments.Niels Skovgaard Olsen - 2014 - Questions, Discourse and Dialogue: 20 Years After Making It Explicit, Proceedings of AISB50.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the explanatory resources that Robert Brandom‟s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. 12.
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  7. Some non-revisionist solutions to some semantic antinomies.J. M. Kuczynski - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiry 37 (3-4):51-61.
    It is shown that Russell's Paradox can be solved without advocating the Theory of Types, and also that the Liar's Paradox can be solved in much the same way. Neither solution requires that any of our commonsense-based beliefs be revised, let alone jettisoned. It is also shown that the Theory of Types is false.
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  8. The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.
    The main goal of this paper is to investigate what explanatory resources Robert Brandom’s distinction between acknowledged and consequential commitments affords in relation to the problem of logical omniscience. With this distinction the importance of the doxastic perspective under consideration for the relationship between logic and norms of reasoning is emphasized, and it becomes possible to handle a number of problematic cases discussed in the literature without thereby incurring a commitment to revisionism about logic. One such case in (...)
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  9. ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC AND EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY.John Corcoran - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):131-2.
    John Corcoran and George Boger. Aristotelian logic and Euclidean geometry. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic. 20 (2014) 131. -/- By an Aristotelian logic we mean any system of direct and indirect deductions, chains of reasoning linking conclusions to premises—complete syllogisms, to use Aristotle’s phrase—1) intended to show that their conclusions follow logically from their respective premises and 2) resembling those in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics. Such systems presuppose existence of cases where it is not obvious that the conclusion follows from the premises: (...)
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  10. Wants and Acts: Logical, Causal and Material Connections.Edward Allen Francisco - 1974 - Dissertation, Purdue University
    This inquiry is addressed to two questions: (1) what if any logical relations might exist between the concepts of desire and action (as they and the distinctions to which they commit us are ensconced in ordinary parlance), and (2) what if any causal or significant non-causal (i.e., material) relations might ever exist between instances of desire and action? -/- It is held that any credible move to deal with such questions must initially, and at some length, specify the employment (...)
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  11. Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.Mark Jago - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):278-283.
    Stephen Barker presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those of (...)
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  12. Russell's Logicism.Kevin C. Klement - 2018 - In Russell Wahl, The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York, USA: Bloomsbury. pp. 151-178.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the best-known proponents of logicism: the theory that mathematics reduces to, or is an extension of, logic. Russell argued for this thesis in his 1903 The Principles of Mathematics and attempted to demonstrate it formally in Principia Mathematica (PM 1910–1913; with A. N. Whitehead). Russell later described his work as a further “regressive” step in understanding the foundations of mathematics made possible by the late 19th century “arithmetization” of mathematics and Frege’s logical definitions of (...)
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  13. The Workings of the Intellect: Mind and Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 1997 - In Patricia A. Easton, Logic and the Workings of the Mind the Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy. pp. 21-45.
    Two stories have dominated the historiography of early modern philosophy: one in which a seventeenth century Age of Reason spawned the Enlightenment, and another in which a skeptical crisis cast a shadow over subsequent philosophy, resulting in ever narrower "limits to knowledge." I combine certain elements common to both into a third narrative, one that begins by taking seriously seventeenth-century conceptions of the topics and methods central to the rise of a "new" philosophy. In this revisionist story, differing approaches to (...)
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  14. Literal Meaning & Cognitive Content.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2015 - Madison, WI, USA: Freud Institute.
    In this work, it is shown that given a correct understanding of the nature of reference and of linguistic meaning generally, it is possible to produce non-revisionist analyses of the nature of -/- *Perceptual content, *Mental content generally, *Logical equivalence, *Logical dependence generally, *Counterfactual truth, *The causal efficacy of mental states, and *Our knowledge of ourselves and of the external world. -/- In addition, set-theoretic interpretations of several semantic concepts are put forth. These concepts include truth, falsehood, negation, (...)
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  15. Reconsidering the Carnap-Kuhn Connection.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2015 - In William J. Devlin & Alisa Bokulich, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions - 50 Years On. Cham: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol. 311. Springer.
    Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as opposed rather than complementary. In particular, (...)
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  16. Descartes on Physical Vacuum: Rationalism in Natural-Philosophical Debate.Joseph Zepeda - 2013 - Society and Politics 7 (2):126-141.
    Descartes is notorious for holding a strong anti-vacuist position. On his view, according to the standard reading, empty space not only does not exist in nature, but it is logically impossible. The very notion of a void or vacuum is an incoherent one. Recently Eric Palmer has proposed a revisionist reading of Descartes on empty space, arguing that he is more sanguine about its possibility. Palmer makes use of Descartes’ early correspondence with Marin Mersenne, including his commentary on Galileo’s Two (...)
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  17. Supposition and desire in a non-classical setting.J. Robert G. Williams - unknown
    *These notes were folded into the published paper "Probability and nonclassical logic*. Revising semantics and logic has consequences for the theory of mind. Standard formal treatments of rational belief and desire make classical assumptions. If we are to challenge the presuppositions, we indicate what is kind of theory is going to take their place. Consider probability theory interpreted as an account of ideal partial belief. But if some propositions are neither true nor false, or are half true, or whatever—then it’s (...)
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  18. Two dogmatists.Charles Pigden - 1987 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 30 (1 & 2):173 – 193.
    Grice and Strawson's 'In Defense of a Dogma is admired even by revisionist Quineans such as Putnam (1962) who should know better. The analytic/synthetic distinction they defend is distinct from that which Putnam successfully rehabilitates. Theirs is the post-positivist distinction bounding a grossly enlarged analytic. It is not, as they claim, the sanctified product of a long philosophic tradition, but the cast-off of a defunct philosophy - logical positivism. The fact that the distinction can be communally drawn does not (...)
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  19. Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.
    In this paper, I investigate whether we can use a world-involving framework to model the epistemic states of non-ideal agents. The standard possible-world framework falters in this respect because of a commitment to logical omniscience. A familiar attempt to overcome this problem centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in modal space, it is easy to model extremely non-ideal agents (...)
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  20. Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):319.
    I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of (...) theories. Essentially, the problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic. (shrink)
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  21. Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.
    This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the (...)
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  22. Causal and Logical Necessity in Malebranche’s Occasionalism.A. R. J. Fisher - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):523-548.
    The famous Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) espoused the occasionalist doctrine that ‘there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not true causes but only occasional causes’ (LO, 448, original italics). One of Malebranche’s well-known arguments for occasionalism, known as, the ‘no necessary connection’ argument (or, NNC ) stems from the principle that ‘a true cause… is (...)
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  23. Logical Inquiries into a New Formal System with Plural Reference.Ran Lanzet & Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2004 - In Vincent F. Hendricks, First-order logic revisited. Berlin: Logos. pp. 173-223.
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  24. Making sense of logical pluralism.Matti Eklund - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):433-454.
    The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they re...
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  25. Formality in Logic: From Logical Terms to Semantic Constraints.Gil Sagi - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227).
    In this paper I discuss a prevailing view by which logical terms determine forms of sentences and arguments and therefore the logical validity of arguments. This view is common to those who hold that there is a principled distinction between logical and nonlogical terms and those holding relativistic accounts. I adopt the Tarskian tradition by which logical validity is determined by form, but reject the centrality of logical terms. I propose an alternative framework for logic (...)
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  26. Constructive Empiricism and Logical Positivism: The Return of the Prodigal Son.Ragnar van der Merwe - forthcoming - Filozofia Nauki.
    Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism (CE) has been much discussed. There is, however, a curious feature of van Fraassen’s writings that has been overlooked up until now. This is that he sometimes capitalises certain key terms, notably “Induction”. This is done to differentiate a pragmatic small ‘i’ induction (which has epistemic import) from a rule-bound capital ‘I’ induction (which does not). In this paper, I argue that van Fraassen’s small letter/capital letter distinction reveals an underlying dualism, one that is reminiscent (...)
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  27. God’s Place in Logical Space.Andrew Dennis Bassford - 2021 - Journal of Analytic Theology 9:100-125.
    It has been argued recently that classical theism and Lewisian modal realism are incompatible theses. The most substantial argument to this effect takes the form of a trilemma. It argues that no sense can be made of God’s being a necessary being in the modal realistic picture, on pain of, among other things, modal collapse. The question of this essay is: Is that so? My goal here is to detail the reasons that have been offered in support of this contention (...)
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  28. Knowledge of necessity: Logical positivism and Kripkean essentialism.Stephen K. McLeod - 2008 - Philosophy 83 (2):179-191.
    By the lights of a central logical positivist thesis in modal epistemology, for every necessary truth that we know, we know it a priori and for every contingent truth that we know, we know it a posteriori. Kripke attacks on both flanks, arguing that we know necessary a posteriori truths and that we probably know contingent a priori truths. In a reflection of Kripke's confidence in his own arguments, the first of these Kripkean claims is far more widely accepted (...)
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  29. An Arithmetization of Logical Oppositions.Fabien Schang - 2016 - In Jean-Yves Béziau & Gianfranco Basti, The Square of Opposition: A Cornerstone of Thought (Studies in Universal Logic). Cham, Switzerland: Birkhäuser. pp. 215-237.
    An arithmetic theory of oppositions is devised by comparing expressions, Boolean bitstrings, and integers. This leads to a set of correspondences between three domains of investigation, namely: logic, geometry, and arithmetic. The structural properties of each area are investigated in turn, before justifying the procedure as a whole. Io finish, I show how this helps to improve the logical calculus of oppositions, through the consideration of corresponding operations between integers.
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  30. Logical form and the order of nature: Comments on Beátrice Longuenesse's Kant and the capacity to judge.Michael Friedman - 2000 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2):202-215.
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  31. A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.
    The traditional possible-worlds model of belief describes agents as ‘logically omniscient’ in the sense that they believe all logical consequences of what they believe, including all logical truths. This is widely considered a problem if we want to reason about the epistemic lives of non-ideal agents who—much like ordinary human beings—are logically competent, but not logically omniscient. A popular strategy for avoiding logical omniscience centers around the use of impossible worlds: worlds that, in one way or another, (...)
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  32. The Construction of the Logical World: Frege and Wittgenstein on Fixing Boundaries of Human Thought.Nikolay Milkov - 2012 - In Elisabeth Nemeth, Crossing Borders: Thinking (Across) Boundaries. University of Vienna, pp. 151-61.
    The paper presents a new approach to the history of analytic philosophy. Instead of exploring different kinds of analysis (Michael Beaney), or to marry analytic philosophy to the analytic / synthetic distinction (Scott Soames), we turn attention to the fact that it was rooted in two different types of logical constructing. The discrepancy between the two concepts of logical constructing produced much unclarity in our understanding of analytic philosophy.
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  33. Against Metaphysical Necessity. Alethic Modalities in Updated Logical Empiricism.Manuel Bremer - manuscript
    The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism (...)
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  34. Logical norms, accuracy and degree of belief.Robert Williams - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland, Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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  35. A Logical Defence of Maher’s Model of Polythematic Delusions.Paul Franceschi - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35 (2):451-475.
    We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequacy with Brendan Maher's account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary (...)
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  36. Direct Reference and Logical Truth: a Reply to Lasonen‐Aarnio.Michael McKinsey - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.
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  37. Explanationism and the awareness of logical truths.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-7.
    In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.
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  38. The logical reconstruction of pure exchange economics: Another alternative.Douglas Wade Hands - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (3):259-278.
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  39. Philipp Frank’s Austro-American Logical Empiricism.Thomas Mormann - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1): 56 - 86.
    The aim of this paper is to discuss the “Austro-American” logical empiricism proposed by physicist and philosopher Philipp Frank, particularly his interpretation of Carnap’s Aufbau, which he considered the charter of logical empiricism as a scientific world conception. According to Frank, the Aufbau was to be read as an integration of the ideas of Mach and Poincaré, leading eventually to a pragmatism quite similar to that of the American pragmatist William James. Relying on this peculiar interpretation, Frank intended (...)
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  40. What Is Logical Validity.Hartry Field - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland, Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    What are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless.
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  41. It Is Never Rational for Anyone to Believe They Don’t Know the Logical Truth.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):43-47.
    Let T be any logical truth. Does the subject know that T (any random subject)? It is not rational for any subject to believe that they don’t, whoever they are. Similarly, it is not rational for them to believe that their evidence doesn’t support T, and it is not even rational for them to believe that they don’t believe that T. It is not rational for anyone anywhere at any time to believe that they don’t know that T. Such (...)
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  42. Assertion and hypothesis: a logical framework for their opposition relations.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Ciro De Florio - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (2):131-144.
    Following the speech act theory, we take hypotheses and assertions as linguistic acts with different illocutionary forces. We assume that a hypothesis is justified if there is at least a scintilla of evidence for the truth of its propositional content, while an assertion is justified when there is conclusive evidence that its propositional content is true. Here we extend the logical treatment for assertions given by Dalla Pozza and Garola by outlining a pragmatic logic for assertions and hypotheses. On (...)
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  43. The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories.Manuel García-Carpintero & M. Pérez Otero - 1999 - European Review of Philosophy 4:157-182.
    This paper is partly inspired by a well-known debate between Ruth Barcan Marcus, Terence Parsons and W. V. 0. Quine in the sixties> concerning the extent to which Quantified Modal Logic is committed to Essentialism; the issue nevertheless goes back to the origins of "analytic philosophy'', to the reflections of Frege, Russell, and the earlier Wittgenstein on the nature of logic. By elaborating on a suggestion by Quine, we purport to show that there is a relevant and interesting way to (...)
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  44. Dutch Books and Logical Form.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):961-970.
    Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various requirements of rationality. Some are plausible: probabilism and conditionalization. Others are less so: credal transparency and reflection. Anna Mahtani has argued for a new understanding of DBAs which, she claims, allow us to keep the DBAs for probabilism (and perhaps conditionalization) and reject the DBAs for credal transparency and reflection. I argue that Mahtani’s new account fails as (a) it does not support highly plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) (...)
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  45. The Logical Space of Social Trinitarianism.Matthew Davidson - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (3):333-357.
    I try to lay bare some of the conceptual space in which one may be a Social Trinitarian. I organize the paper around answers to five questions. These are: (1) How do the three Persons of the Trinity relate to the Godhead? (2) How many divine beings or gods are there? (3) How many distinct centers of consciousness are there in the Godhead? (4) How many omnicompetent beings are there? (5) How are the Persons of the Trinity individuated? I try (...)
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  46. Unveiling the link between logical fallacies and web persuasion.Antonio Lieto & Fabiana Vernero - 2013 - In Antonio Lieto & Fabiana Vernero, ACM Proceedings of the 5th Web Science Conference, Paris. ACM.
    In the last decade Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) has started to focus attention on forms of persuasive interaction where computer technologies have the goal of changing users behavior and attitudes according to a predefined direction. In this work, we hypothesize a strong connection between logical fallacies (forms of reasoning which are logically invalid but cognitively effective) and some common persuasion strategies adopted within web technologies. With the aim of empirically evaluating our hypothesis, we carried out a pilot study on a (...)
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  47. Revisionist reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.
    Several theorists have observed that attitude reports have what we call “revisionist” uses. For example, even if Pete has never met Ann and has no idea that she exists, Jane can still say to Jim ‘Pete believes Ann can learn to play tennis in ten lessons’ if Pete believes all 6-year-olds can learn to play tennis in ten lessons and it is part of Jane and Jim’s background knowledge that Ann is a 6-year-old. Jane’s assertion seems acceptable because the claim (...)
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  48. The logical form of determiners.Peter Ludlow - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (1):47 - 69.
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  49. A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory: Husserl's Rejection and Revision of his Philosophy of Meaning Intentions from the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2020 - Studia Phaenomenologica 20:359-380.
    This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not (...)
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  50. Morpho-logical Investigations: Wittgenstein and Spengler.A. Losev - 2012 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy 4.
    The influence of Spengler on Wittgenstein's philosophical development is considered. The point of interest is in a significant methodological restructuring which it appears to have produced. After an initial over-enthusiastic reception, Wittgenstein is seen to object on some points which he attempted to emend in his own philosophy. Spengler's name disappeared inreworked manuscripts but traces persist in the Philosophical Investigations and an important section (§89-133) is found to be connected with it.
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