Results for 'Logical Truth'

999 found
Order:
  1. What Makes Logical Truths True?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272.
    The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity.Rosanna Keefe - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 429-452.
    In this paper, I ask whether we should see different logical systems as appropriate for different domains (or perhaps in different contexts) and whether this would amount to a form of logical pluralism. One, though not the only, route to this type of position, is via pluralism about truth. Given that truth is central to validity, the commitment the typical truth pluralist has to different notions of truth for different domains may suggest differences regarding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. A Note on Logical Truth.Corine Besson - 2014 - Logique Et Analyse 57 (227):309-331.
    Classical logic counts sentences such as ‘Alice is identical with Alice’ as logically true. A standard objection to classical logic is that Alice’s self-identity, for instance, is not a matter of logic because the identity of particular objects is not a matter of logic. For this reason, many philosophers argue that classical logic is not the right logic, and that it should be abandoned in favour of free logic — logic free of existential commitments with respect to singular terms. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Logical Truth / Logička istina (Bosnian translation by Nijaz Ibrulj).Nijaz Ibrulj & Willard Van Orman Quine - 2018 - Sophos 1 (11):115-128.
    Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth.Tuomas Tahko - 2014 - In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic: Logical Realism, Logical Anti-Realism and All Things In Between. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Philosophical Accounts of First-Order Logical Truths.Constantin C. Brîncuş - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):369-383.
    Starting from certain metalogical results, I argue that first-order logical truths of classical logic are a priori and necessary. Afterwards, I formulate two arguments for the idea that first-order logical truths are also analytic, namely, I first argue that there is a conceptual connection between aprioricity, necessity, and analyticity, such that aprioricity together with necessity entails analyticity; then, I argue that the structure of natural deduction systems for FOL displays the analyticity of its truths. Consequently, each philosophical approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Direct Reference and Logical Truth: a Reply to Lasonen‐Aarnio.Michael McKinsey - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  8. Relative Interpretations and Substitutional Definitions of Logical Truth and Consequence.Mirko Engler - 2020 - In Igor Sedlár & Martin Blicha (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2019. London, Vereinigtes Königreich: College Publications. pp. 33 - 47.
    This paper proposes substitutional definitions of logical truth and consequence in terms of relative interpretations that are extensionally equivalent to the model-theoretic definitions for any relational first-order language. Our philosophical motivation to consider substitutional definitions is based on the hope to simplify the meta-theory of logical consequence. We discuss to what extent our definitions can contribute to that.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Logic, Logical Form, and the Disunity of Truth.Will Gamester - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):34-43.
    Monists say that the nature of truth is invariant, whichever sentence you consider; pluralists say that the nature of truth varies between different sets of sentences. The orthodoxy is that logic and logical form favour monism: there must be a single property that is preserved in any valid inference; and any truth-functional complex must be true in the same way as its components. The orthodoxy, I argue, is mistaken. Logic and logical form impose only structural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  10. The Truth Table Formulation of Propositional Logic.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - forthcoming - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy.
    Developing a suggestion of Wittgenstein, I provide an account of truth tables as formulas of a formal language. I define the syntax and semantics of TPL (the language of Tabular Propositional Logic), and develop its proof theory. Single formulas of TPL, and finite groups of formulas with the same top row and TF matrix (depiction of possible valuations), are able to serve as their own proofs with respect to metalogical properties of interest. The situation is different, however, for groups (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Logic and limits of knowledge and truth.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):341-367.
    Though my ultimate concern is with issues in epistemology and metaphysics, let me phrase the central question I will pursue in terms evocative of philosophy of religion: What are the implications of our logic-in particular, of Cantor and G6del-for the possibility of omniscience?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  12. Language, Truth, and Logic and the Anglophone reception of the Vienna Circle.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - In Adam Tamas Tuboly (ed.), The Historical and Philosophical Significance of Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave. pp. 41-68.
    A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Truth and Paradox in Late XIVth Century Logic : Peter of Mantua’s Treatise on Insoluble Propositions.Riccardo Strobino - 2012 - Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 23:475-519.
    This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the late XiVth century and puts it into perspective within the context of the contemporary debate concerning semantic paradoxes. The author of the text is the italian logician Peter of Mantua (d. 1399/1400). The treatise is relevant both from a theoretical and from a historical standpoint. By appealing to a distinction between two senses in which propositions are said to be true, it offers an unusual (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Conservatively extending classical logic with transparent truth.David Ripley - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):354-378.
    This paper shows how to conservatively extend classical logic with a transparent truth predicate, in the face of the paradoxes that arise as a consequence. All classical inferences are preserved, and indeed extended to the full (truth—involving) vocabulary. However, not all classical metainferences are preserved; in particular, the resulting logical system is nontransitive. Some limits on this nontransitivity are adumbrated, and two proof systems are presented and shown to be sound and complete. (One proof system allows for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  15. Logic and Truth in Religious Belief.Srećko Kovač - 2015 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 119-132.
    Logical reasoning is not only a component of religious faith (cf., for instance, the "Golden rule"), but, in addition, the religious faith itself can be conceived as a logical pragmatic function applied to sentences and their meanings. Pragmatic role of religious faith is shown on the examples of the analogy of seed and spoken word (e.g., Mt 13:3-23) and on the degrees of faith described in the episode about Nicodemus (John 3). Pragmatics adds (different grades of) perseverance to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. That Truth Exists is More Logical.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Think 10 (27):109-112.
    Postmodernists claim that there is no truth. However, the statement 'there is no truth ' is self -contradictory. This essay shows the following: One cannot state the idea 'there is no truth ' universally without creating a paradox. In contrast, the statement 'there is truth ' does not produce such a paradox. Therefore, it is more logical that truth exists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  55
    Fusion, fission, and Ackermann’s truth constant in relevant logics: A proof-theoretic investigation.Fabio De Martin Polo - forthcoming - In Andrew Tedder, Shawn Standefer & Igor Sedlar (eds.), New Directions in Relevant Logic. Springer.
    The aim of this paper is to provide a proof-theoretic characterization of relevant logics including fusion and fission connectives, as well as Ackermann’s truth constant. We achieve this by employing the well-established methodology of labelled sequent calculi. After having introduced several systems, we will conduct a detailed proof-theoretic analysis, show a cut-admissibility theorem, and establish soundness and completeness. The paper ends with a discussion that contextualizes our current work within the broader landscape of the proof theory of relevant logics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Theories of truth based on four-valued infectious logics.Damian Szmuc, Bruno Da Re & Federico Pailos - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):712-746.
    Infectious logics are systems that have a truth-value that is assigned to a compound formula whenever it is assigned to one of its components. This paper studies four-valued infectious logics as the basis of transparent theories of truth. This take is motivated as a way to treat different pathological sentences differently, namely, by allowing some of them to be truth-value gluts and some others to be truth-value gaps and as a way to treat the semantic pathology (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  19. Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic.Gila Sher - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):337-350.
    In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20. The Logic of the Whole Truth.Joseph S. Fulda - 1989 - Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 15 (2):435-446.
    Note: The author holds the copyright, and there was no agreement, express or implied, not to use a facsimile PDF. -/- Using erotetic logic, the paper defines the "the whole truth" in a manner consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. It cannot mean "the whole story," as witnesses in an adversary system are permitted /only/ to answer the questions put to them, nor are they permitted to speculate, add irrelevant material, etc. Nor can it mean not to add an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic, by John Woods, Springer, 2018. [REVIEW]Andrew Aberdein - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (2):873-881.
    A review of John Woods, Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic. Cham: Springer, 2018.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  90
    Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Semantic externalism in the style of McDowell and Evans faces a puzzle formulated by Pryor: to explain that a sentence such as 'Jack exists' is only a posteriori knowable, despite being logically entailed by the seemingly logical truth 'Jack is self-identical', and hence being itself a logical truth and therefore a priori knowable. Free logics can dissolve the puzzle. Moreover, Pryor has argued that the existentially hedged 'If Jack exists, then Jack is self-identical', when properly formalised, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Review of John Woods, Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic. [REVIEW]Gilbert Plumer - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (1):147-156.
    This article reviews John Wood’s Truth in Fiction: Rethinking its Logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Modal Logics of Kripke-Feferman Truth.Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern - manuscript
    We determine the modal logic of fixed-point models of truth and their axiomatizations by Solomon Feferman via Solovay-style completeness results.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  26. Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - unknown - In Filippo Ferrari, Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher & Florian Steinberger (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    Once upon a time, logical conventionalism was the most popular philosophical theory of logic. It was heavily favored by empiricists, logical positivists, and naturalists. According to logical conventionalism, linguistic conventions explain logical truth, validity, and modality. And conventions themselves are merely syntactic rules of language use, including inference rules. Logical conventionalism promised to eliminate mystery from the philosophy of logic by showing that both the metaphysics and epistemology of logic fit into a scientific picture (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Formalization of dialectical logic, Separation theory of truth. Logic of cellular automata.Zhou Senhai - manuscript
    By separating the general concept of truth into syntactic truth and semantic truth, this article proposes a new theory of truth to explain several paradoxes like the Liar paradox, Card paradox, Curry’s paradox, etc. By revealing the relationship between syntactic /semantic truth and being-nothing-becoming which are the core concepts of dialectical logic, it is able to formalize dialectical logic. It also provides a logical basis for complexity theory by transferring all reasoning into a directed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. The Logic of Logical Necessity.Andrew Bacon & Kit Fine - manuscript
    Prior to Kripke's seminal work on the semantics of modal logic, McKinsey offered an alternative interpretation of the necessity operator, inspired by the Bolzano-Tarski notion of logical truth. According to this interpretation, `it is necessary that A' is true just in case every sentence with the same logical form as A is true. In our paper, we investigate this interpretation of the modal operator, resolving some technical questions, and relating it to the logical interpretation of modality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Knot and Tonk: Nasty Connectives on Many-Valued Truth-Tables for Classical Sentential Logic.Tim Button - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):7-19.
    Prior’s Tonk is a famously horrible connective. It is defined by its inference rules. My aim in this article is to compare Tonk with some hitherto unnoticed nasty connectives, which are defined in semantic terms. I first use many-valued truth-tables for classical sentential logic to define a nasty connective, Knot. I then argue that we should refuse to add Knot to our language. And I show that this reverses the standard dialectic surrounding Tonk, and yields a novel solution to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  30. Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and A New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher BY Chen Bo.Gila Sher & Chen Bo - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (1):3-57.
    Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model of knowledge. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. On the explanatory power of truth in logic.Gila Sher - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):348-373.
    Philosophers are divided on whether the proof- or truth-theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The paper demonstrates the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic by showing that and how it can provide (i) an explanatory characterization —both semantic and proof-theoretical—of logical inference, (ii) an explanatory criterion for logical constants and operators, (iii) an explanatory account of logic’s role (function) in knowledge, as well as explanations of (iv) the characteristic features of logic —formality, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Philosophy of Logic – Reexamining the Formalized Notion of Truth.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Tarski "proved" that there cannot possibly be any correct formalization of the notion of truth entirely on the basis of an insufficiently expressive formal system that was incapable of recognizing and rejecting semantically incorrect expressions of language. -/- The only thing required to eliminate incompleteness, undecidability and inconsistency from formal systems is transforming the formal proofs of symbolic logic to use the sound deductive inference model.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Truth in Fiction, Impossible Worlds, and Belief Revision.Francesco Berto & Christopher Badura - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):178-193.
    We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  34. Theories of truth for countable languages which conform to classical logic.Seppo Heikkilä - forthcoming - Nonlinear Studies.
    Every countable language which conforms to classical logic is shown to have an extension which has a consistent definitional theory of truth. That extension has a consistent semantical theory of truth, if every sentence of the object language is valuated by its meaning either as true or as false. These theories contain both a truth predicate and a non-truth predicate. Theories are equivalent when sentences of the object lqanguage are valuated by their meanings.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. How to Conquer the Liar and Enthrone the Logical Concept of Truth.Boris Culina - 2023 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 23 (67):1-31.
    This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed solutions (“the revenge of the Liar”). This solution complements the classical procedure of determining the truth values of sentences by its own failure and, when the procedure fails, through an appropriate semantic shift allows us to express the failure in a classical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Philosophy of Logic – Reexamining the Formalized Notion of Truth.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Because formal systems of symbolic logic inherently express and represent the deductive inference model formal proofs to theorem consequences can be understood to represent sound deductive inference to true conclusions without any need for other representations such as model theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Horwich's minimalist conception of truth: some logical difficulties.Sten Lindström - 2001 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 9:161-181.
    Aristotle’s words in the Metaphysics: “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” are often understood as indicating a correspondence view of truth: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in the world that makes it true. Aristotle’s words can also be interpreted in a deflationary, i.e., metaphysically less loaded, way. According to the latter view, the concept of truth is contained in platitudes like: ‘It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Deflationism, truth, and desire.Jamin Asay - 2022 - Ratio 35 (3):204-213.
    Deflationists about truth generally regard the contribution that ‘true’ makes to utterances to be purely logical or expressive: it exists to facilitate communication, and remedy our expressive deficiencies that are due to ignorance or finitude. This paper presents a challenge to that view by considering alethic desires. Alethic desires are desires for one’s beliefs to be true. Such desires, I argue, do not admit of any deflationarily acceptable analysis, and so challenge the deflationist’s austere view about the semantic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Truth and Proof without Models: A Development and Justification of the Truth-valuational Approach (2nd edition).Hanoch Ben-Yami - manuscript
    I explain why model theory is unsatisfactory as a semantic theory and has drawbacks as a tool for proofs on logic systems. I then motivate and develop an alternative, the truth-valuational substitutional approach (TVS), and prove with it the soundness and completeness of the first order Predicate Calculus with identity and of Modal Propositional Calculus. Modal logic is developed without recourse to possible worlds. Along the way I answer a variety of difficulties that have been raised against TVS and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Logic: The Stoics (part one).Susanne Bobzien - 1999 - In Keimpe Algra & et al (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    ABSTRACT: A detailed presentation of Stoic logic, part one, including their theories of propositions (or assertibles, Greek: axiomata), demonstratives, temporal truth, simple propositions, non-simple propositions(conjunction, disjunction, conditional), quantified propositions, logical truths, modal logic, and general theory of arguments (including definition, validity, soundness, classification of invalid arguments).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Three logical theories.John Corcoran - 1969 - Philosophy of Science 36 (2):153-177.
    This study concerns logical systems considered as theories. By searching for the problems which the traditionally given systems may reasonably be intended to solve, we clarify the rationales for the adequacy criteria commonly applied to logical systems. From this point of view there appear to be three basic types of logical systems: those concerned with logical truth; those concerned with logical truth and with logical consequence; and those concerned with deduction per se (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  42. Heidegger’s Concept of Time in Logic: The Question of Truth.Clara Carus - 2022 - Phänomenologische Forschungen 1:19-36.
    In his 1925/26 lecture Logic: The Question of Truth Heidegger turns to an interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason in order to elucidate his own understanding of time. The largely overlooked lecture series, I argue, is at the root of Heidegger’s exposition of the concept of time and its relationship with human existence (Dasein). Although Heidegger claims that Kant’s concept of time is confined to that of ‘world-time,’ Heidegger develops the first exposition of his understanding of time as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Many-Valued Logic between the Degrees of Truth and the Limits of Knowledge.Salah Osman - 2002 - Alexandria, Egypt: Al Maaref Establishment Press.
    هو أول كتاب باللغة العربية يعرض لمراحل وآليات تطور المنطق الرمزي المعاصر متعدد القيم بأنساقه المختلفة، مركزًا على مشكلة الغموض المعرفي للإنسان بأبعادها اللغوية والإبستمولوجية والأنطولوجية، والتي تتجلى – على سبيل المثال – فيما تحفل به الدراسات الفلسفية والمنطقية والعلمية من مفارقات تمثل تحديًا قويًا لثنائية الصدق والكذب الكلاسيكية، وكذلك في اكتشاف «هيزنبرج» لمبدأ اللايقين، وتأكيده وعلماء الكمّ على ضرورة التفسيرات الإحصائية في المجال دون الذري، الأمر الذي يؤكد عدم فعالية قانون الثالث المرفوع في التعامل مع معطيات الواقع الفعلي، واستحالة (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid.Stephen Barker - 2011 - In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. Cambridge University Press.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Quantificational Logic and Empty Names.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    The result of combining classical quantificational logic with modal logic proves necessitism – the claim that necessarily everything is necessarily identical to something. This problem is reflected in the purely quantificational theory by theorems such as ∃x t=x; it is a theorem, for example, that something is identical to Timothy Williamson. The standard way to avoid these consequences is to weaken the theory of quantification to a certain kind of free logic. However, it has often been noted that in order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  46. Objective truth in matters of taste.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
    A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   304 citations  
  48. Stoic Logic.Susanne Bobzien - 2003 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    ABSTRACT: An introduction to Stoic logic. Stoic logic can in many respects be regarded as a fore-runner of modern propositional logic. I discuss: 1. the Stoic notion of sayables or meanings (lekta); the Stoic assertibles (axiomata) and their similarities and differences to modern propositions; the time-dependency of their truth; 2.-3. assertibles with demonstratives and quantified assertibles and their truth-conditions; truth-functionality of negations and conjunctions; non-truth-functionality of disjunctions and conditionals; language regimentation and ‘bracketing’ devices; Stoic basic principles (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  49. What is Logical Form?Ernie Lepore & Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Logical Form and Language. Clarendon Press.
    This paper articulates and defends a conception of logical form as semantic form revealed by a compositional meaning theory. On this conception, the logical form of a sentence is determined by the semantic types of its primitive terms and their mode of combination as it relates to determining under what conditions it is true. We develop this idea in the framework of truth-theoretic semantics. We argue that the semantic form of a declarative sentence in a language L (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  50. Truth-preserving and consequence-preserving deduction rules”,.John Corcoran - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):130-1.
    A truth-preservation fallacy is using the concept of truth-preservation where some other concept is needed. For example, in certain contexts saying that consequences can be deduced from premises using truth-preserving deduction rules is a fallacy if it suggests that all truth-preserving rules are consequence-preserving. The arithmetic additive-associativity rule that yields 6 = (3 + (2 + 1)) from 6 = ((3 + 2) + 1) is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. As noted in James Gasser’s dissertation, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 999