I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...) or question-begging one. (shrink)

Imagination is necessary for scientific practice, yet there are no in vivo sociological studies on the ways that imagination is taught, thought of, or evaluated by scientists. This article begins to remedy this by presenting the results of a qualitative study performed on two systems biology laboratories. I found that the more advanced a participant was in their scientific career, the more they valued imagination. Further, positive attitudes toward imagination were primarily due to the perceived role of imagination in problem-solving. (...) But not all problem-solving episodes involved clear appeals to imagination, only maximally specific problems did. This pattern is explained by the presence of an implicit norm governing imagination use in the two labs: only use imagination on maximally specific problems, and only when all other available methods have failed. This norm was confirmed by the participants, and I argue that it has epistemological reasons in its favour. I also found that its strength varies inversely with career stage, such that more advanced scientists do (and should) occasionally bring their imaginations to bear on more general problems. A story about scientific pedagogy explains the trend away from (and back to) imagination over the course of a scientific career. Finally, some positive recommendations are given for a more imagination-friendly scientific pedagogy. (shrink)

Recently, Kit Fine's (1994) view that modal truths aretrue in virtue of,grounded in, orexplained byessentialist truths has been under attack. In what follows we offer two responses to the wave of criticism against his view. While the first response is pretty straightforward, the second is based on the distinction between, what we call,Reductive Finean EssentialismandNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism. Engaging the work of Bob Hale onNon-Reductive Finean Essentialism, we aim to show that the arguments against Fine's view are unconvincing, while we acknowledge (...) the presence of a deep standoff between the two views. (shrink)

I argue that Kant has developed a broad systematic account of the architectonic functionality of pure reason that can be used and advanced in contemporary contexts. Reason, in the narrow sense, is responsible for the picture of a well-ordered universe of science consisting of architectonic ideas of science, sciences and parts of sciences. In the first section (I), I show what Kant means by the architectonic ideas by explaining and interrelating the concepts of (a) the faculty of reason, (b) ideas (...) (as principles), (c) method, and (d) sciences of reason. Thereafter (II), I think through his holistic understanding of science and scientific progress and suggest differentiating between four levels of use of architectonic ideas, drawing on the metaphor of a well-structured universe as imagined by Kant in his work on the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. I also claim that each possible idea of reason can be (apart from its primary function) additionally regarded as a fourth-level architectonic concept when explicitly conceived as an object of (e. g. philosophical) studies, i. e. from a mere methodological perspective. In the final section (III), I unveil the potential of Kant’s theory by pointing out how this architectonic methodological function of pure reason is tacitly used in Karl-Otto Apel’s contemporary philosophical research programme. You can get the official version of the paper and the whole issue (open access) by clicking on the attached link. (shrink)

Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts which are most closely associated with the “Frege point", but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Supposedly this is only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts. Against this I argue that this fact more readily supports the view that questions operate on assertions and other (...) forceful acts themselves. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. Force is representational: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects non-conceptually present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" begins with an argument against sense-datum epistemology. There is some question about the validity of this attack, stemming in part from the assumption that Sellars is concerned with epistemic foundationalism. This paper recontextualizes Sellars's argument in two ways: by showing how the argument of EPM relates to Sellars's 1940s work, which does not concern foundationalism at all; and by considering the view of H.H. Price, Sellars's teacher at Oxford and the only classical (...) datum theorist to receive substantive comment in EPM. Timm Triplett has claimed that Sellars's discussion simply begs the question against Price, but this depends on the mistaken assumption that Sellars's concern is with foundationalism. On the contrary, Sellars's argument concerns the assumption that the innate capacity for sensory experience counts as "thinking in presence" in the way needed for empiricist accounts of content acquisition. Price's distinction between noticing universals and being aware of them encapsulates the tensions empiricists face here. (shrink)

When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading (...) cues (e.g. ‘seeing’ Kanizsa triangles), hallucinations of Charles Bonnet Syndrome patients, and dreams are experiences of past‐perceived objects. (shrink)

Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity (...) has no evidential value. (shrink)

Moral philosophy continues to be enriched by an ongoing empirical turn,mainly through contributions from neuroscience, biology, and psychology. Thusfar, cultural anthropology has largely been missing. A recent and rapidly growing‘ethical turn’ within cultural anthropologynow explicitly and systematically studiesmorality. This research report aims to introduce to an audience in moral philosophyseveral notable works within the ethical turn. It does so by critically discussing theethical turn’s contributions to four topics: the definition of morality, the nature ofmoral change and progress, the truth of (...) moral relativism, and attempts to debunkmorality. The ethical turn uncovers a richer picture of moral phenomena on theintersubjective level, one akin to a virtue theoretic focus on moral character, withstriking similarities of moral phenomena across cultures. Perennial debates are notsettled but the ethical turn strengthens moral philosophy’s empirical turn and itrewards serious attention from philosophers. (shrink)

According to the simple modal account of essence, an object has a property essentially just in case it has it in every world in which it exists. As many have observed, the simple modal account is implausible for a number of reasons. This has led to various proposals for strengthening the account, for example, by adding a restriction to the intrinsic or sparse properties. I argue, however, that these amendments to the simple modal account themselves fail. Drawing on lessons from (...) these failures, I propose a new version of a modal account, inspired by Ruth Barcan Marcus's defense of the coherence of quantified modal logic, according to which an object has a property essentially just in case (i) it has it in every world in which it exists, (ii) the property is discriminating (or non-trivial), and (iii) the property is qualitative. The resulting account of essence does not face any of the standard objections other accounts face, and I defend it from other potential objections. (shrink)

Speedrunning is a kind of ‘metagame’ involving video games. Though it does not yet have the kind of profile of multiplayer e-sports, speedrunning is fast approaching e-sports in popularity. Aside from audience numbers, however, from the perspective of the philosophy of sport and games, speedrunning is particularly interesting. To the casual player or viewer, speedrunning appears to be a highly irreverent, even pointless, way of playing games, particularly due to the incorporation of “glitches”. For many outside the speedrunning community, the (...) use of glitches appears to be cheating. For speedrunners, however, glitches are entirely within the bounds of acceptability. Because of this, however, speedrunning frequently involves sidestepping what are typically taken to be the core challenges of the game. By examining the distinction between the use of glitches and cheating in speedrunning, we can gain a greater understanding of the unique ethos of this activity; that is, we can make sense of what fundamentally constitutes speedrunning as a metagame. I argue that by understanding the code of the game not as rules but as physics, and by examining what actions are deemed impermissible by the speedrunning community – such as hardware modification and hacking – we can see that the ethos of speedrunning has three components: constitutive skills (including dexterity, memorisation and mental fortitude); a collective, fine-grained knowledge of the game and the desire to subvert the intentions of the programmers. Each of these components limits and structures the earlier ones: collective knowledge takes priority over constitutive skills, and subversion takes priority over both. These three components form the ethos that structures speedrunning as a metagame, expressing what speedrunners take to be its central aim. (shrink)

Over the last two decades there has been a growing interest in the transcendental dialectic of Critique of Pure Reason in Germany. Authors, however, often do not pay enough attention to the fact that Kant’s theory of reason (in the narrow sense) and the concept of ideas derived from it is not limited to this text. The purpose of this article is to compare and analyze the functionality of mind as a subjective ability developed by Kant and Fichte with the (...) Hegelian expansion of the mind to the idea of universal rationality. The relevance of such a comparison is connected with the need to demonstrate how the Hegelian paradigm of absolute rationality causes either the subsequent rejection of reason as a philosophical principle in the 19th and´20th centuries counter-discourse, or reduction of reason to the concept of pragmatic rationality. In the first part of this paper, the author intends to differentiate between at least 7 different types of ideas and their functions in Kant’s works. In the second part, he demonstrates how Fichte tries to systematize them beginning with reason, which at first creates an idea of itself. Special attention is paid to the way that Fichte categorizes them with the help of 5 spheres of action or 5 worldviews. The third and final part of the article discusses how Hegel goes beyond the frame of the transcendental philosophy of consciousness using different demands linked to the concepts of “reason” and “ideas”. Although these requirements are not found in Kant and Fichte, they entail a set of difficulties, which the author considers in conclusion. The author’s interpretation of the theory of ideas and their functions in Kant, Fichte and Hegel demonstrates the dynamic character of the theories of reason in classical German philosophy, as well as the relevance of the 7 types of ideas that retain their significance for philosophy of the 21st century. Keywords: Kant and German idealism, types of ideas, functions of reason, worldviews, the problem of different demands. В Германии на протяжении последних двух десятилетий возрос интерес к трансцендентальной диалектике «Критики чистого разума». Однако авторы часто не обращают внимания на то, что кантовская теория разума (в узком смысле), в которой разворачивается работа с идеями, не ограничивается этим текстом. Целью данной статьи является сравнительный анализ разработанной Кантом и Фихте функциональности разума как субъективной способности с гегелевским расширением разума до идеи всеобщей разумности. Актуальность такого сравнения связана с необходимостью продемонстрировать то, каким образом гегелевская парадигма абсолютной разумности вызывает либо последующий отказ от разума как философского принципа в контрдискурсе XIX–XX вв., либо редукцию разума к понятию прагматической рациональности. В первой части данной статьи вводится различение по меньшей мере семи различных видов идей и связанных с ними функций в философии Канта. Во второй части демонстрируется попытка Фихте их систематизировать исходя из утверждения том, что разум должен сначала создать идею о самом себе. Проанализировано также предложенное Фихте распределение идей на пять сфер действенности или типов мировоззрения. В третьей, итоговой части статьи рассмотрен выход гегелевской мысли за рамки трансцендентальной философии сознания. Автор статьи связывает этот процесс с выдвижением не осуществимых в контексте философии Канта и Фихте требований к понятиям «разум» и «идея» и анализирует ряд сложностей, вызванных этими требованиями. Таким образом, интерпретация учения об идеях и их функциях у Канта, Фихте и Гегеля демонстрирует динамический характер теорий разума в классической немецкой философии и актуальность семи видов идей, которые сохраняют свое значение для философии XXI в. Ключевые слова: Кант и немецкий идеализм, виды идей, функции разума, мировоззрение, проблема различных требований. (shrink)

This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of there being (...) determination relations where no such relations obtain. Since, plausibly, dependence relations just are asymmetric determination relations, we argue that once we come mistakenly to believe that there exist determination relations, the existence of other asymmetries (conceptual and temporal) explains why it appears that there are dependence relations. (shrink)

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the (...) second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

We propose that all actual causes are simultaneous with their direct effects, as illustrated by both everyday examples and the laws of physics. We contrast this view with the sequential conception of causation, according to which causes must occur prior to their effects. The key difference between the two views of causation lies in differing assumptions about the mathematical structure of time.

: The debate between proponents of ideal and non-ideal approaches to political philosophy has thus far been framed as a meta-level debate about normative theory. The argument of this essay will be that the ideal/non-ideal debate can be helpfully reframed as a ground-level debate within normative theory. Specifically, it can be understood as a debate within the applied normative field of professional ethics, with the profession being examined that of political philosophy itself. If the community of academic political theorists and (...) philosophers cannot help us navigate the problems we face in actual political life, they have not lived up to the moral demands of their vocation. A moderate form of what David Estlund decries as “utopophobia” is therefore an integral element of a proper professional ethic for political philosophers. The moderate utopophobe maintains that while devoting scarce time and resources to constructing utopias may sometimes be justifiable, it is never self-justifying. Utopianism is defensible only insofar as it can reasonably be expected to help inform or improve nonutopian political thinking. (shrink)

Abstract: In earlier work, I argued that individuals have a right to own firearms for personal defense, and that as a result, gun prohibition would be unjustified unless it at least produced benefits many times greater than its costs. Here, I defend that argument against objections posed by Nicholas Dixon and Jeff McMahan to the effect that the right of citizens to be free from gun violence counterbalances the right of self-defense, and that gun prohibition does not violate the right (...) of self-defense because it renders everyone overall safer. (4258 words). (shrink)

Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...) I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly. (shrink)

The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizeshis students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper (...) argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis). (shrink)

Contemporary theorists critical of the current vogue for compassion might like to turn to Friedrich Nietzsche as an obvious ally in their opposition to the sentiment. Yet this essay argues that Nietzsche’s critique of compassion is not entirely critical, and that the endorsement of one’s sympathetic feelings is actually a natural outgrowth of Nietzsche’s immoralist ethics. Nietzsche understands the tendency to share in the suffering of their inferiors as a distinctive vulnerability of the spiritually strong and healthy. Their compassion, however, (...) is an essential element of the imaginative creativity that Nietzsche holds to be the goal of human existence. Although shared suffering may prove debilitating for some, great individuals must come to affirm their compassion as necessary in achieving accurate knowledge of the human condition. (shrink)

Rival causal and interpretive approaches to explaining social phenomena have important ethical differences. While human actions can be explained as a result of causal mechanisms, as a meaningful choice based on reasons, or as some combination of the two, it is morally important that social scientists respect others by recognizing them as persons. Interpretive explanations directly respect their subjects in this way, while purely causal explanations do not. Yet although causal explanations are not themselves expressions of respect, they can be (...) used in respectful ways if they are incorporated into subjects’ self-directed projects. This can occur when subjects correctly understand and freely adopt researchers’ goals through a process of informed consent. It can also occur when researchers correctly understand and adopt their subject’s goals, using their research to empower those they study. (shrink)

How children seek knowledge and evaluate claims may depend on their understanding of the source of knowledge. What shifts in their understandings about why scientists might disagree and how claims about the state of the world are justified? Until about the age of 41/2, knowledge is seen as self-evident. Children believe that knowledge of reality comes directly through our senses and what others tell us. They appeal to these external sources in order to know. The attainment of Theory of Mind (...) (ToM) at this age is commonly seen as the significant shift in development in understanding disagreements in knowledge claims. Children attaining ToM understand that someone exposed to incorrect or incomplete information might have false beliefs. Disagreement, then, is still attributed to objective sources of knowledge. The current study examines the later developing Interpretive Theory of Mind (iToM) as the basis for children’s understanding of how people with access to the same information might disagree and what this means for how to provide justification for a knowledge claim. Fourteen 2nd graders with the most iToM responses to four tasks and 14 with the fewest iToM responses were selected from a larger sample of 91. In analyses of interviews about a story in which two experts make different claims about a scientific phenomenon, those in the high iToM group noted subjective perspective and processes as the source of disagreement and suggested the need for investigation as the means to knowing. In contrast, those in the low iToM group mostly could not explain the source of disagreement and held that knowledge is acquired from external sources. A comparison of the interviews regarding the science story 2 years later allows for a qualitative description of the development. Those in the low iToM group showed more general recognition of subjective and constructive processes in knowing whereas those in the high iToM group identified interpretive processes and the relativity of perspectives with implications for how observations were conducted and interpreted. Only those in the high iToM group referred to the importance of evidence as a basis for knowledge claims at either point in the study. (shrink)

Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I (...) argue that these results force us to give up either (V), our current conception of what it is to be epistemically responsible, or (C) the responsibility-reliability connection. I will argue that we should relinquish (V). This is likely to reshape our epistemic practices. It will force us to alter our epistemic judgments about certain instances of reasoning, to endorse some counterintuitive epistemic prescriptions, and to rethink what it is for cognitive agents to be epistemically responsible. (shrink)

The common view that Hume is a regularity theorist about laws of nature isn’t textually well grounded. The texts show that he thinks of them as objective governing principles that could conceivably be violated while still counting as a law of nature. This is a standard view at the time, and Hume borrows it from others. He implies that the best evidence for rational religion is the exceptionless workings of the laws of nature, he argues that suicide isn’t incompatible with (...) the will of God by identifying his will with the laws of nature, and he has Philo argue for the existence of God from the simplicity of the laws governing the world. He sheds some of the theological baggage that laws of nature carry at the time, but not all of it. (shrink)

Mozi and George Berkeley are philosophers who are not often put into conversation. However, I argue that comparing them can shed some light on the relationship between certain philosophical positions and their resulting moral philosophies. Specifically, I will draw attention to the way that their lack of interest in an appearance-reality distinction and in "essence" gives rise to a tension between consequentialism and divine command theory. These similarities exist despite the fact that Mozi and Berkeley otherwise have quite distinct views. (...) For example, Mozi's dao-centered theoretical orientation leads him to assume that the world simply is as it is given through our senses, whereas Berkeley holds that the world is... (shrink)

The premise that it is logically necessary for a necessary condition of value to be valuable is sometimes used in metaethics in support of the claim that agency, or some constitutive condition of agency or action, has value for all agents. I focus on the most recent application of this premise by Caroline T. Arruda and argue that the premise is false. Despite this defect the relevant evaluative step could still work just in case of agency if an additional condition (...) were satisfied. (shrink)

Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s defense fails, in that if (...) his defense of CS’s skeptical half succeeds, then his defense of CS’s conciliatory half fails. We then suggest a potential way forward. We suggest in particular that the correct way of being a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic is to deny that S has a privileged way of knowing about her thoughts, but to grant that she is nonetheless an authority on her thoughts. (shrink)

In his 2009 encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI calls for a deeper, theological and metaphysical evaluation of the category of “relation” to achieve a proper understanding of the human being’s “transcendent dignity.” For some contemporary thinkers, this position might seem to be hopelessly paradoxical or even incoherent. After all, many contemporary thinkers are apt to believe that the human creature can have “transcendent dignity” only if the being and goodness of the human creature is not conditioned by (...) or dependent upon any relation or relatedness to anything else, including the natural environment. This chapter seeks to show that apparent paradoxes in Benedict XVI’s statement will begin to disappear if one resists the rather understandable temptation to interpret his thought by relying on presuppositions borrowed from contemporary ethical theories. More specifically, this chapter aims to show that Benedict XVI’s teachings— embedded as they are within a rich tradition of Catholic “natural law” thinking—are importantly distinguishable from contemporary utilitarian and deontological views. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to demonstrate that Benedict XVI’s “natural law” account offers an intellectually defensible alternative to contemporary modes of environmental thinking. (shrink)

In the modern period, the most original and influential theories about law and politics were developed in connection with a set of far-reaching, interrelated questions about the definition of law, the purpose of law, the relationship between law and morality, and the existence of natural law and natural rights. In this entry I summarize the contributions of Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu; William Blackstone; Jeremy Bentham; and Immanuel Kant as exemplars of the history of modern (...) thought on law and politics. (shrink)

A heuristic is a rule of thumb. In psychology, heuristics are relatively simple rules for making judgments. A fast heuristic is easy to use and allows one to make judgments quickly. A frugal heuristic relies on a small fraction of the available evidence in making judgments. Typically, fast and frugal heuristics (FFHs) have, or are claimed to have, a further property: They are very reliable, yielding judgments that are about as accurate in the long run as ideal non-fast, non-frugal rules. (...) This paper introduces some well-known examples of FFHs, raises some objections to the FFH program, and looks at the implications of those parts of the FFH program about which we can have some reasonable degree of confidence. (shrink)

Scholars studying classic political texts face an important decision: Should these texts be read as artifacts of history or as sources for still-valid insights about politics today? Competing historical and “presentist” approaches to political thought do not have a methodological dispute—that is, a disagreement about the most effective scholarly means to an agreed-upon end. They instead have an ethical dispute about the respective value of competing activities that aim at different purposes. This article examines six ethical arguments, drawn primarily from (...) the work of Quentin Skinner, in favor of the historical approach. It concludes that while both intellectual history and presentist theory are ethically justifiable, the best justification of the former enterprise is that it can help us achieve the purposes of the latter. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Enlightenment sentimentalism’s greatest potential contribution to scholarship today is not a matter for moral philosophy alone, but rather an agenda for fruitful collaboration between fields across the humanities and social sciences. This interdisciplinary program for both understanding an improving human nature is contrasted with alternative approaches, and defended against objections that it cannot produce a moral code categorically binding on any rational being as such. The chapter concludes with some sociological and psychological hypotheses that might help (...) explain why the interdisciplinary and sentimentalist approach to ethics, for all its intellectual virtues, has not been adequately appreciated. (shrink)

According to the deliberative view of democracy, the legitimacy of democratic politics is closely tied to whether the use of political power is accompanied by a process of rational deliberation among the citizenry and their representatives. Critics have questioned whether this level of deliberative capacity is even possible among modern citizenries--due to limitations of time, energy, and differential backgrounds--which therefore calls into question the very possibility of this type of democracy. In my dissertation, I counter this line of criticism, arguing (...) that deliberative democrats and their critics have both idealized the wrong kind of citizen deliberation. Citizen deliberation should not be concerned with the indeterminate project of "translating" abstract democratic principles and values into everyday cases of political problem-solving. Instead, deliberation should take the form of analogy, just as we already find it in everyday politics and affairs. When ordinary citizens use analogies, they do not derive decisions from general principles or values, but they still reason nonetheless. Seen from this analogical perspective, deliberative democracy is already a practical reality to a large degree. When an election is on the horizon, a campaign season arises in which debates, forums, and "barstool" dialogues exponentially increase the amount of citizen deliberation. In these settings, citizens can readily be seen to be mapping analogous past candidates, elections, issues, and problems onto those currently on the ballot so as to reason about them. Consequently, analogical reasoning allows citizens to treat the majority rule mechanisms that proliferate in real politics as "deliberative outlets," which is to say, as catalysts of deliberation akin to the "creative outlets" that catalyze self-expression in the arts. While citizens may recognize majority rule mechanisms as catalysts of deliberation, many democratic theorists will hesitate to embrace this vision of the practical reality of deliberative politics. Isn't analogical reasoning too low in rigor to be placed at the heart of the deliberative ideal? I develop two arguments to explain the foundational role analogy plays in deliberation and to counter such critics. First, I draw on the explosion of research on analogical reasoning over the past two decades to show that it is far more rigorous and systematic than many suppose. Second, I argue that to the extent that citizen deliberation is concerned with rational planning, rather than just reasoning in general, analogical reasoning is logically superior. When we reason about what to do, we make plans that incorporate predictions about what is likely to ensue when a given course of action is selected. However, as soon as predictions enter into deliberation, its underlying logic changes as well. The reason for this change in logic is that as our probabilistic reasoning expands, the probability of its conclusions degenerates. Therefore, when assessing probabilities, we no longer should seek decisions derived from long, elegant chains of reasoning that connect our various options to generalities like values and principles. Instead, what we need is "short and sweet," or terse, humble lines of reasoning, which are more congruent with this form of deliberation. Thus, to the extent that democratic deliberation is involved in rational planning, it calls not for the elegant, deductive kind of reasoning idealized by proponents and critics of deliberative democracy alike. Instead, democratic deliberation calls for the "short and sweet," analogical kind of decision-making we associate with ordinary citizens already. After all, as research has shown, analogies are a much preferred and rigorous way by which even experts engage in probabilistic reasoning. By focusing on analogical reasoning, I therefore conclude that the practical reality of deliberative democracy should be recognized in ways that might ordinarily be dismissed. (shrink)

What factors are involved in the resolution of scientific disputes? What factors make the resolution of such disputes rational? The traditional view confers an important role on observation statements that are shared by proponents of competing theories. Rival theories make incompatible (sometimes contradictory) observational predictions about a particular situation, and the prediction made by one theory is borne out while the prediction made by the other is not. Paul Feyerabend, Thomas Kuhn, and Paul Churchland have called into question this account (...) of theory-resolution. According to these philosophers, substantially different and competing scientific theories are semantically incommensurable: those theories do not share a common observation language. Two charges have been leveled against the semantic incommensurability theories. The first is that it ignores that some semantic features of observational terms (e.g., their reference) can be expressed by proponents of competing theories. The second is that the semantic incommensurability thesis is self-defeating. In this paper I will argue that both of these charges are true but not for the reasons usually given. (shrink)

美国和世界正处于人口过度增长的崩溃过程中,其中大多数在上个世纪,现在全部归功于第三世界人民。消耗资源,增加40亿人口,将崩溃工业文明,带来惊人的饥饿、疾病、暴力和战争。地球每年至少损失1%的表土,因此 ,当它接近2100年时,大部分粮食的生长能力将消失。数十亿将死去,核战争几乎可以肯定。在美国,由于大规模移民和移民再生产,加上民主带来的滥用,这大大加速了这一点。堕落的人性无情地把民主和多样性的梦想变 成了犯罪和贫穷的恶梦。只要中国坚持限制自私的独裁统治,中国将继续压倒美国和世界。崩溃的根本原因是我们与生俱来的心理无法适应现代世界,这导致人们把不相干的人当作他们共同的利益对待。人权观念是左派分子宣扬 的邪恶幻想,旨在转移人们对无节制的第三世界母性无情毁灭地球的注意力。再加上对基础生物学和心理学的无知,导致部分受过教育的控制民主社会的人产生社会工程错觉。很少有人明白,如果你帮助一个人,你伤害了别人— —没有免费的午餐,任何人消耗的每一件东西都会破坏无法修复的地球。因此,各地的社会政策是不可持续的,一个个、没有严格控制自私的社会将崩溃为无政府状态或独裁。最基本的事实几乎从未提及过,即美国或世界上没有 足够的资源来使相当一部分穷人摆脱贫困并使他们继续生活。这样做的企图正在使美国破产,毁灭世界。地球生产食物的能力每天都在下降,我们的遗传质量也是如此。现在,和往常一样,穷人最大的敌人是其他穷人,而不是富 人。如果不进行戏剧性和立即的变化,就不可能阻止美国或任何遵循民主制度的国家的崩溃。.

我已经习惯了奇怪的书和特殊的人,但霍金斯脱颖而出,因为他使用一个简单的技术来测试肌肉张力作为关键,任何种类的陈述的"真相"-即,不只是被测试的人是否相信它,但它是否真的是真的!众所 周知,人们会表现出自动的、无意识的生理和心理反应,就像他们接触到的任何东西——图像、声音、触觉、气味、想法、人。所以,肌肉阅读,找出他们的真实感受是一点也不激进,不像用它作为一个沉思的棍子(更多的肌肉 阅读)做"超自然科学"。 霍金斯描述了在认知负荷增加时使用降低手臂肌肉的张力,从而导致手臂在手指持续压力下下降。他似乎没有意识到,在社会心理学方面,有一个长期而庞大的持续研究,被诸如"隐性认知"、" ;自动性"等短语所指,而他使用"运动学"只是一小部分。除了肌肉张力(不常使用)外,社会心理学家还测量脑电图、电光皮肤反应,以及最常见的言语反应、句子、图像或情况,有时从刺 激后几秒钟到几个月不等。许多,如巴格和韦格纳,认为结果意味着我们是自动机,学习和行动在很大程度上没有意识通过S1(自动化系统1)和许多其他,如基尔斯特罗姆和尚克斯说,这些研究是有缺陷的,我们是S2的生 物(审议系统2)。虽然霍金斯似乎并不知道,就像在高阶思维的描述性心理学的其他领域一样,"自动性"的情况仍然像维特根斯坦描述心理学无菌和贫瘠的原因时一样混乱。在30年代。然而,这本书 是一个容易阅读,一些治疗师和精神教师可能会发现它使用。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago. -/- Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as (...) a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural selection. “Gödel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say (contra nearly everyone) that is all that Gödel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test. Wittgenstein often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with -/- ‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and nothing is meaning [semantics]…” -/- I make some brief remarks which note the similarities of these ‘mathematical’ issues to economics, physics, game theory, and decision theory. -/- Those wishing further comments on philosophy and science from a Wittgensteinian two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my other writings -- Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock and Yanofsky (2019), and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Religion, Politics, Economics, Literature and History (2019). (shrink)

「ゴーデルの道」では、3人の著名な科学者が、デシッド不能、不完全性、ランダム性、計算可能性、パラコンシステンションなどの問題について議論しています。私は、ウィトゲンシュタイニアンの視点から、全く異なる 解決策を持つ2つの基本的な問題があることをこれらの問題に取り組んでいます。科学的または経験的な問題は、言語がどのように理解的に使用できるか(数学と論理に特定の質問を含む)、特定の文脈で実際にどのように 単語を使用するかを調べて決定する必要がある、観察的および哲学的な問題を調査する必要がある世界に関する事実です。私たちがプレイしている言語ゲームについて明確になると、これらのトピックは他の人と同じように 普通の科学的、数学的な質問であると見なされます。ウィトゲンシュタインの洞察はめったに等しくなく、決して上回ることはなく、彼がブルーブックスとブラウンブックスを口述した80年前と同じくらい適切です。失敗 にもかかわらず、本当に完成した本ではなく一連のノートは、半世紀以上にわたって物理学、数学、哲学の出血エッジで働いてきたこれらの3人の有名な学者の作品のユニークな源です。ダ・コスタとドリアは、普遍的な計 算に書いて以来、ウォルパート(以下または私の記事を参照)によって引用されています(ウォルパートとヤナフスキーの「理由の外側の限界」の私のレビューを参照)、,そして彼の多くの成果の中で、ダ・コスタはパラ コンシタンションのパイオニアです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Obwohl die SSSSK und der Rest des Weltmilitärs riesige Summen für fortschrittliche Hardware ausgeben, ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass WW3 (oder die kleineren Engagements, die dazu führen) von softwaredominiert wird. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass die SSSSK, mit wahrscheinlich mehr Hackern (Codern), die für sie arbeiten, als der Rest der Welt zusammen, zukünftige Kriege mit minimalen physischen Konflikten gewinnen wird, nur indem sie ihre Feinde über das Netz lähmt. Keine Satelliten, keine Telefone, keine Kommunikation, keine Finanztransaktionen, kein Stromnetz, kein Internet, (...) keine fortschrittlichen Waffen, keine Fahrzeuge, Züge, Schiffe oder Flugzeuge. Es wird wahrscheinlich innerhalb weniger Jahrzehnte über den Inseln im Südchinesischen Meer oder Taiwan passieren, aber da sie weltweit Militärstützpunkte errichten, könnte es überall passieren (siehe Crouching Tiger etc.). Zukünftige Konflikte werden Hardkill- und Softkill-Aspekte mit den erklärten Zielen der KPC haben, den Cyberkrieg zu betonen, indem sie Kontrollsysteme aller militärischen und industriellen Kommunikation, Ausrüstung, Kraftwerke, Satelliten, Internet, Banken und jedes mit dem Netz verbundene Gerät oder Fahrzeug hacken und lähmen. (shrink)

アメリカと世界は、過去1世紀の人口過剰な人口増加から崩壊し、現在は第3世界の人々のために崩壊しています。資源の消費と40億ca.2100の追加は、産業文明を崩壊させ、驚異的な規模で飢餓、病気、暴力と戦 争をもたらすでしょう。地球は毎年表土の少なくとも1%を失うので、2100に近づくにつれて、その食糧栽培能力のほとんどはなくなりました。何十億人もの人が死んで、核戦争は確実です。アメリカでは、これは大規 模な移民と移民の生殖によって、民主主義によって可能になった虐待と相まって、非常に加速されています。堕落した人間性は、民主主義と多様性の夢を犯罪と貧困の悪夢に変えます。中国は、利己主義を制限する独裁政権 を維持する限り、アメリカと世界を圧倒し続けるだろう。崩壊の根本的な原因は、私たちの生来の心理学が現代世界に適応できないことであり、人々は無関係な人を共通の利益を持っているかのように扱う。人権の考え方は 、左翼が第三世界の母性によって地球の無慈悲な破壊から注意を引くために促進する邪悪なファンタジーです。これは、基本的な生物学と心理学の無知に加えて、民主的な社会を支配する部分的に教育を受けた人々のソーシ ャルエンジニアリングの妄想につながります。一人の人を助けた場合、誰かに危害を加える人はいませんが、無料のランチはなく、誰もが消費するアイテムが修復を超えて地球を破壊することを理解している人はほとんどい ません。その結果、至る所の社会政策は持続不可能であり、利己主義に対する厳格な統制なしに、すべての社会が一つ一つ無政府状態または独裁に崩壊する。最も基本的な事実は、ほとんど言及されていないが、貧困層のか なりの割合を貧困から引き上げ、そこに留めるのに十分な資源がアメリカや世界に存在しないことである。これを行う試みは、アメリカを破産させ、世界を破壊することです。私たちの遺伝的品質と同様に、食料を生産する 地球の能力は毎日低下します。そして今、いつものように、貧しい人々の最大の敵は他の貧しい人々であり、金持ちではありません。劇的かつ即時の変化がなければ、アメリカの崩壊や民主主義システムに続く国を防ぐ望み はありません。.

यह दोनों अद्भुत और फिटिंग है कि इस विशाल, शब्दजाल से लदी (इस पुस्तक को वास्तव में एक शब्दकोष की जरूरत है!), भारी शैक्षणिक काम शिक्षित की दुनिया में एक सबसे अच्छा विक्रेता बन गया है. एक शब्दजाल जानने के लिए समर्पित किया जाना है और फिर पाठ के 551 पृष्ठों और नोटों के 238 पृष्ठों के माध्यम से हल. एम,हम बार बार कहा जाता है कि यह सिर्फ क्या आ रहा है की एक रूपरेखा है! हालांकि वह गंभीर रूप (...) से तीन आंदोलनों की ज्यादतियों की आलोचना करता है, यह एक विरचनात्मक और New आयु रहस्यमय और धर्म, दर्शन और व्यवहार विज्ञान के एक बहुत उदार, आध्यात्मिक दृष्टिकोण से व्यवहार विज्ञान है अर्थात्, डेसन, पीएम और गुट निरपेक्षता, उग्र समानतावाद और वैज्ञानिक विरोधी बौद्धिकता के बिना। वह कुछ विस्तार में दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, समाजशास्त्र और धर्म के विभिन्न दुनिया विचारों का विश्लेषण करती है, (ज्यादातर) देखभाल और brill iance के साथ उनके घातक रिडक्शनिस्ट खामियों को उजागर,लेकिन स्रोतों वह विश्लेषण के अधिकांश लगभग कोई प्रासंगिकता के आज कर रहे हैं. वे शब्दावली और अवधारणाओं है कि पहले से ही पुराने थे जब वह शोध और 20 साल पहले लिख रहा था का उपयोग करें. एक शब्दजाल के अंतहीन पन्नों के माध्यम से dig है - Habermas, कांत, Emerson, जंग et alias की चर्चा से लदी. मोती को पाने के लिए. तुम बुरा लेखन, उलझन में और पुराने विचारों और अप्रचलित शब्दजाल का एक भयानक नमूना मिलता है. यदि एक एक अच्छा वर्तमान शिक्षा है, यह doubly इस पुस्तक को पढ़ने के लिए दर्दनाक है (और मानव व्यवहार पर सबसे अधिक लेखन). दर्दनाक है क्योंकि यह बहुत अत्याचार और भ्रामक है, और फिर जब आप को एहसास कितना आसान यह आधुनिक मनोविज्ञान और दर्शन के साथ है. शब्दावली और विचारों को भयावह रूप से भ्रमित और दिनांकित कर रहे हैं (लेकिन Wilber में कम तो अपने स्रोतों की तुलना में अपने विश्लेषण). इस पुस्तक और इसके स्रोतों के अधिकांश होगा मनोविज्ञान ग्रंथों, हालांकि लेखकों के अधिकांश यह पता नहीं था. यह मानव व्यवहार और तर्क के बारे में है कि हम क्यों सोचते हैं और जिस तरह से हम करते हैं और कैसे हम भविष्य में बदल सकता है कार्य. लेकिन (हाल ही में जब तक इस तरह के सभी चर्चा की तरह) explanations में से कोई भीवास्तव में स्पष्टीकरण कर रहे हैं, और इसलिए वे मानव व्यवहार में कोई अंतर्दृष्टि दे. कोई भी शामिल मानसिक तंत्र पर चर्चा करता है. यह वर्णन कैसे एक कार काम करता है बीवाईस्टीयरिंग व्हील और धातु और इंजन, ईंधन या ड्राइव ट्रेन के किसी भी ज्ञान के बिना रंग पर चर्चा की तरह है. वास्तव में, व्यवहार के सबसे पुराने स्पष्टीकरण की तरह, ग्रंथों बोलीघ यहाँ और Wilber द्वारा comments अक्सर बातें वे स्वीकारकरते हैं की किस प्रकार के लिए और अधिक दिलचस्प हैं (औरछोड़!) स्पष्टीकरण के रूप में, और तर्क टीहे का उपयोग करें की तरह, वास्तविक सामग्री के लिए की तुलना में. यदि एक दर्शन और संज्ञानात्मक और विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान पर है, इस के अधिकांश पुरातन है. लगभग हर किसी की तरह (स्कॉलर और सार्वजनिक एक जैसे-ई.छ., Dennett स्वतंत्रता विकसित और अन्य पुस्तकों की मेरी समीक्षा देखें), वह समझ में नहीं आता कि धर्म और नैतिकता की मूल बातें - वास्तव में सभी मानव व्यवहार, हमारे जीन में क्रमादेशित रहे हैं. अपने आप को समझने में एक क्रांति हो रही थी जब वह अपनी कई किताबें लिख रहा था और यह उसे पारित कर दिया. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

著名的蚂蚁人E.O.Wilson一直是我的英雄之一——不仅是一位杰出的生物学家,而且是一小撮正在消失的知识分子,他们至少敢于暗示我们本性的真相,而其他人却无法领会,或者只要他们所掌握的,刻意避免政治权 宜之计。可悲的是,他以最脏的方式结束了他漫长的职业生涯,成为对科学的无知和傲慢攻击的一方,至少部分是出于哈佛同事的宗教热情。它显示了当大学接受宗教团体的钱,科学期刊被大牌们敬畏,以至于他们避免适当的同 行评议,当自我被允许失控时,后果不堪设想。它带我们进入进化的本质,科学方法论的基础,数学如何与科学的关系,什么构成一个理论,甚至什么态度的宗教和慷慨是适当的,因为我们无情地接近工业的崩溃文明。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

由于金蒂斯是一位资深经济学家,而且我饶有兴趣地阅读了他的一些以前的书,所以我期待对行为有更多的见解。可悲的是,他把群体选择和现象学的死手变成了他行为理论的核心,这在很大程度上使工作无效。更糟糕的是,由 于他在这里表现出了如此糟糕的判断,这就使他对以前的所有工作都提出了质疑。几年前,他在哈佛、诺瓦克和威尔逊的朋友试图重新选择团体,这是过去十年中生物学领域的重大丑闻之一,我在《利他主义、耶稣和世界末日》 一文中讲述了这个悲惨的故事——邓普顿·福 foundation 买下了哈佛大学教授职位,攻击了进化、理性和文明——对E.O.威尔逊的《地球的社会征服》(2012年)和诺瓦克和高菲尔德"超级合作者"(2012年)的回顾。与诺瓦克不同,金提人似乎并 非出于宗教狂热,而是强烈希望为人性的严峻现实创造一种替代方案,而(几乎普遍)缺乏对人类基本生物学的理解和空白石板主义的使之变得容易。行为科学家、其他学者和一般公众。 Gintis正确地攻击(正如他以前多次)经济学家、社会学家和其他行为科学家没有一个连贯的框架来描述行为。当然,理解行为所需的框架是一个进化的框架。不幸的是,他未能提供一个自己(根据他的许多批评家,我同 意),并试图嫁接腐烂的尸体的群体选择到任何经济和心理理论,他在他的几十年的工作,只是使他的整个项目无效。 虽然金蒂斯勇敢地努力去理解和解释遗传学,比如威尔逊和诺瓦克,但他远非专家,和他们一样,数学只是使他看不到生物学上的不可能性,当然这是科学的常态。正如维特根斯坦在《文化与价值》第一页中著名的指出的那样: "没有宗教派别滥用形而上学的表达方式像在数学中那样造成如此多的辛德。 一直很清楚,导致行为降低其自身频率的基因不能持久,但这是群体选择概念的核心。此外,众所周知,并经常证明,群体选择只是减少到包容性健身(亲属选择),正如道金斯指出,这只是另一个名字进化的自然选择。和威尔 逊一样,金蒂斯在这个舞台上工作了大约50年,但至今还没有掌握,但是丑闻爆发后,我只用了3天时间就找到、阅读和理解了最相关的专业工作,就像我的文章所详述的。想到金蒂斯和威尔逊在近半个世纪里未能实现这一点 ,这令人费解。 我讨论了群体选择和现象学的错误,这是学术界的常态,是几乎普遍不理解正在毁灭美国和世界的人性的特殊情况。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

L’Amérique et le monde sont en train de s’effondrer à cause d’une croissance démographique excessive, la plupart pour le siècle dernier, et maintenant tout cela, en raison des personnes du 3e monde. La consommation de ressources et l’ajout de 4 milliards d’euros supplémentaires vont effondrer la civilisation industrielle et provoquer la famine, la maladie, la violence et la guerre à une échelle stupéfiante. La terre perd au moins 1% de sa terre maximale chaque année, de sorte qu’il approche de 2100, (...) la plupart de sa capacité de culture alimentaire aura disparu. Des milliards vont mourir et la guerre nucléaire est presque certaine. En Amérique, cela est considérablement accéléré par l’immigration massive et la reproduction des immigrants, combinée avec des abus rendus possibles par la démocratie. La nature humaine dépravée transforme inexorablement le rêve de démocratie et de diversité en cauchemar de la criminalité et de la pauvreté. La Chine continuera à submerger l’Amérique et le monde, tant qu’elle maintiendra la dictature qui limite l’égoïsme. La cause profonde de l’effondrement est l’incapacité de notre psychologie innée à s’adapter au monde moderne, ce qui conduit les gens à traiter des personnes sans lien de parenté comme s’ils avaient des intérêts communs. L’idée des droits de l’homme est un fantasme maléfique promu par les gauchistes pour détourner l’attention de la destruction impitoyable de la terre par la maternité du 3e monde sans retenue. Ceci, plus l’ignorance de la biologie de base et de la psychologie, conduit aux illusions d’ingénierie sociale des personnes partiellement instruites qui contrôlent les sociétés démocratiques. Peu de gens comprennent que si vous aidez une personne, vous faites du mal à quelqu’un d’autre, il n’y a pas de déjeuner gratuit et chaque article que quelqu’un consomme détruit la terre au-delà de la réparation. Par conséquent, les politiques sociales partout sont insoutenables et une à une toutes les sociétés sans contrôle strict sur l’égoïsme s’effondreront dans l’anarchie ou la dictature. Les faits les plus élémentaires, presque jamais mentionnés, sont qu’il n’y a pas assez de ressources en Amérique ou dans le monde pour sortir un pourcentage significatif des pauvres de la pauvreté et les y maintenir. La tentative de le faire est la faillite de l’Amérique et de détruire le monde. La capacité de la terre à produire des aliments diminue chaque jour, tout comme notre qualité génétique. Et maintenant, comme toujours, de loin le plus grand ennemi des pauvres est d’autres pauvres et non les riches. Sans changements dramatiques et immédiats, il n’y a aucun espoir pour empêcher l’effondrement de l’Amérique, ou tout autre pays qui suit un système démocratique. (shrink)