Results for 'Plantinga, Problem of Evil, Molinism, Free will, Open Theism, Free will defense, Theodicy'

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  1. Free Will Is No Defense.Simon Cushing - manuscript
    Why Plantinga's updated (2009) version of the Free Will Defense does not work, and consequently the Logical Argument From Evil against the God of Theism is undefeated.
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  2. God’s Prime Directive: Non-Interference and Why There Is No (Viable) Free Will Defense.David Kyle Johnson - 2022 - Religions 13 (9).
    In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, (...)
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  3. The Free Will Defense Revisited: The Instrumental Value of Significant Free Will.Frederick Choo & Esther Goh - 2019 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science 4:32-45.
    Alvin Plantinga has famously responded to the logical problem of evil by appealing to the intrinsic value of significant free will. A problem, however, arises because traditional theists believe that both God and the redeemed who go to heaven cannot do wrong acts. This entails that both God and the redeemed in heaven lack significant freedom. If significant freedom is indeed valuable, then God and the redeemed in heaven would lack something intrinsically valuable. However, if significant (...)
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  4. Eternal Immolation: could a Trinitarian coordinating-concept for Theistic Metaphysics solve the Problems of Theodicy?Damiano Migliorini - 2017 - International Journalof Philosophy and Theology 5 (1).
    The author contextualizes the Problem of Evil in Open Theism system, listing its main theses, primarily the logic-of- love-defense (and free-will-defense) connected to Trinitarian speculation. After evaluating the discussion in Analytic Philosophy of Religion, the focus is on the personal mystery of evil, claiming that, because of mystery and vagueness, the Problem of Evil is undecidable. Recalling other schools of thought (Pareyson: ontology of freedom; Moltmann: Dialectical theology; Kenotic theology; Original Sin hermeneutics), the author tries (...)
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  5. The logical problem of evil: Mackie and Plantinga.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2013 - In Justin P. McBrayer & Daniel Howard‐Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 19-33.
    J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim (...)
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  6. Logical Problems of Evil and Free Will Defences.Graham Oppy - 2017 - In Chad V. Meister & Paul K. Moser (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 45-64.
    In this paper, I offer a novel analysis of logical arguments from evil. I claim that logical arguments from evil have three parts: (1) characterisation (attribution of specified attributes to God); (2) datum (a claim about evil); and (3) link (connection between attributes and evil). I argue that, while familiar logical arguments from evil are known to be unsuccessful, it remains an open question whether there are successful logical arguments from evil.
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  7. Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - Religions 13 (11):1126-1138.
    James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the (...) will defense is trying to accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)
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  8. The Problem of Natural Inequality: A New Problem of Evil.Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):127-136.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a kind of evil, namely, the unequal distribution of natural endowments, or natural inequality, which presents theists with a new evidential problem of evil. The problem of natural inequality is a new evidential problem of evil not only because, to the best of my knowledge, it has not yet been discussed in the literature, but also because available theodicies, such the free will defense and the soul-making defense, (...)
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  9. The Problem of Evil and the Pauline Principle: Consent, Logical Constraints, and Free Will.Marilie Coetsee - 2023 - Religions 14 (1):1-15.
    James Sterba uses the Pauline Principle to argue that the occurrence of significant, horrendous evils is logically incompatible with the existence of a good God. The Pauline Principle states that (as a rule) one must never do evil so that good may come from it, and according to Sterba, this principle implies that God may not permit significant evils even if that permission would be necessary to secure other, greater goods. By contrast, I argue that the occurrence of significant evils (...)
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  10. Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense.Kenneth Boyce - 2011 - Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
    Paradigmatic examples of logical arguments from evil are attempts to establish that the following claims are inconsistent with one another: (1) God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. (2) There is evil in the world. Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense resists such arguments by providing a positive case that (1) and (2) are consistent. A weakness in Plantinga’s free will defense, however, is that it does not show that theism is consistent with the proposition that there (...)
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  11. Plantinga's Free Will Defence: Critical Note.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Some atheistic philosophers have argued that God could have created a world with free moral agents and yet absent of moral evil. Using possible world semantics, Alvin Plantinga sought to defuse this logical form of the problem of evil. In this critical note, Leslie Allan examines the adequacy of Plantinga's argument that the existence of God is logically compatible with the existence of moral evil. The veracity of Plantinga's argument turns on whether his essential use of counterfactual conditionals (...)
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  12. Margaret Cavendish, Feminist Ethics, and the Problem of Evil.Jill Hernandez - 2018 - Religions 9 (4):1-13.
    This paper argues that, although Margaret Cavendish’s main philosophical contributions are not in philosophy of religion, she makes a case for a defense of God, in spite of the worst sorts of harms being present in the world. Her arguments about those harms actually presage those of contemporary feminist ethicists, which positions Cavendish’s scholarship in a unique position: it makes a positive theodical contribution, by relying on evils that contemporary atheists think are the best evidence against the existence of God. (...)
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  13. Non-Identity Theodicy.Vincent Raphael Vitale - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):269-90.
    I develop a theodicy (Non-Identity Theodicy) that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one af rms the (...)
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  14. God, Evil, and Alvin Plantinga on the Free-Will Defense.Ciro De Florio & Aldo Frigerio - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (3):75--94.
    In this paper we will give a critical account of Plantinga’s well-known argument to the effect that the existence of an omnipotent and morally perfect God is consistent with the actual presence of evil. After presenting Plantinga’s view, we critically discuss both the idea of divine knowledge of conditionals of freedom and the concept of transworld depravity. Then, we will sketch our own version of the Free-Will Defence, which maintains that moral evil depends on the misuse (...)
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  15. The Open Future, Free Will and Divine Assurance: Responding to Three Common Objections to the Open View.Gregory Boyd - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):207--222.
    In this essay I respond to three of the most forceful objections to the open view of the future. It is argued that a) open view advocates must deny bivalence; b) the open view offers no theodicy advantages over classical theism; and c) the open view can’t assure believers that God can work all things to the better. I argue that the first objection is premised on an inadequate assessment of future tensed propositions, the second (...)
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  16. Evil, Freedom and Heaven.Simon Cushing - 2017 - In Heaven and Philosophy. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. pp. 201-230.
    By far the most respected response by theists to the problem of evil is some version of the free will defense, which rests on the twin ideas that God could not create humans with free will without them committing evil acts, and that freedom is of such value that it is better that we have it than that we be perfect yet unfree. If we assume that the redeemed in heaven are impeccable, then the (...) will defense faces what I call the Heaven Dilemma: either the redeemed in heaven are free, in which case it is false that you cannot be free without doing evil, or they are not, in which case (heaven being better than earth) it is false that we are better off with freedom and evil than without either. James Sennett has tried to defend a view of freedom that effectively allows us to be impeccable in heaven so long as we are not on earth, while claiming that we are free in both. I argue that this view leads to a new dilemma: either there is no point to earth at all, and given its miseries, it is wrong for God to make us pass through it to get to heaven (especially if we face the risk of ending up in hell), or Sennett’s view consigns millions who die tragically young to an eternity of unfreedom. (shrink)
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  17. The Problem of Evil in Virtual Worlds.Brendan Shea - 2017 - In Mark Silcox (ed.), Experience Machines: The Philosophy of Virtual Worlds. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 137-155.
    In its original form, Nozick’s experience machine serves as a potent counterexample to a simplistic form of hedonism. The pleasurable life offered by the experience machine, its seems safe to say, lacks the requisite depth that many of us find necessary to lead a genuinely worthwhile life. Among other things, the experience machine offers no opportunities to establish meaningful relationships, or to engage in long-term artistic, intellectual, or political projects that survive one’s death. This intuitive objection finds some support in (...)
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  18. The Problem of Evil.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The existence of evil, pain and suffering is considered by many philosophers to be the most vexed question concerning the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect deity. Why would a loving God permit wanton acts of cruelty and misery on the scale witnessed throughout human history? In this essay, Leslie Allan evaluates four common theistic responses to this problem, highlighting the benefits and challenges faced by each approach. He concludes with a critical examination of a theistic defence (...)
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  19. The Problem of Evil and Replies to Some Important Responses.Bruce Russell - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):105-131.
    I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical (...)
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  20. Plantinga's Defence and His Theodicy are Incompatible.Richard Brian Davis & W. Paul Franks - 2017 - In Klaas J. Kraay (ed.), Does God Matter?: Essays on the Axiological Consequences of Theism. Routledge. pp. 203–223.
    In this paper, we attempt to show that if Plantinga’s free will defence succeeds, his O Felix Culpa theodicy fails. For if every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity, then given that Jesus has a creaturely essence (as we attempt to show), it follows that Incarnation and Atonement worlds cannot be actualized by God, in which case we have anything but a felix culpa.
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  21. 10 Theodicies in Christian Thought.Paul Mayer - manuscript
    The problem of evil is one of the most significant challenges to theism and Christianity in particular, asking why there seems to be so much evil if an omnibenevolent (all good), loving God exists. The problem of evil, as posed by many atheists and agnostics today, (following Epicurus) often asserts that the following premises cannot all be true: 1. God exists, and is omnipotent (all-powerful) 2. God exists, and is omnibenevolent (all-good) 3. God exists, and is omniscient (all-knowing) (...)
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  22. Moral Imaginative Resistance to Heaven: Why the Problem of Evil is So Intractable.Chris Kramer - 2018 - de Ethica: Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics 1 (5):51-67.
    The majority of philosophers of religion, at least since Plantinga’s reply to Mackie’s logical problem of evil, agree that it is logically possible for an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent God to exist who permits some of the evils we see in the actual world. This is conceivable essentially because of the possible world known as heaven. That is, heaven is an imaginable world in a similar way that logically possible scenarios in any fiction are imaginable. However, like some of (...)
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  23. Antitheodicy and the Grading of Theodicies by Moral Offensiveness.James Franklin - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):563-576.
    Antitheodicy objects to all attempts to solve the problem of evil. Its objections are almost all on moral grounds—it argues that the whole project of theodicy is morally offensive. Trying to excuse God’s permission of evil is said to deny the reality of evil, to exhibit gross insensitivity to suffering, and to insult the victims of grave evils. Since antitheodicists urge the avoidance of theodicies for moral reasons, it is desirable to evaluate the moral reasons against theodicies in (...)
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  24. A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE SCANDAL OF EVIL AND SUFFERING.Edvard Kristian Foshaugen - 2004 - Baptist SA (x):x.
    This paper will explore some of the issues and arguments and offer some critical reflection on the ideas and ways that people have proposed to overcome or uphold the dilemma or conflict between the existence of the God of classical theism and evil and the consequence of evil - suffering. I seek explanation of the plain fact of evil and suffering but I do not seek it in the arrogant belief that I can explain evil away. My Christian faith (...)
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  25. Review of Laura Ekstrom's "God, Suffering, and The Value of Free Will". [REVIEW]Hendricks Perry - forthcoming - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
    Louise Antony calls Laura Ekstrom’s book “courageous” (backcover). I have no clue what it means for a work of philosophy to be courageous, but Ekstrom’s book is certainly good. And despite the fact that I think there are about a million problems with it, I recommend it to anyone interested in the problem of evil or skeptical theism: it's well researched and clearly argued—undergraduates as well as professional philosophers will find this book useful. (Well, this recommendation comes with (...)
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  26. Moral Luck, Free Will Theodicies, and Theological Determinism.Philip Swenson - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 184-194.
    I raise two challenges for theological determinism. The first challenge concerns the accounts of human moral responsibility available to them. The second challenge concerns the responses to the problem of evil available to them. We will also see that the two challenges converge in an interesting way.
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  27. Original Sin and a Broad Free Will Defense.W. Paul Franks - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):353–371.
    I begin with a distinction between narrow and broad defenses to the logical problem of evil. The former is simply an attempt to show that God and evil are not logically incompat-ible whereas the latter attempts the same, but only by appealing to beliefs one takes to be true in the actual world. I then argue that while recent accounts of original sin may be consistent with a broad defense, they are also logically incoherent. After considering potential replies, I (...)
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  28. Is There a Right to Hope that God Exists?Jacqueline Mariña - 2022 - Religions 13:Online.
    Abstract: In this paper, I respond to James Sterba’s recent book ‘Is a Good God Logically Possible?’ I show that Sterba concludes that God is not logically possible by ignoring three important issues: (a) the different functions of leeway indeterminism (and the political freedom presupposed by it) and autonomy (the two are very different things, even though both go under the name of freedom), (b) the differences in the conditions of agency in God and in creatures, (there is non-parity in (...)
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  29. Non-Identity Theodicy.Vince Vitale - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):269-290.
    I develop a theodicy that begins with the recognition that we owe our existence to great and varied evils. I develop two versions of this theodicy, with the result that some version is available to the theist regardless of her assumptions about the existence and nature of free will. My defense of Non-Identity Theodicy is aided by an analogy between divine creation and human procreation. I argue that if one affirms the morality of voluntary human (...)
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  30. The problem of Evil is the Nursery : Interrogating Theodicy in Selected Nursery Rhymes.Chatterjee Subhasis Chattopadhyay - manuscript
    Much scholarly work has been done on nursery rhymes. How they are coded artifacts warning children about sexual predators etc. But till date no work has been done about Vedanta and nursery rhymes. This draft will be developed into a monograph and in the meanwhile if anyone wants to develop on these ideas, please follow anti-plagiarism rules and cite properly. I thought of putting this up since both philosophers and literature scholars may benefit from some of the insights here. (...)
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  31. Divine Freedom and Free Will Defenses.W. Paul Franks - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (1):108-119.
    This paper considers a problem that arises for free will defenses when considering the nature of God's own will. If God is perfectly good and performs praiseworthy actions, but is unable to do evil, then why must humans have the ability to do evil in order to perform such actions? This problem has been addressed by Theodore Guleserian, but at the expense of denying God's essential goodness. I examine and critique his argument and provide a (...)
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  32. How to Solve the Problem of Evil: A Deontological Strategy.Justin Mooney - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (4):442-462.
    One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that, (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising (...)
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  33. Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-flopping.John Martin Fischer - 2016 - In Kevin Timpe & Daniel Speak (eds.), Free Will and Theism: Connections, Contingencies, and Concerns. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 48-61.
    I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and (...)
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  34. Free will and the problem of evil.James Cain - 2004 - Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
    According to the free-will defence, the exercise of free will by creatures is of such value that God is willing to allow the existence of evil which comes from the misuse of free will. A well-known objection holds that the exercise of free will is compatible with determinism and thus, if God exists, God could have predetermined exactly how the will would be exercised; God could even have predetermined that free (...)
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  35. An Axiological-Trajectory Theodicy.Thomas Metcalf - 2020 - Sophia 59 (3):577-592.
    I develop a new theodicy in defense of Anselmian theism, one that has several advantages over traditional and recent replies to the Problem of Evil. To make my case, I first explain the value of a positive trajectory: a forward-in-time decrease in ‘first-order-gratuitous’ evil: evil that is not necessary for any equal-or-greater first-order good, but may be necessary for a higher-order good, such as the good of strongly positive axiological trajectory. Positive trajectory arguably contributes goodness to a world (...)
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  36. Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.Chris Tweedt - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (4):391-403.
    The inductive argument from evil to the non-existence of God contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. Some skeptical theists object: one's justification for the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil involves an inference from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil, and they use a principle, "CORNEA," to block that inference. The common sense problem of (...)
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  37. Il Dio che rischia e che “cambia”: introduzione all’Open Theism.Damiano Migliorini - 2019 - Nuovo Giornale di Filosofia Della Religione 8 (2).
    In the following essay I will describe the cultural and disciplinary areas in which Open Theism has been developing and deal with the main authors, who has defended this new doctrine, and their main works. In the second section I will analyse their main theses about divine attributes, some theological questions, several objections to this new non-standard theism and their rebuttals. In the conclusion I will highlight the problems still open and evaluate the overall (...) Theism’s theoretical work. At the end, also the text "Omniscience, Freedom, and Mystery", a part of the article TRANSLATED into english. The issue of omniscience is one of the most debated in contemporary Analytical Philosophy of Religion. However, what is often lacking in this discussion is a deep understanding of the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom within a complete epistemological (what can we really say about the divine and the world), metaphysical and theological framework. For example, it is often forgotten to frame some issues within a clear definition of the notion of mystery. I defined what we can mean by “mystery” in this forthcoming article: "Trinity and Mystery. Three Models: Aquinas, Leibniz, and Hegel" In the same article (and also in the first article mentioned above) can be found a reflection on the analogical use of terms, which involve the terms (the notions) of “freedom” and “omniscience”. This use, therefore, could make possible to develop the argument I propose. (shrink)
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  38. Dreams, Nightmares, and a Defense against Arguments From Evil.Gabriel Citron - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (3):247-270.
    This paper appeals to the phenomenon of dreaming to provide a novel defense against arguments from evil. The thrust of the argument is as follows: when we wake up after a nightmare we are often filled entirely with relief, and do not consider ourselves to have actually suffered very much at all; and since it is epistemically possible that this whole life is simply a dream, it follows that it is epistemically possible that in reality there is very little suffering. (...)
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  39. Free Will of an Ontologically Open Mind.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    The problem of free will has persistently resisted a solution throughout centuries. There is reason to believe that new elements need to be introduced into the analysis in order to make progress. In the present physicalist approach, these elements are emergence and information theory in relation to universal limits set by quantum physics. Furthermore the common, but vague, characterization of free will as "being able to act differently" is, in the spirit of Carnap, rephrased into (...)
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  40. Theism and the Criminalization of Sin.Jeremy Koons - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (1):163-187.
    The free will theodicy places significant value on free will: free will is of such substantial value, that God’s gift of free will to humans was justified, even though this gift foreseeably results in the most monstrous of evils. I will argue that when a state criminalizes sin, it can restrict or eliminate citizens’ exercise of metaphysical free will with respect to choosing to partake in or refrain from (...)
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  41.  37
    Evil and the Problem of Justification: Re-examining some Traditional Theodicies.Emmanuel Adetokunbo Ogundele & Abidemi Israel Ogunyomi - 2021 - Dominican University Journal of Humanities 2 (1):33-47.
    Reconciling the existence of a perfectly good God with the reality of evil in the world seems to be an impossible - or rather an unimaginable endeavour for some scholars. J. L. Mackie, for instance, maintains a logical incompatibility thesis, stating that three of the essential attributes of God, namely: omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence can not be consistently upheld like the theists maintain, in the face of the reality of evil and human suffering in the world. Scholars like William Rowe, (...)
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  42. The Soul-Making Theodicy: A Response to Dore.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The soul-making theodicy seeks to explain how belief in the existence of God is compatible with the evil, pain and suffering we experience in our world. It purports to meet the problem of evil posed by non-theists by articulating a divine plan in which the occurrence of evil is necessary for enabling the greater good of character building of free moral agents. Many philosophers of religion have levelled strong objections against this theodicy. In this essay, Leslie (...)
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  43. The Hiddenness Problem and the Problem of Evil.J. L. Schellenberg - 2010 - Faith and Philosophy 27 (1):45-60.
    The problem of Divine hiddenness, or the hiddenness problem, is more and more commonly being treated as independent of the problem of evil, and as rivalling the latter in significance. Are we in error if we acquiesce in these tendencies? Only a careful investigation into relations between the hiddenness problem and the problem of evil can help us see. Such an investigation is undertaken here. What we will find is that when certain knots threatening (...)
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  44. The defeat of heartbreak: problems and solutions for Stump's view of the problem of evil concerning desires of the heart.Lindsay K. Cleveland & W. Scott Cleveland - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (1):1-23.
    Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas’s theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining of desires of the heart. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering are benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfillment of her heart’s desires. We summarize Stump’s arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump’s account of (...)
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  45. Why do we Suffer? Buddhism and the Problem of Evil.Sebastian Gäb - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (5):345-353.
    This paper explains the Buddhist concept of suffering and its relation to the Christian problem of evil. Although there is no problem of evil in Buddhism, the Buddhist understanding of the origin and causes of suffering will help us to find new approaches to the problem of evil. More specifically, I argue that the concept of evil can be interpreted in terms of dukkha; that the existence of suffering or dukkha is necessarily inevitable for finite beings, (...)
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  46. Skeptical theism is incompatible with theodicy.Scott Coley - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):53-63.
    Inductive arguments from evil claim that evil presents evidence against the existence of God. Skeptical theists hold that some such arguments from evil evince undue confidence in our familiarity with the sphere of possible goods and the entailments that obtain between that sphere and God’s permission of evil. I argue that the skeptical theist’s skepticism on this point is inconsistent with affirming the truth of a given theodicy. Since the skeptical theist’s skepticism is best understood dialogically, I’ll begin by (...)
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    Egoism or the problem of evil: a dilemma for sceptical theism.Benjamin T. Rancourt - 2013 - Religious Studies 49:313-325.
    Sceptical theists undermine the argument from evil by claiming that our ability to distinguish between justified and unjustified evil is weak enough that we must take seriously the possibility that all evil is justified. However, I argue that this claim leads to a dilemma: either our judgements regarding unjustified evil are reliable enough that the problem of evil remains a problem, or our judgements regarding unjustified evil are so unreliable that it would be misguided to use them in (...)
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  48. Agatheology and naturalisation of the discourse on evil.Janusz Salamon - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78 (4-5):469-484.
    This article argues that the existence of horrendous evil calls into question not just the plausibility of the most popular theodicies on offer, notably sceptical theism, but the coherence of any agatheology–that is, any theology which identifies God or the ultimate reality with the ultimate good or with a maximally good being. The article contends that the only way an agatheologian can ‘save the face of God’ after Auschwitz and Kolyma is by endorsing a non-interventionist interpretation of the Divine providence (...)
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  49. Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and Moral Obligation.Stephen Maitzen - 2014 - In Justin McBrayer Trent Dougherty (ed.), Skeptical Theism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Skeptical theism combines theism with skepticism about our capacity to discern God’s morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. Proponents have claimed that skeptical theism defeats the evidential argument from evil. Many opponents have objected that it implies untenable moral skepticism, induces appalling moral paralysis, and the like. Recently Daniel Howard-Snyder has tried to rebut this prevalent objection to skeptical theism by rebutting it as an objection to the skeptical part of skeptical theism, which part he labels “Agnosticism” (with an intentionally (...)
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  50. Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation.D. Caruso Gregg - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    Free will skepticism maintains that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of praise and blame. In recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers have advanced and defended versions of free will skepticism, including Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (2010), Neil Levy (...)
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