Results for 'Sharon Bailey'

58 found
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  1.  8
    Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for Research Performing Organisations: The Bonn PRINTEGER Statement.Ellen-Marie Forsberg, Frank O. Anthun, Sharon Bailey, Giles Birchley, Henriette Bout, Carlo Casonato, Gloria González Fuster, Bert Heinrichs, Serge Horbach, Ingrid Skjæggestad Jacobsen, Jacques Janssen, Matthias Kaiser, Inge Lerouge, Barend van der Meulen, Sarah de Rijcke, Thomas Saretzki, Margit Sutrop, Marta Tazewell, Krista Varantola, Knut Jørgen Vie, Hub Zwart & Mira Zöller - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics 24 (4):1023-1034.
    This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...)
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  2.  71
    Interview: (Comments on White Privilege and Metaphysical Comfort).Alison Bailey - 2017 - In On Race: 34 Conversations in a Time of Crisis.
    George Yancy's interview with Alison Bailey addresses what it means for Whites to be "privilege-cognizant but metaphysically comfortable.” .
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  3. "On Anger, Silence and Epistemic Injustice".Alison Bailey - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:93-115.
    Abstract: If anger is the emotion of injustice, and if most injustices have prominent epistemic dimensions, then where is the anger in epistemic injustice? Despite the question my task is not to account for the lack of attention to anger in epistemic injustice discussions. Instead, I argue that a particular texture of transformative anger – a knowing resistant anger – offers marginalized knowers a powerful resource for countering epistemic injustice. I begin by making visible the anger that saturates the silences (...)
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  4. 'White Talk' as a Barrier to Understanding Whiteness.Alison Bailey - 2014 - In George Yancy (ed.), White Self-Criticality beyond Anti-racism: How Does It Feel to Be a White Problem? Lexington Books. pp. 37-57.
    My project is to explain why the question ‘How does it feel to be a white problem?’ cannot be answered in the fluttering grammar of white talk. The whiteness of white talk lies not only in its having emerged from white mouths, but also in its evasiveness—in its attempt to suppress fear and anxiety, and its consequential [if unintended] reinscription and legitimation of racist oppression. I White talk is designed, indeed scripted, for the purposes of evading, rejecting, and remaining ignorant (...)
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  5. Evidence and the Openness of Knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.
    The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute evidence for its truth, the relation of (...)
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  6. Horgan and Tienson on Phenomenology and Intentionality.Andrew R. Bailey & Bradley Richards - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326.
    Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the (...)
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  7. Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
    The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-extending inferences to single premises, or eliminating epistemic uncertainty in (...)
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  8. The Genesis of Existentials in Animal Life: Heidegger's Appropriation of Aristotle's Ontology of Life.Christiane Bailey - 2011 - Heidegger Circle Proceedings 1 (1):199-212.
    Paper presented at the Heidegger Circle 2011. Although Aristotle’s influence on young Heidegger’s thought has been studied at length, such studies have almost exclusively focused on his interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics, physics and metaphysics. I will rather address Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s ontology of life. Focusing on recently published or recently translated courses of the mid 20’s (mainly SS 1924, WS 1925-26 and SS 1926), I hope to uncover an important aspect of young Heidegger’s thought left unconsidered: namely, that Dasein’s (...)
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  9. Navigating Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2014 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 14 (1):3-7.
    My contribution to this conversation sets out to accomplish two things: First, I offer a definition of epistemic pushback. Epistemic pushback is an expression of epistemic resistance that occurs regularly in classroom discussions that touch our core beliefs, sense of self, politics, or worldv iews. Epistemic pushback is structural: It broadly characterizes a family of cognitive, affective, and verbal tactics that are deployed regularly to dodge the challenging and exhausting chore of engaging topics and questions that scare us. It can (...)
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  10. Tracking Privilege‐Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-preserving epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
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  11. Mr. Magoo’s Mistake.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):289-306.
    Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
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  12. Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.
    There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness and seriousness (...)
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  13.  78
    Tracking Privilege-Preserving Epistemic Pushback in Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.Alison Bailey - 2017 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 32 (4):876-892.
    Classrooms are unlevel knowing fields, contested terrains where knowledge and ignorance are produced and circulate with equal vigor, and where members of dominant groups are accustomed to having an epistemic home-terrain advantage. My project focuses on one form of resistance that regularly surfaces in discussions with social-justice content. Privilege-protective epistemic pushback is a variety of willful ignorance that many members of dominant groups engage in when asked to consider both the lived and structural injustices that members of marginalized groups experience (...)
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  14. Dogmatism Repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.
    Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.
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  15. Zoopolis. A Political Renewal of Animal Rights Theories.Christiane Bailey - 2013 - Dialogue:1-13.
    Book Panel on Zoopolis including articles by Clare Palmer, Dinesh Wadiwel and Laura Janara and a reply by Donaldson and Kymlicka.
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  16. On White Shame and Vulnerabiltiy.Alison Bailey - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):472-483.
    In this paper I address a tension in Samantha Vice’s claim that humility and silence offer effective moral responses to white shame in the wake of South African apartheid. Vice describes these twin virtues using inward-turning language of moral self-repair, but she also acknowledges that this ‘personal, inward directed project’ has relational dimensions. Her failure to explore the relational strand, however, leaves her description of white shame sounding solitary and penitent. -/- My response develops the missing relational dimensions of white (...)
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  17. The Unlevel Knowing Field: An Engagement with Kristie Dotson's Third-Order Epistemic Oppression.Alison Bailey - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3, No. 10.
    My engagement with Dotson’s essay begins with an overview of first- and second-order epistemic exclusions. I develop the concept of an "unlevel knowing field." I use examples from the epistemic injustice literature, and some of my own, to highlight the important distinction she makes between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. Next, I turn my attention to her account of third-order epistemic exclusions. I offer a brief explanation of why her sketch of at this level makes an important contribution (...)
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  18. Le partage du monde: Husserl et la constitution des animaux comme "autres moi".Christiane Bailey - 2013 - Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought 15:219-250.
    Alors que les phénoménologues prétendent avoir dépassé le solipsisme, la plupart n’ont en fait que repousser les frontières de l’intersubjectivité des individus humains aux individus des autres espèces. Pourtant, Husserl reconnaît l’existence d’une intersubjectivité interspécifique, c’est-à-dire d’une intersubjectivité dépassant les limites de l’espèce. Il va même jusqu’à affirmer qu’on comprend parfois mieux un animal familier qu’un humain étranger. Toutefois, même s’il admet que plusieurs animaux sont capables d’une vie de conscience subjective et qu’ils vivent dans un monde de sens partagé, (...)
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  19. Kinds of Life. On the Phenomenological Basis of the Distinction Between Higher and Lower Animals.Christiane Bailey - 2011 - Journal of Environmental Philosophy 8 (2):47-68.
    Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological constitution of the Other through Einfülhung, I argue that the hierarchical distinction between higher and lower animals – which has been dismissed by Heidegger for being anthropocentric – must not be conceived as an objective distinction between “primitive” animals and “more evolved” ones, but rather corresponds to a phenomenological distinction between familiar and unfamiliar animals.
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  20.  96
    Le Capitalisme, les animaux et la nature chez Marx.Christiane Bailey - 2016 - Ithaque:60-86.
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  21. Book Review: Chris Cuomo. The Philosopher Queen: Feminist Essays on War, Love, and Knowledge. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. [REVIEW]Alison Bailey - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (3):218-221.
    The Philosopher Queen: Feminist Essays on War, Love, and Knowledge. By Chris Cuomo. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. The Philosopher Queen is a powerful illustration of what Cherríe Moraga calls a "theory in the flesh." That is, theorizing from a place where "physical realities of our lives—our skin color, the land or concrete we grow up on, our sexual longings—all fuse to create a politic [and, I would add, an ethics, spirituality, and epistemology] born out of necessity" (...)
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  22.  88
    Women of Color and Philosophy (Review).Alison Bailey - 2005 - Hypatia 20 (1):220-225.
    Book Review of Naomi Zack's Women of Color and Philosophy.
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  23.  41
    On Sharon and Spectre’s Argument Against Closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.
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  24.  60
    Review: Anderson-Gold, Sharon, Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant[REVIEW]Anne Margaret Baxley - 2004 - Kant-Studien 95 (2):256-256.
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  25.  16
    Review: Byrd, Sharon and Hruschka, Joachim, Kant's Doctrine of Right[REVIEW]Helga Varden - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):547-559.
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  26. The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology.Nicholas Shackel - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):295-320.
    Many of the philosophical doctrines purveyed by postmodernists have been roundly refuted, yet people continue to be taken in by the dishonest devices used in proselytizing for postmodernism. I exhibit, name, and analyse five favourite rhetorical manoeuvres: Troll's Truisms, Motte and Bailey Doctrines, Equivocating Fulcra, the Postmodernist Fox Trot, and Rankly Relativising Fields. Anyone familiar with postmodernist writing will recognise their pervasive hold on the dialectic of postmodernism and come to judge that dialectic as it ought to be judged.
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  27.  63
    Old Wine in New Bottles.Michael Klenk - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):781-795.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that robust moral realism, the metaethical view that there are non-natural and mind-independent moral properties and facts that we can know about, is incompatible with evolutionary explanations of morality. One of the most prominent evolutionary debunking arguments is advanced by Sharon Street, who argues that if moral realism were true, then objective moral knowledge is unlikely because realist moral properties are evolutionary irrelevant and moral beliefs about those properties would not be selected for. (...)
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  28.  30
    Constructivism and the Problem of Normative Indeterminacy.Yair Levy - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-11.
    I describe a new problem for metaethical constructivism. The problem arises when agents make conflicting judgments, so that the constructivist is implausibly committed to denying they have any reason for any of the available options. The problem is illustrated primarily with reference to Sharon Street’s version of constructivism. Several possible solutions to the problem are explained and rejected.
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  29. Tracking the Moral Truth: Debunking Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.Gerald L. Hull - manuscript
    Sharon Street’s 2006 article “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” challenges the epistemological pretensions of the moral realist, of the nonnaturalist in particular. Given that “Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes” – why should one suppose such attitudes and concomitant beliefs would track an independent moral reality? Especially since, on a nonnaturalist view, moral truth is causally inert. I abstract a logical skeleton of Street’s argument and, with its (...)
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  30. Street on Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Daan Evers - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3663-3676.
    Sharon Street argues that realism about epistemic normativity is false. Realists believe there are truths about epistemic reasons that hold independently of the agent’s attitudes. Street argues by dilemma. Either the realist accepts a certain account of the nature of belief, or she does not. If she does, then she cannot consistently accept realism. If she does not, then she has no scientifically credible explanation of the fact that our epistemic behaviours or beliefs about epistemic reasons align with independent (...)
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  31.  58
    A Normative Approach to Moral Realism.Gerald Hull - manuscript
    The realist belief in robustly attitude-independent evaluative truths – more specifically, moral truths – is challenged by Sharon Street’s essay “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”. We know the content of human normative beliefs and attitudes has been profoundly influenced by a Darwinian natural selection process that favors adaptivity. But if simple adaptivity can explain the content of our evaluative beliefs, any connection they might have with abstract moral truth would seem to be purely coincidental. She continues (...)
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  32. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Our Shared Hatred of Pain.Ben Bramble - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (1):94-101.
    This article responds to an argument from Katarzyna de Ladari-Radek and Peter Singer in their article, "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason.".
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  33. Aligning with the Good.Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-8.
    IN “CONSTRUCTIVISM, AGENCY, AND THE PROBLEM of Alignment,” Michael Bratman considers how lessons from the philosophy of action bear on the question of how best to construe the agent’s standpoint in the context of a constructivist theory of practical reasons. His focus is “the problem of alignment”: “whether the pressures from the general constructivism will align with the pressures from the theory of agency” (Bratman 2012: 81). He thus brings two lively literatures into dialogue with each other. This is laudable. (...)
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  34. Explaining Our Moral Reliability.Sinan Dogramaci - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):71-86.
    I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive (...)
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  35. Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Robert Richards and Michael Ruse (ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    I discuss the structure of genealogical debunking arguments. I argue that they undermine our mathematical beliefs if they undermine our moral beliefs. The contrary appearance stems from a confusion of arithmetic truths with (first-order) logical truths, or from a confusion of reliability with justification. I conclude with a discussion of the cogency of debunking arguments, in light of the above. Their cogency depends on whether information can undermine all of our beliefs of a kind, F, without giving us direct reason (...)
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  36. A Cure for Worry? Kierkegaardian Faith and the Insecurity of Human Existence.Sharon Krishek & Rick Anthony Furtak - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (3):157-175.
    Abstract In his discourses on ‘the lily of the field and the bird of the air,’ Kierkegaard presents faith as the best possible response to our precarious and uncertain condition, and as the ideal way to cope with the insecurities and concerns that his readers will recognize as common features of human existence. Reading these discourses together, we are introduced to the portrait of a potential believer who, like the ‘divinely appointed teachers’—the lily and the bird—succeeds in leading a life (...)
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  37. Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms & Daniel Jacobson (eds.), Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 215-252.
    Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines (...)
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  38.  46
    Evolutionary Arguments Against Moral Realism: Why the Empirical Details Matter (and Which Ones Do).Jeroen Hopster - 2018 - Biology and Philosophy 33 (5-6):41.
    The aim of this article is to identify the strongest evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism and to assess on which empirical assumptions it relies. In the recent metaethical literature, several authors have de-emphasized the evolutionary component of EDAs against moral realism: presumably, the success or failure of these arguments is largely orthogonal to empirical issues. I argue that this claim is mistaken. First, I point out that Sharon Street’s and Michael Ruse’s EDAs both involve substantive claims about the (...)
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  39. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Meet Evolutionary Science.Arnon Levy & Yair Levy - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments appeal to selective etiologies of human morality in an attempt to undermine moral realism. But is morality actually the product of evolution by natural selection? Although debunking arguments have attracted considerable attention in recent years, little of it has been devoted to whether the underlying evolutionary assumptions are credible. In this paper, we take a closer look at the evolutionary hypotheses put forward by two leading debunkers, namely Sharon Street and Richard Joyce. We raise a battery (...)
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  40. Constructivism About Reasons.Nicholas Southwood - 2018 - In D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    Given constructivism’s enduring popularity and appeal, it is perhaps something of a surprise that there remains considerable uncertainty among many philosophers about what constructivism is even supposed to be. My aim in this article is to make some progress on the question of how constructivism should be understood. I begin by saying something about what kind of theory constructivism is supposed to be. Next, I consider and reject both the standard proceduralist characterization of constructivism and also Sharon Street’s ingenious (...)
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  41. Darwin and Moral Realism: Survival of the Iffiest.Knut Olav Skarsaune - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):229-243.
    This paper defends moral realism against Sharon Street’s “Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (this journal, 2006). I argue by separation of cases: From the assumption that a certain normative claim is true, I argue that the first horn of the dilemma is tenable for realists. Then, from the assumption that the same normative claim is false, I argue that the second horn is tenable. Either way, then, the Darwinian dilemma does not add anything to realists’ epistemic worries.
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  42.  60
    Two Accounts of Moral Objectivity: From Attitude-Independence to Standpoint-Invariance.Jeroen Hopster - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (4):763-780.
    How should we understand the notion of moral objectivity? Metaethical positions that vindicate morality’s objective appearance are often associated with moral realism. On a realist construal, moral objectivity is understood in terms of mind-, stance-, or attitude-independence. But realism is not the only game in town for moral objectivists. On an antirealist construal, morality’s objective features are understood in virtue of our attitudes. In this paper I aim to develop this antirealist construal of moral objectivity in further detail, and to (...)
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  43. In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.
    This paper is a defense of moral evidentialism, the view that we have a moral obligation to form the doxastic attitude that is best supported by our evidence. I will argue that two popular arguments against moral evidentialism are weak. I will also argue that our commitments to the moral evaluation of actions require us to take doxastic obligations seriously.
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  44. Detroit to Flint and Back Again: Solidarity Forever.Michael D. Doan, Ami Harbin & Sharon Howell - 2017 - Critical Sociology 43.
    For several years the authors have been working in Detroit with grassroots coalitions resisting Emergency Management. In this essay, we focus on how community groups in Detroit and Flint advanced common struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right, particularly during the period of 2014 to 2016. We explore how, through a series of direct interventions – including public meetings and international gatherings, independent journalism and social media, community-based research projects, and citizen-led policy initiatives – these groups contributed (...)
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  45. Genetically Modified Foods: Golden Rice.Kristen Hessler, Ross Whetten, Carol Loopstra, Sharon Shriver, Karen Pesaresi Penner, Robert Zeigler, Jacqueline Fletcher, Melanie Torre & Gary Comstock - 2010 - In Gary Comstock (ed.), Life Science Ethics, 2nd. ed. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 387-397.
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  46. Wisdom Beyond Rationality: A Reply to Ryan.Iskra Fileva & Jon Tresan - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):229-235.
    We discuss Sharon Ryan’s Deep Rationality Theory of wisdom, defended recently in her “Wisdom, Knowledge and Rationality.” We argue that (a) Ryan’s use of the term “rationality” needs further elaboration; (b) there is a problem with requiring that the wise person possess justified beliefs but not necessarily knowledge; (c) the conditions of DRT are not all necessary; (d) the conditions are not sufficient. At the end of our discussion, we suggest that there may be a problem with the very (...)
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  47. Family Justice and Social Justice.Sharon A. Lloyd - 1994 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (3-4):353-371.
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  48.  45
    Bare Particulars and Exemplifcation.Timothy Pickavance - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2):95-108.
    Bare particulars tend to get a bad rap. But often, the arguments lodged against bare particulars seem to miss important aspects of the theoretical context of bare particulars. In particular, these arguments fail to situate bare particulars within a constituent ontology with substrates, and thus fail to appreciate an important consequence of that context: the need for two types of exemplification. In this paper, I do three things. First, I motivate and describe the need, given bare particulars, for two types (...)
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  49. Natural Experiments and Pluralism in Political Science.Sharon Crasnow - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):424-441.
    Natural experiments are an increasingly popular research design in political science. This popularity raises a number of questions. First, what are natural experiments and why are they appealing? Second, what makes a good natural experiment? And finally, are natural experiments able to provide resources for knowledge production that other methodologies cannot or do not provide? Using Mary Morgan’s and Thad Dunning’s recent work on natural experiments, I offer answers to the first two questions and use the analysis to argue that (...)
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  50.  17
    Engineering Ontologies: Foundations and Theories From Philosophy and Logical Theory.Nicola Guarino & Barry Smith - 2006 - In SemanticMining: Semantic Interoperability and Data Mining in Biomedicine (NoE 507505). 1 Deliverable D.21.2. pp. 1-13.
    Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ is often used by philosophers as a synonym for ‘metaphysics’ (literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term which was used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. The term ‘ontology’ (or ontologia) was itself coined in 1613, independently, by two philosophers, Rudolf Göckel (...)
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