An Article with a map of professions, a mapping of power/knowledge.

An article about the place philosophy has in our lives. Lectured on youtube.

This is an article about death from a medical point of view.

The philosophy of measurement studies the conceptual, ontological, epistemic, and technological conditions that make measurement possible and reliable. A new wave of philosophical scholarship has emerged in the last decade that emphasizes the material and historical dimensions of measurement and the relationships between measurement and theoretical modeling. This essay surveys these developments and contrasts them with earlier work on the semantics of quantity terms and the representational character of measurement. The conclusions highlight four characteristics of the emerging research program in (...) philosophy of measurement: it is epistemological, coherentist, practice oriented, and model based. (shrink)

We examine whether the "evidence of evidence is evidence" principle is true. We distinguish several different versions of the principle and evaluate recent attacks on some of those versions. We argue that, whatever the merits of those attacks, they leave the more important rendition of the principle untouched. That version is, however, also subject to new kinds of counterexamples. We end by suggesting how to formulate a better version of the principle that takes into account those new counterexamples.

Suppose we learn that we have a poor track record in forming beliefs rationally, or that a brilliant colleague thinks that we believe P irrationally. Does such input require us to revise those beliefs whose rationality is in question? When we gain information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational, we are in one of two general cases. In the first case we made no error, and our beliefs are rational. In that case the input to the contrary is misleading. In (...) the second case we indeed believe irrationally, and our original evidence already requires us to fix our mistake. In that case the input to that effect is normatively superfluous. Thus, we know that information suggesting that our beliefs are irrational is either misleading or superfluous. This, I submit, renders the input incapable of justifying belief revision, despite our not knowing which of the two kinds it is. (shrink)

Hering’s opponent-colors theory suggests that our color sensations are produced by three mechanisms: a red–green mechanism, a yellow–blue mechanism, and a white–black mechanism. The first two mechanisms give rise to our sensations of hued colors; the third mechanism gives rise to our sensations of hueless colors. Noticeably, whereas the pair of colors produced by each of the hued mechanisms do not mix to yield a phenomenal intermediate (i.e., there are no greenish reds, reddish greens, yellowish blues, or bluish yellows), the (...) colors produced by the hueless mechanism, white and black, do have a phenomenal intermediate—gray. This different behavior of the white–black mechanism poses a problem for Hering’s theory. Several attempts to fix this problem have been suggested. This paper focuses on the suggestion made by Paul Heggelund a century after Hering proposed his theory. In Heggelund’s amendment of Hering’s theory, the hueless colors are not confined to the one-dimensional gamut between black and white, but rather require two components for their full description: a light–dark (or luminous–black) component, where light and dark are mutually exclusive sensations, and a white component, which doesn’t have an opponent counterpart. Here I show that although Heggelund’s theory indeed provides a solution to the problem that the hueless colors pose to Hering’s theory, it is not self-consistent. I go on to revise Heggelund’s theory to obtain a consistent opponent-colors theory. (shrink)

I show that the mathematical description of opponent-colors theory is identical to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Based on the dual-aspect theory of phenomenal consciousness, which suggests that one or more physical entities in our universe have phenomenal aspects that are dual to their physical aspects and therefore predicts an exact correspondence between a system’s phenomenal states and the objective states of its underlying physical substrate, I hypothesize that color sensations are phenomenal dual aspects (...) of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Since nothing in this hypothesis suggests that what brings about the phenomenal experience that is dual to two-state quantum systems is the two-dimensionality of these systems, it is natural to generalize this hypothesis and suggest that other types of phenomenal experience (e.g., taste, odor, sound) are phenomenal dual aspects of quantum systems of higher dimensionalities. Finally, I propose that the two-state quantum systems that give rise to color in the brain are two-state ion-channels. (shrink)

ABSTRACTShould conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no one should (...) follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic akrasia. (shrink)

Epistemically akratic agents believe both p and that believing p is irrational for them. Some of the costs of thinking that epistemic akrasia can be rational are clear. It is hypocritical, and outright weird, to have beliefs that we consider irrational, let alone to reason with or act on those beliefs. However, as Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) and Brian Weatherson (2019) have argued, the weirdness of akrasia does not obviously tell against its rationality. Here I argue that views permitting epistemic akrasia (...) fare worse than previously thought. These views imply that we should sometimes have beliefs that we know for certain are either irrational or false. And while having a belief that we know to be irrational is straightforwardly irrational, the additional possibility that the belief may be false cannot make having it any more rational. (shrink)

In Marx’s posthumously published manuscripts from 1857–1863, we find a systematic exposition of his concept of subsumption. Though much has been written about it, significant interpretative gaps persist. In this article, I begin filling these gaps by examining the emergence of Marx’s concept of subsumption. I will argue that in the Grundrisse Marx brings together distinct but complementary elements from Hegel’s theories of judgment and teleology to coin two new and well delineated concepts of subsumption that prefigure his later concepts (...) of formal and real subsumption. These two concepts may be defined as: (a) the process of acquiring the social relational property of being a means to an end; (b) the process by which changes in non-relational properties occur in something due to this acquisition – and occur to better suit said end. (shrink)

I show that the mathematical description of opponent-colors theory is identical to the mathematical description of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Following the principles of dual-aspect theory of phenomenal consciousness, which predicts an exact correspondence between a system’s phenomenal states and the objective states of its underlying physical substrate, I suggest that color sensations are phenomenal dual aspects of two-state quantum systems in a mixed state. Since nothing in this hypothesis suggests that what brings about the phenomenal experience (...) that is dual to two-state quantum systems is the two-dimensionality of these systems, it is natural to generalize this hypothesis and suggest that other types of phenomenal experience (e.g., taste, odor, sound) are phenomenal dual aspects of quantum systems of higher dimensionalities. Finally, I propose that the two-state quantum systems that give rise to color in the brain are two-state ion-channels. (shrink)

What it means for an action to have moral worth, and what is required for this to be the case, is the subject of continued controversy. Some argue that an agent performs a morally worthy action if and only if they do it because the action is morally right. Others argue that a morally worthy action is that which an agent performs because of features that make the action right. These theorists, though they oppose one another, share something important in (...) common. They focus almost exclusively on the moral worth of right actions. But there is a negatively valenced counterpart that attaches to wrong actions, which we will call moral counterworth. In this paper, we explore the moral counterworth of wrong actions in order to shed new light on the nature of moral worth. Contrary to theorists in both camps, we argue that more than one kind of motivation can affect the moral worth of actions. (shrink)

Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about whether a particular doxastic attitude of ours is rational? An agent who suspends about whether her attitude is rational has serious doubts that it is. These doubts place a special burden on the agent, namely, to justify maintaining her chosen attitude over others. A dilemma arises. Providing justification for maintaining the chosen attitude would commit the agent to considering the attitude rational—contrary to her suspension on the matter. Alternatively, in the absence of (...) such justification, the attitude would be arbitrary by the agent's own lights, and therefore irrational from the agent's own perspective. So, suspending about whether an attitude of ours is rational does not cohere with considering it rationally preferable to other attitudes, and leads to a more familiar form of epistemic akrasia otherwise. (shrink)

The years following Israel’s founding were formative ones for the development of philosophy as an academic discipline in this country. During this period, the distinction between philosophy seen as contiguous with the humanities and social sciences, and philosophy seen as adjacent to the natural and exact sciences began to make its presence felt in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This distinction, which was manifest in the curriculum, was by no means unique to the Hebrew University, but reflected the broader bifurcation (...) between two schools of Western philosophy in the twentieth century. In English-speaking countries, it is generally referred to as the divide between analytic and continental philosophy. What was special about the situation at the Hebrew University, however, was that the split manifested itself in a rather small department, being embodied, basically, in one prominent representative of each school – Nathan Rotenstreich and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. This article will focus on some key aspects of the lives and thought of Rotenstreich and Bar-Hillel. It will address their philosophical maturation as S.H. Bergmann’s students, their views on the goals of twentieth-century philosophy, on the philosopher’s role in public life, and the circumstances under which they started teaching in Jerusalem right after the founding of the State of Israel. (shrink)

Scholars have recently argued that Hegel posited international recognition as a necessary feature of international relations. My main effort in this article is to disprove this point. Specifically, I show that since Hegel rejected the notion of an international legal system, he must hold that international recognition depends on the arbitrary will of individual states. To pinpoint Hegel’s position, I offer a close reading of Hegel’s intricate formulations from the final paragraphs of the Philosophy of Right—formulations that are easy to (...) quote out of context just as they are transparent when considered in due context. (shrink)

Preface to the Hebrew Translation of Karl Marx's Introduction and Preface to the Critique of Political Economy .

Preface to the Hebrew Translation of Louis Althusser's For Marx.

In his Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel affirms that truth is ‘usually’ understood as the agreement of thought with the object, but that in the ‘deeper, i.e. philosophical sense’, truth is the agreement of a content with itself or of an object with its concept. Hegel then provides illustrations of this second sort of truth: a ‘true friend’, a ‘true state’, a ‘true work of art’. Robert Stern has argued that Hegel's ‘deeper’ or ‘philosophical’ truth is close to what Heidegger labelled ‘material’ (...) truth, namely a property attributed to a thing on the basis of the accordance of that thing with its essence. It has since been common to think of Hegel's concept of ‘philosophical’ truth as ‘ontological’, ‘objective’ or ‘material’ in contrast to ‘epistemological’ or ‘propositional’ definitions. In this paper, I wish to add an important nuance to the existing literature on this subject: even though things have a truth-value for Hegel, the latter is always negative. I argue that Hegel's criterion of ‘philosophical’ truth, which is best formulated as ‘agreement with self’, is first and foremost intended to examine the truth-value of thought-determinations. I then argue that even though this criterion may also be applied to examine the truth-value of things (namely, even though things have a truth-value), things never fall under this definition. After reviewing several of Hegel's explicit remarks on the matter, I provide an alternative explanation to those features of Hegel's ‘philosophical’ truth which have led scholars to view it as a truth in things. Especially, I argue that what are generally seen as Hegel's examples (‘true friend’, ‘true state’, ‘true work of art’) are not intended as examples but only as imperfect illustrations of ‘philosophical’ truth. (shrink)

When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)

Richard Feldman has proposed and defended different versions of a principle about evidence. In slogan form, the principle holds that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. Recently, Branden Fitelson has argued that Feldman’s preferred rendition of the principle falls pray to a counterexample related to the non-transitivity of the evidence-for relation. Feldman replies arguing that Fitelson’s case does not really represent a counterexample to the principle. In this note, we argue that Feldman’s principle is trivially true.

Over recent decades, several global tech giants have gained enormous power while at the same time generating various disputes with their end-users, local governments, and regulators. We propose that the Jewish concept of covenant can help the above parties, legal scholars, and wider society, in addressing this complex legal reality. We present the challenge of disequilibrium between the above four parties against the main points of conflict: the requirement of customer consent; clear contractual provisions upon entry; options for reasonable customer (...) exit; limitations on the platform’s ability to exercise unilateral termination; profile-based discrimination; and liability for mere intermediation. We introduce the biblical concept of covenant, and we review its unfolding in Jewish tradition. Further, we conceptualize three main covenantal principles: (1) responsibility—God and humans are both conceived as moral agents; (2) reciprocity—God as a caring law giver, open to human appeals; and (3) reasonability—divine instruction as initially intelligible. We demonstrate how the latter principle of explainability is exercised in the biblical law narratives and how the story of Balaam stresses the significance of moral agency that cannot hide behind “mere intermediary” claims. In light of this analysis, we revisit the relationship between tech giants and tech users to demonstrate how covenantality offers novel ways to conceptualize the noted conflicts between the parties. (shrink)

R. Feldman defends a general principle about evidence the slogan form of which says that ‘evidence of evidence is evidence’. B. Fitelson considers three renditions of this principle and contends they are all falsified by counterexamples. Against both Feldman and Fitelson, J. Comesaña and E. Tal show that the third rendition––the one actually endorsed by Feldman––isn’t affected by Fitelson’s counterexamples, but only because it is trivially true and thus uninteresting. Tal and Comesaña defend a fourth version of Feldman’s principle, which––they (...) claim––has not yet been shown false. Against Tal and Comesaña I show that this new version of Feldman’s principle is false. (shrink)

We offer a critical evaluation of a recent proposal of E. Tal and J. Comesa\~na on the topic of when evidence of evidence constitutes evidence. After establishing that attempts of L. Moretti and W. Roche to discredit the proposal miss their mark, we fashion another, which does not.

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

A separação entre o ser, isto é, o ato, e o dever-ser, ou seja, o sentido de comando, permissão etc.. do ato é parte fundamental para o entendimento da epistemologia proposta por Hans Kelsen. Dessa discriminação entre o ser e o dever-ser há o principal argumento do autor para a separação do direito das ciências causais e, principalmente, a superação da falácia naturalista no âmbito teórico e moral. Nesse sentido, também o artigo se propôs a analisar a refutação de Kelsen (...) a doutrinas morais e jurídicas negadoras de tal distinção e, consequentemente o reflexo de tal posicionamento na perspectiva da responsabilidade. (shrink)

I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

Tal vez el rasgo que más tipifica los cambios operados en el capitalismo actual sea la mundialización de sus atributos fundamentales. El capital se desprende del rostro nacional que lo había identificado durante su etapa clásica. Así, no sólo la materia prima, los trabajadores, los dueños de las acciones, ni el proceso productivo mismo, quedan enmarcados en fronteras nacionales precisas. La competencia de productos, firmas y personas ya no se realiza entre vecinos, sino con la mediación a veces de miles (...) de kilómetros, sin que los competidores siquiera sospechen quiénes son sus oponentes. La lógica actitud darwinista que genera la competencia, en tanto mecanismo principal del sistema, ahora sí representa una verdadera lucha por la existencia de todos contra todos. El enfrentamiento entre individuo y especie, al que Marx en su época hacía referencia, es en este momento mucho más diáfano. El modelo económico en que se enmarca la mundialización posee los mismos fundamentos liberales del capitalismo clási-co. De hecho, es ese el modelo por excelencia del capitalismo, el que más plenamente expresa su esencia. Basado en la idea de que cada individuo debe convertirse en un agente productivo que atienda únicamente sus propios intereses y que, por consiguiente, deje de ser preocupación y ocupación de la sociedad, el liberalismo. (shrink)

Tal vez el rasgo que más tipifica los cambios operados en el capitalismo actual sea la mundialización de sus atributos fundamentales. El capital se desprende del rostro nacional que lo había identificado durante su etapa clásica. No sólo la materia prima, tampoco los trabajadores, los dueños de las acciones, ni el proceso productivo mismo quedan enmarcados en fronteras nacionales precisas. El modelo económico en que se enmarca la mundialización posee los mismos fundamentos liberales del capitalismo clásico. La globalización neoliberal actual (...) es en buena medida la expansión hasta un marco planetario de los mismos atributos del liberalismo clásico nacional, con sus consiguientes secuelas negativas para la vida, ahora redimensionadas debido al alcance mismo del sistema. Pero la mundialización también entraña una serie de características particulares que la convierten en lo que podríamos calificar como una nueva forma de imperialismo. Sí, se trata de un capitalismo imperial que, para tal propósito, utiliza como principal mecanismo al propio libre mercado mundializado... (shrink)

Tal vez como nunca antes, el tema de los valores cobra hoy una importancia capital para los destinos del género humano. Se trata de una relevancia no sólo teórica, sino, sobre todo, práctica. Los valores suplen, en la sociedad, la función que en otras especies desempeñan los instintos biológicos, sobre todo, el de la autoconservación. El hecho de que el género humano haya puesto en peligro su propia supervivencia es el más claro indicador de la aguda crisis de valores por (...) la que atraviesa. La comprensión de esta crisis, en su sentido más profundo, es un requisito imprescindible para su superación. Y ello presupone indagar en el complejo mundo de los valores humanos y actuar en consecuencia en la actividad educativa y práctica. Premio de la Academia de Ciencias de Cuba en 2003 y Premio de la Crítica Científico-Técnica en 2005, este libro resume toda la labor investigativa anterior de su autor. Las tres partes que lo integran coinciden con los tres frentes teóricos fundamentales en que ha venido desarrollando sus estudios: los problemas generales de la teoría de los valores, el análisis axiológico de problemas cruciales del mundo contemporáneo y los valores en la historia y en el pensamiento latinoamericanos. (shrink)

Que tal um take diferente sobre os ricos e famosos? Primeiro o óbvio-os romances de Harry Potter são superstição primitiva que incentiva as crianças a acreditar na fantasia, em vez de assumir a responsabilidade pelo mundo-a norma, é claro. JKR é tão sem noção sobre si mesma e do mundo como a maioria das pessoas, mas cerca de 200 vezes tão destrutiva como o Americano médio e cerca de 800 vezes mais do que o chinês médio. Ela foi responsável pela (...) destruição de talvez 30.000 hectares de floresta para produzir esses romances de lixo e toda a erosão que se seguiu (não trivial como é pelo menos 6 e talvez 12 toneladas/ano solo no oceano para todos na terra ou talvez 100 toneladas por Americano, e assim por cerca de 5000 toneladas/ano para os livros de Rowling e filmes e seus 3 filhos). A terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo superficial cada ano, de modo que se aproxima 2100, a maioria de sua capacidade crescente do alimento será ido. Então há a enorme quantidade de combustível queimado e resíduos feitos para fazer e distribuir os livros e filmes, bonecas plásticas etc. Ela mostra sua falta de responsabilidade social, produzindo crianças em vez de usar seus milhões para incentivar o planejamento familiar ou comprar a floresta tropical, e promovendo a estupidez liberal convencional de 3ª supremacia mundial que está destruindo a Grã-Bretanha, América, o mundo e o futuro de seu descendente. Claro, ela não é diferente dos outros 7.8 bilhões sem noção-apenas mais barulhento e mais destrutivo. É o não livre almoço problema mandado grande. A máfia só não pode ver que não existe tal coisa como ajudar uma pessoa sem prejudicar os outros. Direitos ou privilégios dados a novos operadores em um mundo superlotado só podem escureceros de outros. Apesar dos enormes desastres ecológicos que acontecem na frente deles em todos os lugares todos os dias, eles não podem fixá-los à maternidade desenfreada de "os diversos", que representa a maior parte do aumento da população do século passado e tudo isso neste Um. Eles não têm alguma combinação de inteligência, educação, experiência e sanidade necessária para extrapolar os assaltos diários sobre os recursos e funcionamento da sociedade para o eventual colapso da civilização industrial. Cada refeição, cada viagem de carro ou ônibus, cada par de sapatos é outra unha no caixão da terra. Ele provavelmente nunca cruzou sua mente que um assento em um avião de Londres para San Francisco produz cerca de uma tonelada de carbono que derrete cerca de 3 metros quadrados de gelo marinho e como um dos superprivilegiados que ela provavelmente voou centenas de tais vôos. Não só os ricos e famosos, mas quase qualquer figura pública em tudo, incluindo praticamente todos os professores, são pressionados a ser politicamente correto, que nas democracias ocidentais, agora significa social democrático (Neomarxista-i. e., comunista diluído) terceiro supremacistas mundiais que trabalham para a destruição de suas próprias sociedades e seus próprios descendentes. Assim, aqueles cuja falta of Educação, experiência, inteligência (e senso comum básico), que deve proibi-los de fazer quaisquer declarações públicas em tudo, dominar totalmente todos os meios de comunicação, criando a impressão de que o inteligente e civilizados devem favorecer a democracia, a diversidade e a igualdade, enquanto a verdade é que estes são os problemas e não as soluções, e que eles próprios são os principais inimigos da civilização. Ver meu livros Suicídio pela Democracia 4ª Ed (2019) y outras. (shrink)

¿Qué tal una toma diferente de los ricos y famosos? Primero lo obvio — las novelas de Harry Potter son supersticiones primitivas que animan a los niños a creer en la fantasía en lugar de asumir la responsabilidad del mundo-la norma por supuesto. JKR es tan despistada sobre sí misma y el mundo como la mayoría de las personas, pero unas 200 veces más destructivas que el estadounidense promedio y unas 800 veces más que el chino promedio. Ella ha sido (...) responsable de la destrucción de tal vez 30.000 hectáreas de bosque para producir estas novelas de basura y toda la erosión subsiguiente (no trivial como es al menos 6 y tal vez 12 toneladas/año de tierra en el océano para todos en la tierra o tal vez 100 toneladas por American, y así alrededor de 5000 toneladas/año para los libros y películas de Rowling y su 3 niños). La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Luego está la enorme cantidad de combustible quemado y los desechos hechos para hacer y distribuir los libros y películas, muñecas de plástico, etc. Ella muestra su falta de responsabilidad social produciendo niños en lugar de usar sus millones para alentar la planificación familiar o comprar la selva tropical, y promoviendo la estupidez liberal convencional de la 3ª supremacía mundial que está destruyendo Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos, el mundo y el futuro de su descendiente. Por supuesto, ella no es tan diferente de las otras 7.8 mil millones de - sólo más ruidosas y destructivas. Es el no libre problema de almuerzo escrito grande. La multitud simplemente no puede ver que no hay tal cosa como ayudar a una persona sin dañar a los demás. Los derechos o privilegios dados a los nuevos participantes en un mundo superpoblado sólo pueden disminuir los de los demás. A pesar de los desastres ecológicos masivos que ocurren delante de ellos en todas partes todos los días, no pueden anclar a la maternidad desenfrenada de "lo diverso", que representa la mayor parte del aumento de la población del siglo pasado y todo eso en este. Carecen de una combinación de inteligencia, educación, experiencia y cordura necesaria para extrapolar los asaltos diarios a los recursos y el funcionamiento de la sociedad para el eventual colapso de la civilización industrial. Cada comida, cada viaje en coche o autobús, cada par de zapatos es otro clavo en el ataúd de la tierra. Probablemente nunca ha cruzado su mente que un asiento en un avión de Londres a San Francisco produce alrededor de una tonelada de carbono que derrite unos 3 metros cuadrados de hielo marino y como uno de los privilegiados que probablemente ha volado cientos de tales vuelos. No sólo los ricos y famosos, pero casi cualquier figura pública en absoluto, incluyendo prácticamente todos los profesores, se ven presionados a ser políticamente correcto, que en el las democracias occidentales, ahora significa socialdemócrata (Neomarxista — i. e., comunista diluido), supremacistas del tercer mundo que trabajan por la destrucción de sus propias sociedades y sus propios descendientes. Entonces, aquellos cuya falta of educación, experiencia, inteligencia (y el sentido común básico), que debería prohibirles hacer declaraciones públicas en absoluto, dominar totalmente a todos los medios de comunicación, creando la impresión de que los inteligentes y civilizados deben favorecer la democracia, la diversidad y la igualdad, mientras que la verdad es que estos son los problemas y no las soluciones, y que ellos mismos son los principales enemigos de la civilización. Ver mi suicidio por la democracia 2Nd Ed (2019) y otras obras. (shrink)

A história da psicologia, tal como aparece em algumas obras (E.G. Boring 1950; M. Reuchlin 1957; P. Fraisse e J. Piaget 1963) ou em capítulos introdutórios de alguns manuais (M. Reuchlin 1977), reflete uma adesão — raramente discutida — a uma concepção internalista. Segundo essa concepção, a psicologia seria animada por uma dinâmica própria, um processo evolutivo totalmente endógeno, e seria independente de fatores externos tais como os domínios religiosos, sociopolíticos e econômicos. Além do mais, os partidários dessa história aceitam (...) ver a psicologia influenciada por disciplinas situadas em suas fronteiras, como a biologia, a fisiologia e, em menor medida, a física. Esses domínios fronteiriços geralmente dizem respeito a objetos psicológicos habitualmente qualificados de inferiores, como reflexos, sensações e percepções, em oposição à linguagem e ao pensamento, qualificados como processos superiores. Esses mesmos domínios fronteiriços engendraram por sua vez subdomínios relativamente autônomos, tais como a psicofísica ou a psicofisiologia. Correlativamente a essa concepção internalista, o desenvolvimento científico é apresentado como um caminho ao estado de psicologia positiva, tal como A. Comte a definiu em 1837 na 45a lição do Curso de Filosofia Positiva. A caminhada até a positividade foi indicada pelo próprio A. Comte: estudo da anátomo-fisiologia do sistema nervoso (a frenologia de Gall lhe parece a esse respeito uma contribuição decisiva), estudos comparados, análise de casos patológicos, estudo dos comportamentos animais e do desenvolvimento individual. Considerando a evolução da psicologia nos últimos cem anos, seríamos tentados a sustentar que ela realizou o projeto positivista. Psicologia diferencial, psicopatologia, etologia animal e psicologia da criança são vários domínios que concorrem para essa realização. Entretanto, esses domínios estão longe de parecerem homogêneos quanto aos métodos empregados e os modelos epistemológicos aos quais se referem. Um exame atento dessas dimensões metodológicas e epistemológicas mostra que se avança, sobretudo, em ordem dispersa. (shrink)

En este trabajo discutimos la extensión de la influencia que el pensamiento de Richard Owen tuvo sobre el de Charles Darwin. Además, se intentará mostrar lo heterogéneo de tal influencia, que va desde teorías específicas a giros retóricos. Esta influencia es en muchos casos subestimada, dando la sensación de que la novedad darwiniana consistió únicamente en mirar con ojos desprejuiciados lo que los otros no habían visto. Esta visión resulta injusta con Owen, y también con el esfuerzo conceptual llevado adelante (...) por Darwin con las piezas brindadas por sus precursores. Finalmente, este es un caso interesante para entender el tipo de novedad aportada por las revoluciones científicas y el modo sofisticado en que tal novedad se sustenta sobre el trabajo de los enfoques previos. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel- ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men- tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first (...) section of the pa- per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min- dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would (...) either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representation- alism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from men- tal representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

Resumen: La capacidad unificadora de una teoría científica es un rasgo usualmente contemplado a la hora de evaluar su adecuación. Kitcher ha elucidado satisfactoriamente tal noción mediante su enfoque de los patrones explicativos. Sin embargo, su perspectiva adolece de ciertas carencias. Concretamente, sostendremos que el requisito de rigurosidad de los patrones para evaluar la capacidad unificadora debe ser repensado, pues atenta contra la heterogeneidad característica de las diferentes aplicaciones de teorías unificadoras. A su vez, mostraremos cómo estas dificultades bien pueden (...) ser subsanadas desde el marco del estructuralismo metateórico sin por ello resignar ninguna de las acertadas intuiciones de Kitcher. -/- Palabras clave: Explicación, Kitcher, estructuralismo metateórico, unificación, unificación espuria. -/- Abstract: Kitcher has satisfactorily explicated unification using his particular approach to scientific explanation. However, we believe that his perspective has certain problems, which have been inherited by more recent approaches to the topic. Specifically, the requirement of stringency of patterns that Kitcher proposes to determine the unifying power of an explanatory pattern undermines the typical and peculiar heterogeneity we can find in different applications of unifying theories. We will show how this topic can be better addressed by the perspective built by metatheoretical structuralism without sacrificing any of Kitcher’s correct intuitions. -/- Keywords: Explanation, Kitcher, metatheoretical structuralism, spurious unification, unification. (shrink)

Conocer los mecanismos que operan en el mundo social es tarea fundamental de la economía como ciencia. La transformación del mundo social está vinculada a la reorientación de esta disciplina. Tal es la propuesta de Tony Lawson y la Escuela de Cambridge. Para que la economía sea reorientada ha de ajustarse a los presupuestos ontológicos del Realismo Crítico. En este trabajo se intentará profundizar en la naturaleza de los mecanismos y su relación con la economía como ciencia, y se presentarán (...) dos dificultades en torno a esta noción: a) la posibilidad de una teoría económica de sistemas abiertos, y b) el conocimiento de los mecanismos. (shrink)

En este trabajo sostengo que la concepción mecanicista no captura la relevancia explicativa de la ley de polarización dinámica de Cajal. La relevancia explicativa de la ley se fundamenta en su rol como principio de diseño neuronal. Como tal, la ley nos brinda acceso epistémico a intervenciones ideales, conceptualmente posibles, sobre la localización de los diversos componentes de los centros nerviosos, y nos permiten evaluar el impacto de esas intervenciones sobre las condiciones de viabilidad del organismo.

In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious men­ tal states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the (...) focus of this chapter. The first, originating in research by Libet, has been interpreted as showing that the neural events initiating voluntary actions precede our conscious willing of them, meaning the conscious will cannot be what causes them. The second challenge, originating in studies by Milner and Goodale, consist of instances in which the content of visual consciousness and motor action dissociate, casting doubt on the intuitive view that visual consciousness guides visually based motor action. (shrink)

Neste artigo, discuto o problema das propriedades emergentes, começando por apresentar uma concepção tradicional de acordo com a qual estas propriedades exibem três características definidoras: elas dependem de propriedades e relações físicas, mas constituem, em relação a estas, uma novidade e, como tal, não são delas deduzíveis. Em primeiro lugar, discuto algumas das razões gerais que explicam o facto de tradicionalmente se supor que este tipo de novidade – e.g. causal ou qualitativa – parece exigir que as propriedades emergentes não (...) se encontram, de todo, fisicamente fundadas, não podendo ser deduzidas das suas bases físicas. Portanto, a dependência física das propriedades emergentes não pode ser explicada, o que é normalmente tido como misterioso. Recorrendo a uma concepção funcionalista de dedutibilidade, discuto de seguida, com mais detalhe, a relação entre a novidade e a não-dedutibilidade, realçando o modo como os diferentes tipos de não-dedutibilidade conduzem a diferentes tipos de novidade e, como tal, a diferentes formas de emergência. Finalmente, considero algumas abordagens científicas modernas que rejeitam a não-dedutibilidade enquanto condição necessária da emergência. Segundo tais abordagens, o tipo de novidade associado às propriedades emergentes é compatível com uma fundação física, o que, por sua vez, faz desvanecer o mistério e confere respeitabilidade científica à noção de emergência. Concluirei estabelecendo comparações entre estas abordagens e o hilomorfismo neo-Aristotélico. (shrink)

En este texto analizo los principales argumentos y contraargumentos realistas y anti-realistas que se han construido a favor y en contra de la capacidad científica para producir conocimiento objetivo y verdadero del mundo social y natural. Argumento que el lenguaje teórico y el lenguaje observacional con el que los científicos sociales y naturales se refieren a las diversas entidades, fenómenos, propiedades y procesos científicos observables e inobservables están determinados, en la práctica, por sus tradiciones teóricas de investigación; lo que muestra (...) que la metodología científica depende en tal medida de las teorías que es, a lo sumo, un proceder constructivo y no un proceder de descubrimiento. (shrink)

Slurs such as spic, slut, wetback, and whore are linguistic expressions that are primarily understood to derogate certain group members on the basis of their descriptive attributes and expressions of this kind have been considered to pack some of the nastiest punches natural language affords. Although prior scholarship on slurs has uncovered several important facts concerning their meaning and use –including that slurs are potentially offensive, are felicitously applied towards some targets yet not others, and are often flexibly used not (...) only derogatorily to convey offense towards out-group members but also non-derogatorily to convey affiliation with in-group members– the literature remains largely focused on slurs that typically target African Americans, male homosexuals, and sexually active females. Since no account of slurs that typically target Hispanics or Mexican-Americans has so far been proposed, here I offer the first systematic and empirically informed analysis of these that accounts for both their derogatory and appropriative use. Importantly, this article reviews over a dozen Spanish stereotypes and slurs and explains how the descriptive attributes involved in a stereotype associated with a slur can contribute to the predication of certain content in the application of that slur toward its target in context. This article further explains how the psychological effects of stereotype threat and stereotype lift can be initiated through the application of a relevant slur towards its target in context as well. -/- ----- -/- Las expresiones peyorativas tales como spic (‘spic’), slut (‘zorra’), wetback (‘espalda mojada’) y whore (‘puta’) son expresiones lingüísticas que se entienden principalmente para minusvalorar ciertos miembros de un grupo sobre la base de sus atributos descriptivos (como la raza o el sexo). Se ha considerado que las expresiones de este tipo conllevan algunos de los puñetazos más desagradables que el lenguaje natural puede proporcionar. Aunque la literatura especializada sobre expresiones peyorativas ha descubierto varios hechos importantes en cuanto a significado y uso –entre los que se incluyen que tales expresiones son potencialmente ofensivas, apuntan efectivamente hacia unos objetivos pero no hacia otros, y con frecuencia se utilizan con flexibilidad no sólo despectivamente para ofender a miembros por fuera de un grupo, sino que también de forma no despectiva para afiliar con miembros dentro de un mismo grupo–, tal literatura sigue centrada en gran medida en las expresiones peyorativas que típicamente apuntan contra los afroamericanos (nigger ‘negro’), los homosexuales varones (fagot ‘maricón’), y las mujeres sexualmente activas (slut ‘zorra’). En tanto que no se ha propuesto al momento dar cuenta de expresiones peyorativas dirigidas contra hispanos o mexicano-americanos, en este trabajo se ofrece el primer análisis sistemático y empíricamente informado de tales expresiones, tanto en sus usos despectivos y de apropiación. Es importante destacar que en este artículo se revisan más de una docena de estereotipos y expresiones peyorativas en español, además de explicar cómo los atributos descriptivos que participan de un estereotipo asociado con una difamación pueden contribuir a la predicación de determinados contenidos en la aplicación de esa expresión hacia su objetivo en contexto. Asimismo, en este artículo se explica cómo comienzan los efectos psicológicos de la amenaza estereotipada y el realce estereotipado cuando se emplea una expresión peyorativa relevante contra un objetivo en contexto. (shrink)

El artículo propone una interpretación de la obra literaria "Las Crónicas de Narnia" del autor ingles C. S Lewis. Tal interpretación posibilita considerar la alegoría religiosa que esta obra literaria realiza sobre la experiencia de la divinidad a través de la figura del León.

Artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are used to model human activities and predict behavior. Such systems have shown race, gender and other kinds of bias, which are typically understood as technical problems. Here we try to show that: 1) to get rid of such biases, we need a system that can understand the structure of human activities and;2) to create such a system, we need to solve foundational problems of AI, such as the common-sense problem. Additionally, when informational platforms uses these (...) models to mediate interactions with their users, which is a commonplace nowadays, there is an illusion of progress, for what is an increasingly higher influence over our own behavior is took for an increasingly higher predictive accuracy. Given this, we argue that the bias problem is deeply connected to non-technical issues that must be discussed in public spaces. -/- Técnicas de inteligência artificial (IA) são utilizadas para modelar as atividades humanas e gerar predições comportamentais. Estes sistemas têm apresentado vieses diversos, inclusive de raça e gênero, tipicamente tomados como problemas de engenharia. Realiza-se aqui um esforço argumentativo para mostrar que: 1) escapar dos vieses demanda um sistema que compreenda a estrutura das atividades humanas e; 2) criar um sistema que apresente tal compreensão, demanda a solução de problemas fundacionais da IA, em particular, o problema de como modelar o senso comum. No caso de plataformas informacionais que usam desses modelos para mediar interações com seus usuários, algo cada vez mais comum, o não reconhecimento disso dá margem a uma ilusão de progresso, em que uma crescente influência sobre nosso comportamento é tomada como uma crescente acurácia preditiva. Nesse cenário, argumenta-se que o problema dos vieses está associado a questões não técnicas que devem ser discutidas em espaços públicos. (shrink)

Patočka’s phenomenology of world and life in the early 1940s – This article addresses Patočka’s early phenomenology of life and world. It begins with an introduction that situates Patočka’s reflections on the meaning of the world against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology. Next, it analyzes a rarely studied manuscript, The inwardness and the world, written during an often overlooked period of his thought: the 1940s. The originality of Patočka’s thinking in this period emerges through answering a series of questions about (...) the text: How does the Czech philosopher describe the world? What is reality from the perspective of the manuscript? How does Patočka present experience? Finally, the paper concludes by highlighting the implications of Patočka’s turn away from the relationship between world and subjectivity in this text. His reflections on the naturalness of the world in relation to human and non-human life suggest that, even before Merleau-Ponty, Henry and Levinas – and perhaps more faithfully than Husserl – Patočka was working to revise the concept of transcendental phenomenology. (shrink)

O presente artigo almeja demonstrar que em Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, de 1906/07, por meio de uma crítica ao ceticismo, Husserl promove uma mudança que será significativa no desenvolvimento posterior de sua filosofia: a introdução da εποχή. Ao contrário do ceticismo grego, tal conceito em Husserl, ao suspender o juízo, busca um dado indubitável: o ego. Isso proporciona com que Husserl supere o ceticismo, tanto em sua face dogmática (negação de possibilidade de todo o conhecimento), quanto crítica (suspensão (...) do juízo perante o alcance do conhecimento). Com isso, pode-se perceber que ao retomar um conceito cético da filosofia antiga, e opor-se ao relativismo, Husserl inaugura o seu primeiro esboço de uma filosofia pura, que adiante será concretizada, em sua última fase, como idealismo fenomenológico-transcendental. (shrink)

This paper challenges “traditional measurement-accuracy realism”, according to which there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems have definite values. An accurate measurement outcome is one that is close to the value for the quantity measured. For a measurement of the temperature of some water to be accurate in this sense requires that there be this temperature. But there isn’t. Not because there are no quantities “out there in nature” but because the term ‘the temperature of this water’ fails (...) to refer owing to idealization and failure of specificity in picking out concrete cases. The problems can be seen as an artifact of vagueness, and so doing facilitates applying Eran Tal’s robustness account of measurement accuracy to suggest an attractive way of understanding vagueness in terms of the function of idealization, a way that sidesteps the problems of higher order vagueness and that shows how idealization provides a natural generalization of what it is to be vague. (shrink)