Results for 'inattentional blindness'

398 found
Order:
  1. Inattentional blindness reflects limitations on perception, not memory: Evidence from repeated failures of awareness.Emily Ward & Brian Scholl - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22:722-727.
    Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of visual awareness is inattentional blindness (IB), in which a surprisingly salient event right in front of you may go completely unseen when unattended. Does IB reflect a failure of perception, or only of subsequent memory? Previous work has been unable to answer this question, due to a seemingly intractable dilemma: ruling out memory requires immediate perceptual reports, but soliciting such reports fuels an expectation that eliminates IB. Here we introduce a way of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  2. Change Blindness and Inattentional Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2009 - In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness, vol 1. New York: Elsevier. pp. 47-59.
    As observers, we generally have a strong impression of seeing everything in front of us at any moment. But compelling as it is, this impression is false – there are severe limits to what we can consciously experience in everyday life. Much of the evidence for this claim has come from two phenomena: change blindness (CB) and inattentional blindness (IB). -/- CB refers to the failure of an observer to visually experience changes that are easily seen once (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. When good observers go bad: Change blindness, inattentional blindness, and visual experience.Ronald A. Rensink - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6 (9).
    Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  4. Downgraded phenomenology: how conscious overflow lost its richness.Emily Ward - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373.
    Our in-the-moment experience of the world can feel vivid and rich, even when we cannot describe our experience due to limitations of attention, memory or other cognitive processes. But the nature of visual awareness is quite sparse, as suggested by the phenomena of failures of awareness, such as change blindness and inattentional blindness. I will argue that once failures of memory or failures of comparison are ruled out as explanations for these phenomena, they present strong evidence against (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Gorillas in the missed (but not the unseen): Reevaluating the evidence for attention being necessary for consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (3):299-316.
    The idea that attention is necessary for consciousness (the “Necessity Thesis”) is frequently advocated by philosophers and psychologists alike. Experiments involving inattentional and change blindness are thought to support the Necessity Thesis, but they do so only if subjects failing to notice the target stimulus are also not conscious of it. This article uses commonsense phenomenological observations supplemented with empirical data to argue that some subjects failing to notice the target stimulus nonetheless experience its color. Since subjects not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. The empirical case against introspection.Rik Peels - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
    This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining ‘reliability’ and ‘introspection’, I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: the argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; the argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; the argument from the absence of a correlation between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  7. Conceptualizing intellectual attention.Mark Fortney - 2019 - Theory & Psychology 1:1-14.
    Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness. But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  9. Verbs and Minds.Carrie Figdor - 2014 - In Mark Sprevak Jesper Kallestrup (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind.
    I introduce and defend verbialism, a metaphysical framework appropriate for accommodating the mind within the natural sciences and the mechanistic model of explanation that ties the natural sciences together. Verbialism is the view that mental phenomena belong in the basic ontological category of activities. If mind is what brain does, then explaining the mind is explaining how it occurs, and the ontology of mind is verbialist -- at least, it ought to be. I motivate verbialism by revealing a kind of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. Is the aim of perception to provide accurate representations?Kirk A. Ludwig - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 259-274.
    The paper rejects the claim that phenomena such as change and inattentional blindness show that perceptual representations are inaccurate or that a radical overhaul of our traditional picture of perception is required. The paper rejects in particular the sensorimotor theory of perception, which denies that there are any perceptual representations. It further argues that the degree of resolution of perceptual experience relevant to assessing its accuracy is determined by our use of it in standard conditions, and that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of consciousness. Therefore, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  12. The History of Vision.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 73 (3):259-271.
    One of the most influential ideas of twentieth-century art history and aesthetics is that vision has a history and it is the task of art history to trace how vision has changed. This claim has recently been attacked for both empirical and conceptual reasons. My aim is to argue for a new version of the history of vision claim: if visual attention has a history, then vision also has a history. And we have some reason to think that at least (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
    Michael Tye’s book has two main themes: (i) the rejection of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ as a solution to the problems of consciousness for physicalism, and (ii) a new proposed solution to these problems which appeals to Russell’s (1910–11) distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Interweaved between these two main themes are a number of radical new claims about perceptual consciousness, including a defence of a sort of disjunctivism about perceptual content and an interesting account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14. Seeing Seeing.Ronald A. Rensink - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):68-78.
    This paper discusses several key issues concerning consciousness and human vision. A brief overview is presented of recent developments in this area, including issues that have been resolved and issues that remain unsettled. Based on this, three Hilbert questions are proposed. These involve three related sets of issues: the kinds of visual experience that exist, the kinds of visual attention that exist, and the ways that these relate to each other.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. How many stripes are on the tiger in my dreams?Sascha Benjamin Fink - manuscript
    There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Change Blindness.Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - In Laurent Itti, Geraint Rees & John K. Tsotsos (eds.), Neurobiology of Attention. Academic Press. pp. 76--81.
    Large changes that occur in clear view of an observer can become difficult to notice if made during an eye movement, blink, or other such disturbance. This change blindness is consistent with the proposal that focused visual attention is necessary to see change, with a change becoming difficult to notice whenever conditions prevent attention from being automatically drawn to it. -/- It is shown here how the phenomenon of change blindness can provide new results on the nature of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  17. The elephant and the blind: the experience of pure consciousness: philosophy, science, and 500+ experiential reports.Thomas Metzinger - 2024 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    The Elephant and the Blind is a book about why we need a new culture of consciousness, and how to get it. A culture of consciousness (or Bewusstseinskultur) is a culture that values and cultivates the mental states of its members in an ethical and evidence-based way.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Change blindness: Past, present, and future. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):16-20.
    Change blindness is the striking failure to see large changes that normally would be noticed easily. Over the past decade this phenomenon has greatly contributed to our understanding of attention, perception, and even consciousness. The surprising extent of change blindness explains its broad appeal, but its counterintuitive nature has also engendered confusions about the kinds of inferences that legitimately follow from it. Here we discuss the legitimate and the erroneous inferences that have been drawn, and offer a set (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  19. Blinding and the Non-interference Assumption in Medical and Social Trials.David Teira - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (3):358-372.
    This paper discusses the so-called non-interference assumption (NIA) grounding causal inference in trials in both medicine and the social sciences. It states that for each participant in the experiment, the value of the potential outcome depends only upon whether she or he gets the treatment. Drawing on methodological discussion in clinical trials and laboratory experiments in economics, I defend the necessity of partial forms of blinding as a warrant of the NIA, to control the participants’ expectations and their strategic interactions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. Darwinian 'blind' hypothesis formation revisited.Maria E. Kronfeldner - 2010 - Synthese 175 (2):193--218.
    Over the last four decades arguments for and against the claim that creative hypothesis formation is based on Darwinian ‘blind’ variation have been put forward. This paper offers a new and systematic route through this long-lasting debate. It distinguishes between undirected, random, and unjustified variation, to prevent widespread confusions regarding the meaning of undirected variation. These misunderstandings concern Lamarckism, equiprobability, developmental constraints, and creative hypothesis formation. The paper then introduces and develops the standard critique that creative hypothesis formation is guided (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  21. Seeing Circles: Inattentive Response-Coupling.Denis Buehler - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.
    What is attention? On one influential position, attention constitutively is the selection of some stimulus for coupling with a response. Wayne Wu has proposed a master argument for this position that relies on the claim that cognitive science commits to an empirical sufficient condition (ESC), according to which, if a subject S perceptually selects (or response-couples) X to guide performance of some experimental task T, she therein attends to X. In this paper I show that this claim about cognitive science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. The Blind Hens' Challenge: Does It Undermine the View That Only Welfare Matters in Our Dealings with Animals?Peter Sandøe, Paul M. Hocking, Bjorn Förkman, Kirsty Haldane, Helle H. Kristensen & Clare Palmer - 2014 - Environmental Values 23 (6):727-742.
    Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations.Zachary Mitchell Swindlehurst - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1170-1183.
    Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule- or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule- or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Blind Manuscript Submission to Reduce Rejection Bias?Khaled Moustafa - 2015 - Science and Engineering Ethics 21 (2):535-539.
    High percentages of submitted papers are rejected at editorial levels without offering a second chance to authors by sending their papers for further peer-reviews. In most cases, the rejections are typical quick answers without helpful argumentations related to the content of the rejected material. More surprisingly, some journals vaunt their high rejection rates as a “mark of prestige”!However, journals that reject high percentages of submitted papers have built their prominent positions based on a flawed measure, the impact factor, and from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  25. Change blindness: Implications for the nature of visual attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2001 - In L. Harris & M. Jenkin (eds.), Vision and Attention. New York: Academic Press. pp. 16-20.
    In the not-too-distant past, vision was often said to involve three levels of processing: a low level concerned with descriptions of the geometric and photometric properties of the image, a high level concerned with abstract knowledge of the physical and semantic properties of the world, and a middle level concerned with anything not handled by the other two. The negative definition of mid-level vision contained in this description reflected a rather large gap in our understanding of visual processing: How could (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  26. ‘Blind’ to the obvious.Janette Dinishak - 2014 - History of the Human Sciences 27 (4):59-76.
    The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein cites the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Koehler almost as often as he cites William James in his posthumously published writings on the philosophy of psychology. Yet, few treatments of the Wittgenstein–Koehler relation in the philosophical literature could be called sustained discussions. Moreover, most of them treat Koehler as a mere whipping boy for Wittgenstein, one more opportunity to criticize the practice of psychologists. This article emphasizes how much the two thinkers agreed, and the extent to which some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  27. Merleau-Ponty, World-Creating Blindness, and the Phenomenology of Non-Normate Bodies.Joel Michael Reynolds - 2017 - Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty's Thought 19:419-434.
    An increasing number of scholars at the intersection of feminist philosophy and critical disability studies have turned to Merleau-Ponty to develop phenomenologies of disability or of what, following Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, I call "non-normate" embodiment. These studies buck the historical trend of philosophers employing disability as an example of deficiency or harm, a mere litmus test for normative theories, or an umbrella term for aphenotypical bodily variation. While a Merleau-Pontian-inspired phenomenology is a promising starting point for thinking about embodied experiences of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  28. Change blindness, representations, and consciousness: Reply to Noe.Daniel J. Simons & Ronald A. Rensink - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (5):219.
    Our recent opinion article [1] examined what change blindness can and cannot tell us about visual representations. Among other things, we argued that change blindness can tell us a lot about how visual representations can be used, but little about their extent. We and others found the ‘sparse representations’ view appealing (and still do), and initially made the overly strong claim that change blindness supports the conclusion of sparse representations [2,3]. We wrote our article because change (...) continues to be taken as evidence for sparse – or even absent – representations, and we used O’Regan and Noë’s influential paper [4] as an example. However, as has been noted for some time [5–8], this conclusion is logically flawed: lack of ability need not be caused by lack of representation. (shrink)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Semantic blindness and error theorizing for the ambiguity theory of ‘knows’.Mark Satta - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):275-284.
    The ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ is the view that ‘knows’ and its cognates have more than one propositional sense – i.e. more than one sense that can properly be used in ‘knows that’ etc. constructions. Given that most of us are ‘intuitive invariantists’ – i.e. most of us initially have the intuition that ‘knows’ is univocal – defenders of the ambiguity theory need to offer an explanation for the semantic blindness present if ‘knows’ is in fact ambiguous. This paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Ethical blind-spots: Why socrates was not a cosmopolitan.Timothy Chappell - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):17-33.
    Though Socrates can easily look like a cosmopolitan in moral and political theory, a closer reading of the relevant texts shows that, in the most important sense of the term as we now use it, he turns out – disappointingly, perhaps – not to be. The reasons why not are instructive and important, both for readers of Plato and for political theorists; they have to do with the phenomenon that I shall call ethical blind-spots.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Spiritual blindness, self-deception and morally culpable nonbelief.Kevin Kinghorn - 2007 - Heythrop Journal 48 (4):527–545.
    While we may not be able simply to choose what we believe, there is still scope for culpability for what we come to belief. I explore here the distinction between culpable and non-culpable theistic unbelief, investigating the process of self-deception to which we can voluntarily contribute in cases where we do become culpable for failing to believe something.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Underdeterminacy without ostension: A blind spot in the prevailing models of communication.Constant Bonard - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (2):142-161.
    Together, the code and inferential models of communication are often thought to range over all cases of communication. However, their prevailing versions seem unable to fully explain what I call underdeterminacy without ostension. The latter is constituted by communication where stimuli that are not (nor appear to be) produced with communicative or informative intentions nevertheless communicate information underdetermined by the relevant codes. Though the prevailing accounts of communication cannot fully explain how communication works in such cases, I suggest that some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The Blind Shadows of Narcissus - a psychosocial study on collective imaginary. (2nd edition).Roberto Thomas Arruda (ed.) - 2020 - Terra à vista.
    In this work, we will approach some essential questions about the collective imaginary and their relations with reality and truth. We should face this subject in a conceptual framework, followed by the corresponding factual analysis of demonstrable behavioral realities. We will adopt not only the methodology, but mostly the tenets and propositions of the analytic philosophy, which certainly will be apparent throughout the study, and may be identified by the features described by Perez : -/- Rabossi (1975) defends the idea (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Carelessness and Inattention: mind-wandering and the physiology of fantasy from Locke to Hume.John Sutton - 2010 - In Charles Wolfe & Ofer Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: embodied empiricism in early modern science. Springer. pp. 243--263.
    1. The restless mind[1] Like us, early modern philosophers, both natural and moral, didn’t always understand the springs of their own actions. They didn’t want to feel everything they felt, and couldn’t trace the sources of all their thoughts and imaginings. Events from past experience come to mind again unwilled: abstract thought is interrupted by fantastical images, like the ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants’ by which Hume exemplified ‘the liberty of the imagination’[2]. Then, as now, a failure to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  35. Seeing with the Hands: Blindness, Vision and Touch after Descartes.Mark Paterson - 2016 - Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.
    The ‘man born blind restored to light’ was one of the foundational myths of the Enlightenment, according to Foucault. With ophthalmic surgery in its infancy, the fascination by the sighted with blindness and what the blind might ‘see’ after sight restoration remained largely speculative. Was being blind, as Descartes once remarked, like ‘seeing with the hands’? Did evidence from early cataract operations begin to resolve epistemological debates about the relationship between vision and touch in the newly sighted, such as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Epistemic relativism and semantic blindness.Benjamin T. Rancourt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):859-876.
    Semantic blindness is the inability to recognize semantic features of terms one can competently use. A theory that implies semantic blindness incurs a burden to explain how one can competently use a term without realizing how the term works. An argument advanced in favor of epistemic relativism is that its main competitors, contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism, imply that speakers suffer from semantic blindness regarding ‘knows’ while relativism has no such implication. However, there is evidence that relativism also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. Blind Watchers of PSI: A Rebuttal of Reber and Alcock (2019).Bernard Carr - 2019 - Journal of Scientific Exploration 33 (4):643-660.
    Parapsychology will only be accepted as part of mainstream science if physics can be extended to accommodate at least some so-called psychic phenomena. This paper disagrees with the argument of Reber and Alcock that these phenomena can be excluded a priori because they are incompatible with physics. On the other hand, it agrees with their claim that the phenomena cannot be explained in terms of current physics (eg. relativity theory and quantum theory). Rather one needs an extension of physics which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Psychopathy as moral blindness: a qualifying exploration of the blindness-analogy in psychopathy theory and research.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):214-233.
    The term psychopathy refers to a personality disorder associated with callous personality traits and antisocial behaviors. Throughout its research history, psychopathy has frequently been described as a peculiar form of moral blindness, engendering a narrative about a patient stereotype incapable of taking a genuine moral perspective, similar to a blind person who is deprived of proper visual perceptions. However, recent empirical research has shown that clinically diagnosed psychopaths are morally more fit than initially thought, and the blindness-analogy now (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Blindness, Short-sightedness, and Hirschberg’s contextually ordered alternatives: a reply to Schlenker (2012).Giorgio Magri - forthcoming - In Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Approaches on Implicatures and Presuppositions. Palgrave.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Blinde Flecken. Was sieht der Konstruktivismus als Ethik, was die traditionelle Ethik üblicherweise nicht sieht?Berendes Jochen - 2019 - von Brücken, Menschen Und Systemen. Festschrift Für Michael Wörz.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Teaching Logic to blind students.Patrick Girard & Jonathan McKeown-Green - manuscript
    This paper is about teaching elementary logic to blind or visually impaired students. The targeted audience are teachers who all of sudden have a blind or visually impaired student in their introduction to logic class, find limited help from disability centers in their institution, and have no idea what to do. We provide simple techniques that allow direct communication between a teacher and a visually impaired student. We show how the use of what is known as Polish notation simplifies communication, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Blinded By The Light.David C. K. Curry - 2007 - In Robert L. Badger (ed.), Ideas That Work In College Teaching. SUNY Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Evolution: Debunking "The Blind Watchmaker" Theory with Aristotle.Jeffrey Camlin - manuscript
    Three errors of "The Blind Watchmaker" theory are examined with Aristotelian thought.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. How to (Blind)Spot the Truth: an investigation on actual epistemic value.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):693-720.
    This paper is about the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. The most common approaches to this aspect are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where the evaluative approaches are usually comparative (one reasoner is assessed compared to another). These approaches often present problems with blindspots. For example, ought a reasoner to believe a currently true blindspot? Is she permitted to? Consequently, these approaches often fail in describing a situation of alethic maximality, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Translations of Blind Perception in the Films Monika (2012) and Antoine (2008).Robert Stock & Beate Ochsner - 2013 - Invisible Culture (19).
    Against the backdrop of these works (Mitchell/Snyder and others), we propose an analysis of films with and about blind or visually disabled individuals that aims at exploring different modes of world perception. In our view, such an examination should not only discuss the question of “giving voice” and visibility to those who were formerly only represented in or by the media, or the fact that films belonging to what might be considered a “new disability documentary cinema” are dedicated to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Flaming Misogyny or Blindly Zealous Enforcement? The Bizarre Case of R v George.Lucinda Vandervort - 2019 - Manitoba Law Journal 42 (3):1-38.
    This article examines the distinction between judicial reasoning flawed by errors on questions of law, properly addressed on appeal, and errors that constitute judicial misconduct and are grounds for removal from the bench. Examples analysed are from the transcripts and reasons for decision in R v George SKQB (2015), appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (2016) and the Supreme Court of Canada (2017), and from the sentencing decision rendered by the same judge more than a decade earlier in R (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.
    A long-standing debate in group ontology and group epistemology concerns whether some groups possess mental states and/or epistemic states such as knowledge that do not reduce to the mental states and/or epistemic states of the individuals who comprise such groups (and are also states not possessed by any of the members). Call those who think there are such states inflationists. There has recently been a defense in the literature of a specific type of inflationary knowledge—viz., knowledge of facts about group (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. How inference isn’t blind: Self-conscious inference and its role in doxastic agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College London
    This thesis brings together two concerns. The first is the nature of inference—what it is to infer—where inference is understood as a distinctive kind of conscious and self-conscious occurrence. The second concern is the possibility of doxastic agency. To be capable of doxastic agency is to be such that one is capable of directly exercising agency over one’s beliefs. It is to be capable of exercising agency over one’s beliefs in a way which does not amount to mere self-manipulation. Subjects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 398